... Did you watch the video? :brow:

He literally says "What is [color]? I don't know. [...] I don't have any concept of what it is. There is this whole part of vocabulary, of language, that doesn't mean anything to me. Over the years people have tried and tried to explain color to me and I just don't understand it."

If I had know about this video before, I would have showed it to you to prove my point; that we get meanings from experience, and to experience is to experience something.

He uses them correctly in most cases — Banno

I am starting to think your position is merely that people can use words in a sentence that is grammatically correct, even if they don't understand the meaning of the words. If that is all you are trying to say, then no dispute here.

And notice that your argument above, for some sort of innate ideas, simply falls apart when you talk to a blind person. Edison's use of colour is not innate; nor is it complete. But it is there for you to see. — Banno

Banno, please try to understand your opponents' position prior to arguing against them. Right now, you are attacking a straw man, because I said that it was your fact, which I disagreed with, that suggested the existence of Innate Ideas. This is not my position. I side with Aristotle and Hume who claim that we obtain our ideas and meanings from experience, and this video proves my point.

What is pointed to by Edison's use of "red"? — Banno

'Red' points to this, which he has not apprehend. That is his whole point. He said "When somebody says 'something is red' to me, I don't quite get it. [...] Stuff I picked up from hearing about it". He says he does not understand, but can repeat what others told him.

A red sports car and a red sunset need not be the same colour. Yet they are both red. — Banno

Red comes in many shades. They both have some shade of red.

...and yet they do indeed use these words. How can that be, if your account is right? — Banno

I believe that fact is wrong, but for the sake of argument, let's say it is right. Would this not suggest that we have Innate Ideas, as per Plato and against Aristotle and Hume? That without the need of experience, every man, blind or sighted, already knows the idea of colours a priori? Well this still would not change my point that words point to things, in this case, to ideas that we know a priori; am I wrong?


I read up on this a bit. This is indeed astonishing. "She was able to enjoy music by feeling the beat and she was able to have a strong connection with animals through touch".

But I am not sure if she would have been able to perceive the animals' colours; although she may have been able to somewhat perceive the tone of the sounds from the vibration frequencies.

The sky is blue, but not all of it, and not the same shade f blue — Banno

Yes, the sky need not be completely blue, and there may be multiple shades, all referred by the word 'blue'. But both cases have some portion of blue, which makes the statements true. If the sky for a particular day was completely orange, then the statement would be false. If meanings did not have some essential properties, then how could we differentiate true from false statements?

Take salty: an adjective which points to a flavour. I had a porterhouse yesterday that had been salted on one side before cooking. It had little in common with the salty smoked bacon I had for breakfast, nor with the Pad Thai; indeed, that saltiness is complimented with umami, a taste I could not name apart from "salty" when I was a child. What is the being these have in common? — Banno

I am not sure I understand the point you are trying to make. It is either true or false that you perceive the porterhouse, smoked bacon, and pad thai as 'salty', used as one common meaning. If true, then indeed the flavours must have one thing in common, even if the flavours are not exactly the same, inasmuch as there are different shades of blue. It may be true that the porterhouse, bacon, and pad thai are more salty than avocados; inasmuch as the colours turquoise, aqua, and azure are more blue than the colour orange.

Hello.
It depends what is meant by "intrinsically disordered". Maybe it only means homosexuality is an unnatural condition, which would be more of a statement of fact than a statement of judgement of the person.

I agree that war is intrinsically evil, but not necessarily immoral.

P1: The first principal of morality is "do good and avoid evil". In other words, "act in such a way so as to maximum the resulting good and minimize the resulting evil".
P2: Saving lives is intrinsically good, and taking lives is intrinsically evil.
C: Going to war that is expected to result in saving more lives in the long run than not going to war is good; and not going to war in that case is evil.

Hello. I agree with most of what you wrote.

Real Truth is inaccessible to us — Kaiser Basileus

What about, as you mention later on, logical necessities? Truth does not contradict truth; therefore any self-contradicting statements are necessarily false; therefore any negation of self-contradicting statements are necessarily true. E.g. "Timeless objective truths don't exist" = self-contradiction; therefore "Timeless objective truths exist" = true.

Also, what about first principles, such as the laws of logic? Knowledge of logical necessities implies that we have a priori knowledge of the laws of logic as being true, for we cannot logically prove the laws of logic to be true. And in the off chance they are not part of eternal truths, then we are all screwed.

Hello.

Have you heard of the Just War Theory? It gives a list of criteria to judge not only if going to war is just, but can also judge if not going to war could be unjust.

E.g. if the Nazis decide to commit genocide against the Jews, it could be your nation's moral duty to declare war against them to save other lives.

Hello.

I am not sure I understand your position. Are you saying a beast is moved to intercourse by pleasure or by the aim to procreate? My guess is the former, as it appears a lot of beasts, especially the males, don't take care of their offsprings.

Hello.
I can tell you the christian position on this topic, which is not necessarily my position (I am on the edge myself).

Christianity has nothing against homosexuality as such, and is only opposed to particular types of sexual intercourse. According to christianity, the functions or ends of intercourse are (1) procreation, (2) union among two people in a marriage, (3) pleasure. And the act must be used with these ends in mind, in the order shown.

The problem with homosexual intercourse is that it can meet ends (2) and (3) but never (1). As such, it is misused. Note however that this is no worse than heterosexual intercourse for the end of (2) and (3) only.

Also, christianity (at least most branches) sees nothing wrong with being a homosexual without the act of intercourse, as it recognizes that the condition is involuntary, and therefore cannot be blameworthy. At worse, it sees it as an unnatural condition like being blind or deaf.

Actually I agree with you. Instead of saying "at the start of the discussion", I should have said "as they come in the discussion". And then, only the key words are important, like 'being' in our previous discussion.

To add to this, I claim that to obtain general truths, like "x is always y", then it is important to find the essence of x, that is, its essential properties.

A being is a living thing; a thing may be living or not. As you say, "thing" is the most general term, while being is more constrained (to living things). — Pattern-chaser

I am using the term as used by Aristotle, Aquinas, and the rest of the scholastic crew. Admittedly, you are right that the meaning is mostly associated with the term 'thing' in common language. I just think using the term 'being' makes you sound like a boss. :cheer:

But it is equally true to observe that, if we all just change the meaning if the terms we use, to suit our current needs, communication suffers. — Pattern-chaser

Correct. And this is the main point of the OP; that words that have the potential to be ambiguous should be defined at the start of the discussion. And once established, the definitions should stay the same for the remainder of the discussion.

Ask a blind man. He knows the meaning, but cannot appreciate that meaning as you (a sighted person) can. — Pattern-chaser

The meaning of the word 'blue' in common language is literally this. How could he know this meaning? How would you describe it to him? Note that talking about its light wavelength would not cut it; because that is not its meaning in the common language. Even before people knew about wavelengths, they knew the meaning of the word 'blue'.

Also, to use Aristotelian terminology, the wavelength description of 'blue' is merely its material cause, not its formal cause (meaning). :nerd:

I know the meaning of X-ray, although I will never sense one directly, as I don't have that ability. — Pattern-chaser

In this case, the meaning of 'X-ray' in the common language is the same for you as it is for everyone else: an electromagnetic wave of certain wavelength or something. But this is different than the meaning of 'blue' for a blind man versus a sighted man.

There is not one thing that is the meaning of a word, since the meaning will change from one use to another. — Banno

I agree with this. Many words have the same meaning (synonyms); and many meanings have the same word (homonyms).

Further, there is not one thing that is the meaning of a word, since meanings are not things. — Banno

But there is a thing, a being, as defined in my previous post. To side with philosophers like Aristotle and Hume, we apprehend meanings by observation. And to observe is to observe something.

A blind man born blind would not know the meaning of the words 'colour' or 'blue' or 'bright'.

You have made this claim several times. Each time I have denied it, and several times I have provided counterexamples of words that do not just refer to 'beings'. — Banno

Adverbs, verbs, adjectives, conjuncts...[don't refer to things] — Banno

Perhaps, as Mr Ninja suggested, we should clarify what we mean by 'being' and 'thing'. A being is a thing, in the sense that that-which-is-not-a-being is nothing. As such, a being needs not be a concrete object like a horse or a ball, but may also be a more abstract thing like an action, feeling, state of mind, relation between objects, property, etc. because even these abstract things are not nothing.

Under such a definition, words such as verbs, adverbs, adjectives, and conjuncts still point to beings.

• E.g. The word 'jump' is a verb which points to the act that is jumping. Actions are beings.
• E.g. The word 'here' is an adverb which points to a location. Locations are beings.
• E.g. The word 'salty' is an adjective which points to a flavour. Flavours are beings.
• E.g. The word 'meanwhile' is a conjunct (I think) which points to a particular time period. Time periods are beings.

It seems to me to be much simpler to point out that "No" has several uses, including denying what has been previously claimed, and expressing surprise or disagreement. — Banno

I agree; but I also claim that the act of denying, the state of being surprised, and state of disagreement are all beings. E.g. I would never know what the word 'surprise' means if I had never observed a person in that state before. What I observed could not have been nothing.

According to you, "Only words that are nouns are meaningful".
— Samuel Lacrampe

I said no such thing. — Banno

I just read back, looking for this quote, or words that reflect it, and found nothing. Did Banno really say this, or did you make it up? :chin: — Pattern-chaser

This was my understanding of the position up to that point, as per the quotes below. If my above statement does not reflect that position, then no worries. A minor misunderstanding.

The assumption here is that there is a something that is the meaning of a word [...] But there isn't, of course. — Banno

Is it really so inconceivable that words not have a "real meaning"? — Banno

Nouns refer to things, real or otherwise. Lots of other words do not. — Banno

This could be. I'll redeem myself by giving my meaning of 'being'.
The term 'being' in philosophy is the same as 'thing'. Because that which is not being is nothing. Beings are categorized primarily as either real or imaginary, where real beings exist outside of a mind, and imaginary beings exist only in a mind. Although an imaginary being is not real, it is nonetheless not nothing.

Thanks for you clarification on your position. Now do you believe that not all words refer to beings, or do you simply believe that, although they may exist, it is unproductive to look for these beings?

If the latter only, then you are free to believe this. I personally disagree, because it is important to clarify what each person means with their terms at the beginning of the discussion so as to avoid misunderstandings. As points out, we better make sure we mean the same thing when I use the term 'being' and you use the term 'thing'. But this disagreement is not major, and so we can leave it here.

If the former, then this is an error.
P1: To say that words have meanings is the same as to say that words point to beings. Words are created to express the being that is perceived, and not the opposite way around. Men first had to observe a tree before coming up with the word 'tree' to express what they observed. It makes no sense to suppose men first created the word 'tree' to express nothing, and only later on used that word to refer to tree they observed.
P2: All words have meanings. Otherwise propositions that contain those words would effectively be meaningless.
C: Therefore all words point to beings.

Now, those beings that words point to are either real or imaginary. E.g. a 'horse' points to a real being, and a 'unicorn' points to an imaginary being. I think you and I agree on this point. But they all point to a being nonetheless.

• "No?" In this context, it has the same meaning as "do you disagree?", which can be a real state of mind.
• "And ...?" In this context, it has the same meaning as "what do you conclude?", and concluding is a real act.
• "stands" In this context, it as the same meaning as "has not been refuted", and refuting is a real act (so is not refuting).

My turn. According to you, "Only words that are nouns are meaningful". In that statement, the bolded words are not nouns, and therefore meaningless. The statement is therefore meaningless, and therefore cannot be true. The statement is a self-contradiction.

And ...? Propositions are never made of only nouns; and my previous point stands.

My statement was meant as a prescriptive statement (should we care) rather than a descriptive statement (do people actually care); but I now see it was poorly worded. As a descriptive statement, I agree with you.

I accept the clarification on your position.

So to be sure, Nouns refer to things, real or otherwise. Lots of other words do not. — Banno

Remember that if some words do not refer to beings, that is, are meaningless, then propositions that use those words are also meaningless and thus cannot be true. What would be an example of such words?

Great post. Don't despair Agustino.
The primary function of reason and arguments is not to persuade, but to seek truth. Proof:

P1: We call a thing 'good' if it achieves its function.
P2: An argument is called perfect (fully good) if its conclusion is obtained with certainty, that is, we are certain to have found truth.
C1: Therefore the function of an argument is to find truth.

P3: Despite an argument being perfect, some recipients may still be unconvinced. That may be so because they are pig-headed; looking to be right, not to find truth.
C2: Therefore the function of an argument is not to persuade.

Persuasion is only a secondary or bonus effect of reason and arguments. Having said that, if your argument is flawless, and the recipient's intent is to seek truth primarily (and there is no misunderstanding), then persuasion will necessarily follow.

And besides, other than sales and marketing people, who cares about persuading those who don't seek truth anyways? :wink:

Have You Ever Persuaded Someone Holding An Opposite Worldview From You On TPF? — Agustino

Yes; or rather, I have been persuaded by other people, who showed me a flaw in my reasoning. But I sure as heck would not have admitted it to them! :shade:

If science has taught us anything, is that reality is damn complicated. :wink:

As described in my last post, there is a difference between a concept and the real being, but that difference is so minor on a non-technical level that, for simplicity, I can side with you and say that words refer to real beings directly. This removes the need to talk about concepts, and preserves the ability of propositions to be true.

Back to the original dispute. My objection was not directly about concepts, but about your claim that the meaning of a word is not a real thing; that is to say, words don't refer to real things. As per your last post, it seems your new position is that words do refer to real things; thereby moving away from your original position. Am I interpreting all this right?

Understood. The point of your comment was therefore to be descriptive, a pure observation of what people do; rather than to be prescriptive, a judgement of what people should do. I accept your point as such.

As i said before, truth is about statements, and nothing else. You will no doubt disagree with this, but data or feelings or whatever else are not themselves claims to truth. — ChatteringMonkey

Indeed they are not "claims to truth" because they are not claims at all. But what do you call the difference between the perception of a thing that is really there, vs the perception of a thing that is not really there, if not true and false? Whatever you want to call it, false data is effectively the same as false statements, insofar that they both convey information that does not reflect reality.

a social contract (an agreement) doesn't imply that everybody has a say in it. [...] People are represented. — ChatteringMonkey

True. But a contract requires an agreement among all parties involved, whether it is in a direct or indirect way, as is the case when being represented. As the slaves were not represented, this "social contract" is not really a contract; more of an imposition.

That the Wiki also lists Hinduism as having an element of the golden rule in it, only goes to show i think how vague it really is, since apparently it can fit any system, even the ones that have strict class distinctions from birth. — ChatteringMonkey

No. In this case, the golden rule is in direct contradiction with the class distinction (unless lower classes are treated more like servants than slaves; but I doubt it). Rather, this tells me that the Golden Rule, although known, was simply ignored in that system. One may choose to ignore the moral law, but the fact is that it was still known.

For instance, a thief disagrees with the moral rule that stealing is wrong, and yet people find it perfectly acceptable and even expect that he will be dealt with forcefully. — ChatteringMonkey

A thief does not believe stealing is right, because he does not want it to happen to him. He is therefore stealing, knowing it is wrong to steal. The fact that some go against the moral system does not count against the existence of that moral system.

But "victims of inequality" in general, probably wanted to improve their lot in life by moving up in class yes, but i very much doubt they thought it even feasable to remove classes altogether. — ChatteringMonkey

Sure; but this does not go against the existence of morality. Quite the opposite, it could be used to explain why slavery took so long to be abolished.

Yet how many people act in this way, really... taking a cursory look at the general discource on for instance Twitter should be evidence enough that people generally don't act on the Golden rule. — ChatteringMonkey

This still doesn't mean some people value being lied to, treated as lower than others, or badmouthed. You cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is', that is to say, you cannot deduce the existence of morality based on human behaviour. We can both be right, namely, morality exists, and a lot of people act immorally.

ANd if you have to introduce the apple in order to show how our concepts allow us to communicate, you may as well have not introduced concepts in the first place.

What I would like you to see here is how counter-intuitive it is to suppose that a name refers to something other than what is named; to suppose that the word "apple" does not refer to the apple here before us; or that "Sydney" does not refer to that city. — Banno

For simplicity, it is true that we might as well say that concepts are the real beings; or at least their intelligible part. The subtle difference between a concept and a real being is that the real being can exist without the concept existing in my mind if I have not apprehended that being. E.g., a baby has no concept of apples despite apples existing in the world.

To get technical, a 'concept' is a term in epistemology and requires a subject. It is the intelligible meaning our words refer to. A 'form' is a term in metaphysics and does not require a subject; only an object. It is what gives matter its intelligibility, organization, or identity. Once the subject has apprehended the object, then the concept in the subject coincides with the form of the object. We call that 'knowledge'.

A first problem, to get us started. Where are concepts located? Do I have an apple-concept in my head, while you have an apple-concept in your head?

If so, when I present you with an apple and say "Here is an apple", "Apple" refers to the concept-of-apple in my mind; but for you it refers to the concept-of-apple in your own mind. The implication is that, despite the apple being there before us both, we are not referring to the very same thing. — Banno

Indeed, my concept of apple, your concept of apple, and the form of apple from the real being must be one and the same. The problem of location is solved by inferring the immateriality of concepts (the universal kind), forms, and by extension, minds. Thus universal concepts don't have a physical location. The argument goes as follows:

P1: All physical beings are particulars. They all have particular spacial-temporal properties.
P2: Universal concepts are not particulars. Our concept of apple refers to many particular apples.
C: Concepts are not physical beings.

This unity of concepts and form is what connects subjects together, eg, you and I can have a meaningful coherent communication; and connects subjects with objects, eg, we can know something about the outside world.

Pascal summarizes it this way:

[...] it is impossible that our rational part should be other than spiritual; and if any one maintain that we are simply corporeal, this would far more exclude us from the knowledge of things, there being nothing so inconceivable as to say that matter knows itself. — Pascal

Are they? I don't see any good reason to suppose that this is the case. Indeed, while I have a clear idea of what sort of thing a word is, I have no clear idea of what sort of thing a concept is. — Banno

Words are made of letters. The word 'apple' is made of the letters A, P, P, L, E. Words are symbols or signs that point to concepts. A Concept is the intelligible meaning intended by the word. E.g., the words ‘apple’ in english and ‘pomme’ in french are two words that point to the same concept (the fruit thing). On the other hand, the same word ‘bank’ can point to one concept as found in ‘river bank’, or another concept as found in ‘bank account’. This is sufficient to demonstrate that words and concepts are separate things.

So language works by referring to concepts rather than to things in the world? [...] Further, I would have thought that "Samuel Lacrampe" refers to you, and not to my-concept-of-you. — Banno

Words point to concepts, and my point is that concepts coincide with real beings. That's what I mean when I say concepts must be connected to reality. To use your example, the words "Samuel Lacrampe" indeed refer to the real being which is me.

But now I am confused about your position, because I thought you believed the meaning of a word is not a real thing.

That is, descriptivism is pretty much dead, finished off by Kripke. Am I wrong here? — Banno

That depends on the argument Kripke or yourself have to back up that claim. Now admittedly, I am not familiar with the notion of descriptivism. Is it what we are discussing here?

Could you give a case example where a person rightfully "knows" something, but that knowledge is either unjustified, untrue, or unbelieved?

Granted, when we say "I know this person", we are here using the word ambiguously. We do not mean here that we believe any truth about this person, but merely that we have met them. Now we are not talking about this type of knowledge, but the type that is about a statement, like "I know x is y".

Real things are all concepts? That's not right. — Banno

Almost; but rather, the concepts in our mind reflect intelligible beings in reality. What else does it mean to call a statement "true"? A statement is called true because it reflects reality. So the statement must be connected to reality in some way. Since statements are made of concepts (represented by words), then the concepts themselves must be connected to reality. If there is connection between concepts and real beings, then no proposition ever spoken can be called "true"; which is absurd.

I think the fundamental difference between your view and mine is that i don't believe that 'true is what the majority of people think is true'. I think we determine what is true by veryfing it with data, and it doesn't matter how many people believe something if it can't be veryfied. Agreement about something doesn't make it true. — ChatteringMonkey

I agree about statements. Statements are not judged as true by majority. I also agree that we verify statements with data. But how do we verify data? We know that not all data perceived is true. Thus we judge data to be true by majority; and that is the point I am trying to make.

morality is about agreement between people about a set of rules — ChatteringMonkey

Well, this new definition is not too far off the mark, because looking for an agreement between people implies that everyone has a say in it. However, notice that even with this new definition of morality, slavery is not morally good because surely slaves would not have agreed with those rules.

Large portions of history hierarchy, different classes and unequality were to norm. — ChatteringMonkey

Here is my source. But assuming you are correct, this fact is likely explained by the use of force by a particular group, and surely not by a mutual agreement among the whole group; and thus the reason is not an ethical reason.

Not a whole lot of people thought there was something wrong with that. — ChatteringMonkey

Except for the victims of the inequality. You make it sound like slaves wanted to be slaves. I don't know my history too well, but I am fairly sure this could not be the case.

Also the point that you seem to miss is that the golden rule by itself is far from a fully formed morality. It's vague, and only deals with one aspect of what humans want. There are a variety of things we want, and not all of these things line up perfecty. — ChatteringMonkey

I think this is incorrect. The fact is nobody values being lied to, treated as lower than others, badmouthed etc; and on the other hand, everybody values honesty, treated as equal, trusted etc. Thus the Golden Rule is fitting: As I seek honesty, equality and trust towards me, and reject dishonesty, inequality and badmouthing towards me, so I ought to treat others in the same way, knowing they want this treatment too.

How do you know that there are essential properties for such words to be found? — Pseudonym

Same demonstration as given here (middle section).

Is it? — Pseudonym

Sure is. It is one of the best ways to arrive at principles. E.g. "Knowledge implies justification", by definition.

This just repeats the same error; that people would have found some flaw if there was one to find. My examples surely must cause you to question that assumption? — Pseudonym

You gave examples of hypotheses that have been debunked. The original definition of knowledge has never been debunked, but at most, added on to. The fact that it has never been debunked and there was a long time lapse in adding more properties is indeed not a proof, but makes it reasonable to suppose that the original definition is close to the truth.

This is nothing but the scientific method at work: a hypothesis becomes accepted if it is the simplest one that people have not been able to falsify.

If he used the Socratic method, but was unsuccessful in sufficiently backing up his claim, and if every other person using the Socratic method to make such claims was also unsuccessful in backing up their claim (empirically true, since no such claims have been taken to be unquestionably 'right'), then at least by inference that pushes us to conclude that the Socratic method does not work as a means of backing up a claim. — Pseudonym

This statement seems to contradict your previous claim, namely, the fact that people did not find a flaw is not a proof that there is not one to find. Using the same rationale here, the fact the people merely disagree on the result of a method is not a proof that the method is bad. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, merely stating others' opinions without the justification for their opinion is not productive.

Back to the original definition: Justified true belief. Does anyone dispute any of these properties as being essential? If no, then it is reasonable to infer these are truly essential; and credit goes to the socratic method. While it may not have found the perfect definition (yet), it did get us close to the truth by finding these first properties. Personally, I'll take a method that, while possibly imperfect, leads closer to the truth, over the alternative which is nothing.

Yep, I stand corrected. I actually prefer your definition of art over mine.
You're just wrong about kittens. Kittens can all die.

Well, yes, apart from it's use. Which might be to have you think in terms of use rather than meaning. [...] Is it really so inconceivable that words not have a "real meaning"? — Banno

The problem with this view is, if words don't point to real things (concepts), then no proposition ever spoken can be objectively true, for truth means 'reflective of reality'. Example: The proposition "The Earth is round" cannot be objectively true if the words 'Earth', 'is', and 'round' don't point to anything in reality.

So we should do philosophy by vote? — Banno

Of course not. I was merely stating I find no flaw in your logic for that quoted sentence; though the conclusion that words don't have meanings doesn't follow from this.

Science proceeds by looking and generalising rather than repeated questioning. — Banno

That is indeed part of science, but a topic is truly scientific only if it is testable, verifiable, falsifiable. Thus the hypothesis definition is tested and falsified by finding examples and counter-examples in the common language that uses the defined term. This is essentially the Socratic Method.

Feelings can also be caused by things that are not real, like dreams or imagination. — ChatteringMonkey

Sure, but the same goes for senses. We know our perceptions from dreams to be false, from contradictions among our own perceptions or those from other subjects. This "reality" could be a dream, but it is unreasonable to infer this because the large majority of subjects perceives the same things, and this hypothesis then fails the law of parsimony.

I don't agree with feelings themselves being true or false. Only statements can be true or false, and we know by veryfying the statements with the senses. — ChatteringMonkey

Not true. All our different types of perceptions can be false. We may falsely see, hear, smell, or feel something, without making a statement. And their correctness are tested by contradictions among ourselves and other subjects. How frightening it must be to be the last person in the world, because of the challenge to differentiate the true from false perceptions without other people's feedback. :sad:

Say for instance, you have fear for a spider. Your feeling will not help you determine if that spider is actually dangerous. To know you will have to test it, and observe what happens. — ChatteringMonkey

Agreed. I don't believe the function of emotional feelings is to find truth, but to provide a quick way to make a judgement, rather than using the more accurate but much slower reason. Nevertheless, while not infallible, feelings are designed to feed true information, and they tend to be true most of the time. If this was not the case, then it would be wise to suppress all feelings, which is absurd.

It's not like there is only one true morality that can be deduced from feelings with mathematical certainty. — ChatteringMonkey

But there is. Fact: Virtually nobody in the world judges the situation of being treated as less-than-equal as a good thing; not even bad people like Hitler. We are either collectively wrong about this judgement (for if not objective, then not objectively true), or this treatment is objectively bad. Most civilizations have opted for the latter hypothesis, because they all adopted the Golden Rule of ethics.

The assumption here is that there is a something that is the meaning of a word; [...] But there isn't, of course. — Banno

Does it follow that your comment, made of nothing but words, is meaningless? :joke:

if this meaning-of-a-word were identified, we would all agree on it. — Banno

Agreed. This is why it is so important to identify that real meaning or concept.

No, if it were then philosophers would have to be linguists and definitions could easily be resolved by the dictionary. — Pseudonym

Again, if that was the case then the work has already been done. The staff at the various dictionaries have already invested far more time than you or I ever could in determine exactly what the common usage of words is in the real world. So what more work needs to be done? — Pseudonym

The dictionary is a good start, but you will notice that some definitions are not perfect for they do not state the essential properties; they only give a vague description of the term, which is sufficient for most readers to understand the meaning, but not capture the essence. Look up the dictionary definition of 'knowledge' for example.

It is important in philosophy to find the essence of things in order to find essential truths about them. E.g., is x always y?

I wasn't commenting on the value, only that, contrary to your assertion, it is not the Socratic method which allows me to know when two philosophers disagree, a simple empirical study of their words does that. The expression "I disagree", for example, would do the job. — Pseudonym

You misunderstood my original point. My point was not to determine how we know others disagree, but what makes them disagree.

No. Consider the earth-centred solar system, the flat-earth, humours as a cause of disease, phlogiston, creationism. An idea's persistence has no bearing on its rightness. — Pseudonym

You are right regarding your examples; but regarding the definition of knowledge, Gettier did not attempt to disprove the original definition, but only to show it was incomplete. And the fact that the original definition held up for so long shows that it must have been close to completeness, otherwise people would have found exceptions earlier.

He didn't "discover" some property was missing. He claimed some property was missing, others disagreed, and still do. That's the point, he simply made a claim it was grammatically possible to make and no one had any means of determining if he was right or not. — Pseudonym

Claims are made valid or not depending on if the reason that backs it up is valid or not. Gettier backed up his claim by finding counter-examples that aim to falsify the original definition. Whether he was successful or not is besides the point; the point being that even he used the Socratic Method.

Both. I think it is applied because even your description of sifting the meaning from a proposition by context is still using the Socratic Method on a particular test. I also think it ought to be applied, because it is the scientific method applied to definition of terms as used in the common language. If the scientific method works, then this should work too.

The raw data is also through our senses, because feelings are only triggered if we are aware of the events that cause them, and that awareness comes from seeing, hearing, etc. information about the event.

But surely you agree that some feelings inform us of real things. For example, the feeling of fear triggered from encountering a bear is true, for it points to a real danger; and the feeling of relief triggered by seeking shelter in a blizzard is true, for it points to a real removal of danger. These are examples of true feelings that point to physical good or evil.

Then we observe that virtually nobody in the world likes to be lied to, cheated on, ignored, or bad-mouthed, due to the negative feelings these events trigger in us. These feelings do not point to physical evils, for we are not physically harmed when being lied to, cheated on, ignored, or bad-mouthed. Therefore they must point to moral evils. And it is reasonable to infer these feelings are true, because they are felt by virtually everybody in the world.

, hello.
Because we can prove that all meaningful words have essential properties. Then the fact that we are able to use all words in a meaningful sentence shows that we have some knowledge of their meanings. We just need to uncover the definition by separating the essential properties from the non-essential ones; which is done through the Socratic Method.

Most find their definition through a combination of factors, but mainly common usage. — Pseudonym

But common usage IS the test used in the Socratic Method to verify or falsify a hypothesis definition. Thus we are not really in disagreement here.

Again, I don't agree, we can use simple empiricism to see that we don't agree, read the words of two philosophers on the subject and infer from your understanding of their different meanings that they don't agree. — Pseudonym

Their opinion alone is not valuable without the reason to back it up. And that reason is finding counter-examples that falsify the definition, in other words, the Socratic Method.

Knowledge as justified true belief has been in doubt since Gettier but the point of my argument is not about consensus, it's about how we justify the process. So what if lot's of people agree, how does that make the one who doesn't more wrong, and if it doesn't automatically make him more wrong, then what method are you going to put forward to convince him otherwise. He's already heard the arguments and still does not agree, what then? — Pseudonym

My point was not about the number of people who agree vs disagree. It was the fact that even those who don't agree are not in full disagreement, and simply find the accepted definition to be insufficient.

Take 'knowledge' again. The essential properties of 'justified' + 'true' + 'belief' were found by Plato using the Socratic Method, and the definition was accepted until Gettier in the 20th century. This means the original definition must have been mostly right if it held up for that long. And even assuming that Gettier has successfully demonstrated that some property is missing, this did not demonstrate the three properties as inessential, only insufficient. And finally, it was still the Socratic Method which allowed him to discover that some property was missing, by falsifying the definition with counter-examples.

I just don't understand your position. After all, the Socratic Method is nothing but the scientific method [observation, hypothesis, testing through verification and falsification, repeat] applied to definition of terms as used in the common language. To dispute the Socratic Method is also to dispute the scientific method, is it not?