Is Eugen a bot? — 180 Proof
I don't think so? Combination of (1) English is second language (2) isn't used to arguing on forums (3) isn't used to Spinoza (4) is coming at this from a distant vantage point seem to explain it to me. It seems Eugen's also responding to prompts in context and reasoning with analogies, both of which are hard for bots. — fdrake
He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus
So far, it seems to me Damasio gives primacy to the body, whilst Spinoza's parallelism doesn't. — Eugen
For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby. — Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop XXXV, Note
For me it is simple. In order to take Spinoza seriously, he has to offer: 1. a logical and coherent explanation for how it is possible that from a God without qualia and will to reach qualia and will; 2. a coherent explanation for how it is possible for something complex (man) to be conscious and something less complex not to possess consciousness, then I can take these metaphysics seriously. — Eugen
I don't really want to go down the rabbit hole for "qualia", which similarly to before is a concept anathema to Spinoza. This would be another debate where you're coming at Spinoza very obliquely and thus glance off his ideas rather than sticking in them. — fdrake
Yes, but here's where I'm still failing to see the logic. In Spinozism, I see a human being as a ripple of an ocean with two characteristics (minimum): Extension (body) and thought. Even if we go with the parallelism and for the sake of the argument we leave the physical interaction of atoms apart in order to escape materialism emergence and the hard problem, the problem still remains. In Spinozism, it's all about cause and effect. Are consciousness, qualia, or will caused by something with no qualia and will? If yes, how does Spinoza explain this is possible? Or he just assumes it does?I already showed you that mind as composition thing earlier, and mind as idea of the body. — fdrake
That'd be great, but it's basically impossible. I've got a life...Just a suggestion - Why not reach out to a philosophy department at a university and talk to a Spinoza scholar - if you can find one? A conversation in real time might cut to the chase. — Tom Storm
It seems to me some of your questions are constructed using modern understandings that don't quite fit and may be incompatible with Spinoza. — Tom Storm
- yes, but also happy. Frustrated because I can't find a way to make myself clear enough and because sometimes I don't exactly understand answers. Happy because I'm making progress, I really do, I think I'm much closer to my goal than I was at the beginning. I'm also happy because people actually put a lot of effort in order to help me, even if I am sometimes a pain in the ....Are you feeling frustrated? — Tom Storm
but maybe it will help to reflect on why you are frustrated. — Tom Storm
Ar — Tom Storm
ct on why you are frustrated. Would it help to slow do? What do you think is going on in this discussion between you and the others? Are people refusing to answer you? — Tom Storm
Or are you making it hard for them to answer? — Tom Storm
:rofl: :clap:He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus
Let's use the exmaple of qualia coming out from no qualia. For Spinoza, the absence of qualia is body and mind. The occurrence of qualia is body and mind. So when qualia is generated out of its absence, it an event of body and mind (no qualia) going to another event of body and mind (qualia). — TheWillowOfDarkness
He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus
Whether it is caused by a conscious entity or a non-conscious entity, qualia is explained for Spinoza. — Valentinus
It seems to me it is just defined, not explained. That's exactly my issue. — Eugen
not reporting why you cannot leave your bunker — Valentinus
Spinoza is describing how it happens: if qualia is produced by non-qualia, then it is a mode of substance. We get the causality in the presence of that mode.
That's what makes the difference between it happening or not. If the mode is not present, we do not have qualia caused by non-qualia. — TheWillowOfDarkness
Consciousness is complexity (re: Spinoza); "consciousness" doesn't "arise" from "complexity". There are an infinity of essences in substance (which causes them to exist) according to Spinoza and, therefore, infinite degrees of complexity, and, at or above (some) threshold, the attribute of mind 'exhibits' consciousness in parallel with the attribute of body 'exhibiting' methodical, purposeful behavior.The reason why a rock is not conscious and you are is because you are complex, and consciousness arises from complexity because this and that. — Eugen
:up:↪180 Proof Thanks, man! — Eugen
Good.Nobody can suspect me of being ↪180 Proof friend, but I have to admit his last reply was probably the most helpful for me in order to understand what you guys are saying.
I have to say the analogies and simple language you gave there were super-helpful.
It seems so.I hope I'm getting it right, or at least to have made some progress.
Correct.In regards to the wrong question, I admit that the hard problem applies to materialism, and Spinozism is not materialism.
I wouldn't put things that way. Rather, for Spinoza (I think): logic is reality, reality is nature naturing (i.e. infinite-eternal substance) from the perspective of eternity; "natural laws" are interpretations of (entailed) interactions of nature natured (i.e. infinite/finite modes of parallel (complementary) attributes of thought (mind) & extension (body)) from the perspective of time, thus discoverable and revisable. Mathematics is a subset, or artifact, of logic and useful for interpreting (i.e. describing, modeling) "natural laws" yet without being determined by "natural laws".1. Under Spinozism, the laws of nature have to be logic? E.g. you cannot have 2+2=6, you MUST have 2+2=4. And from this logic derive the physical laws of nature, ie things attracting or repelling each other, etc. Am I right? — Eugen
Am I? :point:Am I wrong about the emergence?
It's currently unknown whether "consciousness" is (a) an emergent property or (b) a glitchy computational output of the human brain-CNS system; what's known experientially as well as experimentally is that "consciousness" (i.e. phenomenal self-modeling (Metzinger)) is brain-dependent as well as brain-blind, and that most of human subjective 'mental life' is confabulated (e.g. intentionality, introspection, mind-body duality, soul/spirit, (collective) unconsious agency, panpsyche, etc) in the brain-blind (to itself) gap, or the cognitive blindspot facilitating cognition (à la the visual blindspot enabling vision).By 'weak emergence' I understand properties reducible to some 'configuration of simples' (e.g. rainfall from convection of water vapor).
By 'strong emergence' I understand properties reducible to complexes of interrelated 'configurations of simples' and, therefore, irreducible to discrete 'configurations of simples' themselves (e.g. climate systems from chaotic interractions between local geography, ground temperature, prevailing winds, barometric pressure-gradients, average humidity, etc but not reducible to any or the sum of the simples). — 180 Proof
logic is reality — 180 Proof
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