You have shown a lot of patience and I would like you to understand me.
I have always wondered how consciousness is possible. The explanation of the materialists, that is, the emergence, failed to convince me.

In Spinoza, as in materialism, qualia, will, and human thoughts have as a source something without qualia, consciousness, will, etc. But, as far as I understand from you, in Spinoza it is not about emergence as in materialism. But does he come up with an alternative explanation?

For me it is simple. In order to take Spinoza seriously, he has to offer: 1. a logical and coherent explanation for how it is possible that from a God without qualia and will to reach qualia and will; 2. a coherent explanation for how it is possible for something complex (man) to be conscious and something less complex not to possess consciousness, then I can take these metaphysics seriously.

If the answers for 1 and 2 are YES, then I would like to hear those explanations.

If Spinoza does not offer such explanations in his paper, but only starts from the premise that 1 and 2 are simply the case, and we simply have to accept, then this discussion is over from my point of view.

Any metaphysics that does not give me a serious and coherent explanation for consciousness, qualia or will, but that only starts from assumptions related to consciousness, or that contains fundamental problems, is a metaphysics that I cannot take seriously.

Is Eugen a bot? — 180 Proof


I don't think so? Combination of (1) English is second language (2) isn't used to arguing on forums (3) isn't used to Spinoza (4) is coming at this from a distant vantage point seem to explain it to me. It seems Eugen's also responding to prompts in context and reasoning with analogies, both of which are hard for bots. — fdrake

He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed.

He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus

You guys are psychos :lol:

I forgot to include the perennial use of Ad hominems.

So far, it seems to me Damasio gives primacy to the body, whilst Spinoza's parallelism doesn't.

So far, it seems to me Damasio gives primacy to the body, whilst Spinoza's parallelism doesn't. — Eugen

If you're used to reductive or emergentist physicalisms, Spinoza's parallelism will seem unintuitive, and like it doesn't give "primacy to the body". But...

In historical context, Spinoza forcing a continuity/parallel between the mind and the body was enough of a departure from the doxa+theology of his time to get him branded an atheist and a heretic, and since then he's been seen as a particularly hard line determinist - on the side of the question (roughly): how could a person act if what thus happened was not determined?

For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby. — Spinoza, Ethics, Part II, Prop XXXV, Note

Though I can see why you'd think that Spinoza doesn't give "primacy to the body", since Spinoza has mind as a distinct attribute, and that he does not reduce the mental to (emergent properties of aggregates of) the physical. Even though in his historical context, he gave an unprecedented primacy to the body!

For me it is simple. In order to take Spinoza seriously, he has to offer: 1. a logical and coherent explanation for how it is possible that from a God without qualia and will to reach qualia and will; 2. a coherent explanation for how it is possible for something complex (man) to be conscious and something less complex not to possess consciousness, then I can take these metaphysics seriously. — Eugen

(1) I don't really want to go down the rabbit hole for "qualia", which similarly to before is a concept anathema to Spinoza. This would be another debate where you're coming at Spinoza very obliquely and thus glance off his ideas rather than sticking in them.

(2) I already showed you that mind as composition thing earlier, and mind as idea of the body. If you want a scientific answer to that question; ie, a mechanically detailed answer to "how does consciousness emerge from matter?" (nevermind "how does consciousness emerge from the human body?" ... ), you're not going to find it in Spinoza.

And I very much doubt you will find an answer in other philosophers either! If you've put this barrier up against Spinoza, I'd advise you to apply the same barrier to other philosophers who have anything to say about philosophy of mind and see who remains. As a filter for meaningful content, I doubt it would let much (any?) hitherto published philosophy through. Whether that's because philosophy sucks or because the filter works like trying to press oranges to get apple juice, I'll leave up to you to.

I don't really want to go down the rabbit hole for "qualia", which similarly to before is a concept anathema to Spinoza. This would be another debate where you're coming at Spinoza very obliquely and thus glance off his ideas rather than sticking in them. — fdrake

So to sum this first part up, Spinoza does not offer an explanation for how come a force with 0 consciousness, will, qualia, etc. can give rise to consciousness, am I right? Please try to answer me in the shortest simplest manner. A yes/no would be perfect, if possible, of course.

I already showed you that mind as composition thing earlier, and mind as idea of the body. — fdrake

Yes, but here's where I'm still failing to see the logic. In Spinozism, I see a human being as a ripple of an ocean with two characteristics (minimum): Extension (body) and thought. Even if we go with the parallelism and for the sake of the argument we leave the physical interaction of atoms apart in order to escape materialism emergence and the hard problem, the problem still remains. In Spinozism, it's all about cause and effect. Are consciousness, qualia, or will caused by something with no qualia and will? If yes, how does Spinoza explain this is possible? Or he just assumes it does?

Even if we go further and eliminate cause-effect at all, I still don't understand WHY do humans have consciousness, but a rock doesn't? It seems to me that the human mind is just defined as ''the idea of the body'' or as a ''composition thing''. but this is not an explanation for why it has qualia or will while other things don't.
For me, saying humans have will because we are more complex than rocks does not explain anything, it is just an assumption that consciousness arises from complexity.

So why exactly ''an idea of the body'' possesses qualia? Or it just does?
PS: I don't demand a scientific proof, but at least a logical explanation. Or at least tell me if there is an explanation at all.

For Spinoza, qualia is modes of substance.

Qualia is both a mode of body and a mode of mind. A mode of body, in that qualia is an instance of existence caused to be. In that qualia has conceptual meaning, it is also a mind of mode.

Whether it is caused be a conscious entity or a non-conscious entity, qualia is explained for Spinoza. Qualia is of both body and mind in either. The combination problem makes no sense, since mind and body are never being combined. Both are always there in parallel.

Let's use the exmaple of qualia coming out from no qualia. For Spinoza, the absence of qualia is body and mind. The occurrence of qualia is body and mind. So when qualia is generated out of its absence, it an event of body and mind (no qualia) going to another event of body and mind (qualia).

Thank you. I have had the most extraordinary time following this discussion and your questions with their reactions. I had no idea Spinoza with a thing with anyone but my mother and a few random academics scattered across the globe.

Just a suggestion - Why not reach out to a philosophy department at a university and talk to a Spinoza scholar - if you can find one? A conversation in real time might cut to the chase.

It seems to me some of your questions are constructed using modern understandings that don't quite fit and may be incompatible with Spinoza. There is an increasing irritation in your tone. Are you feeling frustrated? I am not trying to be a dick, but maybe it will help to reflect on why you are frustrated. Would it help to slow do? What do you think is going on in this discussion between you and the others? Are people refusing to answer you? Or are you making it hard for them to answer?

- cool name

Just a suggestion - Why not reach out to a philosophy department at a university and talk to a Spinoza scholar - if you can find one? A conversation in real time might cut to the chase. — Tom Storm

That'd be great, but it's basically impossible. I've got a life...

It seems to me some of your questions are constructed using modern understandings that don't quite fit and may be incompatible with Spinoza. — Tom Storm

Agree, but I'm getting better at this.

Are you feeling frustrated? — Tom Storm

- yes, but also happy. Frustrated because I can't find a way to make myself clear enough and because sometimes I don't exactly understand answers. Happy because I'm making progress, I really do, I think I'm much closer to my goal than I was at the beginning. I'm also happy because people actually put a lot of effort in order to help me, even if I am sometimes a pain in the ....

but maybe it will help to reflect on why you are frustrated. — Tom Storm

I know the sources of my frustration.

Ar — Tom Storm

ct on why you are frustrated. Would it help to slow do? What do you think is going on in this discussion between you and the others? Are people refusing to answer you? — Tom Storm

Even if most of the guys here are super-cool, I have to say I consider SOME OF them biased and rather prone to defend Spinoza than providing me with straight answers, and others are actually malicious and preoccupied with my person. But no, that doesn't frustrate me.

Or are you making it hard for them to answer? — Tom Storm

I'm struggling to make things simpler.

He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus

:rofl: :clap:

Let's use the exmaple of qualia coming out from no qualia. For Spinoza, the absence of qualia is body and mind. The occurrence of qualia is body and mind. So when qualia is generated out of its absence, it an event of body and mind (no qualia) going to another event of body and mind (qualia). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes! So Spinoza does indeed explain (define) consciousness in this way, but he doesn't provide an answer for the question ''How can qualia be generated out of its absence?'', he just assumes it does. Right?

He is working a plurimum interrogationum while riding the merry-go-round of a circulus in probando. He may not be a bot but he is hermetically sealed. — Valentinus

Ok, I admit! That was actually funny :lol:

:up:

Your reply missed an important observation by Willow of Darkness:

"Whether it is caused by a conscious entity or a non-conscious entity, qualia is explained for Spinoza. Qualia is of both body and mind in either. The combination problem makes no sense, since mind and body are never being combined. Both are always there in parallel."

Whether it is caused by a conscious entity or a non-conscious entity, qualia is explained for Spinoza. — Valentinus

It seems to me it is just defined, not explained. That's exactly my issue.

It seems to me it is just defined, not explained. That's exactly my issue. — Eugen

Sure, you have made yourself clear. That is why you have drawn the interest you have. Not too many people are calling out for a careful reading of Spinoza these days.

Something you have not demonstrated in these interchanges so far is to start from what you are hearing from other people and go from there. That foreign place you can barely imagine. That is the beginning of conversation, not reporting why you cannot leave your bunker.

Spinoza is describing how it happens: if qualia is produced by non-qualia, then it is a mode of substance. We get the causality in the presence of that mode.

That's what makes the difference between it happening or not. If the mode is not present, we do not have qualia caused by non-qualia.

not reporting why you cannot leave your bunker — Valentinus

I just wanted to find out if Spinoza offers an alternative response for emergence to the question ''How is it possible to obtain consciousness from non-conscious?". So far, I think he does say consciousness arises from non-conscious, but he does not have an explanation for how this would be possible in the first place.
So the answer would look something like this: It is possible to obtain consciousness from non-conscious, because this and that. The reason why a rock is not conscious and you are is because you are complex, and consciousness arises from complexity because this and that. So far, all I've received is: consciousness it just comes from non-conscious, and complex modes are conscious.That doesn't not mean that nothing will ever convince me otherwise. Maybe some explanation will occur eventually. If that explanation will convince me more than emergence, it remains to be seen, but so far I haven't heard one.

I think you're accusing me for not paying too much respect for Spinoza. It is not my interest to respect or disrespect him. I just want to understand the answer to my question, that's all. Don't take it personally.
I'd love to leave my bunker, but so far I haven't been convinced to do so. But I'll keep insisting until I'll have a final answer. I'm studying Spinoza, trust me :smile:

Spinoza is describing how it happens: if qualia is produced by non-qualia, then it is a mode of substance. We get the causality in the presence of that mode.

That's what makes the difference between it happening or not. If the mode is not present, we do not have qualia caused by non-qualia. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think (hope) I understand you perfectly. This is an exposure of how things might happen IF it is possible to get qualia from non-qualia or consciousness from non-conscious, but it is not an explanation for WHY it is possible to get qualia from non-qualia. In Spinozism, I am searching for the latter part.

The reason why a rock is not conscious and you are is because you are complex, and consciousness arises from complexity because this and that. — Eugen

Consciousness is complexity (re: Spinoza); "consciousness" doesn't "arise" from "complexity". There are an infinity of essences in substance (which causes them to exist) according to Spinoza and, therefore, infinite degrees of complexity, and, at or above (some) threshold, the attribute of mind 'exhibits' consciousness in parallel with the attribute of body 'exhibiting' methodical, purposeful behavior.

Are these essences "just there", you keep asking? No. They must be there because they constitute substance which necessarily exists. Spinoza discusses this, as I've pointed out already, in section I Of God (Ethics); and like Euclid's geometry, definitions and axioms are posited the truth or validity of which are borne out by the demonstration of the entire system of postulates (or in Spinoza's case propositions).

So, every entity, every property, every relation (i.e. modes and their affects, in Spinoza's terms) always already exists, nothing "emerges" from the perspective of eternity (re: substance); in fact, this is what he means by reality, or "God". Like chess: logically every match and every configuration of the pieces are inherent in the rules which constitute the game of chess itself; the only novelty, the only surprises, result from the players' finite perspectives – observing from the perspective of time – and that they cannot comprehend the game from perspective of eternity. For Spinoza, if X exists, then it necessarily exists as an essence (i.e. mode) caused to exist by substance.

In this case, X being "consciousness", "consciousness" is a degree of complexity manifest in the attribute of mind which doesn't "just exist" (or could just as well not exist), but necessarily exists, necessarily cannot not exist, because it is an essence inherent to reality (i.e. substance). Like valid moves in chess – whether or not you make them or you are aware of them – they are entailed by the chess ruleset.

Your questions, Eugen, make no sense in a Spinozist metaphysical framework because your assumptions are 'empirical' (and borrowed from mysterians like Chalmers, Nagel, et al). But you'd know that if you'd bother to closely read Spinoza and stop relying on videos or shallow summaries on him with which to frame questions on topics of no concern to his 17th century metaphysics. No doubt you will persist on incorrigibly; my sketchy elaboration here, hopefully, will be of use to someone else who wishes to study Spinoza on his terms, in his historical context, rather than merely projecting their own misplaced, confused, agendas on to him. It doesn't matter that your answer is "Spinoza is wrong because the hard problem is true" because interrogating Spinoza's metaphysics about "the hard problem" only amounts to asking the wrong question (e.g. Why don't fish like ice-skating or bowling?): any answer given to the wrong question (such as yours, Eugen) is not only wrong, it's not even wrong.

That's a helpful nugget of info, thanks.

:up:

Thanks, man!

Nobody can suspect me of being friend, but I have to admit his last reply was probably the most helpful for me in order to understand what you guys are saying.
I have to say the analogies and simple language you gave there were super-helpful.

Now it makes sense to me what you're saying (or, at least I hope so :rofl: ). But before adding my opinions, I'd like you to confirm if I'm getting you right:

It will probably sound cheesy but I cannot find a better one.

So in the let's say ''abstract'' part of reality, there are infinite necessary essences. But even if we're talking about infinite here, it does not include for example magic, because magic is supernatural, and God is just natural under Spinoza.
So there is something like a necessary law which states something like 100 = complexity and complexity = consciousness. 1 means simplicity and simplicity is NOT consciousness, but 1+1+....+1 = 100, and 100 means complexity.
So back to the ''happening reality'', when we get 100, we get consciousness.

In a nutshell:

In the abstract it is necessary: 1+1+...+1 = 100 and 100 = complexity; complexity = consciousness.
This, in turn, translates into the ''happening world'' something like that:
a rock = 1+1+1 = 3, simplicity +simplicity + simplicity = unconscious +unconscious +unconsious, which is not complexity, so it is not consciousness
a human: 1+1+....+1 = 100, simplicity +....+ simplicity = unconscious + unconscious +...+ unconscious = complexity = consciousness
So 100 is composed of many ''1''s translates into complexity is composed of many ''simplicities'', which in the ''happening world'' it translates something like consciousness is composed of ''unconscious'' things.
And even if in the ''happening world'' we could call it emergent because certain interactions have to happen in order to obtain the complexity (please correct me if I'm wrong again), it is not fair to call it emergent from the point of view of the whole reality, because it was already there in an abstract form. All that happens in the ''happening world'' is just an expression of those necessities from the "abstract", and because the reality is infinite, then it will 100% happen when the right combinations occur.


I hope I'm getting it right, or at least to have made some progress.


In regards to the wrong question, I admit that the hard problem applies to materialism, and Spinozism is not materialism.

↪180 Proof Thanks, man! — Eugen

:up:

Nobody can suspect me of being ↪180 Proof friend, but I have to admit his last reply was probably the most helpful for me in order to understand what you guys are saying.
I have to say the analogies and simple language you gave there were super-helpful.

Good.

I hope I'm getting it right, or at least to have made some progress.

It seems so.

In regards to the wrong question, I admit that the hard problem applies to materialism, and Spinozism is not materialism.

Correct.

I've got 2 questions for you, 1 related to Spinozism, 1 not directly connected to the topic of this OP, it is related more to the concept of emergence, because I want to understand better how Spinozism is related to naturalism.

1. Under Spinozism, the laws of nature have to be logic? E.g. you cannot have 2+2=6, you MUST have 2+2=4. And from this logic derive the physical laws of nature, ie things attracting or repelling each other, etc. Am I right?

2. As far as I know, there are 2 types of emergence: weak and strong.

The whole is the sum of its parts, ie consciousness is matter and only matter. E.g. some compositions of matter are pain, thoughts, etc. So there's absolutely nothing new on the table, just combinations of matter, and we could also draw the conclusion that it is emergent only from our perspective, but at the level of reality, it is just laws manifesting.

Strong emergence - consciousness is created by matter, but it cannot be deduced only from its components, so the whole is more than the sum of its parts. But it would be also fair to state that even if it is not deductible from our perspective, we could still not call it emergent from the universe's perspective, because there are also laws playing their roles after all, exactly like in Spinozism.
E.g. if we were to rewind the universe a billion times, we would also obtain the strong emergence, because it is in its laws to do so.

Which one of two would be more appropriate for Spinozism?

Am I wrong about the emergence?

1. Under Spinozism, the laws of nature have to be logic? E.g. you cannot have 2+2=6, you MUST have 2+2=4. And from this logic derive the physical laws of nature, ie things attracting or repelling each other, etc. Am I right? — Eugen

I wouldn't put things that way. Rather, for Spinoza (I think): logic is reality, reality is nature naturing (i.e. infinite-eternal substance) from the perspective of eternity; "natural laws" are interpretations of (entailed) interactions of nature natured (i.e. infinite/finite modes of parallel (complementary) attributes of thought (mind) & extension (body)) from the perspective of time, thus discoverable and revisable. Mathematics is a subset, or artifact, of logic and useful for interpreting (i.e. describing, modeling) "natural laws" yet without being determined by "natural laws".

In chess terms: logic corresponds to the ruleset entailing every valid move and position, therefore every possible chess match; mathematics – since you brought it up – describes the finite domain of all alternatives moves implied by each position (piece) at each turn; and the "laws of nature" correspond to (the) archive of known strategies, tactics, gambits, etc. The game of chess is logic (eternal-pov) and valid, better, strategies are "natural laws" (temporal-pov) – the latter is constrained by, but not equivalent to, the former.

Am I wrong about the emergence?

Am I? :point:

By 'weak emergence' I understand properties reducible to some 'configuration of simples' (e.g. rainfall from convection of water vapor).

By 'strong emergence' I understand properties reducible to complexes of interrelated 'configurations of simples' and, therefore, irreducible to discrete 'configurations of simples' themselves (e.g. climate systems from chaotic interractions between local geography, ground temperature, prevailing winds, barometric pressure-gradients, average humidity, etc but not reducible to any or the sum of the simples). — 180 Proof

It's currently unknown whether "consciousness" is (a) an emergent property or (b) a glitchy computational output of the human brain-CNS system; what's known experientially as well as experimentally is that "consciousness" (i.e. phenomenal self-modeling (Metzinger)) is brain-dependent as well as brain-blind, and that most of human subjective 'mental life' is confabulated (e.g. intentionality, introspection, mind-body duality, soul/spirit, (collective) unconsious agency, panpsyche, etc) in the brain-blind (to itself) gap, or the cognitive blindspot facilitating cognition (à la the visual blindspot enabling vision).

Thank you! I think I understand.

logic is reality — 180 Proof

I've got one on this: let's assume 2+2=5. If that were the case, we would be considered logic and accepted as the only way under Spinozism and there could be no other reality where 2+2=4. But 2+2=4, and it is the one and only way, so there could be no other reality where 2+2=5. So my assumption that, in theory, there could be a reality where 2+2=5 is simply wrong and makes no sense, right?

So yes, maths is a tool, but by using it, can we deduce what's logic and what is not, ie what is real and what isn't real?

Reality (Spinozist or not) cannot be deduced from math. And "2+2=6" is certainly possible but with different rules of arithmetic. Just like Ptolemy's 'geocentric epicycles' worked but not as well as the Copernican-Galilean heliocentric model without 'epicycles'. Math depends on logic, Eugen, not the other way around. Spinoza certainly reasoned this is so. Wittgenstein too. And as much as I'm able to grok them, Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems demonstrate this as well.

Interesting. In this case, am I wrong if I say that empiricism should be primordial in our understanding of the reality? E.g., if we do an experiment where our previous mathematical model indicated 4 but we obtain 6 instead of 4, should we conclude (of course after a few repetitions) that our mathematical model was wrong, not the experiment, right?
And if the answer is yes, should we adapt our maths as well? E.g. we put 2 apples in a box, then we put another 2 and we get 6 apples out of the box instead of what we expected from our mathematical model, ie 4. If that were the case, should we conclude 2+2=6?