The burden of disproving my argument falls on the neurological reductionism — Wayfarer

I'm not attempting to disprove your argument. I'm asking how you're not committing the same fallacy. I'm presuming (hypothetically) that your argument is sound, that we cannot draw conclusions about reason from neurological data using reason. If it is true, then we cannot draw conclusions about reason from any data source using reason - the source of evidence or data is immaterial to your argument.

Yet you draw several conclusions about reason, even within this very argument, let alone in your other widely written opinions. So how do you escape the fallacy? How are you able to draw conclusions about reason?

If you’re claiming that the mind is explicable in terms of neurological data, then you have to show how the brain causes or gives rise to the activities of thinking, such as reasoning, etc — Wayfarer

There is no inherent contradiction in trying to understand reason with reason. The difficulty is in explaining reason together with its efficacy, its capacity to understand the world, its agency.

If one uses reason to state: "reason is useless", then there is a contradiction. But if one uses reason's efficacy to understand reason's efficacy, then there's no contradiction.

How are you able to draw conclusions about reason? — Isaac

The conclusion I'm drawing is not about reason, but about the argument that 'the mental world... is closely associated with brain activities that can be approximately located and even measured in some cases in the form of electrochemical impulses'.

Yes, but you used two properties of reason to draw this conclusion. The fact that it must be used to interpret neurological data, and the fact that you can't stand outside of it. I'm asking you how you arrived at those two properties.

Let's try it this way. I say "I do not need to use reason to interpret neurological data, and I can stand outside of reason. I have some other capacity, which I call X, and I use that to draw conclusions about reason from the neurological data". How do you dispute that claim? Because undisputed it completely undermines your argument.

As far as I can tell, the only way you could dispute it is to show that what I call capacity X is, in fact, reason. But to do that you'd need to claim to know some properties of 'reason' (to demonstrate that they are the same). Yet you've just argued that we cannot know any properties of reason, because we'd have to use reason to discern them and that's circular.


Or, another way. Four properties of reason...

1. It is the capacity we use to interpret and find meaning in neurological data.
2. It is the only such capacity (there's no 'capacity X' which does a similar job).
3. It is unique to humans (or uniquely advanced in humans) - a previous claim I've read from you.
4. It is constituted entirely of, and can be reduced to, brain activity.

You seem to be saying there's some non-circular method of deriving the first three, but for some reason we cannot derive the fourth in the same way. I'm asking what that difference is.

Now why on earth do you feel the need to introduce ‘spiritualism’ to the conversation? — Wayfarer

And what is panpsychism if not spiritualism or vitalism? A spiritualist doesn't have to be Victorian. There are very modern ones. But equally spiritualistic.
I responded to your argument in a previous comment.

Yes, but you used two properties of reason to draw this conclusion. T — Isaac

The problem is not the use of reason to support materialism. The argument that Wayfarer is trying to thwart is not "the reason." It is an inductive reasoning that breaks the presumed circularity. If this type of reasoning is invalidated, the reason as a whole is invalidated, including the reasons for denying the reason. Absolute skepticism that would prevent even Wayfarer from speaking here.

I’m not arguing for neurological reductionism. — Wayfarer

No one, at least not me, is advocating reductionism. It is not a question of establishing the equivalence between brain impulses and language units. It is a more general argument of an inductive nature.

"reason is useless", then there is a contradiction. — Olivier5

I see no contradiction. Using reason to evaluate the consequences of reason does not seem to me to be circular. No more than doctor's eye measuring the diopters of an eye. I would like someone to explain in detail the alleged contradiction in saying that reason proves not to be effective for X.

Scheme:
The first premise is the description of a scientific method.
The second premise consists of the description of cases that include the success of that method.
The conclusion is that the method is effective.

The argument is completed with a sufficient reference to other cases of scientific methods and the stipulation that science is a rational procedure.

Where is the circularity? I do not see that the conclusion is included in any premise, nor that the premises are tautological.

Certainly you can measure and infer what these data mean, but that act of inference is the very thing you’re purporting to explain with reference to the data. There’s a vicious circularity in that which I don’t think can be overcome even in principle. — Wayfarer

It might help to assert what reason is, or failing that, what reason is supposed to do, before declaring impossibilities or absurdities to it. And while reason can be considered a thing because it is necessarily predicated on brain mechanisms in accordance with deterministic natural law, nothing whatsoever is accomplished by such consideration, because nothing is given by its necessity towards its employment as a faculty. Which, ironically enough, is precisely how those deterministic natural laws came about in the first place.

Even so, I’m in complete agreement on the circularity thesis, it being an intrinsic quality of reason itself and by association, the human condition under which it is necessarily employed. Nevertheless, within the auspices of a logical speculative metaphysics, reason’s intrinsic circularity, manifest in its most fundamental aspect by using reason the faculty to draw conclusions about the very faculty under examination, can be at least recognized and thus alleviated, even if not eliminated entirely. Best way to do that, is stop trying to prove what can only be presupposed.

Sorry to intrude & intervene in your discussion, but I would like to reply to the question that you’ve raised in your latest post in this thread (about reason).

Stating that “reason is useless” involves a contradiction not because of circularity, but because of inconsistency; for, to use reason to disprove reason already PRESUPPOSES its veracity, in direct opposition to the conclusion that you've seemingly drawn about it, thus this is self-defeating or contradictory.

In other words, asserting apriori that reason is useless can’t, by definition, be proven by experience or empirically, thus reason itself remains to prove it; whereby you’d be using reason to do so, presupposing the very fact of not being useless (thus contradicting or self-defeating the original assertion). Now, retorting that the assertion is advanced aposteriori, & not apriori, e.g., by referring to an instance or instances of flawed reasoning, can’t help you, as this doesn’t actually prove that reason, in general, is useless, but only that someone’s particular reasoning is incorrect.

If you use reason to prove that reason is not working, or useless or an epiphenomenon, then there is a contradiction, the same contradiction than “This sentence is false”.

This thread has strayed a little off topic. Oh well - its to be expected.:smile:

Consciousness = thought + emotion

But which has the greater weight?

Do we ever conclude a deliberation in a non self interested way?

Yes, but you used two properties of reason to draw this conclusion. The fact that it must be used to interpret neurological data, and the fact that you can't stand outside of it. I'm asking you how you arrived at those two properties. — Isaac

If you’re interpreting neurological data for scientific or medical reasons, there’s no issue, because that is what neuroscience is intended to do. But recall that we’re discussing ‘materialist theory of mind’ which is not a scientific theory, but a philosophical attitude.

Consider David Armstrong who was a leading advocate of such an approach:

‘The Nature of Mind’ begins with the simple assertion that "men have minds", and Armstrong suggests that modern science may be the best tool with which to investigate the nature of the mind. He says that it seems that scientific consensus is converging on an explanation of the mind in "purely physico-chemical terms". He acknowledges some disagreement on the matter, but says that dissent tends to be on primarily non-scientific grounds.

This is the view that I am taking issue with. And he’s right - I’m not taking issue on scientific grounds, but philosophical, because it’s not a scientific matter. (If it is not the view that was being advocated by David Mo, then apologies. But at least this passage makes the issue clearer.)

So the argument that I’m trying to develop is that in order to support the kinds of scientific judgements that Armstrong believes are possible, you have to use the very faculty that you’re seeking to explain, namely, the mind, in a general sense, and reason, in particular. That’s because in the analysis of the brain and the evaluation of whether the mind is an output of the brain, you’re always going to be claiming that the data ‘indicates that...’ or ‘means that...’ or ‘is...’.

Armstrong claims that mind is purely physico-chemical, which is the basic claim of materialist theory of mind. But all such statements rely on rational inference so are dependent on elementary logic, which in turn is dependent on abstraction, at a very fundamental level.

And I’m arguing that you’re not going to see anything that corresponds with reason or meaning or abstraction in neurological data, while you are quite plausibly going to see things that have physical consequences, like hypoglycemia leading to depressed sugar levels leading to coma. That will turn up in the data directly. There are all kinds of things you can infer from the data, which is the specific task of science and which is not at issue. But remember what we're talking about, which is 'mind as a product of brain' - not hypoglycemia or some other objective condition.

And you can’t say, OK then, well, let’s leave reason, abstract ideation and speech to one side, and then investigate the data, because you can’t investigate without relying on those faculties. That's where I'm saying that the circularity comes in. We can’t get outside reason, to treat it as an objective phenomenon; indeed, reason is required to determine what is an objective phenomena.

This is because we're dealing with a philosophical argument, not a scientific hypothesis per se. I’m not saying that ‘reason is circular’ in any general sense. I’m saying there is circular reasoning implied in materialist theories of mind, in particular, which claim that mind (reasoning, thinking) can be understood in physico-chemical terms (as per Armstrong).

It might help to assert what reason is, or failing that, what reason is supposed to do, before declaring impossibilities or absurdities to it. — Mww

I'm saying that whenever we engage in rational inference - that 'this must mean that X' or 'because X is so, then Y must be the case', then we're employing reasoning based on abstraction. I’m not trying to define ‘reason’ in a general sense.

Nevertheless, within the auspices of a logical speculative metaphysics, reason’s intrinsic circularity, manifest in its most fundamental aspect by using reason the faculty to draw conclusions about the very faculty under examination, can be at least recognized and thus alleviated, even if not eliminated entirely. Best way to do that, is stop trying to prove what can only be presupposed. — Mww

:up:

No more than doctor's eye measuring the diopters of an eye. — David Mo

A doctor can examine a subject's eye, or examine all the aspects of vision, eyesight, optics, and so on. What is involved in a medical examination is the application of knowledge of the principles of vision and the physiology of sight and optometry and so on. So in that sense, a doctor will see things that another may not, due to factors above and beyond the mere physical act of inspection. Those trained faculties ‘transcend’, as it were, the mere physical act of seeing.

And what is panpsychism if not spiritualism or vitalism? — David Mo

I can see you're trying to grapple with the meaning of 'mind' if it's not something conceived of in physical terms. The implication seems to be that it is spooky ethereal ‘stuff’. That, I contend, is the hangover from Cartesian dualism that depicts the mind as some kind of thing. (‘Res cogitans’ literally means ‘thinking thing’, as the Latin ‘res’ - root of ‘reality’ - means ‘thing’ or ‘object’.)

The problem with all of this, is that mainstream philosophy (particularly English-speaking philosophy) has tacitly adopted a dualistic model of ‘mind and matter’ as a consequence of Cartesian dualism. It leads to certain problems and ways of thinking that make the whole matter unresolvable. So the only answer seems to be, to rely on science and scientific naturalism. It takes a fair bit of work to re-frame it so as to understand the root of the issue.

not because of circularity, but because of inconsistency; for, to use reason to disprove reason already PRESUPPOSES its veracity, — aRealidealist

That is just the fallacy of circularity



"Reason" is an abstraction. There are several methods that we call rational. Logic is a rational method. Analysis is a rational method. Inductive generalization is a rational method. The hypothetical-deductive method is a rational method.
Through a meta-analysis of the results of these methods I can conclude that they are useful in solving certain problems. For example, they are useful in finding the remedy for certain diseases. Or to solve the problem of the origin of the solar system.
Continuing with my meta-analysis I can conclude that reason is a better tool than other irrational resources such as faith or intuition.

I am surprised that you are denying such an obvious thing on the basis of a misapplied abstract logical principle. In any case, instead of repeating over and over again that reason cannot prove the validity of reason, I would like you to tell me where the logical flaw in the previous argument for rationality lies.

So much for my first argument for reason.
The second argument follows.

To claim that reason is not valid as knowledge using reason is an incongruity. The fallacy of circularity is a logical principle. Logic is reason. Then you claim with reason that reason doesn't count. Capital fallacy. Unless you distinguish between various uses of reason. But then, your argument of circularity against reason falls away by itself.

Wayfarer, it would be like the ophthalmologist who observes the eye and concludes that the eye's sight is useless for seeing anything.

All this has been told to you several times already (recently by Isaac or Olivier), but you do not get out of the vicious circle of your presupposition that lies in the inappropriate use of concepts. The limits of knowledge are the limits of language. There is no way to prove anything other than by rational methods because that's what "proving" means. There is no use of "prove" other than to demonstrate rationally. Your attempt to invalidate reason is an attack on language, which is all we have to reason with and understand the world in a common way. If you attack the principles of language you cannot speak meaningfully. Like you're trying to do here. With little success, in my opinion.

You may try to override the use of reason to solve specific problems. It can be tried. But that would not prove that irrational methods are more successful, but that human knowledge has limits. And claiming irrational knowledge about the whole universe escapes the limits of language and knowledge. It's pure illusion.

It takes a fair bit of work to re-frame it so as to understand the root of the issue. — Wayfarer

Are you telling me that you have to belong to some kind of sect or brotherhood to understand this panpsychism stuff? Or is there some peripatetic academy of panpsychism? Where do you sign up? (Don't get angry, it is a joke)

In the meantime, we're here quietly arguing. If it's impossible to do it, you should have warned us first. And if it's not impossible, let's continue.

If you don't want your panpsychism to be associated with spiritualism you should look for another term to describe your theory. From time immemorial "psyche" has referred to anything related to the anima or immaterial mind. If you are talking about consciousness you have only one alternative: either you describe consciousness in terms that can be related to matter or you separate it from matter. And if you want to say that it's a mixed thing between matter and non-matter you should specify what the properties of that strange entity are that they are neither.

But you don't have a problem with that alone. The problem is that you speak of a universal consciousness that does not manifest itself in a verifiable way. Even the stones are supposed to have something like "consciousness", but it is not seen where this consciousness of the stones resides.

It's all rather esoteric. No wonder you have to resort to some kind of unattainable to simple mortals teaching to understand it.

You've just repeated your argument again without addressing any of the points I raised. If you're just going to ignore me there's not much point in me being on the other end of this conversation, is there?

Reason" is an abstraction. — David Mo

Disagree. Reason is the faculty that makes abstraction possible. If you didn't have the faculty of reason, which is able to grasp similarities, differences and types, then you wouldn't be able to understand abstractions.

All of your stock examples are ‘reason applied to empirical problems’. They don’t cast much light on the faculty of reason, as such.

You may try to override the use of reason to solve specific problems. — David Mo

I'm reasoning about the specific problems entailed by materialist philosophy of mind.

If you don't want your panpsychism to be associated with spiritualism you should look for another term to describe your theory. — David Mo

But I didn't introduce either term to the conversation. You did.

If you are talking about consciousness you have only one alternative: either you describe consciousness in terms that can be related to matter or you separate it from matter. — David Mo

See! That's what I mean. There's a cultural reflex, that if it can't be understood in scientific terms, then it's spooky - it's 'panpsychist' or 'spiritualist'.

The problem is that you speak of a universal consciousness that does not manifest itself in a verifiable way. — David Mo

I did no such thing. Where did I use that terminology, or say anything like that?

It's all rather esoteric. No wonder you have to resort to some kind of teaching unattainable to simple mortals to understand it. — David Mo

Anything that challenges the assumed consensus might be hard to grasp, but it's not necessarily esoteric. It might be hard to fathom, but there are many references that could be given in support, from contemporary philosophy.

You've just repeated your argument again without addressing any of the points I raised — Isaac

I addressed your points with reference to a textbook example. What you don't understand is that your original criticism never addressed mine in the first place. I still don't think you have.

Reason is the faculty that makes abstraction possible. — Wayfarer

Among other things. It is also the power to divide problems. Traditionally, the reason is said to be both synthetic and analytical.
I said that "reason" was an abstraction because it is a general term that groups together methods that are diverse and that I listed. They are said to be rational in order to distinguish them from thinking that is not based on logic and observation. Therefore, there is not "one thing" called reason, but a predicate that applies to different yet similar things.

I'm sorry to say, but the rest of your answers seem elusive to me.

Wayfare is correct that one cannot use reason to disprove the efficacy of reason. The contradiction involved is obvious: IF reason is BS, THEN you can’t use to prove that reason is BS.

This issue has been summarized as follows: any solution proposed to the mind-body problem has to account for the possibility of its own emergence as a true solution. Another way to say it is: scientific theories of the mind must account for the human mind’s capacity to understand the world through science.

The contradiction involved is obvious: IF reason is BS, THEN you can’t use to prove that reason is BS. — Olivier5

Sorry, what's your response to this? :

"Reason" is an abstraction. There are several methods that we call rational. Logic is a rational method. Analysis is a rational method. Inductive generalization is a rational method. The hypothetical-deductive method is a rational method.
Through a meta-analysis of the results of these methods I can conclude that they are useful in solving certain problems. For example, they are useful in finding the remedy for certain diseases. Or to solve the problem of the origin of the solar system.
Continuing with my meta-analysis I can conclude that reason is a better tool than other irrational resources such as faith or intuition. — David Mo

If reason cannot be shown to be an effective way of solving problems, can it be shown that there is another way? The theory of emergency - which you defend - is not rational?

See! That's what I mean. There's a cultural reflex, that if it can't be understood in scientific terms, then it's spooky - it's 'panpsychist' or 'spiritualist'. — Wayfarer

You swallowed the final part of my remark:

And if you want to say that it's a mixed thing between matter and non-matter you should specify what the properties of that strange entity are that they are neither.

You can use reason to justify reason of course. What you cannot do logically is use reason to debase or disprove reason.

And if you want to say that it's a mixed thing between matter and non-matter you should specify what the properties of that strange entity are that they are neither.

Its more subtle than that. We don't actually know everything about matter. It's true we have worked out what can be determined and measured using scientific instruments, but it is a mistake to limit the properties of matter to these discoveries. The so called non matter, or the dreaded aether might also be properties of matter which we have not discovered yet. Also we don't understand the origin, or cause of matter, which might were we to know it provide a grounded basis for a philosophy of matter.

If I have 3 marbles in 3d space connected by sticks so they form a triangle, I can move 1 marble, while the other two remain stationary (they merely rotate but do not move in the 3d coordinates), I can move 1 marble so one of the others has to move as well, but the 3th remains stationary, and I can move one so the other two have to move as well.

Your question presupposes only the latter of the 3 possibilities is a real possibility.

You swallowed the final part of my remark:

And if you want to say that it's a mixed thing between matter and non-matter you should specify what the properties of that strange entity are that they are neither. — David Mo

What I'm trying to explain is that the division of 'mind and matter' is often assumed, it's part of modern Western culture, going back to Descartes. (The very first unit of philosophy I studied was Descartes: First Modern Philosopher.) What happened since Descartes is that this presumed split between mind and matter has played out in the intervening centuries but it still has deep consequences for how it is thought about. It's woven into the fabric of how we think about it. So don't think I'm having a go at you.

De-constructing what that means and approaching it from a different perspective is not a simple undertaking.

I'm not talking about 'an entity' of any kind. My argument has been about a specific point, which is criticism of 'mind' as being 'physico-chemical' (David Armstrong's term. ) My argument is that you can't provide an account of reason on the basis of physico-chemical reactions or activities, as a matter of principle. So I’m not positing some ‘spooky stuff’, although the salient point is that this is the way you’re inclined to interpret it!

But the argument is based simply on an analysis of the nature of reason and meaning - no spooky stuff required.

I addressed your points with reference to a textbook example. — Wayfarer

No you didn't. My question was quite clear. Of the four properties of the faculty 'reason' which I gave, your claim is that three of them can be inferred using reason, but the fourth cannot. The question has a simple answer that is not contained (or even referenced) in the text excerpt you quoted. Why can we infer three properties of reason, using reason, but you deny we can use reason to infer the fourth. I want to know what you think the crucial difference is. All your texts and replies so far have done is repeat the view that we cannot infer the fourth property in my list. I'm already very aware that this is your view. I'm asking how it differs from the other three properties I mentioned, because you seem to think we can infer those using reason.

OK, trying again.

1. [Reason] is the capacity we use to interpret and find meaning in neurological data. — Isaac

Correct. It is the capacity we use to interpret and find meaning in any data. A datum is 'a piece of information' by definition; it is not regarded as 'information' until it is interpreted, per definition. And it's a further step to an hypothesis.

2. It is the only such capacity (there's no 'capacity X' which does a similar job). — Isaac

Correct.

3. It is unique to humans (or uniquely advanced in humans) - a previous claim I've read from you. — Isaac

Not relevant to the current argument, but largely true. However, if you want to argue the case, I suggest you start a new thread.

4. It is constituted entirely of, and can be reduced to, brain activity. — Isaac

I'm saying that reason can't be accounted for in neuroscientific terms. It belongs to a completely different ontological level - the symbolic level, you might say. That's why I'm saying you can't account for reason in terms of brain science or in terms of 'correlation with electro-chemical signals', which is the point I took issue with.

I'm saying that reason can't be accounted for in neuroscientific terms. It belongs to a completely different ontological level - the symbolic level, you might say. — Wayfarer

I disagree: you can (in theory) explain reason in neuroscientific terms as long as you don't explain it away, as long as your explanation accounts for the agency and utility of that symbolic level that it explains. In short: compatibilism is the only logically coherent form of materialism.

Again, I'm not asking for a reiteration of your position. I know you think the first three are correct. I know you think the last one cannot be inferred. I'm asking you why, not for a restatement of the fact that you believe it to be the case. Why do you believe it to be the case?

All four are facts about reason - properties of reason. You're not explaining how the fact that "It belongs to a completely different ontological level - the symbolic level" prevents neuroscience from accounting for it. Simply declaring it to be the case isn't sufficient. When pressed on the matter you said something about the circularity of using reason to infer facts about reason. Hence my question about how the fourth inference differs from the others.

I’m saying that ‘reason’ or ‘meaning’ can’t be found amongst the data, because it is internal to the act of thought. Reason and logic comprise wholly the relations of ideas. You either see that, or you don’t, and at this stage, let’s accept you don’t, in which case, I’m done trying to argue for it.