There is no more a contradiction between the computer program following a program line by line not intentionally doing so and yet the same computer trying to clean troughs, as there is in the shaky person having their hands shake not intentionally shaking them and yet the same shaky person shifting a gear trying to shift. — InPitzotl

I think there is. If A is nothing but B which is doing nothing but C, then A is doing nothing but C. If a robot is nothing but a program which is doing nothing but executing lines, then the robot is doing nothing but executing lines. The robots' "intentions" is thus only an expression for what we perceive it is doing, and points to nothing in reality.


As for the rest of the discussion, let's clean it up by summarizing where I think we are.

(1) There are only 3 possible explanations for all events: determinism, free will, and randomness, as so:
(2) Determinism: Cause A always gives Effect B.
(3) Free Will: Cause A may give different effects; and this is explained by Cause A having free will.
(4) Randomness: Cause A (including "nothing") may give different effects; but this is not explained by Cause A having free will.
(5) The PoSR disallows for randomness. This only leaves determinism and free will for possible explanations for all events.

(6) From observation, it appears everything that is physical (ie matter and energy) is determined, with perhaps the exception of photons and humans.
(7) Photons: Science states events with photons have no physical cause.
(8) But PoSR demands a sufficient cause.
(9) So they must have a non-physical cause, which could be free will or other.
(10) If free will, this proves that free will is non-physical.
(11) If other, then the cause is both non-physical and determined.
(12) In both cases, it follows that everything that is physical is determined.

(13) Humans: Humans have free will (assumed in the OP).
(14) Humans have a part that is non-physical.

The robot in cleaning up troughs is different than the computer in following its program line by line. — InPitzotl

So my question is, how are they different, such that a robot can have intentions? I'm fairly sure a robot is nothing more than a computer executing a program line by lines, with sensors attached.

[...] it's your model of human action... namely, humans have free will which implies they are not fully determined (your words) which requires non-physical souls. But other than having non-physical souls, it's implied that you agree humans can actually exist. — InPitzotl

?? Sorry; I don't understand the point of this whole paragraph, or the previous demonstration with steps 1 through 6 anymore. How does this fit with the original objection about the laws of thoughts?

You're trying to prove that physics is fully determined; you can't just hold that as a premise. — InPitzotl

That's not what I was trying to prove with the previous syllogisms. These were merely a response to your 6-step objection, which admittedly I apparently have misunderstood.

I thought we already showed that the physical is determined: PoSR. Let's loop back. I think there are only 2 alternatives to determinism: randomness and free will. PoSR disallows for randomness, and I believe you already dismissed the hypothesis that photons have free will. This only leaves determinism.

But let me just try this a different way. [...] now photons and radioactive atoms are not physical. — InPitzotl

This is really straining away from common sense. Of course photons are physical; why wouldn't they be? And even if they weren't, this doesn't mean they are undetermined. As per above, the only alternative to determinism is free will, and this goes for all things, regardless if they are physical or not.

As the zombie carries out the command, he is indeed intending it — InPitzotl

Oh okay. So "intention" means "aiming towards a goal", not necessarily choosing that goal. I will think a bit more about this definition; to see if true intentions can exist without freely choosing them.

The zombie is an agent; it has to navigate a complex environment that it doesn't have full knowledge about. [...] The wind-up doll will go through the exact actions needed to clean the troughs; all built-in. — InPitzotl

A simple wind-up doll, fine. But what if we add sensors to the doll, so it can see, hear, feel, smell, and taste, like the zombie; and make the program a lot more complex such as "if shovel not found at location A, then search for it", etc. At this point, is there still a difference between the zombie and the doll-with-sensors-and-complex-program?

But that just sounds like AlphaZero building its own valuation system, which it does deterministically. — InPitzotl

I thought we agreed that computers, being nothing but programs, cannot have intentions. People on the other hand can have intentions, and intentionally choose our own ranking of values. Now for the tricky part: maybe there is such a thing as "deterministic intentions", that is, we always aim towards the goal which results in the greater value for us. But by this definition, then intention towards values themselves must be different than deterministic intentions.

6. State A involves the physical. — InPitzotl

Does this mean State A is fully physical or merely that some of it is physical? I hope the two syllogisms below cover both options.

P1.1. All that is fully physical is determined, so that state A will always evolve to state B.
P1.2. State A is all physical.
C1. State A will always evolve to state B.

or

P2.1. All that is fully physical is determined, so that state A will always evolve to state B.
P2.2. State A does not always evolve to state B.
C2. State A is not fully physical.

If a photon has just original causation, then it's not fully determined. We need never have photons with free will. — InPitzotl

One of the expressions of the PoSR is that "every change (or event) necessitates a sufficient cause".
If photon A always causes effect B, then that's sufficient. But if sometimes photon A also causes effect C, then there is a change between causation A-B and causation A-C, and this change necessitates a cause other than photon A alone.

Suppose there's a classic, old, voodoo style zombie (not a p-zombie) hanging around.[...] — InPitzotl

So you would say the original command to go clean the troughs is not intended by the zombie, but everything else in that set of acts is intended with the goal of cleaning the troughs, is that correct? Would this therefore be different than a computer program which only goes through a programming code line by line with no intentions involved? Genuinely asking.

That's fine, but your example took something like a desire (preference for vanilla), and added a second variable to it (cost). What is the purpose of having two variables involved in the choice? [...] — InPitzotl

Right. The reason I added the second variable was because my position is that free will doesn't apply for the taste example only, but does apply if we have conflicting values. I'll try again.

In a situation with only one type of value, like choosing between chocolate or vanilla, then free will is not really involved; because free will or not, everyone would simply pick their preferred flavour, and that's that. Free will only applies at the "very beginning", when it comes to ranking our values in order of priority. E.g. ethics #1, safety #2, pleasure #3. Then in a situation where several values are in conflict, then our intentions are directed with the end of achieving the higher values over the lower ones. Note, I acknowledge I did not defend why that is; because as per the OP, this free will is assumed to be true for this discussion.

[...] There is no solid a proiri reason that the universe must fit our preconceived notions of how it works. — InPitzotl

Sure there is. The Laws of Thoughts are also called Laws of Logic. Take the Law of Non-Contradictions. If two propositions contradict, then at least one of these is necessarily false. This not only means that we made an error in our reasoning, but more importantly it means that one of these propositions is not reflective of reality. If this wasn't the case, then these Laws would serve no purpose.

[...] if I, a conscious sentient agent, can be an original cause; how come a photon cannot be an original cause, or a radioactive atom? — InPitzotl

Yes, we can also entertain the hypothesis that photons have free will. But I think the OP argument would still hold, because this power of free will still cannot be physical if science has determined that no antecedent physical cause exist.

So people always intend to do the good (at least in their view), and when they don't do the good, then they have regret.

But is this even logically possible? The following appears to be a logical necessity:
Intention + Possibility = Act
If you intend to do something, and it is possible for you to do it, then you will necessarily do it. If you did not do it, it was either because it was not possible, or because you did not really intend it.

E.g. Who can say "Yes I cheated, but it was unintentional"? (Aside from this of course)

Particles don't have fixed positions, they instead have probablity distributions. So you have cause A and then 50% chance for effect B, 20 % chance fo effect C etc. — Echarmion

No objection; just thinking out loud. What you describe indeed does not fit determinism, and yet a probability distribution still implies some sort of order. It is odd that it is not fully ordered, yet not fully random... For some reason, I would be more willing to accept full absence of order over partial order.

This does not normally occur on the macro scale, but the jury is still out on exactly when this breaks down into determined effects. — Echarmion

That seems to me simply the result of Central Limit Theorem; where the macro scale averages out the inconsistencies. If so, then I'm pretty sure it's quantifiable with some confidence interval.

There is of course the "hidden causes" line of argument that claims this apparent probablity distribution is just dues to lack of knowledge. But so far experimental results have not backed it up. I think there have actually been a number of experiments that make "hidden causes" seem less likely. — Echarmion

This poses a difficulty. I am fairly sure that the Scientific Method is founded on the Principle of Sufficient Reason; and any scientific theory that goes against its founding principles would be self-defeating, like sawing off the branch it's sitting on.

humans indeed are a highly social species, so nurture (for which "psychological history" is longhand) is very significant. But nature is also very significant; — InPitzotl

That's fine. The point was that to explain our resulting taste, nature and nurture are sufficient without having to bring in free will.

Making preferences complex isn't impressive. — InPitzotl

It's not about complexity. I'm okay with computers making highly complex decisions and still being fully determined. It's about how we all feel we freely chose our values; which once chosen, determine the rest of our behaviour accordingly.

I've no problem with choice, and no problem with volition; [...] I'm agnostic on the free will question — InPitzotl

I still don't understand the distinction between volition and free will. How can intentions truly exist if they are not freely chosen? To contrast, AlphaZero, being nothing but a program that goes through the motions, has no intentions.

(1) You're telling God what to do, [...] (1) comes into play with how you argue that physics is fully determined; it must be, "laws of thoughts" demand it to be. That to me sounds not so much like an argument as it does an excuse not to give one. — InPitzotl

That sounds to me like an ad hominem attack. Are you objecting because there is a flaw in my reasoning, or merely because it seems I am telling God what to do?

(2) You want to have your cake and eat it too. [...] when it comes to how we behave, this rule suddenly gets thrown out the window; "laws of thoughts" demand physics to be fully determined; "free will" demands us to not be. That's (2). — InPitzotl

This is a misunderstanding. Laws of Thoughts, specifically the Principle of Sufficient Reason, does not allow for random causality. This therefore leaves two possibilities for causality. Free Will, and Determinism for things which don't possess free will. Neither of these possibilities violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason, as far as I can tell. But if it does, let me know.

Defending the existence of free will would take too long, and so it is assumed to be true in this discussion. However, if we were to argue about free will, then I agree that Ockham's Razor would be a good starting point, and that the free-willer would then have the onus of proof.

I think I understand what you are saying better now. Yes, if self-control is not a result of knowledge but is applied alongside knowledge, there perhaps it is indeed synonymous to free will.

As I said earlier, another fact is that we can act on ideas that do not reflect reality...therefore we are not marionettes being played by the world around us. — Chester

I'm not sure about this one though. Ideas like unicorn indeed do not reflect reality, but they might still be caused by our perception of reality in the first place. I don't think determinism and imagination are incompatible.

I am inclined to agree with you that calling the result "determined" as per some clockwork model of the universe, isn't supported by current science. — Echarmion

the laws of physics are descriptive — Echarmion

Perhaps they are not prescriptive, but they are predictive. — Banno

I agree that when we say "physical things obey the laws of physics", it is merely an expression to say there is uniformity or consistency in causality, and the laws of physics describe that uniformity. That's also all I meant in P1.

But there appears to be a discrepancy with our meaning of the term "determined". My understanding of "determined" is that a given Cause A will consistently result in Effect B; not necessarily that we can know with certainty what Cause A and Effect B are. Do you mean something else by it?

I like the first one better, as it is simpler and thus easier for me to follow.

You are correct that the argument can only go as far as proving that we have a non-physical part, and that the claim that this is the soul is an add-on at the end. That's okay, I think the hard work is in the first part for most people. After that, it is not great effort to connect this part which is non-physical and has free will, to what is commonly referred to as the soul.

If someone assesses an action as violating the Golden Rule, but also thinks that they should do it anyway for some other reason, then that means they think there are (at least) exceptions to the Golden Rule, and it isn't always morally binding. — Pfhorrest

The Golden Rule is an absolute; here's why. Fairness is defined as treating everyone equally; no discrimination. Nobody in their right mind can judge that being unfair is morally good, and that being fair is morally bad. And unfairness necessarily results when breaking the Golden Rule.

Consider beliefs for comparison. [and the rest of this post] — Pfhorrest

Yes I agree with this when it comes to beliefs; but not when it comes to morality. You make it sound like the way people act is always out of the honest belief that the act is morally good. But this is absurd for a couple of reasons.

(1) Rapists exist; and nobody in their right mind would honestly believe rape to ever be the morally good. They do it because of some sort of pleasure it brings, not out of moral duty.
(2) A prerequisite of guilt is that the defendant knows or should have known that the act was bad. Thus if all moral errors are honest errors, then nobody can be a morally bad person.

Maybe the following test will work. As a child, have you ever lied? If so, was it really out of honest belief that it was your moral duty to lie at this time; or was it because it was an easy escape while knowing it was morally wrong?

Hey all. Sorry, I'm a little behind in answering the comments. Will be back at it tomorrow.

I actually am haha. But that is besides the point of the discussion which is about the argument in the OP.

That you can intend to move demonstrates volition. That you have no choice by definition rules out free will. Essentially, you're conflating free will with volition — InPitzotl

It's weird because in french, "free will" is translated as "volonté libre", and "volition" as "volonté". Be that as it may, a choice is still present as long as you have the choice to intend one way or another. Intentions must be free and have multiple choices, otherwise they would be no intentions at all. And if you tie me up so that I am immobile, we say this was done "against my will", that is, against my intention, my consent.

If it's a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes the photon to go left instead of right, how is it not a logical fallacy to say that nothing causes me to pick vanilla instead of chocolate? — InPitzotl

Alright. You pick vanilla because vanilla tastes better than chocolate for you, and since this choice in taste is not voluntary, it must come from psychological history; and everyone with the same history would do the same. Now if that was the whole story, then indeed positing free will would be superfluous. But let's add to the example that vanilla is more expensive than chocolate. You then have to choose between two conflicting values: taste and money. And choosing between values is voluntary, and so is caused by our power of free will (or volition if you prefer).

We have a few disagreements.

Someone who cheats on their spouse thus either honestly thought that the pleasure it brought them was more important than the other consequences of it, and acted according to that judgement, in what they felt was a justified, and therefore moral — Pfhorrest

By "moral value" I mean breaking the golden rule of ethics: do onto others as you would want them to do onto you. This rule is simple enough that most people can correctly judge what is morally right and wrong; and this removes the possibility of honest rational mistake about moral judgements.

or else they thought that they should act out of more consideration for those other consequences than for their own pleasure, and yet did not act that way, doing something they thought was wrong ought of weakness of will. — Pfhorrest

Once judged that cheating is morally wrong, then they can freely choose between moral value or pleasure (picture the angel and demon on each shoulder like in cartoons). If they ended up cheating from choosing pleasure, then the act was intended, willed. If they chose the moral good but somehow ended cheating anyways (say they were drugged), then the act indeed happened against their will; but free will must exist for something to go against it.

So the free choice is at the step of choosing between moral value and pleasure, and then the remaining outcome is determined.

I think what you refer to is "will power" or "self-control", which is indeed related to free will but different still. You say we obtain free will through educating ourselves; but then what causes us to educate ourselves if not free will? Something cannot cause itself into existence.

I think dogs only have instinct; and can walk away from a treat once we have modified their instinct through training.

Free will is supposed to involve choice, which is none of the above things. I voluntarily reach towards the chocolate ice cream after I deliberate about whether to get chocolate or vanilla. — InPitzotl

Hmmm... I don't think a choice in outcome is necessary for free will. You can tie me up so as to remove my choice in outcome of moving vs not moving, but this would not take away my free will, because I can still choose to intend to move.

Does Free Will violate the Principle of Sufficient Reason? — InPitzotl

I don't believe so.
E.g. What caused this person to act in such a way, if it did not follow the cause-to-effect we observe in other physical things? Answer: His free will.

Hello.

We are also animals. — Daniel

Sure. But what's your point with regards to this discussion?

But you have used that claim to further claim that the world is determined. If the 'laws of physics' are merely a description, which they are, then any claim of determinism is unjustified. — A Seagull

I don't understand this statement. If nature is uniform, consistent in its effects resulting from a given cause, then it is indeed determined; where the opposite of "determine" is "randomness", when free will is not involved.

Nature is not uniform, there is no claim for that in physics, and any claim to uniformity is at best, very very approximate and even then only in some circumstances. — A Seagull

So is the alternative randomness? This seems to fail the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In addition, how do you explain technology without the Uniformity of Nature? E.g. planes consistently fly.

The important bit...
And again, what is salient is that intelligent, practical folk accept these uncaused events as part of the mechanism that allows all our electronic devices to function.
— Banno — Banno

Meh. People have developed technology in the past before fully understanding the theory behind it; like boats before fully understanding buoyancy. Also I'm wondering if order can result out of chaos, which sounds like what something-out-of-nothing would be.

...four...
— Samuel Lacrampe

There's your problem. — Banno

Oh ok. I didn't know this was disputed as a Law of Thought. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is self-evidently true, because any attempt to give a sufficient reason for or against it would presuppose it. This is why it fits as part of the basic laws of thoughts or logic.

it's that these cannot both be known (or determined) with certainty at all. — Wayfarer

That's okay. What I meant by "determined" is not that we can know it with certainty, but that the cause-effect is consistent or uniform, even if we don't know it. So identical causes yield identical effects.

There is no non-physical 'part' because 'parts' generally characterise physical things; in other words, physical things are composed of parts, and it is not as if 'the soul' is one part amongst others. — Wayfarer

Indeed, "parts" don't apply to non-physical things. But if we define a human being as the whole system of body and soul, then the soul is a part of that system.

science can't account for the 'subjective unity of individual perception'. — Wayfarer

Thomas Aquinas was already talking about this back then (but I cannot find the source of this anymore).

nothing causes [...] — Banno

I would accept the claim "we don't know what causes [...]", but "nothing causes [...]" is a logical fallacy.
It goes against the Principle of Sufficient Reason; which is one of the four Laws of Thoughts.

Also, curious about the butterflies...

To say that all physical things "obey the laws of physics" is merely an expression. It refers to the Uniformity of Nature, which is the principle that the course of nature continues uniformly the same. For a given cause A, we always expect to see effect B.

Hello.
I mostly agree with that you said. I would just replace the term "imagination" with "free will". I think some animals have imagination, e.g., dogs can have dreams, but not free choices.

Hello.
Does this uncertainty principle entail that equal causes may give unequal effects, or does it merely say that we cannot predict with precision what these effects may be? If the latter, then I don't think this invalidates the argument in the OP.

Hello.

This is correct, but being voluntary, intended, willed, is a deterministic matter (of whether your judgement of the merits of alternative courses of action determines your actions) — Pfhorrest

I think I get what you are saying, namely that although our acts are freely chosen, those choices are based on what we judge to have the most beneficial outcome, and thus this judgement determines our choices.

I accept that, but I believe these judgements are based on our values we choose, and this choice is indeterministic (though I don't mean by that that ethics is subjective). E.g. most rational persons understand that cheating on their spouse is morally wrong, but some are tempted to do it because it gives pleasure. Free will kicks in when they choose between moral value and pleasure. At that point, indeed, the act is determined by that judgement of the best outcome, based on the values they chose.

Hello.
Can you elaborate on why P1 is false? Are you saying that some physical things do not obey some laws of physics, or in other words that equal causes may give unequal effects?

Hello.
In a way, we can end at the conclusion that we have a non-physical part, and that's already a decent find. But otherwise, by soul I mean the same as what religious groups mean when they say the soul outlasts the body. More technically defined, it is that which gives a human being a personal identity, a particular person rather than merely a member of a species. E.g. Due to my body, I am a human being, but due to my soul and its power of free will, I am more specifically Samuel.

But what do we do if there a bunch of conflicting hypotheses, neither of which can be refuted (in the sense of a falsification). Take the classic theism - atheism debate. Refutation really doesn't seem like a good fit for a host of problems. — Echarmion

Are these frequent? Maybe just because some hypotheses haven't been refuted yet, doesn't mean they cannot be refuted. [Side note, I didn't think the theism-atheism problem was too hard; but that could be a conversation for another time].

But we only need working physics to live. We don't really need metaphysics. That is, we don't technically need to understand what it is we are predicting and explaining, only that our predictions are good enough. — Echarmion

That still depends on the metaphysical topic. Is it important to know that the perceived physical rock is metaphysically real? Indeed probably not. But moral values? Quite so. The answer should influence the behaviour of most people.

[...] And to make matters worse, there seems to be no way to confirm anyone else sees red the way you or I see it. — Echarmion

Occam's Razor. Boom. :wink:

What is "objective goodness" even supposed to mean? A catalogue of good deeds? A definition? A divine judge? — Echarmion

If you are asking what is objective goodness, it means that some things are good as a matter of fact, not a matter of opinion. If you are asking for the definition of objective goodness, then skipping straight to the answer of Aristotle without explanation (as it would be a long one), it is "a potentiality being actualized. And as actuality and potentiality are objective states of things, goodness in that sense is objective.

Right, so would you call these principles "true" or something else? — Echarmion

Truth being defined as "conformance to reality", calling these principles true means that applying them will give conclusions that conform to reality.

[...] The latter would, at most, be a claim about epistemology. — Echarmion

Right; saying "I don't know" is indeed not a metaphysical claim. But my point was that if saying "the perception is a false one", that is implicitly making the metaphysical claim that "a false perception exists in reality".

Yeah I think I get what you are saying too, that in terms of total content that is existing in the real world and displayed in the illusory world at one time, (3) can have less total content than (2). But I don't think that "less content in the objects of explanation" translates to "lesser complexity of the explanation". I illustrate with an example.

I observe a house from the front side. Then I circle around to check that all 4 sides are fully built. I observe that no wall is missing. Kinda like this. I can draw 2 explanations.

(1) There are really only 2 walls existing, and a swift house builder just moves the 2 walls around as I circle around, to make it look like there are 4 walls.
(2) There are 4 walls.

One could argue that explanation (1) has less content in the objects of explanation (ie 2 walls + 1 builder as opposed to 4 walls). Yet clearly explanation (2) is the simplest in terms of explanation.

So if you want to establish burden of proof as an epistemological principle for metaphysical questions, you'll have to justify the connection between the rule and metaphysical reality. — Echarmion

Sure. Aside from mathematics and pure logic, we never reach certainty for any other sciences. In all other sciences (metaphysics and others), the accepted position about a topic is the one that has not yet been refuted. We say that the position stands, that it becomes the prima facie, and that the onus of proof is on the other side. It is a good alternative to remaining agnostic about everything merely on the grounds that we do not reach certainty. Maybe we can afford to remain agnostic on some topics, but not all. See next paragraph as an example.

The problem is that this false perception may very well be normal, even unavoidable, for humans, and therefore your previous arguments do not work. — Echarmion

This topic of whether all perceptions are false or some are true, is a good example where we cannot afford to remain agnostic on the grounds that both hypothesis remain possible. We gotta live. We gotta pick a side. Enters the Prima Facie approach as per above.

So what about the colour red? Is it real or imaginary? — Echarmion

Hmmm.... That's a tough one. It's almost worthy of its own discussion. For now, I say real; as we cannot conceive something we have not experienced in the past. E.g. a blind man born blind cannot conceive the colour red.

How would that be possible? Do you imagine there to be some actual rulebook hidden somewhere that is the "object" you could base morality on? The question of morality is "what should I do". How is that in any way connected to objects? — Echarmion

The objective basis to ethics is values, ie that some things are good or bad in reality. E.g. I should do this because it is objectively good.

Another one would actually be epistemology itself. Because if epistemology is about discovering the "objective nature" of the universe, then the truth criterion for that cannot be "accordance with objective nature". That'd be circular. — Echarmion

Siding with Aristotle, the foundations of epistemology are first principles called the laws of thoughts. These laws are Deductive Reasoning (aka logic), Inductive Reasoning (aka stats), and Abductive Reasoning (aka Parsimony). As first principles, they are not founded on any other premises.

Whether or not you prefer to reserve the term "reality" for "objective" or "metaphysical reality" doesn't change whether or not the latter is connected to physics. — Echarmion

It does. Let me try again another way. We perceive a physical object. Either that object is real or not. If real, then we made a claim about metaphysics. If not real, then the explanation is the existence of a false perception. Then we still made a claim about metaphysics, namely that this false perception is real.

if you have a collection of random thoughts, some of those could just happen to conform. — Echarmion

Good point. Let me try again: Knowledge is achieved when the thoughts are true and justified, and correct justification must follow the laws of thoughts.

It seems to me this statement can be viewed in one of two ways. (1) You are either making a claim about how we already do things (i.e. using witness testimony to corroborate facts), or (2) or you are concluding from your argument that philosophical realism holds. — Wolfman

Both. The witness testimony uses the PUP to determine the most reasonable story about the case. And that same rationale is used to determine the most reasonable claim about metaphysics.

Your premise already assumes that external objects exist; it's just that whether something is objectively real or not depends on the number of people who saw it. But you haven't even established that external objects exist in the first place — Wolfman

External objects must exist for us to have true or false perceptions of them. Also I am fairly sure Hume did not question the existence of external objects; and was only skeptical about their true nature.

This debate would have been over hundreds of years ago if it were that easy. — Wolfman

Unless all those debaters used that similar line of circular reasoning. :wink:

Let's call the two hypotheses as so: (1) for world as we perceive it; and (2) for brain in a vat.
One formulation of Occam's Razor is: Entities should not be multiplied without necessity.
In hypothesis (1), the entities are: A real world which we perceive.
In hypothesis (2), the entities are: A real world which we don't perceive + an illusion of the world we perceive, created by a machine in that real world.
Hypothesis (1) is composed of fewer entities, and is therefore simpler.

Now you argue that it is easier in (2) to create the illusory world, than in (1) to create a real world. But this omits the fact that in (2), a real world also exists, which includes the machine that creates the illusory world. And appealing to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, an effect necessitates a sufficient cause. The machine containing the information for the illusory world must exist in a world that is at least as rich in information.

Haha! True that.

I am not a fan of "burden of proof" type arguments outside of a legal context. While I think the general rule that the one who advances a claim is obligated to provide justification is a fine one, it's a rule of debate, not a law of (meta-)physics. I am repeating myself here, but there is no reason to suppose that the world cares about the burden of proof. — Echarmion

But the point of (sincere) debate is to find truth. Proper rules of reasoning and debate (which includes burden of proof) is part of epistemology. You might as well say that the objective world does not care about epistemology as such, which is true, but would miss the point that the function of epistemology is to know the objective world.

A Hallucination is a specific way in which one persons perception differs from the perception in others in defined, pathologic ways. Hume's scepticism goes deeper than that. It's not about individual mistakes but about whether humans are at all equipped, sensory or otherwise, to gain knowledge about metaphysical reality — Echarmion

That's fine. Instead of "hallucination" let's called it "false perception", for which "false" means "not in conformance with reality".

For any given ability to observe, one can make up teapots that fall just outside of it. — Echarmion

We (at least I) may have lost track of what the original point was here. If that's okay, we can leave this tangent as is.

Sure, but then your statement "reality implies objectivity" reads "reality implies external reality", which is wrong, as there are obviously internal realities. — Echarmion

I don't believe so. There are only 2 categories of being in that sense: real and imaginary. E.g. a horse is real, a unicorn is imaginary. By "internal reality", I am guessing you actually mean "imaginary" which is the alternative to being real.

[...] So even if metaphysics would be impossible, there'd still be truth. [...] — Echarmion

I still challenge this claim. Ethic is only properly speaking a science if it is objective; which means that goodness exists in reality. But if no goodness in reality, then no ethics. Similarly, there is no such thing as "physical reality" if we can know nothing about reality. Even if the physical is the result of a false but universal and consistent perception, we are then still claiming that this false perception exists in reality.

Which is good, if you think that thoughts construct reality. Do you? — Echarmion

Of course not. But true thoughts are thoughts which content conforms to reality. And true thoughts are possible only if they follow the laws of thoughts.

Which would be easier or, if you prefer, more parsimonious: an illusion of a universe or an actual universe? The answer to that question is, according to none other than the Principle of Parsimony: an illusion of a universe is simpler than an actual universe. — TheMadFool

Wait why is the illusion the simpler explanation? In both cases, true or false perception, some sort of universe must exist for us to have a perception of it. But in the illusion case, we must posit the state of having an illusion on top of having a universe. Then to be picky, we must also posit an explanation for why the illusion is so structured and consistent (as opposed to continuously changing). With that, I would say the actual universe is the simplest explanation.

Given the context of my last post, it should be pretty clear that I'm explicating Hume's views, not mine own. You should abide by the principle of charity instead of cherry picking and coming back with this kind of response. — Wolfman

Well I thought that since you were defending Hume's position, you agreed with him. My bad for assuming. Bonus, I didn't know about this Principle of Charity. That's a good one.

As for Hume's claim: If he claims something drastically different than what I described in the OP, then we can discard it. It doesn't make the PUP any less valid on its own. Now for fun, we could try to examine Hume's true claim, or else leave it there. Up to you.

Hello.
Fortunately, we have principles of reasonableness like the Principle of Parsimony, to keep us grounded in common sense, and prevent us from getting lost into too many "What if" questions.

So if I understand correctly, "belief" in our common language is a catch-all term which could mean either "guess", "estimate", "supposition" or "opinion", and as it is less clear than the other terms, it should be avoided. I can accept that. Can't deny that clearer is better.