So, we’re dependent on the (physical) brain to be able to cognise such ideas, but the ideas themselves are not the product of a material process, rather, they are what must exist prior for any material process to occur (hence ‘a priori’). — Wayfarer

Ideas do not exist before they materialize into a brain and a language. At most, the relationships that those ideas express exist previously. Because the same relationships can be expressed with different ideas.

My argument is that you can't provide an account of reason on the basis of physico-chemical reactions or activities, — Wayfarer

If I wanted to do that I'd be a reductionist and I'm not. I have made an argument that the brain can be considered the cause of the mental. Not that it can be used to describe the mental.

But the argument is based simply on an analysis of the nature of reason and meaning - no spooky stuff required. — Wayfarer

At this point I'm not sure if you're advocating panpsychism or not. But what you have said is that making a distinction between the mental and the physical is not acceptable. That means we can't distinguish between an emotion and the molecular behavior of limestone. For example. And that's what I'm asking you for a demonstration, a clue or any kind of argument that can prove such a thing. Because I don't see emotion in limestone, no matter how hard I try. And if you say it's something more subtle, you'll have to risk saying what is this subtle thing between an emotion and limestone.
The opposite would be to go around the subject without specifying anything. Which I'm afraid is what we're doing.

since, again, what you’d derived didn’t justify your presupposition, nor vice versa, but it was in direct opposition to, thus being INCONSISTENT with, your presupposition. — aRealidealist

Aside from this emphatic statement, it would have been nice if you had tried to prove it with a little analysis of my reasoning. You will understand that your proclamation is not convincing to me without some kind of argument behind it.
My starting point is that we call various methods of reasoning rational. The conclusion is that these methods are more effective than the irrational ones.
I don't see any circularity or inconsistency.

I don’t agree that logic is a rational method, for logic is the rational method. — aRealidealist

Excuse me. Logic is a part of rationality. Even the Greeks, who made the first distinction between sciences, like Aristotle, do not place logic as "the" reason. Traditionally, various forms of rational reasoning are distinguished, including science, philosophy, technology and even rhetoric. This is my starting point. "Reason" is said of many things.

You actually affirm this, that “logic IS reason,” later in your reply. — aRealidealist

I don't know if there is any nuance of English that escapes me, but I wanted to say that logic is a form of reason. Not that it's the only form of reason. It's not easy to handle the determined articles in the English grammar.

Moreover, I don’t agree that logic or reason is an abstraction; — aRealidealist

I don't think I said that. Logic is a form of thought associated with philosophy, generally allowing to pass from one statement to another by means of formal rules. There are different types of logic. It is even said that there is a logic of common sense. And a formal logic and a mathematical logic. All this is logic. I don't think it's an abstraction like the concept of reason.

Its more subtle than that. We don't actually know everything about matter. — Punshhh

There's a lot we don't know about the universe in general that we know we don't know. Much more than we even suspect. That makes it possible to write science fiction novels. But the philosophy is more serious. It is not about the possible but about the existing and, at best, about what we can predict from the existing. The horizon of our hopes and their foundation.
Attributing consciousness to material things is like imagining a monkey writing Dante's Divine Comedy in one go. Possible? Imaginatively possible, metaphysically possible and very impossible to have happened. So we'll leave the theory of the literary monkeys to fantasy. Anything else would not be a subtlety but an absolute waste of time.

See! That's what I mean. There's a cultural reflex, that if it can't be understood in scientific terms, then it's spooky - it's 'panpsychist' or 'spiritualist'. — Wayfarer

You swallowed the final part of my remark:

And if you want to say that it's a mixed thing between matter and non-matter you should specify what the properties of that strange entity are that they are neither.

The contradiction involved is obvious: IF reason is BS, THEN you can’t use to prove that reason is BS. — Olivier5

Sorry, what's your response to this? :

"Reason" is an abstraction. There are several methods that we call rational. Logic is a rational method. Analysis is a rational method. Inductive generalization is a rational method. The hypothetical-deductive method is a rational method.
Through a meta-analysis of the results of these methods I can conclude that they are useful in solving certain problems. For example, they are useful in finding the remedy for certain diseases. Or to solve the problem of the origin of the solar system.
Continuing with my meta-analysis I can conclude that reason is a better tool than other irrational resources such as faith or intuition. — David Mo

If reason cannot be shown to be an effective way of solving problems, can it be shown that there is another way? The theory of emergency - which you defend - is not rational?

Reason is the faculty that makes abstraction possible. — Wayfarer

Among other things. It is also the power to divide problems. Traditionally, the reason is said to be both synthetic and analytical.
I said that "reason" was an abstraction because it is a general term that groups together methods that are diverse and that I listed. They are said to be rational in order to distinguish them from thinking that is not based on logic and observation. Therefore, there is not "one thing" called reason, but a predicate that applies to different yet similar things.

I'm sorry to say, but the rest of your answers seem elusive to me.

It takes a fair bit of work to re-frame it so as to understand the root of the issue. — Wayfarer

Are you telling me that you have to belong to some kind of sect or brotherhood to understand this panpsychism stuff? Or is there some peripatetic academy of panpsychism? Where do you sign up? (Don't get angry, it is a joke)

In the meantime, we're here quietly arguing. If it's impossible to do it, you should have warned us first. And if it's not impossible, let's continue.

If you don't want your panpsychism to be associated with spiritualism you should look for another term to describe your theory. From time immemorial "psyche" has referred to anything related to the anima or immaterial mind. If you are talking about consciousness you have only one alternative: either you describe consciousness in terms that can be related to matter or you separate it from matter. And if you want to say that it's a mixed thing between matter and non-matter you should specify what the properties of that strange entity are that they are neither.

But you don't have a problem with that alone. The problem is that you speak of a universal consciousness that does not manifest itself in a verifiable way. Even the stones are supposed to have something like "consciousness", but it is not seen where this consciousness of the stones resides.

It's all rather esoteric. No wonder you have to resort to some kind of unattainable to simple mortals teaching to understand it.

not because of circularity, but because of inconsistency; for, to use reason to disprove reason already PRESUPPOSES its veracity, — aRealidealist

That is just the fallacy of circularity



"Reason" is an abstraction. There are several methods that we call rational. Logic is a rational method. Analysis is a rational method. Inductive generalization is a rational method. The hypothetical-deductive method is a rational method.
Through a meta-analysis of the results of these methods I can conclude that they are useful in solving certain problems. For example, they are useful in finding the remedy for certain diseases. Or to solve the problem of the origin of the solar system.
Continuing with my meta-analysis I can conclude that reason is a better tool than other irrational resources such as faith or intuition.

I am surprised that you are denying such an obvious thing on the basis of a misapplied abstract logical principle. In any case, instead of repeating over and over again that reason cannot prove the validity of reason, I would like you to tell me where the logical flaw in the previous argument for rationality lies.

So much for my first argument for reason.
The second argument follows.

To claim that reason is not valid as knowledge using reason is an incongruity. The fallacy of circularity is a logical principle. Logic is reason. Then you claim with reason that reason doesn't count. Capital fallacy. Unless you distinguish between various uses of reason. But then, your argument of circularity against reason falls away by itself.

Wayfarer, it would be like the ophthalmologist who observes the eye and concludes that the eye's sight is useless for seeing anything.

All this has been told to you several times already (recently by Isaac or Olivier), but you do not get out of the vicious circle of your presupposition that lies in the inappropriate use of concepts. The limits of knowledge are the limits of language. There is no way to prove anything other than by rational methods because that's what "proving" means. There is no use of "prove" other than to demonstrate rationally. Your attempt to invalidate reason is an attack on language, which is all we have to reason with and understand the world in a common way. If you attack the principles of language you cannot speak meaningfully. Like you're trying to do here. With little success, in my opinion.

You may try to override the use of reason to solve specific problems. It can be tried. But that would not prove that irrational methods are more successful, but that human knowledge has limits. And claiming irrational knowledge about the whole universe escapes the limits of language and knowledge. It's pure illusion.

"reason is useless", then there is a contradiction. — Olivier5

I see no contradiction. Using reason to evaluate the consequences of reason does not seem to me to be circular. No more than doctor's eye measuring the diopters of an eye. I would like someone to explain in detail the alleged contradiction in saying that reason proves not to be effective for X.

Scheme:
The first premise is the description of a scientific method.
The second premise consists of the description of cases that include the success of that method.
The conclusion is that the method is effective.

The argument is completed with a sufficient reference to other cases of scientific methods and the stipulation that science is a rational procedure.

Where is the circularity? I do not see that the conclusion is included in any premise, nor that the premises are tautological.

I’m not arguing for neurological reductionism. — Wayfarer

No one, at least not me, is advocating reductionism. It is not a question of establishing the equivalence between brain impulses and language units. It is a more general argument of an inductive nature.

Yes, but you used two properties of reason to draw this conclusion. T — Isaac

The problem is not the use of reason to support materialism. The argument that Wayfarer is trying to thwart is not "the reason." It is an inductive reasoning that breaks the presumed circularity. If this type of reasoning is invalidated, the reason as a whole is invalidated, including the reasons for denying the reason. Absolute skepticism that would prevent even Wayfarer from speaking here.

Now why on earth do you feel the need to introduce ‘spiritualism’ to the conversation? — Wayfarer

And what is panpsychism if not spiritualism or vitalism? A spiritualist doesn't have to be Victorian. There are very modern ones. But equally spiritualistic.
I responded to your argument in a previous comment.

is that it's just assumed that science has an in-principle grasp of the relationship, — Wayfarer

That's not a guess. It is the use of an inductive method that has proven itself millions of times. If you want to say that believing that what has been proven millions of times is true is an assumption, true: a very effective assumption.

So the argument I’m deploying is that the nature of logical necessity — Wayfarer

I don't know any materialists who think they base their theory on logical necessity. It's more based on inductive arguments. It is another thing to try to disarm inconsistencies in the dualistic or spiritualistic position.

Of course I do not believe that spiritualism can be demonstrated with logical necessity. I'd like to know how this is done.

o in doing that, you’re deploying the very faculty that you are claiming neuroscience can provide an account of. — Wayfarer

Indeed. Neither you could investigate the functioning of an eye through your eyes, nor analyze speech using language... etc.

As far as ‘theories of consciousness’ are concerned - that’s really what we’re talking about here - I think we need to situate the whole discussion in relation to some school, approach or domain of discourse, rather than trying to develop an entire system de novo. — Wayfarer

The method is good for high-level discussions, but in a forum like this it may lead to muddled discussions about whether a certain John Doe really said this. In my experience, it is common in this type of forum for someone to read a web page about John Doe and misinterpret his theories. To avoid these problems it is better to keep what one thinks here. The discussion is more direct and frank.

In my discussions with philosophers (including professionals) I have found that it is not uncommon for them to be baffled if one refuses to speak about what Husserl, Kant or John Doe said and asks them to defend their personal position. I had a rather ironic teacher who said that this happens because today's philosophers are not philosophers but members of Toledo School of Translators (he was a specialist in medieval philosophy, of course).

it’s conflating the physical relations between synapses, with the logical relations between terms. — Wayfarer

I don't think I'm conflating synapses with logic. I'm applying one of the basic forms of inductive logic. If x never occurs when y is missing, y must be the cause or part of the cause of x. That applies with obvious success to a lot of natural events. I don't see why it doesn't apply to the relationship between the brain - or an area of the brain - and the act of talking or getting excited. It would be a similar relationship as when the application of a nerve stimulus produces the movement of the frog's leg. Much more complicated, of course, but the same stimulus-response relationship.

Honestly, I don't see the contradiction.

It depends on what you mean by mind. — Mickey

This -more or less:
The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion.

let us call it pure awareness without content, — Mickey

I call this empty substrate that you speak of "consciousness" and it consists simply of realizing my position in the world. I can only directly capture my consciousness and infer other consciousnesses because their attitude is similar to mine. (Some philosophers say that this capture of other subjects like me is immediate. I won't argue with that, if it's not necessary for your argument). If I have to infer a consciousness of the universe it will have to be because the universe acts in a similar way to mine. This is absurd for two reasons:

Because the universe does not have a body similar to mine and cannot gesture its consciousness, as other consciousnesses in the world do.
Because to claim that the universe can realize its position in the universe is a contradiction. It would be like realizing the position I hold within my "I". This proposition is impossible because a position with respect to oneself is an identity and consciousness is a relational term, that is, it establishes a relationship between two types of entity.

There’s a vicious circularity in that which I don’t think can be overcome even in principle. — Wayfarer

An empirical inference is not logically included in the data that serve as a premise. It is a knowledge that advances synthetically on those data by providing new knowledge. Because we are not talking about a judgment that proves itself true, but a reasoning based on experience that produces a conclusion where before there was a hypothesis. That synthesis is the discovery of unity from diversity, so to speak.

From the data that we have about the functioning of the brain, we can infer that the mind is its product. Whether this inference is more or less solid is a matter for debate.

Our holistic, referential world of significance is what is most basic for Heidegger. It is does not involve awareness, thought, or subject-object duality. This is the same type of holism described by panpsychists. — Mickey

Not that I know much about Heidegger, but the concept of holism does not appear in the texts I have consulted. Neither his nor his interpreters. On the other hand, I would like us to focus on something other than Heidegger because I do not think he is a clear thinker. As far as I know, moreover, the idea that the Being of Heidegger is something like a soul or a mind seems to me incompatible with what I know about him.
Spending time on clearing up confusion is not always productive.

I would like you to defend the idea that the mind is like a spiritual or mental entity, which is what I think panpsychism stands for. That is hard enough for me to find traces of a mind in some of the recent US presidents, but even less so in a volcano or a supernova explosion. I don't see them emitting thoughts, or speaking, or expressing emotions, or any of the properties that are usually considered in a mind.

The idea of a platform I don't know that makes things better. A platform that complains about the futility of life or how much it costs to pour lava through the crater? I don't see it, honestly.

But if the universe doesn't do anything of the things that a consciousness do, why do you call it a "consciousness"?

Once the thought is formed a qualia arises. — Pop

It may be a question of terminology, but this does not seem right to me. You can have sensations (called in philosophy impressions or qualia) whether you think about something or not. Not only the reception of sensations, but the formation of perceptions is a spontaneous procedure that can precede or follow the formation of a thought based on them. A simple example: you bite into the fruit, feel a strange taste and at the time or later you think "This cherry is over-ripe". Of course, what there is not is first a thought and then an impression/qualia.

The ownership of ideas is closely related to the ownership of labor and the means of production, because if one company owns the idea of doing some work a particular way, then nobody else is permitted to do that unless they pay the owner of the idea of doing that. — Pfhorrest

The problem then lies in two points:
-Can a work I've done negatively affect a fundamental right of the community?
-To what extent can I sell my work without alienating my personal dignity?

I think the theoretical answers are:
-Maybe.
- Less easily than is assumed in capitalism.

I suppose they need to be nuanced.

If consciousness is fundamental, then it cannot be part of the set of mind as described below. Mind must be a subset of consciousness.

As a consequence the following wikipedia quote would be misinformation:

" Mind: The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion." — Pop

There is no misinformation in the Wikipedia definition. It is the use that the major dictionaries collect and the use in tens of thousands of psychological and philosophical articles and books. For them, what you call "consciousness" is called "mind". I would say that it is your use of the word that produces some verbal confusion. As I explain below.

That consciousness arises at the same time as a thought is formed, and that this is the fundamental first step of all thinking. — Pop

This is true, if you include in consciousness more than thoughts, as your own definition suggests. That is, "consciousness", in your definition, would be active when some unconscious activities are functioning: desires, emotions, dreams, associations of ideas would be part of this "consciousness" or we would need another word to designate them. Freud called it "unconscious" to oppose it to conscious. In my concept of mind, this would fit in nicely. How does it fit in with your concept of consciousness? Because it sounds strange that there's an unconscious part of consciousness
And if you admit that there are two differentiated processes, the conscious and the unconscious, what do you call the whole of both? Is it not logical to call it mind and talk about the mental in this sense?

What seems clear to me is that the mental world is somewhat more extensive than mere thoughts and is closely associated with brain activities that can be approximately located and even measured in some cases in the form of electrochemical impulses.

In principle, all property is a theft from the community. But even Bakunin wasn't thinking about socializing his socks.
Instead of signing up to maximalist and unrealistic ideas, it is more normal to establish the conditions under which private property can violate people's fundamental rights. This does not necessarily imply a form of socialism, as the ultra-liberal right claims. For a long time there have been communal rights that the lords of the land had to respect.


The problem, with or without socialism, is where to set the limits of those rights. And the problem needs an urgent solution, because the neoliberal offensive is privatizing basic rights such as health, water, education and justice.

It seems to me that issues such as the ownership of ideas are of a different order than the ownership of land, labour or the means of production.

The Court appreciates the willingness of the defence.
Case closed.

The idea that consciousness is a subset of mind is a nonsense — Pop

It depends on what you mean by conscience. Sometimes consciousness and mind are used as synonymous words. For example in this Wikipedia definition sense 2 is similar to mind:

Consciousness 1. awareness or perception of an inward psychological or spiritual fact: intuitively perceived knowledge of something in one's inner self
                •  inward awareness of an external object, state, or fact
    2. the state or activity that is characterized by sensation, emotion, volition, or thought.

Mind: The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion.

This ambiguity permits the mind-body problem be treated in the articles "Mind" and "Consciousness" at once.

If you want to undo the ambiguity of the concept of conciousness in your texts some present confusions in this discussion can be avoided.

You continue to evade the proposition posed to you, this is getting tiresome. — Pop

What proposition? I don't find it. Repeat it, please.

You are bound to stay confused whilst you continue to use outdated concepts such as mind. — Pop

Old-fashioned? 65 Categories found in PhilPapers. 10 Journals - including the prestigious Mind (over 20,000 articles).
Doesn't seem like a very old-fashioned topic when it has such a large audience among philosophers and psychologists.

Do you establish any difference between mind and consciousness? I'm not clear on how you use the concept of consciousness.
For me there is a difference between being aware of something and thinking about something, but that difference doesn't seem to be taken into account in this thread.

Somewhere between my mind and my brain. — Wheatley

As far as location is concerned, I don't see the mind having a different place from the whole nervous system (there are neurons in my bowels, also). I don't see my mind thinking from the table or from the back of the room. When my nervous system moves, my mind moves with it.

I say the mind is empty. — Wheatley

Where do you place (metaphorically or otherwise) your thoughts on this sentence now? Is it not in your mind? Where does that thought occur? Not in your cousin's, of course.

basketball isn't a container. — Wheatley

Is the air not contained within the ball? I don't think you can say otherwise.

The below is all confused: — Pop

Confused? Try to tell me what is on your mind right now that is not experiences, emotions and thoughts about experiences and emotions or ideas based on experiences and emotions.

Experience = Thought + Emotion
Consciousness = Thought + Emotion — Pop

So: experience=consciousness. Pure logic.

Yet you take instruction from them! — Pop

Then something that gives me information doesn't have to be a mind. Information is the product of a mind: the mind that gives me information and/or my mind that extracts the information. Without minds there are facts. Only facts.

Why can't consciousness be empty then? — Wheatley

Because to say that a pitcher is empty, you have to describe the pitcher separately from its possible contents. And you can't do that with your mind. Whenever you define the mind, you define the contents, never the container.

Experience is not passive, it's an activity. — Wheatley

Indeed. And the mind is that activity.

These are expressions of consciousness — Pop

Indeed: from a human mind that has created them. But they are not minds.

The below link leads to a video: — Pop

I hate videos. Could it be an article from a specialized magazine?

Consciousness is emptiness! A very strange kind of emptiness. — Wheatley

If you separate it from the experiences, emotions and thoughts. It's nothing, apart from this.

How can you separate experience and consciousness? — Pop

As used in this thread the term "consciousness" (as equivalent to "mind") cannot be. Experience is one of the elements that form consciousness.