Hello. I have a couple of questions.
Why do you claim that if morality is objective, then God exists, then predestination exists?
I am assuming that you are not a theist; and by extension, that you do not believe in objective morality. Does it follow, in your view, that Hilter was not objectively immoral?

Courage is when the desire to help out-competes the desire to remain safe. — Inter Alia

This does not agree with the definition I stated. I courage is defined as "the will to do something that goes against one's inclinations (or desires)", then courage cannot itself be an inclination or desire. Maybe you don't agree with the definition, and believe that courage is in fact a desire? But courage is praiseworthy; and there is nothing praiseworthy about submitting to our desires.

This, however, is not a fair characterisation of what I've said, [...] everyone already knows what is a 'Good' society as an evolved instinct [...] I guarantee they will have a definite idea of where we want to be, and be very uncertain about how to get there. — Inter Alia

Understood. So I am still at the point of understanding your position. Could you then describe to me this definite idea of where we want to be, with respect to a good society?

I am surprised that you do not see injustice in this scenario. If your 1000-employee company gave everyone a Christmas bonus every year except for you, would you not be upset, and rightfully so?This behaviour is called discrimination, which is defined as "unjust treatment of different categories of people or things".

If the employer gave a raise to one person and not the other, and the person who did not receive an unearned raise never found out, there would be no harm and so it wouldn't be immoral — VagabondSpectre

This contradicts what you said earlier here about potential harm. On the same rationale, if your spouse cheated on you and you never found out, then there would be no harm and so it wouldn't be immoral either; but this is absurd.

I understand. So your view is that harm is an essential property of immorality. But this still does not explain how an attempted murder, causing no harm, is immoral. I think you have answered previously that harm is always done to the immoral person, but what reasons do you have to believe that?

Got it. What about a case that involves no harm, either potential or actual, such as this?
Two employees have the same skills and seniority. I give a big raise to one, and none to the second one. This seems unjust; and yet I did not harm anyone.

The point though, was that the concept of one changed, evolved. My proposal was that in the original sense the concept of "one" did not allow that one could be divided. But then someone proposed the principle of fractions, which would require that "one" be redefined such that the one could be divided. There are numerous examples of evolution in mathematical principles. The addition of the numeral 0, and negative integers is one example. More recently we have what is called imaginary numbers. Before imaginary numbers, there was no square root of -1, that was disallowed by the conceptual structure. Now there is a square root of -1, it is allowed. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that, if we remove the identity or unit such as 'm' from the number, that anyone thought that 1 could not be divided. As you say yourself later on, one body can be divided into many molecules, and everyone can see that. So I think your claim once again shows the evolution of symbols, not of the concepts they point to.

Otherwise, I agree about your statement regarding how one object is composed of many parts. Physical objects can in theory be divided into an infinite quantity of smaller parts.

Yes, they are members of the universal form, hydrogen, but that's a human designation based in our determination of similarity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The principle of sufficient reason demands that there is an objective reason as to why all hydrogen atoms behave the same way every time. The reason is one of two: Either the atoms are connected in some way, or they are not. If they are, then this connection is what is called the universal form, or genus, or species. If they are not, then the phenomenon is a mere coincidence, which, while logically possible, fails the law of parsimony until the first reason is refuted.

Besides, do you not believe in objective species at least when it comes to living beings, such that all humans are part of the human species, all dogs part of the dog species, and all trees part of the tree species? Science could explain this by mere DNA, but this only pushes the problem back a step, and does not explain why the DNA is similar among beings of the same species.

Does it follow that attempted murder is not immoral?

It sounds like you equate 'will' or 'intention' to 'desires', 'inclinations', 'emotions'. But if this was the case, then the term 'courage' would be meaningless, because is means "the will to do something that goes against one's inclinations."

It also sounds like you equate moral success with the success of a society to survive. But does it follow that a society built on slavery is morally successful, so long that everyone survives?

Ah! yes, thank you. In other words, unjustified harm is an essential property of immorality. I got confused when he said that it was both, that harm causes immorality and immorality causes harm, where as in this case, it is actually neither.

Sorry we couldn't come to an understanding. I thought you meant "harm causes immorality" when you said the following:

what would make it immoral other than the harm done? — Sam26

I.e., if harm makes an act immoral, then harm causes immorality. I understand you don't mean "harm causes immorality every time", but maybe that "harm is a necessary cause for immorality".

I haven't worked out how to reply to multiple people yet — Inter Alia

Hit 'Reply' on several posts from different people.

If there is no harm done when one acts, then I don't see how an act can be called immoral, i.e., what would make it immoral other than the harm done? [...] Since I believe that all immoral acts have the property of harm, that is, that harm is necessarily a property of an immoral act. Thus, both your questions, ("...is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral?") are answered in the affirmative. I've already explained how intention isn't necessarily a feature of an immoral act. The latter part of your question is essentially the same as the former. It's the same as A=B and B=A. — Sam26

There is an error. 'Because' has the word 'cause' in it. My question could be rephrased as "Does harm cause immorality, or does immorality cause harm?". "A causes B" is not the same as "B causes A". But from what you said, it sounds like you mean "harm causes immorality".

Also, in an earlier post I showed how intent is not necessarily a feature of an immoral act, the example being an accident where one didn't intend to cause harm, but harm happened nevertheless. Most immoral acts that people commit are intentional, but not all, is what I'm saying. This is the point of calling some immoral acts accidental, it's an accident because someone didn't intentionally set out to harm someone, as opposed to intentionally doing something to harm someone. This is clearly seen in a drunk driving example, or even in an example where someone is not paying sufficient attention to what their doing. In each example one is held accountable for their actions in spite of not intentionally harming others. [...] Another important point of what makes something both immoral and accidental is responsibility, I'm held responsible for the act of driving drunk and causing harm to someone or myself, because of what I could have reasonably foreseen in terms of my actions. Thus it not about intention, but about what one should have known about certain actions, and thus we are responsible for actions taken that could lead to harm. — Sam26

I see your point, but want to show you that intention is still the root cause of all immoral acts, including immoral accidental ones. Let's consider the example of harm caused by drunk driving. Yes, the person did not directly intend to harm the victim by driving drunk. But did he have the intention to avoid harm? Logically, either the driver (1) intended to avoid harm as the end goal, or (2) he did not.

(1) The driver had the intention to avoid harm as the end goal: If he could foresee the act of drunk driving as having a harmful outcome, then he could not have made the decision to drive drunk, because this would contradict his intentions. Conversely, if he could not have foreseen the act of drunk driving as having a harmful outcome, then he could still make the decision of driving drunk without contradicting his intentions. But then he is not responsible, because as you said, immorality necessitates responsibility; and responsibility necessitates being able to reasonably foresee the outcome. Therefore the act is not immoral.

(2) The driver did not have the intention to avoid harm as the end goal: If he could foresee the act of drunk driving as having a harmful outcome, then he could still have made the decision to drive drunk, without contradicting his intentions. Then he is responsible; then the act is immoral.

Conclusion: although the person may not have the direct intention of causing a harmful outcome, the intention of avoiding harm or not as the end goal is still the necessary root cause to an act being immoral or not.

So your position is that an immoral act is always harmful because the person that causes the immoral act always harms themselves. In your view, is the act immoral because the person harms themselves, or do they harm themselves because the act is immoral? If the former, then how do you know they harm themselves? If the latter, then what makes the act immoral besides intention?

Otherwise, I agree that harm is essential to physical evil.

I believe concepts change too. I believe that 1 was originally used to signify the most simple unit. Unlike 2, 4, 6, 8, it could not be divided. As the practise of division developed it was allowed that 1 could be divided, and this gave us fractions. So the concept signified by 1 changed from being the most simple, indivisible unit to being infinitely divisible. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is an interesting topic. I think you are making an error with the claim that because 1 can be divided, then it loses its original nature of being the most simple unit or identity. 1 whole can be divided into two halves, but notice that we are forced to change identity, as underlined, in order to speak truly. 1 whole = 2 halves, but 1 whole ≠ 2 wholes, because 1 ≠ 2. Similarly, 1 m = 100 cm, but 1 m ≠ 100 m. In other words, for a given identity, 1 remains the simplest unit; and if it gets divided, then it gets divided into different identities. As such, the nature of 1 remains unchanged.

That "a rock participates in the form of rock-ness" requires a judgement. The thing itself, and the form of rock-ness are two distinct things. [...] Without that judgement, the particular thing, and the universal form must be inherently united. In the way that I describe, the particular and the universal are distinct, and a judgement relates them. Without the judgement, they must be already related through participation. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is indeed my position that the particular thing and the universal form are inherently united. If I understand you correctly, your position is that the particular and the universal are distinct, objectively disconnected, and only related by man-made judgement, is that correct? From this view, does it follow that only particular forms are objective real, where as universal forms are only man-made?

My position is that both types of forms exist objectively. Indeed, particular forms must exist in order for a thing to have its own identity. But then it must also have a universal form in order to be part of the genus or species it belongs to. If this was not the case, then two things made of the same material could in principle behave completely differently. E.g., two rocks composed of the same minerals, when put in contact with fire, could react differently, such that one could be inert, and the other one could blow up. But this would be absurd. We could never know any generalities; only particulars after having done particular tests on each one of them. Furthermore, we could never perform any inductive reasoning, such as "all rocks made of this mineral are inert to fire", or "all fires are hot", or "no human can breath under water", etc.

That is correct. My point is therefore that an object being mental is not sufficient to demonstrate that it is non-physical. And as it is the case for mental images conveying no information, so it is as well with mental images that do convey information, for they remain mental images. The image remains physical, even though the information it conveys is not.

Great discussion. I want in. Is either harm or intention essential to morality? Consider the following cases.

(1) Harm without intention: a rock falls on someone. This is not immoral.
(2) Harm with intention: A person intends and successfully kills someone innocent. This is immoral.
(3) Intention without harm: A person intends but fails to kill someone innocent. This is still immoral. I personally would not appreciate this. Would you?
(4) No harm, no intention: A rock; that's it. Clearly not morally bad, and yet, also not morally good.

If the above judgements are correct, then it follows that harm is not essential, where as intention is, unless there exists a case where morality exists without intention.

A few things to note:

• Although it is difficult, or even impossible, to discover some's true intention, true intentions still exist.
• In more complex cases, the intended outcome is more challenging to achieve, but this does not change the intention itself. I.e, willing good or willing harm as the end.

I understand, but it's an important part of my view of ethics, there are many who view ethics as subjective and/or relative. [...] So it's my view when talking about justice that we have a view of justice that's has some objective standard. — Sam26

I completely agree.

Your response to the self-sealing fallacy is not sufficient. [...] Thus, because of the way your argument is framed, it's self-sealing as far as I can tell. — Sam26

Well, in theory, we could always ask the individuals whether they have an inclination to seek justice for themselves or not; but I see your point that this is not practicable to do in a large scale. Much like for intentions, we cannot be certain about inclinations from mere observations. However, we have a few solutions left: (1) reasonable claim, and (2) empirical data by observing ourselves.

(1) Reasonable claim: For a given behaviour, it is not more reasonable to assume that the person was seeking justice rather than injustice to themselves?
(2) Empirical data within ourselves: I already asked, but do you not personally have an inclination to seek justice rather than injustice for yourself?

I don't think it's true that necessarily all unjust people know their unjust (you seem to be basing this on the idea of innate knowledge). — Sam26

It must be so, because if they sincerely did not know that their act was causing some harm, then it would be an honest mistake; which is a mistake, but is not unjust.

What is the evidence that we have innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge gained in some other way. — Sam26

Specifically regarding morality, I summarize here the argument from my original post, which has yet to be refuted: if knowledge is necessary for intentions, and intention is necessary for moral language, then knowledge is necessary for moral language. And we know it cannot be learned from observation, because as Mr. Wayfarer stated earlier, we cannot entail 'what ought to be' from 'what is'. Therefore, either moral language does not exist, or if it does, then its knowledge must be innate.

Generally speaking, there is a test to determine if a knowledge is innate or not, but let's save it for another time, for the sake of keeping this post somewhat short.

Yes, you are on to something! I was not all that familiar with the term meta-ethics, but the way you have described it makes sense. Described as such, you are correct that my original post is merely about the source of our knowledge of the moral good; which is meta-ethics. The focus was not on the essence of morally good intentions and acts; which is normative ethics. This discussion was brought up later on, almost as a tangent; and to this, I claim that the Golden Rule is a sure way to test the moral goodness of an intention and act. While the two topics are related insofar that they deal with ethics, the claims are not dependant on one another.

I also agree about the views that morality is objective, and that predicting the consequences of an act is a good way to determine moral goodness, as this method follows from the Golden Rule.

It is possible, therefore, that determining whether an action is moral, can only be only be done in the context of the perpetrator's acquired knowledge of morality (in the normative sense) because although innately born with the concept of what is 'good' and what is 'evil', they may have no moral knowledge at all i.e. have no clue as to whether their actions will achieve or frustrate the achievement of that state. — Inter Alia

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that although we may all have theoretical knowledge of the moral good, we may lack the knowledge of the right course of action in a given situation. That may be, and this is where the Golden Rule becomes a useful tool. How should I act? The same way I would want others to act towards me in the same situation if the roles were reversed.

Sure, there are the books that contain the definition and the people that know it. The definition, while abstract, is not something ontologically separate from those physical books or people. (It is also implicit in the natural world which means it is discoverable by anyone with the requisite intelligence and skills.) — Andrew M

If by definition, you mean quite literally the description of the concept, and not the concept in itself, then I agree with you. (man this topic is hard).

Wittgenstein would agree they're objective. Yet, he (rightly, in my opinion) denied that math are discovered and unchangeable. Rather, they're invented. The world is a certain way. But it could be otherwise. This means that the way the world is, is contingent. Although, it is also a fact that people most of the time perform certain tasks the same way. It is not just the world that exhibits regularities, it is us as well. Math are grounded in certain human actions; sorting, arranging etc. These actions are performed with a certain amount of regularity by most humans. These performances are then re-enforced by schooling and "hardened" into rules. These rules then, are the basis of math. Had the world been otherwise, had we been otherwise, then our practices would be different and math would be different as well (if they would have been invented at all). — Πετροκότσυφας

Not gonna lie, I did not read your quoted paragraphs (tl;dr O:) ), but I read the above. Let's make the distinction between three kinds of reality: (1) potential, that is, not actual and contingent, (2) actual and contingent, and (3) actual and necessary. I claim that math concepts fit into reality (3). We can use Chesterton's Test of Imagination to demonstrate this.

• (1) Unicorns don't exist, but I can image them. They are therefore potential.
• (2) Horses exist but I can imagine a world without them. They are therefore actual and contingent. Same for laws of physics. These may be unchangeable in our universe, but sci-fi writers imagine universes with different laws all the time, like a flat Earth carried by elephants on a giant turtle.
• (3) The concept I+I=II is actual (we can test this with objects), and I cannot imagine any other results, such as I+I=I or I+I=III. E.g., try to imagine 1 apple, and then 1 other apple, and yet imagine 3 apples in total, without adding a third apple in the mental image. It cannot be done. Math concepts are therefore actual and necessary.

That image imparts no information. — Wayfarer

Nevertheless, we agree that the container of info is physical, even if the info it contains is not. But I think that a mental image is also nothing but a container of information. After all, 'mental image' is synonymous to what I called earlier 'physical visualization', even according to Edward Feser's article.

If information is the arrangement of physical parts, then there must be a reason for that particular arrangement being the particular arrangement which it is in order that we can say that it is "information". It must have the capacity to inform us of something. — Metaphysician Undercover

To clarify, I was referring to information pointing to no concepts, that is, meaningless raw data, like statics from the tv set, perceived by the senses but unintelligible to the mind. Otherwise, I agree that meaningful information must be non-physical, for the reason you pointed out.

What different symbols represent is not unchangeable, and this is evident in evolving language. So if for some reason the ordering of the symbols which represent numbers gets changed, and this all agreed upon, such that the order is 1,3,2,4, and the symbol 3 starts to mean the same thing as 2 does now, then 1+1 would equal 3. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are once again confusing the symbol or word, with the concept it points to. Yes, we can change the symbols 1, 2, 3, ..., but we cannot change the concepts I, II, III, ... As such, we can make 1+1=3 if we change the symbols, but cannot make I+I=III <-- As you can see, there is one too many bar on the right side of the equation, which makes it unbalanced.

And as it is with concepts of numbers, so it is with other concepts. E.g., we can change the word "red", but the concept of red-ness will remain unchanged.

The point is that there is no necessity between the symbol and what it represents. It doesn't necessarily represent what it does, and this is because what it represents was somehow decided upon. Therefore the relationship between the symbol and what it represents is dependent on the existence of subjects. Since the existence of concepts seems to be dependent on this relationship between symbols and representation, we cannot simply assert that concepts are "objective" if you define objective in this way (independent of subjects). — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your first three sentences. This is why there are different languages and writing symbols. However, I still disagree with your last sentence, that concepts or universal forms are dependent on that relationship. A rock participates in the form of rock-ness, even before a subject observes it or find a word or symbol for it for the first time.

First, an action is just or not just, not because of what someone believes, but because of objective criteria that we recognize as just. — Sam26

Agreed. But just to clarify, the current argument is not whether or not justice is objective (it is), but whether all humans seek justice to themselves (even if they could be wrong about what true justice is).

Your argument is self-sealing. — Sam26

I don't think so. All we need to do to falsify it is to find a case where a man is faced with two options with similar outcomes, but the first one is just to him, and the second one is less just; and the man picks the less just option (assume no false perceptions). But I claim no such case exists: Who in their right mind would pick the less just option when all else is equal?

But external facts aside, the question is what do you, Sam26, observe within you? Do you not find an inclination to seek justice at all times, at least for yourself?

Really, all you're saying is that people don't willingly harm themselves. After all when an injustice is done, whether it's an injustice to oneself or to another, then one is harming oneself or the person to whom the injustice is done. Thus, the real question is "Do people do harm to themselves intentionally?" The answer is quite obviously yes. People smoke knowing full well that they are harming themselves, not only do they smoke knowing this, but they do a myriad of things knowing that they're harming themselves. If they do these kinds of things, why wouldn't they do things to themselves that they perceive to be unjust? — Sam26

Harming oneself is not synonymous to injustice. Take martyrs, or even people who practice self-flagellation. They willingly harm themselves, but do so precisely in the name of justice. As for smokers, it is explained by one of the following three reasons: (1) addiction, (2) they don't truly believe it causes harm, (3) they may believe it causes harm, but do so because they perceive that not doing so would result in a greater harm (e.g. peer pressure). None of these reasons implies injustice done to oneself.

All your doing is making the claim that they believe they're seeking justice for themselves, but the error of this thinking can be seen if we understand that being unjust is the same as any wrongdoing. We know that people make all kinds of immoral decisions, knowing that that their actions are immoral, and knowing that it will cause harm to themselves, or harm to others. — Sam26

Maybe my position is not yet clear, because I agree that unjust people know they are unjust. This follows from the title of this discussion, that moral knowledge is innate. I am just arguing at the moment that they have no inclination to do injustice to themselves.

My main point is that all immoral acts cause harm to someone, and I'm going to stick with that. [...] So for a lie to be immoral it would have to cause harm to someone, if it doesn't cause any harm, then I would contend that it's not immoral. — Sam26

Would you then say that the morality of an act is determined by the consequence? I.e., If it results in harm, then immoral; if not, then not. It would seem to follow that attempted but failed murder is not immoral because no harm was done. Do you agree?

The problem here is that space and time are not properties, so neither can place be a property. That's why motion is so difficult to understand, it's not the property of an object, it is a relationship between objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems inconsequential, because a relative property is still meaningful, so long as the standard is the same for all things. If I describe the dog I see as being at the intersection of streets A and B at time T, everybody understands the description of the location, so long as streets A and B don't move.

How would you propose to determine the spatial-temporal location of a concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

Easy: They have none. My position is that non-physical things don't occupy physical spaces. I thought this was a generally accepted claim. Where would the claim that "all things have a spacial-temporal location" come from?

How are you defining "objective" here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Part of reality, independent of a subject. As such, math concepts are discovered and unchangeable. We cannot simply decide that "1+1=3", even if everybody agreed to do so.

Yes, your definition of "ideal" is completely different from mine. Ideal to me means perfect in conception. Therefore a thing cannot be an ideal. You define ideal as the perfect thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright, but I admit I am not sure what the difference is between "perfect in conception" and simply "perfect". It seems that if a thing is perfect, then its conception cannot be more perfect.

If conception was as you describe here, experience dependent, then we could never understand things which had just been described to us, but we had not seen. The various fields of science demonstrate that the true nature of conception is within definition, as there is much which is described and conceived of, without having been experienced. — Metaphysician Undercover

A fair point. I reply that it is true, that if we have never experienced basic concepts of shapes, colours, sounds, tastes, and feelings, such as, triangle-ness, redness, a music note, sweetness, and coldness, then we could never understand more complex concepts made from basic concepts, such as house, horse, sun, or law. But if we do apprehend the basic concepts from experience, then I think we can apprehend complex concepts composed of basic concepts, without experiencing them. E.g., I have never observed a chiliagon, but if it is defined as "a polygon with 1000 sides", then I can apprehend it, because I already apprehended the concepts 'polygon', '1000', and 'sides'.

Well, if unintelligible or meaningless information is nothing but the arrangement of physical parts in a certain way, then I can definitely mail such info from a mental image: Say I have a mental image of this. I transpose this info on paper, and voilà. And the same can be done with the mental image of a particular triangle, so long that it does not serve to symbolize the concept of triangle-ness. I.e., an animal can have the same mental image when observing a picture of a particular triangle, without understanding the concept of triangle-ness.

As far as I can tell, the hypothesis of info being nothing but arrangements of physical parts seems adequate, when concepts are not involved.

How can one imagine triangle-ness without any physical properties? Isn't that exactly what triangle-ness is, a physical property? — Metaphysician Undercover

Particular objects participate in triangle-ness due to their specific physical properties, but the concept triangle-ness itself is not made of physical properties, as demonstrated in my previous argument. Also, see the response below in case of confusion about the term 'imagination'.

How would you imagine a universal triangle that is not a particular kind of triangle, namely scalene, isosceles or equilateral? I think that fails Chesterton's test. So maybe you're thinking of the definition of a triangle (e.g., a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles). And, yes, we can think coherently about that. But the definition is not separable from particulars either, whether the human being that thinks about it or the books that contain it. — Andrew M

As I read up on this stuff, I see now that I was using the term 'imagination' incorrectly. I indeed meant to say "thinking coherently" about the concept, and not "having a physical visualization in the mind". This may have created some confusions; my bad. So the fact that we can think coherently (without contradiction) about a thing that contains no particular shows that such thing is not essentially made of particulars.

I am not sure what you mean, Andrew, regarding "the definition is not separable from particulars either". Could you clarify?

You can represent it physically, but it's an ideal object in the sense of being a geometric primitive. And surely the triangle I am just now imagining, is not physical, on account of it's a mental image. — Wayfarer

I don't think that an image being mental demonstrates that the image is non-physical. For one thing, mental images are particulars. Do you have a reason to believe it to be so?

Think, McFly, Think (and I recommend having a read of the whole post.) — Wayfarer

I finally read this. It was good, and on par with my position; not too surprising as Feser and I are both catholic. And... I once again used the wrong term in my posts when it comes to 'imagination'. I used the term generally to say "thinking about the concept", where as Feser uses it strictly to say 'mental image' or 'physical visualization in the mind'. This may have been one of the sources of confusion throughout the discussion, such as this one.

Hello.
What criteria that is learned from experience can be used to judge if an act is moral or not? It cannot be the harm caused by the act, because, as discussed with @Sam26, an act causing harm can still be moral if it is done for good reasons. We yet have to discover the criteria to judge if the reasons are good or not.

Besides how does one separate innate knowledge from any other kind of knowledge? In other words, what is the criteria by which we understand that a piece of knowledge is innate? — Sam26

In the case of morality, the raw sense data is called Conscience. Otherwise, in general, you can search within yourself to discover undoubtable principles, such as "All humans ought to be treated with the same level of respect", or "1+1=2", or "If A is B, and B is C, then A is C".

I am intrigued.

Excuse me, but have you been living on planet Earth? People believe all kinds of crazy things, even when it comes to how they treat themselves. Just look at those who believe that blowing themselves up will win them a place in heaven. As for the example I gave, why would you doubt that people would do this willingly, people do all kinds of things willingly in the name of religion. I agree that there were some, maybe even a majority who probably didn't sacrifice willingly, but even a cursory examination of how people have behaved in the past, toward themselves and towards others leads me to conclude you are as wrong about this as you can get. — Sam26

I admit I misspoke when I said that nobody sacrifices themselves willingly. You may be right that some may willingly blow themselves up, and others with them, in the name of some religion. Having said that, I want to clarify my claim about human behaviour, and show that the above fact does not harm it:

Everyone seeks justice for themselves (not necessarily for others), and avoid injustice against themselves (not necessarily injustice that works in their favour). In other words, everyone is inclined to do good to themselves.

Now, in the case of people blowing themselves up, either they see the act as (1) just or (2) unjust. (1) If they see it as just, then it fits my claim, and their error is only an error in facts about the given situation. E.g., they may sincerely believe that the people they blow up are evil people, like Nazis, where as in fact, they are not. (2) If they see the act as unjust, then it is nevertheless seen as unjust in their favour, because as you said yourself, it is likely done to "win them a place in heaven". But, it cannot be that some people willingly accept a condition that they perceive to be unjust to themselves, if a more just option exists. If you disagree, then I challenge you to find one. ;)

That's MY point, that's exactly what you're doing? Thus, it's your argument that's circular. You didn't read my point carefully enough. — Sam26

My argument was not circular, because the Golden Rule was my starting point; a premise to judge if events are moral or not. I think you are now asking where the premise comes from. It is based on the metaphysical principle that all humans have equal ontological value. I made a post to defend this claim here, but I think most people will agree, simply by agreeing that slavery is immoral. So if all humans have equal ontological value, it follows that they ought to be treated with the same level of respect, and the Golden Rule is merely a practical way of ensuring it is done correctly in a given situation.

So you object to the Golden Rule being the absolute criteria to determine morality, on the grounds that individuals may have different ways of how they want to be treated. I dispute the underlined point. It is inherent to human nature that all humans seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to themselves. I doubt that the victims of the sacrifices to the sun god ever did this willingly, or that the priests picking the victims ever picked themselves; because how can one willingly choose a condition for themselves if they think the condition is unjust? Same for suicidal people; they do not see suicide as a good thing in itself, but as a last resort to minimize the injustice that would otherwise happen to them if they kept on living.

Thus, if everyone inherently seeks justice and avoids injustice to them, then the golden rule is fitting because it results in seeking justice and avoiding injustice for all; and justice is another term for the moral good.

The Golden Rule itself is dependent on a particular view of morality, so it can't be the test of what's moral or immoral. — Sam26

This statement begs the question: If the Golden Rule is truly the test for what is moral, then it is not itself dependant on any moral views; and if it is dependant on a moral view, then it cannot be the test for what is moral. To escape the circle, you would need to back up the claim that the Golden Rule is dependant on a particular moral view. What view would that be?

You need to respect the fact that the properties which a thing actually has, and the properties which a thing is said to have are not necessarily the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your logic is correct; however, we can take a shortcut when it comes to physical things, because of the law of physics that no two physical things can occupy the same space at the same time. As such, the properties of place and time are sufficient to determine if two physical objects observed are the same. And... it is also possible for universal concepts, because they have a limited quantity of essential primary properties (they may have an infinite quantity of essential secondary properties, but these are not critical in defining the concept, as previously explained).

It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.
— Samuel Lacrampe

There are two sides to this procedure, and you are completely neglecting one side. The perception of the object is one factor which allows us to describe it, but knowing the words, and their meanings is another factor. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are missing my point, as I was using my statement above merely as an analogy. My point was that we are certain of the truth of particular examples that contain the concept, such as "this is not a triangle". My hypothesis that "we already have implicit knowledge of the concept from observation" explains this phenomenon, and has not yet been refuted.

Did you not ever go to school in your life? It is quite clear, that in school we learn the concepts, they are taught to us by our teachers. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we can learn some concepts in school, but it does not follow that concepts are subjective. We are taught some math concepts, and yet it is clear that these concepts are objective. Besides, what about the fact that people born blind cannot apprehend the concept of redness, despite having gone to school? Remember that the essential property of redness is not "this light frequency range", which is merely its cause (and good luck explaining light), but purely this.

I simply explained that you were working off an incorrect definition of "ideal", which made the ideal into a particular instance of occurrence. If "ideal" is made into a particular instance of occurrence, then any occurrence is the ideal of that particular occurrence, and "ideal" looses all meaningfulness. So I could define the "ideal" as obtaining 40% on my math exam, then if I get 40% on my math exam I have obtained the ideal. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

What is your definition of ideal? Mine is "perfection; as good as a thing can possibly be". Note that I don't mean Perfection in everything (this could only be God); only in the thing discussed. Under that definition, it is definitely possible to reach ideals. The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. And a 100% score on an exam is the ideal score, because there is nothing to add to reach a better score. I don't understand your example of "40% score on an exam"; what is this ideal of? Not score, because it is possible to obtain a better score.

For Aristotle nature is an inseparable unity of matter and form. Whereas for Plato, matter and form (or ideas) constitute separate and distinct natures. — Andrew M

It is simple enough to demonstrate that information is not physical (at least certain types). We can use the Test of Imagination, as Chesterton calls it: If a thing x is imaginable without the property y, then y is not essential to x. Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. As universals have no particulars by definition, and all physical properties are particulars, then universal forms are imagined without physical properties. Therefore information regarding universal forms is not physical.

That is not to say that universal forms actually do exist without matter, but only that they can exist without matter, without contradiction.

I don't mind the standpoint of nominalism or subjectivism, insofar that the arguments are rational and respectful. If a standpoint is false, then a flaw should exist, and it is a matter of finding it.

And I agree, although, again, it’s important to distinguish a ‘form’ from a ‘mental image’. That is a hard distinction to draw but it’s important. — Wayfarer

I am still unclear about this one. Is 'mental image' the same as 'concept', that is, the form once abstracted in the mind? Or else, if by 'mental image' you mean the physical visualization in the mind, then I agree that concepts are not that; because concepts, being universals, cannot have accidentals properties, which are necessary for any physical visualizations.

There is probably no definition that will fit every single case of what constitutes an immoral act. — Sam26

Conventionally, the "Golden Rule: Will (or intend) unto others as you want them to will unto you" is the absolute criteria to determine if an act is moral or not (between humans). As you will try to defend that harm is an essential property of an immoral act, I will defend the test of the Golden Rule.

What distinguishes the two is having good reasons for one as opposed to not having good reasons for the other. — Sam26

I agree about the necessity of a good reason, but what determines a reason as 'good'? We still need to find the criteria for that.

and if it can be demonstrated that there was no harm, then it would seem to follow that there was no immoral act on the part of the agent. — Sam26

Excluding the harm done to oneself (because it is a bit ambiguous), what about the case of attempted murder? There was no harm done to the victim because the attempt failed, and yet it is evident that the act is immoral.

It's my belief that anyone who commits an immoral act does harm to himself or herself. — Sam26

I agree. Not from a psychological standpoint but from a metaphysical standpoint. If the purpose of our existence is to be morally good and we go against it, then we harm our very existence. But this topic is beyond the scope of this discussion so we should save it for another time.

Now you have lost me. I cannot follow what you are arguing here. You speak about "examples used to falsify the definitions". I assume that these examples are drawings on a paper or some other medium, or in some cases a verbal description. These examples are constructs, created by the person drawing, doing the demonstration. So when an understanding is produced in this way, why do you conclude that it comes from a concept already within? — Metaphysician Undercover

The examples I was referring to are these: "This is not a triangle", and "this is a triangle". I assume you agree that these statements are true, as well as virtually everyone else. Now, this knowledge, that these statements are true, must be explained. I explain it by our knowledge of the concept of triangle-ness. In other words, our knowledge of the concept enables us to make true statements of particulars, as above, which in turn enables to come up with its definition, through a socratic dialogue. It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.

[...] Concepts do not exist in any "objective sense". They are property of subjects and so are subjective. The "more correct" doesn't exist in an objective sense, it is something agreed upon by the various subjects. Some call this inter-subjectivity, but inter-subjectivity doesn't create a true objectivity. But "correctness" is created by inter-subjective agreement, so "three angles" is more correct than "four angles" because it is what is agreed upon by convention. This is what constitutes "correctness", what is agreed upon by convention, not some "objective" concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis.

Your example is of one particular math exam. Just because you got 100% on one exam, this does not mean that you have the ideal understanding of mathematics. You have a lot more to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible.

The law of identity does not suggest that if two separate things change to have all properties coincide, then they become one and the same thing. This is impossible, because 1+1=1 is mathematically impossible. Rather, it says that if two subjects could describe all the properties of an object that they observed, and that all the properties were to coincide, then it follows that they observed the same object. E.g. If I saw a brown dog at time t and position x, y, z; and you saw a brown dog at time t and position x, y, z, then it follows that we saw the same dog (assuming no false perceptions).

This exercise also applies to concepts. Thus if the properties of a concept described by several subjects coincide, then the concept described is one and the same for all. Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; and the minor differences in description is explained by a minor difference in expression, not by a difference in the properties observed. E.g. I may describe the dog as brown, and you may describe it as beige.

Note: the statement "Since all concepts are located in different minds, it follows that the concepts must be separate things in all minds" is invalid, because this "location in the mind" is not a property of the object observed, but of the subject. It would be similarly invalid to say "Since the perception of the dog is from different subjects, then it follows that we did not observe the same dog".

How do I access the concept within me, such that I can determine which changes need to be made? — Metaphysician Undercover

Through a socratic dialogue, either with yourself or with others, which serves as a falsification method. Much like the correctness of a scientific theory is tested through particular experiments, we can test the correctness of a definition through particular examples. Say your first attempt to define triangle-ness is "a plane with three angles". I falsify this by pointing out that this shape is a plane with three angles but is not a triangle. So we must add to the definition that the sides must be straight. Then, I might add the property "red" to the definition, and you falsify this by pointing out that some triangles which are not red remain triangles. So we remove "red" from the definition, and the result is "a plane with three angles and straight sides." If it cannot be falsified any more, then we have obtained the perfect definition.

But... notice that we both seem certain about the correctness of the examples used to falsify the definitions. Where does this knowledge come from? It must come from the concept which we already had. As such, the exercise was never to find the concept, but to express it correctly with words. In other words, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts, and we just try to obtain explicit knowledge from this. This explicit knowledge is useful to deduce universal truths such as "no triangle can fill up a circle", because we now know that all triangles have straight sides where as no circles do.

We can get the meaning of words from physical demonstration. — Metaphysician Undercover

This sounds more like a method to learn a new language than to obtain a concept; but for the sake of argument, let's suppose you are correct. Well, you and I did not go through this process of physical demonstration before having a discussion; and so according to you, it is possible that, despite using the same language, my words have significantly different meanings than yours. So why would to decide to have a discussion with strangers if there is a possibility that none of the words used have the same meaning?

We determine that a particular definition is "incorrect", based on the assumption that there is an ideal definition. The ideal is the best, the most perfect, and need not be something existent, it is simply the assumption of a goal, strive for the best.[...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, inasmuch as a 'better' implies a 'best'; and a 80% mark implies a 100% mark, then a 'more correct' implies a 'fully correct' or 'ideal'. This is necessary. If the ideal does not exist, then neither does the 'more correct' in any objective sense. As such, if you believe that no ideal definition for triangle-ness exist, then it follows that the definition "three angles" is no more correct than "four angles", which is absurd.

I think that the ideal is never achieved, and this is what inspires us to always better ourselves in our understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This claim sounds ad hoc. Can you back it up? If I obtained a 100% mark on a math exam, then my answers have reached the ideal, and I cannot better myself on that exam.

If you want to put a cup on a table,[...] — darthbarracuda

That makes sense to me. I wonder if an objector might say that it is logically possible to have an infinite loop, where the one derivative power is passed down in circle, like a game of hot potato; but this seems so absurd that it would be a last-resort hypothesis.

[...] if material things are contingent, then this means they do not have to exist, which means that they have the potential to not exist. [...] — darthbarracuda

Yes, good point. It is true that contingent existing things have the potential to not exist; and the potential of 'x' implies the potential of 'not x' at some point; and therefore contingent existing things must have the potential to exist at some point.

[...] if we're going to Aristotelian route, it's that goodness has a lot of similarities to that of functioning "as it should". A lamb might not be bad if it's functioning as it should, i.e. to develop into a sheep. But it may be a bad lamb if it fails to develop. [...] — darthbarracuda

How about this:

In man-made things, it is evident that a thing is good if it actualizes its nature, its design. E.g., a paper-cutter is called good if it actually cuts paper correctly, which is its nature. And the nature of a thing is synonymous to its essential potential. E.g., the paper-cutter does not have the potential to cut paper if there is no paper to cut at this time, but once there is, then the potential appears, and a good paper-cutter will actualize it. Therefore a thing is good if it actualizes its essential potential; which means that an un-actualized essential potential corresponds to evil. As is the case of man-made things, so it would be for non-man-made things if these also have essential potential, that is, a nature, a design, a purpose, a final cause.

We just need to demonstrate this last part. Unfortunately, I don't know how yet. I am not even sure if demonstrating that things have essences is sufficient to prove that they must have a purpose, for even Aristotle seems to make a distinction between formal cause (essence) and final cause (purpose). I suspect Aristotle was wrong in making this distinction.

I like it. Here are my questions/comments.

4) "It cannot be infinitely long." Is there a way to demonstrate this, other than by Occam's Razor?

6.) "Things can only exist, however, if it has the potential to exist which is actualized." I don't think this is possible. It seems to me that before a thing exists, then neither does its properties, including the property of potential existence. But we can reach the same conclusion that there must be an actualizer (7) from the premise "everything that begins to exist requires a cause that exists".

8.) "There cannot be more than one purely actual actualizer, as differences between them would entail some difference in potential, which cannot be since it is actualized." This assumes both things have the same potential, which is not necessary (or not demonstrated to be). One thing could be fully actual with respect to its own potential, and similarly for the other thing. Thomas Aquinas comes to the same conclusion from the premise of full perfection, but I can't recall how he demonstrates full perfection in God.

14.) "A privation is an unactualized potential, which corresponds to evil" This is interesting. Could you expand on this? I have trouble imagining that a lamb, having the un-actualized potential of being a sheep, must have evil.

We already discovered that my concept of triangle is not the same as yours. Mine included "three angles", yours did not. We discover these differences, and attempt to correct them through discussion, communication. — Metaphysician Undercover

But what criteria is used to determine that one definition is more correct than the other? I answer that the criteria is the concept, which is the same in all of us. Of course I agree that triangle-ness has the property of "three angles", but as I stated earlier, this is a secondary property which can be deduced from the first property of "three straight lines", and so it is redundant. Similarly, we could add the secondary property that "the sum of all angles equates to 180°", which is also deduced from first properties.

[...] you claim that we could not communicate unless our concepts are the same. See, you have things backward. It is through communication that we establish consistency, and sameness between our concepts, the sameness doesn't exist prior to communication as a prerequisite for communication, it is produced from communication. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are wrong twice. You did not refute my argument that if all words can have different meanings for each individual, then we get infinite regress because all definitions are made of words. It is like speaking completely different languages. My meaning of "yes" could be your meaning of "no", my "flat" could be your "round", etc. Then an agreement could not be attained if there is no common ground or criteria that is shared among all individuals. Therefore, not only could we not communicate, but even if we could, it could not serve to attain an agreement on meanings.

Consider Plato's Symposium. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not prove that individuals necessarily have different concepts. It could be that some definitions are less correct than others, that is, some definitions less accurately point to the one concept. Do you not agree that if I said my definition of the concept of triangle was "four angles", then it would be incorrect? It is pretty much in the name, that "triangles" have "three angles". And an incorrect definition implies that there exists a correct definition.

The problem is, that definitions do not coincide. We already determined this with our definitions of "triangle", yours is different from mine. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Your entire argument depends on the premise that meanings are always different for every individual.
For the sake of argument, let's suppose that our definitions are different to start with. As you said yourself here, "we discover these differences, and attempt to correct them through discussion, communication", thereby making it possible to agree on one definition or meaning for words. Once this is achieved, then concepts become one and the same, by the same law of identity.