Thanks for sharing. Yep, still perplexed. Now I gotta add 'phantasms' as part of the terms to understand, on top of 'forms', 'concepts', 'matter', 'mind', 'intellect', and 'nous'. It's times like these I want to go back to simpler theories in which reality is made of 'stuff' out of a mould, and call it a day.

If the tautology contradicts your claim, then you are wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet another tautology. Remember that coherent debates require clear description of positions, and also reasons to back them up. In this case, if you say that your tautology contradicts my claim, you should explain why that is.

What is at question is whether or not there is a "form of redness" prior to us calling something red. I say no, you say yes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Finally you explain your position, that words create forms, that "red" creates our concept of redness. You seemed to be against this position earlier, but let's move on. Does your claim apply to particular things, as well as concepts? I.e., is the existence of redness in particular things prior to us calling the thing "red"?

My dictionary has a quarter of a page of entry under the word "plane". What is at issue here is whether or not there is ambiguity in word usage, and clearly there is. The ambiguity is reduced by producing definitions. So when you define "plane" as a flat surface, then through this definition you are reducing the possibility of ambiguity. Once it is defined as "flat surface" we can proceed toward understanding the ambiguities within "flat surface". What exactly do you mean by a surface, and what exactly constitutes 'flat". Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Clearly there is"? I understand that complex terms like "angel" or "quasar" are ambiguous terms and demand thorough thinking to remove the ambiguity; but why is it the case for simple terms like "plane", "flat" or "surface"? If you think that all words are ambiguous until they are defined, then this results in infinite regress, because definitions are made of words. Also, the statement "Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way" is a self-contradiction because the very statement would forever remain ambiguous.

It is not required that individuals have the same concepts in order to communicate. If that were the case, then communication could not be a learned ability. [...] Instead of accepting and promoting this absurdity, we ought to consider the proposition that communication is less than perfect. When you say something, I do not understand it exactly in the way which you intend. That is because the conceptual structure within my mind is not exactly the same as that in your mind. But this imperfection does not necessitate the conclusion that we cannot communicate. [...] If my concepts were exactly the same as yours, then whatever you said would automatically be received by me exactly in the way that you intended. [...]. — Metaphysician Undercover

This cannot be. See my previous response above about infinite regress. If my concept of a triangle is not the same as yours, then how could we ever (1) discover this, and (2) correct it to be the same? I could say that "triangle" = "plane" + "three straight sides", but this assumes that the concepts "plane", "three", "straight", and "sides" are the same in both of us, otherwise, we are groundless.

There are other ways to explain the phenomenon of misunderstandings, such as logical fallacies; i.e., we all know the laws of logic innately, but we sometimes make mistakes by cutting corners. Another one is that some concepts have not yet been apprehended (E.g., I don't know what a "quasar" is), and although we can realize this by ourselves, we can make an error by not thinking rationally.

Plato's intent is to go beyond this false premise of Pythagorean Idealism, to determine the real nature of concepts. That is why he worked to expose all the difficulties of it. He continually took words with very ambiguous concepts, and worked to expose that ambiguity. This is known as Platonic dialectics. This flies in the face of Pythagorean Idealism, in which ambiguity is not possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't disagree with what you wrote, but it does not refute my claim. If Plato's intent is to determine the real nature of concepts, then the concept must be the same in all minds. Otherwise, even if successful, each person would come up with a different result according to their own concepts, and the dialogue would be pointless.

This is only according to your definition of "universal form". Your definition doesn't seem to allow a distinction between what the concept says (means) and what the concept is ( its ontological existence). This seems to be because you have no principle which allows for a concept to have any ontological existence. You take the lazy route, just assuming that concepts exist, with no principles to demonstrate how this is possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is right, I make no distinction between "meaning" and "concept", such that a word pointing to concept x is the same as a word meaning x. That is my position. As such, you cannot disagree that meanings are identical in all minds if the definitions coincide. As for the explanation of their existence, we simply have not got to that topic yet, and I don't remember you arguing that the existence of concepts as I describe is impossible. We can do that next.

To each other object. Space is, in such a metaphysic, composed entirely of relations between objects. Therefore, it could be argued that the objectual properties refering to space are not "of the object", but "of the world". Time could be seen in a similar way, replacing objects with events. — Akanthinos

Got it, thanks. In other words, it could be there is no such thing as an absolute cartesian coordinate system for space. I am okay with this theory for space, but it cannot work for time. Time is a function of causality, whereby an effect cannot logically exist before its cause, and so at the very least, the "direction" of time is an absolute.

But that's not the same thing. "A triangle doesn't have the property of compatibility with circularity" states nothing about the potential compatibility of triangularity and circularity, which is exactly what we are trying to get at here. "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with circularity" is already closer to the mark. The first one doesn't have the causal relevance necessary the full phenomena. — Akanthinos

I see your point, that the second statement gives more info than the first one. But as you said before, this results in having an infinite amount of negative properties like "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides"; which is absurd. [Absurd for a philosopher; not for common people who would not give two craps about such a discussion :D ].

How about this solution: Let's differentiate between first and second properties, whereby second properties are deduced from the first. E.g., a triangle has the first properties of "flat surface" and "three straight sides", and then second properties of "not being compatible with circularity, or figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides", and "the sum of angles equates to 180°" etc, all of which can be deduced from the first properties. As such, first properties are always positive, and second properties can be positive or negative.

One could argue that there are at least two spaces for each act of understanding : the space occupied by the information itself, and the space occupied by the information necessary to interpret the object of understanding. As such, understanding, as a stand-in for information processing, would be distributed. — Akanthinos

I think I understand; but these spaces seem merely accidental, and not essential to the process of understanding, like a particular triangle will always have a particular size and location, even though size and location are not essential properties. Even if it is not actual, telepathy as a process of transferring info seems logically possible, and would not require these spaces, although time is still inevitably present.

I could be completely off the mark, but are you saying that sometimes, an action to fulfill justice could move the goal post elsewhere, effectively requiring more actions etc; like a horse attempting to reach the carrot on a stick? I am not sure if such a scenario is necessary in reality, because even if the rules of a system were set up to produce such an effect, then we could always change the rules.

Take the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario. The rules are indeed set up such that the prisoners, despite making rational decisions, can only fail. But this is not a logically necessary situation. We just need to change the rules of the game so that justice is compatible with rational behaviour.

I made no mention of causation, that's your interpretation. What I said is that without the word "red" there is no such thing as what the word red refers to. Do you not recognize that the word "red" is an essential part of "what the word red refers to"? And so there is no such thing as what the word red refers to without the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your claim is a tautology and thus unproductive. Now, either a thing is red, that is, it participates in the form of redness, prior to us calling it "red", or it is not.

• If it is, then the word "red" is not the cause of the existence of redness. And our mind, abstracting concepts by mere observation, does not necessitate words.
• If it is not, then the word "red" is the cause of the existence of redness in things, which is absurd.

The defining term is not the same as the term defined. In Aristotelian logic the defining concept is within the concept defined, as an essential feature. So "man" is defined by "animal", as the concept of animal is within the concept of man as an essential property but animal is not the same as man. Likewise, you define "plane" with "flat surface". One is not the same as the other. The defining term is the more general. If defining terms had the same meaning as the words being defined, then we would never get anywhere in our attempts to understand meaning. It would all be circular. "Flat surface" would mean the exact same thing as "plane", and it would be pointless to define one with the other because it would not help you to understand anything. It is the very fact that "flat surface" means something other to you than "plane" does, that it can be used to help you to understand what "plane" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Man" is not defined merely as an animal, but "plane" is defined merely as "a flat surface". Then you have it backwards: If I defined "plane" as a "plane", then it would be circular. But to define "plane" as "flat surface" is not; precisely because I may know what "flat surface" means and not know what "plane" means. Then the definition of "plane" as a "flat surface" proves that they have the same meaning. If 2+2=4, then it proves that they are logically the same. I.e., having 2 apples and another 2 apples is logically identical to having 4 apples. Thus if "plane" = "flat surface", then they are logically identical.

That is exactly what is at issue here, and why there is so much misunderstanding and disagreement about what universal forms are. Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright. Although I don't agree, I appreciate the consistency in the whole system.

How do you propose that we ought to determine, and compare, the properties of the concepts within each others minds, other than by discussion? — Metaphysician Undercover

Discussion or dialogue is adequate, as is the case for finding the essence of the concept for triangle-ness. I gave another argument before: the fact that if concepts could possibly be different in individuals, then all attempts for communication would be hopeless. Consequently, we must have faith that concepts are, if not identical, then at least exact duplicates in everyone's mind. Finally, if concepts are different in individuals, then most of Plato's dialogue are pointless, because Socrates and his peers, attempting to find forms through arguments, all assume that the form they are looking for is the same for everyone.

But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

You contradict yourself with the earlier claim that you believed in concepts being universal forms. If universals, then these forms or concepts cannot have accidentals.

I think, in Aquinas' terminology, the senses perceive the shape, the intellect perceives the Form, and the mind derives the concept. So concepts are internal to minds, but the Forms are not. — Wayfarer

Interesting. Could you explain the differences between "the intellect perceives the Form" and "the mind derives the concept"? I would have imagined that the intellect is part of the mind, and that the concept is the concept of the form. Maybe it is that the intellect is active in abstracting the form, where as the mind is passive and merely stores it (now called concept once in the mind)?

What you claim here is false. Without the word "red" there is nothing that "red" refers to. That's the point. You are claiming that thing which "red" refers to would exist without the word red. But without the word "red" there would be nothing which "red" refers to, because there would be no such thing as "red". So this nothing cannot be an existent thing. To get to the point of asserting that there is something which "red" refers to, it is necessary that there is the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position?

No, I am saying "plane", and you are saying "flat". By what principle of identity do you conclude that two very distinct words are "the same thing". And since it is very clear that these two distinct words are not the same thing, then it is also very clear that we are not saying the same thing when we say these distinctly different words. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing.

This is how we distinguish between when we are referring to two distinct things which are similar to each other, and when we are referring to the exact same thing, by taking account of the accidentals. So it is by analyzing the accidentals that we determine whether we are talking about two distinct, but similar things, or that we are talking about one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them?

Here is a better way: We test if two things are the exact same by comparing all of their properties, regardless if those properties are essential or accidental, and checking if they are similar or different. As such, the law of identity is applicable to all, even to universal things.

You argument is non sequitur. Just because a person may know a language without knowing a particular concept, does not imply that a person can know a concept without knowing a language. — Metaphysician Undercover

In other words, although knowing the concept is not a necessary effect of knowing the language, knowing the language can still be a necessary cause. I accept the correction.

There is no such thing as redness unless there is such a thing as what the word "red" refers to. And, there is no such thing as what the word "red" refers to unless there is language. Therefore there is no such thing as redness without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

My turn to call non-sequitur. Just because the word "red" refers to the thing which causes the concept redness in the mind, it does not follow that the word "red" is necessary for the existence of the thing, and by extension, the existence of the concept. (Note that I have used the term "concept" to refer to both the thing outside the mind and the idea inside the mind, and as Wayfarer points out, this could be inconsistent with Aquinas who differentiates between form and concept).

You said "exact same properties", so if I am not picky I have not carried out my obligation of due diligence to determine whether the conditions of "exact same" have been fulfilled. — Metaphysician Undercover

But according to google, a plane is a flat surface, and so we are really saying the same thing, and in which case our concepts of triangle-ness does coincide.

That's the problem. "Exact same" implies that accidentals have been included. "Universal" implies that accidentals have been excluded. The two are incompatible by way of contradiction. Yet you insist upon using the two together, to say that I have the exact same concept as you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that 'universal' implies that accidentals have been excluded, by definition of 'universal'. But why would 'exact same' implies that accidentals have been included? As a side note, I thought your position from an earlier post was that universal forms (2) existed, in addition to particular forms (3).

Space is one of the concepts which we use to understand relations between things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Although I find this topic interesting, I will drop out of it because it drifts away from the main topic of forms.

So you may be correct that "all forms are eternal" could be what Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine thought. It is hard to tell because Plato's dialogues I have read (far from all of them) were all about logic and morality which are necessary truths, not about contingent things like apple-ness and redness. Same goes for your passage from Augustine, which uses math as the example so that doesn't help us either :( . But more important than opinion is truth (philosophy > philosophers); and I think I can justify why we should make a distinction between eternal Forms (1) and non-eternal forms (2).

Imagine an evil tyrant who takes over the world and decides to erase the past by burning all books and teachers talking about logic, math, and morality. Well, despite this, the new generation would still be able to rediscover or recollect the laws of logic, math, and morality, and furthermore, the tyrant would not be able to successfully teach different laws than the true ones, such as "2+2=3" and "justice is bad and injustice is good". This is also on par with Plato's Theory of Recollection in the Meno, in which a slave can recollect geometric principles despite never being taught geometry. As these Forms are indestructible and unchangeable, even in the mind, they are eternal and stand above all else.

On the other hand, if the evil tyrant decided to destroy any particular object that is red (jerk), then the new generation could not conceive the form of redness. Redness is not an eternal Form that can be rediscovered or recollected; and must be observed at least once to be conceived; and so Meno's slave could not have recollected redness if he never observed a red thing before. As these forms cannot be acquired by the mind without existing in particular things observed, they are not eternal in the mind.

One question I have about it is - what exactly is meant by the term ‘intelligible object?’ — Wayfarer

Good question. My guess is that 'intelligible' it is not synonymous to 'observable', but is rather related to having coherent communication. We can observe particular things with all their accidentals, but we cannot intelligibly describe each particular thing without the use of universal forms followed by their accidental properties. In order to have an intelligible conversation with you about a particular rock in my backyard, I would have to describe it literally as "the rock (universal form of rock-ness) in my backyard (its accidental properties)". If I called it "Rock #22" or "Bob", you would not know what I am talking to you about if you have never observed said rock.

You stated the terms 'blueprint' and 'eternal' in the same sentence. I think it is important to keep the distinction between Forms and forms. Forms or necessary truths are eternal; forms or concepts or blueprints are not. It is not possible to imagine a thing that is illogical, thereby making logic an eternal Form. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine a world where no red things exist, that is, where no particular participates in the blueprint of redness, and effectively, no subject in that world (excluding God) can acquire the concept of redness; thereby making redness a non-eternal form.

So your claim is that the child understands what "red" is without understanding language. Why is that not contradictory to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you really believe that we can have concepts without language? — Metaphysician Undercover

Why is it contradictory to you? It would be contradictory to understand the word "red" without the language, but not the concept "redness". Concepts are not made of words; rather, words point to concepts. A blind man may know the language, but cannot grasp the concept of redness if he has never seen a red thing. Therefore language is not the cause of acquiring concepts.

Sorry, but my concept of triangle is not the same as that. Mine is of a plane figure, with three sides and three angles. See how different mine is from yours? Yours is "flat", mine is "plane". Mine has three angles. yours does not. Mine is the concept of a triangle while yours is the concept of triangle-ness. To have "the exact same properties", all properties, even the accidentals, must be the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Flat", "plane"... don't be so picky about the words MU. And yes, you can have three angles too, but these are redundant because a plane with three sides necessarily has three angles. You might as well add that the sum of the angles equates to 180°, but this is once again redundant. To sum up, your concept coincides with mine; thereby demonstrating that subjects acquire identical concepts, which is necessary to have coherent communication.

What accidentals can you add to concepts? Remember that concepts are universals.

Space and time, as we understand them, are not physical things. Nor are the relationships between physical things physical things. This is why physicalists produce such a confused form of metaphysics, they take the descriptions which physicists produce, concerning the physical world (descriptions of relationships between objects), and treat these descriptions as if they are actually physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I agree with you regarding time not being a physical thing, because it is a function of causality, which is not necessarily about physical things. But what about space? Common sense or default position is that space or location is a physical thing. How can you back up your claim that it is not?

OK, now you add another qualification, the child must be able to understand the language. That just proves my point. Which do you believe, does the child abstract the concept of redness solely by seeing red things, or is the use of language necessary as well? — Metaphysician Undercover

The child abstracts the concept of redness solely by seeing red things. The understanding of language is not necessary for abstracting the concept, but it is to test if the child got the concept or not, simply because us observers need to ask the child questions. If we could pierce into his mind without asking questions, then he would not need to understand the language. The language is necessary only to know the words which point to concepts, not to obtain the concepts themselves.

First, you beg the question with your definition of universal form, by saying that they are separate from the minds which they are in. That is what you are trying to prove, that they are separate from the minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you suggesting that universal forms are identical to minds? This seems so absurd to me that I did not find the need to backup that statement. Does this means that if you think of a triangle, then your mind becomes triangle-ness? Anyways, I was not trying to prove that concepts are separate from minds, I was trying to prove that all minds connect to the same concepts; as such the argument is not begging the question.

Then, you still do not have any premise which allows you to assume that concepts in different peoples' minds have "the exact same properties"? — Metaphysician Undercover

We went over this before but I will demonstrate once again for one concept. My concept of triangle-ness has the essential properties "flat surface" + "three straight sides". Does your concept have the exact same properties? If not, then what are they?

I would assume that being in different minds is a case of having different properties. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I thought you agreed that forms were not physical, did you not? If not physical, then they cannot have any physical properties, such as a physical location.

Thanks for the info on relational properties. indeed, I think it is the case for colours. I don't see why temporal and spatial properties would be relational though. Relational to what? They are accidental only. I also don't agree with the negative property concept. Instead of saying "an object has the property of non-x", it seems more correct to say "an object does not have the property x".

Why not? Understanding happens in a time and a space. — Akanthinos

I think understanding happens in a time, but not in a space. Here is why: Consider time t1 before I understand an info, and time t2 after I understand it. If we could go back to t1 (somehow), then I would not understand the info. But I understand the info at places p1 and p2, provided it is at time t2. In other words, the existence of understanding seems to be a function of time but not of place.

But I wonder it this is besides the point anyways. The existence of the information "Montréal is in Québec" is not dependent on the receiver understanding the message, is it?

Could you provide an example? I don't see how one could fulfil justice without being just. Note, I don't mean here mere legal justice, which could be unjust; but real justice.

Dang. Once again, I have trouble understanding your big words. Could you provide an example of what you call 'non-relational aspects of an object'?

I'd argue in the same sense as you, but rather viewing temporal and spatial properties of information as yet another indication that information is physical. Datum informs also the processor from their occurences in space and time, and therefore in no actual way does Epp applies in a meaningful way to both individualised occurences of "Montréal is in Québec" and "Montréal is in Québec". — Akanthinos

If I understand correctly, you say that because the information "Montréal is in Québec" was spoken at a specific time and place, then that indicates that info is physical. But as I was trying to show, the info is a separate thing from its container. The container has a time and place, but not the information. People acquire the same information from the message "Montréal is in Québec", regardless if they hear it today or tomorrow, in Canada or in France.

Well ... yes. Unjust justice is a contradiction, and so the fulfilment of justice, that is, being just, cannot be unjust.

I don't see how a concept could be apprehended on the basis of one word. The concept is always the meaning of the word, and it requires an explanation to understand the meaning of a word. The concept of redness is not grasped by seeing red things, it is grasped by understanding what it means to have the property of being red. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word only points to the concept. The concept is apprehended through experience or observation of particulars that participate in the concept or form (2). Children abstract the concept of redness simply by seeing a few red things. Simple proof: ask a toddler to pick the red ball out of other coloured balls, and as long as he can understand the language, he will do so correctly. Other example: you and I can find the cat out of a cat and a dog correctly, even though we (at least I) don't know all the essential properties that make a cat a cat, and a dog not a cat.

This could be the case, and it appears to be what Platonic realists claim. The difficulty with this position is to support the existence of these concepts with some ontological principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking how we know that universal forms (2) are one, and not duplicates in individual minds? The ontological principle that supports this is the law of identity.

• Universal forms (2) or concepts have no accidental properties, by definition of being universals.
• These forms, although in minds, are separate things from the minds they are in.
• The law of identity states that if "two" things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing.
• Therefore the form in two minds must be one and the same in both.

E.g. My concept of 'triangle' has the essential properties 'flat surface' + 'three straight sides'. And I am fairly sure yours does too. Therefore, by law of identity, my concept and your concept are one and the same.

Our universe is filled with multiplicity because each of those things has distinct properties. Since no two physical objects can occupy the same space at the same time, all physical objects have at least different x, y, x positions at time t.

If I observe an object with all its properties, and you observe an object for which all properties coincide with mine, and assuming no false perceptions, then the objects we observe must logically be one and the same; not duplicates, but one. As is the case with objects, so it is with information.

It is simply how the terms are defined. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Got it. I figured it was likely a confusion of terms. I am personally ticked off at how freely the term 'form' is used to mean so many different things that don't seem to have any connection, but I'll deal with it.

The fact that there are many different interpretations of the same material, misinterpretations, and misconceptions, especially with extremely difficult material like what we are dealing with here, clearly demonstrates that concepts are not the same in all minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are using the word 'concept' ambiguously. You mean it in the sense of understanding of a sentence or text. I mean it in the sense of contingent universal forms (2). In that sense, only single words point to concepts, not whole sentences, and these are the same in all subjects that have abstracted it, as demonstrated in my previous post. Therefore, either a subject has abstracted the concept of 'redness', or he has not because he is colourblind; but there is no possibility of misunderstanding concepts.

But this is to ignore the accidentals, and Aristotle's law of identity is designed such that accidentals must be accounted for, so this does not qualify as a philosophically appropriate use of "the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's okay, if they are two separate things because located in different minds, it could be that my concept is an exact copy of your concept. But I don't think this is true. Since concepts are not physical, they cannot have a physical location. Instead, I think that my mind and your mind connect to the same concept. This could explain how communication is done: to communicate is to connect to the same concepts.

Now I still have unanswered questions. To start with, do general forms (2) exist only in our minds (excluding God's mind), or do they exist in particular things that participate in them? My answer is the latter, and here is why.

P1: It is evident that general forms (2) or concepts are the same in all minds. To assume that it could be otherwise would be absurd, because any coherent communication among individuals would be impossible: If my concept of "yes" could be your concept of "no", and so on for all concepts, then how could we hope to ever find this out, and then reach a common language on concepts? Like Meno's Paradox, we could stumble upon the same concepts by sheer luck, but then could never know for sure. Therefore, in order to avoid absurdity and despair, we must have faith that concepts are the same in all minds. This seems similar to Wittgenstein's problem that MU mentioned earlier.

P2: If the concept I perceive is the same as the one you and everyone else perceives, it is much more likely that the concept comes from outside of our minds as opposed to come from our individual minds, and coincidently is the same in all minds. To use an analogy: If I hear a piece of music, it could be either that it comes from my mind or outside; but if two persons hear the same piece of music, it is much more likely that the music comes from outside both minds.

P3: You and I likely live in different countries, and so my concept of tree-ness must have been abstracted from different particular trees than your concept of tree-ness, despite the concept tree-ness being the same.

C: General forms (2) or concepts first exist outside of our minds and inside the particular things that participate in them.

Understood. You are correct, but my previous syllogism is only step 1 of a three-step argument to prove immateriality. Step 1 proves that information is a separate thing from its container. Here is the rest.

Step 2: Proof that info is one thing in two separate containers.
P2.1: The law of identity says that if "two" things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing.
P2.2: Information A, separate from its container, is identical in container B and container C.
C2: Information A in both containers is one and the same, as opposed to being mere duplicates.

Step 3: Proof that information is non-physical.
P3.1: No one physical thing can be in two places at once.
P3.2: The same information A is obtained from containers B and C, which are in two separate places.
C3: Information is not physical.

I agree with you; that the term 'form' is archaic. It should be seen as a temporary term early philosophers used as a place-holder until later philosophers found clearer terms to define the same things. Thus Platonic Forms (1) became 'eternal / necessary truths', Aristotle forms (2) became 'concepts' (or 'pure data' as you call it, and although I never heard that terminology before, I find it fitting too), and particular forms (3) became empirical data.

I must say I am especially disinclined to call empirical data a 'form', because it seems out of place with the other two forms (1) and (2), which have the commonality of being universals, where as form (3) does not. Furthermore, the explanation that our mind acquires empirical data directly from matter seems sufficient, without having to add another factor (form (3)) in the mix.

I'm sorry, but I admit I have trouble understanding your posts. And unfortunately, it seems this conversation has drifted far away from the original argument on whether info is physical or not. Maybe I can go back one last time to my original argument in the form of a syllogism, and perhaps you could pinpoint which part you disagree with?

P1: A thing A is not identical to thing B if A remains when B is removed.
P2: Information A is present when container B is present. But information A is also present when only container C is present, and C ≠ B.
C: Therefore information A is not identical to either containers B or C.

So if I understand you correctly, particular things must have particular forms (3) because only forms are intelligible to our minds, and matter is not. Now why is that the case? If I perceive a particular chair, why can't we not simply conclude that it is because my mind perceives the matter of the chair through direct sense data?

Note here the link between 'form' and 'formal cause'. So to see the form of a thing, is also to see it's reason for existence. — Wayfarer

I think Aristotle separates the formal cause (essence) from the final cause (reason or end). Thus the formal cause of a triangle is "a flat surface with three straight sides", but I don't think that would be a relevant final cause. Having said that, I think this is true when it comes to man-made things, as described at the beginning of this post.

So for example, the architect has a conception, makes a plan, the blueprints for the building, then proceeds to produce the material building. In the case of all artificial objects, the form of the object exists within the mind of the artist before coming to be in the material world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".

But the analogy of a blueprint works more in favour of the general forms (2), than particular forms (3), because a single blueprint typically serves to build many particulars, like several buildings built from the same template.

And the answer to this is that the individual has unique features, that are otherwise called accidentals, which are proper to it alone. So the essence of the individual, as an individual, what you call the "is-ness", and I call, "what it is", is the accidentals. What makes a particular a particular is its uniqueness, the accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the essential principle of Aristotle's law of identity [...] how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. Even using the law of identity, I find that a particular form for particular things remains an unnecessary hypothesis: Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. Then consider rock A only, which has identity A. Split the rock in two halves A1 and A2. Which of the two halves retains identity A? They cannot both retain the same identity, because A1 and A2 have different x, y, z properties, just like rocks A and B. Glue them back together, and we obtain the original rock A, because the physical separation is gone.

Similarly, consider a tree which is able to grow many trunks, but is one organism (they exist but I forgot the name). We call it one thing and not many, because all the trunks are physically connected. But now cut the roots connecting the trunks together; all trucks will live, and what was one is now many living things; separate identities. The reason is because there now exists a physical separation between the trunks.

Therefore, the answer to the question "how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else?" is indeed because of their accidental properties added to the general form (2), but these are physical properties and need only be explained by matter without having to add a particular form (3). (The ship of Theseus anyone?)

all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate Ideas, one for each individual — Wayfarer

Actually ... upon further thinking, I have to make an exception when it comes to humans. Split a human body in two, and we do not obtain two separate humans. Assuming the human survives, only one of the two parts retains the human identity, that is, its self, personality, subjectiveness, soul. And that is the part that is still able to think. So I am siding with Metaphysician Undercover when it comes to a being who has a self or soul, that this particular being has indeed a form that is particular to it.

Bear in mind, Plato was an ancient thinker and that such ideas as logical laws, hadn't even been devised in his time; it was Aristotle who was to put that into a methodical form. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is a great point. As I was wondering myself, if the theory of forms is so important in philosophy, then why is it that nobody really speaks of them outside of the context of Plato, as though it is more of a theoretical exercise than something relevant to our days? I think the answer is that forms are still very much around, but under different names. Thus Plato's Forms (1) are now called necessary / eternal / rational truths or natural laws, or simply Truth as per Kierkegaard; and Aristotle's forms (2) are now called concepts (not to be confused with the ambiguous term 'concept' as a mere idea or draft for a design). And in both cases, forms have essential properties or essences because they are universals.

One thing I am finding, is that Plato seems to think the Forms are real, or are actual existing things, whereas I interpret them as having a kind of implicit reality which is less literal than Plato seems to understand it (or at least as many people says he understands it) — Wayfarer

Well, if Plato's Forms (1) are indeed synonymous to necessary truths, then we can prove that they are real and separate from matter: Necessary truths are, by definition, eternally existing; and if matter is not eternal (which is reasonable to suppose), then Forms (1) must be able to exist separate from matter. And that makes them more real than anything which exists only temporarily, or which existence depends on other things.

Also I think Plato does refer to necessary entities and not contingent entities, as most of his dialogues are about either logic and maths, such as in the Meno (geometry), or morality, such as in the Republic (justice), both of which are typically considered eternal truths.

So you are saying that if there is a physical obstacle, like distance between the message and the recipient, which prevents the receiving of information, then info must be physical; because if it wasn't, then there could not be any physical obstacles. But this is not necessarily the case, because the physical container could simply act as a cause to the existence of the information, as opposed to being the information itself. I.e, the physical container is the efficient cause of information, not the formal cause. And a cause is a separate thing from its effect; therefore if this is true, then the container is a different thing than the information it causes to exist.

That's it. It's syllogism time. If you disagree, can you point to the precise statement you disagree on?

P1: A property is called 'objective' if it is attributed to an object, independent of subjects observing the object. E.g. If a painting is rectangular, then it is so even when it is not observed.
P2: Beauty is also a property attributed to an object, because if I feel the painting to be beautiful, then the feeling is about the painting, not about me. But it is not independent of the subject observing the object, because if I feel the painting to be beautiful, it is I who feels this, and others might have different feelings.
C1: Beauty is not an objective property, as defined in P1.

P3: If a property is not objective, then it is called 'subjective', because they are opposite terms.
C2: Beauty is a subjective property.

You might say that 'stealing' is simply a metaphor for what is actually copying. — Wayfarer

For a physicalist, an idea is a pattern of physical matter. So stealing (i.e., the illegal copying of) an idea entails the occurence of the same pattern in different physical matter, not the transfer of matter. — Andrew M

Yes, I think that you are both correct; that my argument falls apart if the term 'stealing' really means 'copying'. I see now I also made the mistake of using a song as an example in my argument, which is a kind of meaningless information, as I already conceded that meaningless information is visibly only physical; that only meaningful information has the potential of being non-physical, because only this kind of information points to concepts.

Yeah I too should read up on forms. Here are the questions I would like to solve:
(1) Are 'forms' synonymous to 'necessary entities', like the laws of logic and morality?
(2) If not just that, are they also generalizations, like apple-ness and river-ness, in which individual apples and rivers participate in?
(3) If not just that, are they also particulars, i.e., a particular apple has a particular form?

Here are my preliminary answers, until someone can tell me better:
(1) They are definitely that at least. Only this type of form can be adequate for Plato's theory of recollection, where we can dig up the truth simply by thinking hard about it. This is because if an entity is necessary, then it is literally impossible to conceive it in a different way than its necessary way, without making a rational mistake. E.g. it is impossible to conceive that "2+2=3" if only we know what the terms mean. Let's call these 'Forms' (capital F).

(2) I think these too are forms, even though they are contingent. They are acquired through Aristotle's theory of abstraction, that is, we conceive the generalization of tree-ness after observing numerous trees. Our concepts of these forms must be identical, because otherwise, how could individuals be able to communicate together? Let's call these 'forms' (lower case f).

(3) I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. It seems to be an unnecessary hypothesis: What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter?

Right - ideas aren’t physical. But physicalists will say that ideas exist in brains and brains are physical, therefore they’re also physical - no matter what you argue. — Wayfarer

I take it you are playing devil's advocate, but I don't see how your statement refutes my argument. If ideas exist in brains and brains are physical, then by the same rationale, it is logically impossible to steal other people's ideas: Just as my brain cells are mine and not yours, ideas in my brain are mine and not yours. Yet, there is such a thing as intellectual property, which implies ideas can be stolen. How do physicalists explain this?

More on the claim that information is not physical. A physical thing cannot be stolen if it remains with its rightful owner. E.g., I logically cannot have stolen your wallet if it remains in your pocket the whole time. Yet we speak of 'stealing information' when when we make illegal copies of information like burning songs on a CD from Napster. But the original CD that contains the songs remains with its rightful owner. I.e., the atoms of my burnt CD are different atoms from the original CD, and therefore I cannot have not stolen anything physical. Ergo, the information I have stolen must be non-physical.

I refute your argument by claiming that the information is in the container, independent of the ability of the subject to interpret it. If a letter says "Montréal is in Québec", then that is the message on the letter, regardless if people can read it or not. And if they interpret something else from reading it, due to inability to read properly, then they have obtained an incorrect message. To say that a thing is incorrect implies that a correct thing exists. And if a correct message exists, then it must exist in the container.

Really? I thought feelings are always part of a body, not a subject. — Harry Hindu

I'm pretty sure feelings are never part of a body that is not a subject. Paintings don't have feelings, and neither do corpses (former subjects). On the other hand, properties like 'heaviness' can be part of paintings, subjects, or corpses.

What is so difficult about this? By saying that the sentence isn't literally true, is saying that you mean something else when you say it - something objective, not subjective! — Harry Hindu

Then what makes statement A literally true, and statement B not literally true, if not the type of property described?

Give me a break! Did we not agree that beauty is a feeling?! Doesn't that mean that the person has the feeling of beauty?! Again, when you utter the sentence, "The painting is beautiful." you are talking about your feelings toward the painting. If you mean that "I am beautiful." then you'd be committing the same mistake as saying the painting is beautiful. You'd wouldn't mean it literally! So no, you aren't being a feeling. You are a person that currently has the feeling of beauty - a property of a person. — Harry Hindu

Again, feeling or sensing x is not the same as being x or having x. E.g. "I sense the painting is rectangular" is not the same as saying that I, the subject, is rectangular, or have rectangular-ness. Similarly, feeling or sensing beauty is not the same as being beautiful or having beauty. If nothing has beauty in itself, then beauty is not a property of any object, and is therefore not objective. Conversely, some objects are rectangular, and therefore 'rectangular' is objective.

Another way to look at it: objective properties are in the object, independent of subjects or other objects. If the painting is rectangular, it remains rectangular even when no subjects are present. Conversely, subjective properties, while in the subject, are dependant on objects. If I feel beauty about the painting, then the feeling of beauty is dependant on the painting being observed. I may not feel beauty in another painting, even though I, the subject, am the same in both cases.

I agree with you, that there is merit in calling the world of feelings the 'inner reality', because while it is part of objective reality, feelings are always in a subject, and never in an object that is not a subject like a painting.

Harry.
We are on the same page that even feelings are part of objective reality about the subject. Where we disagree however, is that the term 'subjective' becomes obsolete as a result. This is not true. Consider once again the following statements:

A: "This painting is rectangular."
B: "This painting is beautiful."

First, there is clearly a difference between these two types of statements. A is literally true, while B is not, as you also pointed out earlier. This alone is enough to use the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' to differentiate between the two types of statements. But there is more.

In statement A, the property 'rectangular' is directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'rectangular' is clearly an objective property of the painting. In statement B, the property 'beautiful' is not directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'beauty' is not an objective property of the painting. But is it an objective property of the subject? I claim that it is not. If it was, then it would mean that the subject is objectively beautiful. But the subject is not beautiful; the subject only experiences the feeling of beauty when observing the object. Feeling x is not the same thing as being x. The painting is really rectangular. Neither the painting nor the subject is beautiful. Therefore the property 'beauty' is subjective.

I foresaw this in my argument look closer at the types of harm. — Sam26

Is it this? "All immoral acts cause harm to the one committing the act, or to the one who is the object of the act, or to both." Why do you say that an immoral act can cause harm to the one committing it? Note, I don't necessarily disagree, I just want to go further into the analysis.

If you have good reasons to cut the arm off, then obviously it's not immoral, which is why I differentiate between having good reasons for the harm as opposed to not having good reasons. — Sam26

But you said in your previous post that the three factors you mentioned served to judge if an act was immoral. My point is that if these three factors are present in both cases when the act is moral and immoral, then they cannot serve to judge if the act is moral or not.

Hello.

If there is no harm, there is no immorality. — Sam26

What if your spouse cheats on you and you never know about it? As they say, "what you don't know cannot hurt you". But surely, cheating is immoral.

if I cut someone's arm off without good reason, there are several factors that make this an immoral act, and moreover, make it an objective immoral act. First, it's objectively true that the arm has been cut off, we can see it on the ground. Second, we can objectively observe the screams of the victim. Third, we can also witness the screams and tears of family and friends. These three reactions show the objective nature of the harm done. — Sam26

But these three reactions would still occur if you had good reasons to cut someone's arm, like out of self-self-defense. So if the same things are observed for both a moral and immoral case, then they cannot be the criteria to determine if the act is moral or not.

Intent can be tricky because while there are clearly immoral acts that involve intent, there are also acts that cause harm without intent, like accidental harm, which we can be held accountable for. Furthermore, there are evils caused by natural disasters that don't involve intent at all, yet they are often referred to as evils because of the great harm done. One might say then that while we can refer to all immoral acts as evil, not all evil involves immoral actions because they are not always the result of an agent. — Sam26

We need to differentiate between two types of evil. Moral and physical. You are correct that 'harm' is an essential property of evil, when it comes to physical evil. For moral evil, the essential property is intention; intention of not treat others like we want to be treated. So accidental harm and natural disasters are examples of physical evil. Attempted murder and looking down on others are examples of moral evil. And intentionally cutting someone's arm for not good reason is an example of both.

By 'outer reality', I meant properties which are not inner feelings. You have asked not to called them 'subjective', and so I tried to call these properties of feelings something else. I think I will revert back to calling these 'subjective' though. After all, if these properties such as beauty are always feelings, and feelings are only within a subject and not within an object that cannot be a subject, then it makes sense to call them 'subjective'.

How so?

So you are saying that in order for me to acquire the message "Montréal is in Québec" from a letter and from a voicemail, I must be able to read, hear, and speak english; is that correct? And if I did not, then I may misinterpret the information and acquire a different message? But there is objectively a correct interpretation of the information, that is, a correct message, and all other interpretations would be incorrect, would it not? So objectively, it would still be the same message in both mediums, independent of the subject's ability to interpret them correctly.