I don't see how a concept could be apprehended on the basis of one word. The concept is always the meaning of the word, and it requires an explanation to understand the meaning of a word. The concept of redness is not grasped by seeing red things, it is grasped by understanding what it means to have the property of being red. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word only points to the concept. The concept is apprehended through experience or observation of particulars that participate in the concept or form (2). Children abstract the concept of redness simply by seeing a few red things. Simple proof: ask a toddler to pick the red ball out of other coloured balls, and as long as he can understand the language, he will do so correctly. Other example: you and I can find the cat out of a cat and a dog correctly, even though we (at least I) don't know all the essential properties that make a cat a cat, and a dog not a cat.

This could be the case, and it appears to be what Platonic realists claim. The difficulty with this position is to support the existence of these concepts with some ontological principles. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you asking how we know that universal forms (2) are one, and not duplicates in individual minds? The ontological principle that supports this is the law of identity.

• Universal forms (2) or concepts have no accidental properties, by definition of being universals.
• These forms, although in minds, are separate things from the minds they are in.
• The law of identity states that if "two" things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing.
• Therefore the form in two minds must be one and the same in both.

E.g. My concept of 'triangle' has the essential properties 'flat surface' + 'three straight sides'. And I am fairly sure yours does too. Therefore, by law of identity, my concept and your concept are one and the same.

Our universe is filled with multiplicity because each of those things has distinct properties. Since no two physical objects can occupy the same space at the same time, all physical objects have at least different x, y, x positions at time t.

If I observe an object with all its properties, and you observe an object for which all properties coincide with mine, and assuming no false perceptions, then the objects we observe must logically be one and the same; not duplicates, but one. As is the case with objects, so it is with information.

It is simply how the terms are defined. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Got it. I figured it was likely a confusion of terms. I am personally ticked off at how freely the term 'form' is used to mean so many different things that don't seem to have any connection, but I'll deal with it.

The fact that there are many different interpretations of the same material, misinterpretations, and misconceptions, especially with extremely difficult material like what we are dealing with here, clearly demonstrates that concepts are not the same in all minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are using the word 'concept' ambiguously. You mean it in the sense of understanding of a sentence or text. I mean it in the sense of contingent universal forms (2). In that sense, only single words point to concepts, not whole sentences, and these are the same in all subjects that have abstracted it, as demonstrated in my previous post. Therefore, either a subject has abstracted the concept of 'redness', or he has not because he is colourblind; but there is no possibility of misunderstanding concepts.

But this is to ignore the accidentals, and Aristotle's law of identity is designed such that accidentals must be accounted for, so this does not qualify as a philosophically appropriate use of "the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

That's okay, if they are two separate things because located in different minds, it could be that my concept is an exact copy of your concept. But I don't think this is true. Since concepts are not physical, they cannot have a physical location. Instead, I think that my mind and your mind connect to the same concept. This could explain how communication is done: to communicate is to connect to the same concepts.

Now I still have unanswered questions. To start with, do general forms (2) exist only in our minds (excluding God's mind), or do they exist in particular things that participate in them? My answer is the latter, and here is why.

P1: It is evident that general forms (2) or concepts are the same in all minds. To assume that it could be otherwise would be absurd, because any coherent communication among individuals would be impossible: If my concept of "yes" could be your concept of "no", and so on for all concepts, then how could we hope to ever find this out, and then reach a common language on concepts? Like Meno's Paradox, we could stumble upon the same concepts by sheer luck, but then could never know for sure. Therefore, in order to avoid absurdity and despair, we must have faith that concepts are the same in all minds. This seems similar to Wittgenstein's problem that MU mentioned earlier.

P2: If the concept I perceive is the same as the one you and everyone else perceives, it is much more likely that the concept comes from outside of our minds as opposed to come from our individual minds, and coincidently is the same in all minds. To use an analogy: If I hear a piece of music, it could be either that it comes from my mind or outside; but if two persons hear the same piece of music, it is much more likely that the music comes from outside both minds.

P3: You and I likely live in different countries, and so my concept of tree-ness must have been abstracted from different particular trees than your concept of tree-ness, despite the concept tree-ness being the same.

C: General forms (2) or concepts first exist outside of our minds and inside the particular things that participate in them.

Understood. You are correct, but my previous syllogism is only step 1 of a three-step argument to prove immateriality. Step 1 proves that information is a separate thing from its container. Here is the rest.

Step 2: Proof that info is one thing in two separate containers.
P2.1: The law of identity says that if "two" things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing.
P2.2: Information A, separate from its container, is identical in container B and container C.
C2: Information A in both containers is one and the same, as opposed to being mere duplicates.

Step 3: Proof that information is non-physical.
P3.1: No one physical thing can be in two places at once.
P3.2: The same information A is obtained from containers B and C, which are in two separate places.
C3: Information is not physical.

I agree with you; that the term 'form' is archaic. It should be seen as a temporary term early philosophers used as a place-holder until later philosophers found clearer terms to define the same things. Thus Platonic Forms (1) became 'eternal / necessary truths', Aristotle forms (2) became 'concepts' (or 'pure data' as you call it, and although I never heard that terminology before, I find it fitting too), and particular forms (3) became empirical data.

I must say I am especially disinclined to call empirical data a 'form', because it seems out of place with the other two forms (1) and (2), which have the commonality of being universals, where as form (3) does not. Furthermore, the explanation that our mind acquires empirical data directly from matter seems sufficient, without having to add another factor (form (3)) in the mix.

I'm sorry, but I admit I have trouble understanding your posts. And unfortunately, it seems this conversation has drifted far away from the original argument on whether info is physical or not. Maybe I can go back one last time to my original argument in the form of a syllogism, and perhaps you could pinpoint which part you disagree with?

P1: A thing A is not identical to thing B if A remains when B is removed.
P2: Information A is present when container B is present. But information A is also present when only container C is present, and C ≠ B.
C: Therefore information A is not identical to either containers B or C.

So if I understand you correctly, particular things must have particular forms (3) because only forms are intelligible to our minds, and matter is not. Now why is that the case? If I perceive a particular chair, why can't we not simply conclude that it is because my mind perceives the matter of the chair through direct sense data?

Note here the link between 'form' and 'formal cause'. So to see the form of a thing, is also to see it's reason for existence. — Wayfarer

I think Aristotle separates the formal cause (essence) from the final cause (reason or end). Thus the formal cause of a triangle is "a flat surface with three straight sides", but I don't think that would be a relevant final cause. Having said that, I think this is true when it comes to man-made things, as described at the beginning of this post.

So for example, the architect has a conception, makes a plan, the blueprints for the building, then proceeds to produce the material building. In the case of all artificial objects, the form of the object exists within the mind of the artist before coming to be in the material world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I came to the same conclusion myself about the form of anything that is man-made: the form of a man-made thing coincides with its end or purpose. Thus the form of a chair is "a device designed to sit on", and the form of a boat is "a device designed for transportation on water".

But the analogy of a blueprint works more in favour of the general forms (2), than particular forms (3), because a single blueprint typically serves to build many particulars, like several buildings built from the same template.

And the answer to this is that the individual has unique features, that are otherwise called accidentals, which are proper to it alone. So the essence of the individual, as an individual, what you call the "is-ness", and I call, "what it is", is the accidentals. What makes a particular a particular is its uniqueness, the accidentals. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is the essential principle of Aristotle's law of identity [...] how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

But all accidental properties are physical, and forms are not. Even using the law of identity, I find that a particular form for particular things remains an unnecessary hypothesis: Consider two rocks A and B. We know they have different identities because of their different x, y, z properties; which are physical properties. Then consider rock A only, which has identity A. Split the rock in two halves A1 and A2. Which of the two halves retains identity A? They cannot both retain the same identity, because A1 and A2 have different x, y, z properties, just like rocks A and B. Glue them back together, and we obtain the original rock A, because the physical separation is gone.

Similarly, consider a tree which is able to grow many trunks, but is one organism (they exist but I forgot the name). We call it one thing and not many, because all the trunks are physically connected. But now cut the roots connecting the trunks together; all trucks will live, and what was one is now many living things; separate identities. The reason is because there now exists a physical separation between the trunks.

Therefore, the answer to the question "how does it come to be, that any particular object is the object which it is, and not something else?" is indeed because of their accidental properties added to the general form (2), but these are physical properties and need only be explained by matter without having to add a particular form (3). (The ship of Theseus anyone?)

all men instantiate or personify the idea of 'man' - there are not separate Ideas, one for each individual — Wayfarer

Actually ... upon further thinking, I have to make an exception when it comes to humans. Split a human body in two, and we do not obtain two separate humans. Assuming the human survives, only one of the two parts retains the human identity, that is, its self, personality, subjectiveness, soul. And that is the part that is still able to think. So I am siding with Metaphysician Undercover when it comes to a being who has a self or soul, that this particular being has indeed a form that is particular to it.

Bear in mind, Plato was an ancient thinker and that such ideas as logical laws, hadn't even been devised in his time; it was Aristotle who was to put that into a methodical form. — Wayfarer

Yes, that is a great point. As I was wondering myself, if the theory of forms is so important in philosophy, then why is it that nobody really speaks of them outside of the context of Plato, as though it is more of a theoretical exercise than something relevant to our days? I think the answer is that forms are still very much around, but under different names. Thus Plato's Forms (1) are now called necessary / eternal / rational truths or natural laws, or simply Truth as per Kierkegaard; and Aristotle's forms (2) are now called concepts (not to be confused with the ambiguous term 'concept' as a mere idea or draft for a design). And in both cases, forms have essential properties or essences because they are universals.

One thing I am finding, is that Plato seems to think the Forms are real, or are actual existing things, whereas I interpret them as having a kind of implicit reality which is less literal than Plato seems to understand it (or at least as many people says he understands it) — Wayfarer

Well, if Plato's Forms (1) are indeed synonymous to necessary truths, then we can prove that they are real and separate from matter: Necessary truths are, by definition, eternally existing; and if matter is not eternal (which is reasonable to suppose), then Forms (1) must be able to exist separate from matter. And that makes them more real than anything which exists only temporarily, or which existence depends on other things.

Also I think Plato does refer to necessary entities and not contingent entities, as most of his dialogues are about either logic and maths, such as in the Meno (geometry), or morality, such as in the Republic (justice), both of which are typically considered eternal truths.

So you are saying that if there is a physical obstacle, like distance between the message and the recipient, which prevents the receiving of information, then info must be physical; because if it wasn't, then there could not be any physical obstacles. But this is not necessarily the case, because the physical container could simply act as a cause to the existence of the information, as opposed to being the information itself. I.e, the physical container is the efficient cause of information, not the formal cause. And a cause is a separate thing from its effect; therefore if this is true, then the container is a different thing than the information it causes to exist.

That's it. It's syllogism time. If you disagree, can you point to the precise statement you disagree on?

P1: A property is called 'objective' if it is attributed to an object, independent of subjects observing the object. E.g. If a painting is rectangular, then it is so even when it is not observed.
P2: Beauty is also a property attributed to an object, because if I feel the painting to be beautiful, then the feeling is about the painting, not about me. But it is not independent of the subject observing the object, because if I feel the painting to be beautiful, it is I who feels this, and others might have different feelings.
C1: Beauty is not an objective property, as defined in P1.

P3: If a property is not objective, then it is called 'subjective', because they are opposite terms.
C2: Beauty is a subjective property.

You might say that 'stealing' is simply a metaphor for what is actually copying. — Wayfarer

For a physicalist, an idea is a pattern of physical matter. So stealing (i.e., the illegal copying of) an idea entails the occurence of the same pattern in different physical matter, not the transfer of matter. — Andrew M

Yes, I think that you are both correct; that my argument falls apart if the term 'stealing' really means 'copying'. I see now I also made the mistake of using a song as an example in my argument, which is a kind of meaningless information, as I already conceded that meaningless information is visibly only physical; that only meaningful information has the potential of being non-physical, because only this kind of information points to concepts.

Yeah I too should read up on forms. Here are the questions I would like to solve:
(1) Are 'forms' synonymous to 'necessary entities', like the laws of logic and morality?
(2) If not just that, are they also generalizations, like apple-ness and river-ness, in which individual apples and rivers participate in?
(3) If not just that, are they also particulars, i.e., a particular apple has a particular form?

Here are my preliminary answers, until someone can tell me better:
(1) They are definitely that at least. Only this type of form can be adequate for Plato's theory of recollection, where we can dig up the truth simply by thinking hard about it. This is because if an entity is necessary, then it is literally impossible to conceive it in a different way than its necessary way, without making a rational mistake. E.g. it is impossible to conceive that "2+2=3" if only we know what the terms mean. Let's call these 'Forms' (capital F).

(2) I think these too are forms, even though they are contingent. They are acquired through Aristotle's theory of abstraction, that is, we conceive the generalization of tree-ness after observing numerous trees. Our concepts of these forms must be identical, because otherwise, how could individuals be able to communicate together? Let's call these 'forms' (lower case f).

(3) I don't think there is a particular form for each particular material thing. It seems to be an unnecessary hypothesis: What could be explained by the presence of the particular form which could not be explained by the matter?

Right - ideas aren’t physical. But physicalists will say that ideas exist in brains and brains are physical, therefore they’re also physical - no matter what you argue. — Wayfarer

I take it you are playing devil's advocate, but I don't see how your statement refutes my argument. If ideas exist in brains and brains are physical, then by the same rationale, it is logically impossible to steal other people's ideas: Just as my brain cells are mine and not yours, ideas in my brain are mine and not yours. Yet, there is such a thing as intellectual property, which implies ideas can be stolen. How do physicalists explain this?

More on the claim that information is not physical. A physical thing cannot be stolen if it remains with its rightful owner. E.g., I logically cannot have stolen your wallet if it remains in your pocket the whole time. Yet we speak of 'stealing information' when when we make illegal copies of information like burning songs on a CD from Napster. But the original CD that contains the songs remains with its rightful owner. I.e., the atoms of my burnt CD are different atoms from the original CD, and therefore I cannot have not stolen anything physical. Ergo, the information I have stolen must be non-physical.

I refute your argument by claiming that the information is in the container, independent of the ability of the subject to interpret it. If a letter says "Montréal is in Québec", then that is the message on the letter, regardless if people can read it or not. And if they interpret something else from reading it, due to inability to read properly, then they have obtained an incorrect message. To say that a thing is incorrect implies that a correct thing exists. And if a correct message exists, then it must exist in the container.

Really? I thought feelings are always part of a body, not a subject. — Harry Hindu

I'm pretty sure feelings are never part of a body that is not a subject. Paintings don't have feelings, and neither do corpses (former subjects). On the other hand, properties like 'heaviness' can be part of paintings, subjects, or corpses.

What is so difficult about this? By saying that the sentence isn't literally true, is saying that you mean something else when you say it - something objective, not subjective! — Harry Hindu

Then what makes statement A literally true, and statement B not literally true, if not the type of property described?

Give me a break! Did we not agree that beauty is a feeling?! Doesn't that mean that the person has the feeling of beauty?! Again, when you utter the sentence, "The painting is beautiful." you are talking about your feelings toward the painting. If you mean that "I am beautiful." then you'd be committing the same mistake as saying the painting is beautiful. You'd wouldn't mean it literally! So no, you aren't being a feeling. You are a person that currently has the feeling of beauty - a property of a person. — Harry Hindu

Again, feeling or sensing x is not the same as being x or having x. E.g. "I sense the painting is rectangular" is not the same as saying that I, the subject, is rectangular, or have rectangular-ness. Similarly, feeling or sensing beauty is not the same as being beautiful or having beauty. If nothing has beauty in itself, then beauty is not a property of any object, and is therefore not objective. Conversely, some objects are rectangular, and therefore 'rectangular' is objective.

Another way to look at it: objective properties are in the object, independent of subjects or other objects. If the painting is rectangular, it remains rectangular even when no subjects are present. Conversely, subjective properties, while in the subject, are dependant on objects. If I feel beauty about the painting, then the feeling of beauty is dependant on the painting being observed. I may not feel beauty in another painting, even though I, the subject, am the same in both cases.

I agree with you, that there is merit in calling the world of feelings the 'inner reality', because while it is part of objective reality, feelings are always in a subject, and never in an object that is not a subject like a painting.

Harry.
We are on the same page that even feelings are part of objective reality about the subject. Where we disagree however, is that the term 'subjective' becomes obsolete as a result. This is not true. Consider once again the following statements:

A: "This painting is rectangular."
B: "This painting is beautiful."

First, there is clearly a difference between these two types of statements. A is literally true, while B is not, as you also pointed out earlier. This alone is enough to use the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' to differentiate between the two types of statements. But there is more.

In statement A, the property 'rectangular' is directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'rectangular' is clearly an objective property of the painting. In statement B, the property 'beautiful' is not directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'beauty' is not an objective property of the painting. But is it an objective property of the subject? I claim that it is not. If it was, then it would mean that the subject is objectively beautiful. But the subject is not beautiful; the subject only experiences the feeling of beauty when observing the object. Feeling x is not the same thing as being x. The painting is really rectangular. Neither the painting nor the subject is beautiful. Therefore the property 'beauty' is subjective.

I foresaw this in my argument look closer at the types of harm. — Sam26

Is it this? "All immoral acts cause harm to the one committing the act, or to the one who is the object of the act, or to both." Why do you say that an immoral act can cause harm to the one committing it? Note, I don't necessarily disagree, I just want to go further into the analysis.

If you have good reasons to cut the arm off, then obviously it's not immoral, which is why I differentiate between having good reasons for the harm as opposed to not having good reasons. — Sam26

But you said in your previous post that the three factors you mentioned served to judge if an act was immoral. My point is that if these three factors are present in both cases when the act is moral and immoral, then they cannot serve to judge if the act is moral or not.

Hello.

If there is no harm, there is no immorality. — Sam26

What if your spouse cheats on you and you never know about it? As they say, "what you don't know cannot hurt you". But surely, cheating is immoral.

if I cut someone's arm off without good reason, there are several factors that make this an immoral act, and moreover, make it an objective immoral act. First, it's objectively true that the arm has been cut off, we can see it on the ground. Second, we can objectively observe the screams of the victim. Third, we can also witness the screams and tears of family and friends. These three reactions show the objective nature of the harm done. — Sam26

But these three reactions would still occur if you had good reasons to cut someone's arm, like out of self-self-defense. So if the same things are observed for both a moral and immoral case, then they cannot be the criteria to determine if the act is moral or not.

Intent can be tricky because while there are clearly immoral acts that involve intent, there are also acts that cause harm without intent, like accidental harm, which we can be held accountable for. Furthermore, there are evils caused by natural disasters that don't involve intent at all, yet they are often referred to as evils because of the great harm done. One might say then that while we can refer to all immoral acts as evil, not all evil involves immoral actions because they are not always the result of an agent. — Sam26

We need to differentiate between two types of evil. Moral and physical. You are correct that 'harm' is an essential property of evil, when it comes to physical evil. For moral evil, the essential property is intention; intention of not treat others like we want to be treated. So accidental harm and natural disasters are examples of physical evil. Attempted murder and looking down on others are examples of moral evil. And intentionally cutting someone's arm for not good reason is an example of both.

By 'outer reality', I meant properties which are not inner feelings. You have asked not to called them 'subjective', and so I tried to call these properties of feelings something else. I think I will revert back to calling these 'subjective' though. After all, if these properties such as beauty are always feelings, and feelings are only within a subject and not within an object that cannot be a subject, then it makes sense to call them 'subjective'.

How so?

So you are saying that in order for me to acquire the message "Montréal is in Québec" from a letter and from a voicemail, I must be able to read, hear, and speak english; is that correct? And if I did not, then I may misinterpret the information and acquire a different message? But there is objectively a correct interpretation of the information, that is, a correct message, and all other interpretations would be incorrect, would it not? So objectively, it would still be the same message in both mediums, independent of the subject's ability to interpret them correctly.

The problem I see with your interpretation of the story of the fall is that it sounds like this advent of knowledge and self-consciousness is a good thing; a natural evolution of the species progressing towards a higher state. In the christian interpretation however, the event of the fall is the reverse; the fall of a great species down to a lower state. It is so catastrophic that it took the blood of the son of God to redeem the species (and even then we will only see the effects after death).

I understand that there is room for interpretation of symbols such as for the tree of knowledge, but there is no discussing that the event is a bad one.

I admit that this infamous tree of knowledge of good and evil does suggest that Adam and Eve acquired the knowledge of good and evil only after eating the fruit. But it would be absurd to believe that the original sin resulted from mere bad luck of committing an evil act they had no knowledge of. Even C.S. Lewis, one of the big boss of christian philosophy, is perplexed at the role of the tree itself in the event, and just ignores that part. Who am I to disagree with sir Lewis?

I interpret the ‘fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil’ to be a symbolic reference to the advent of self-consciousness — Wayfarer

Well upon realizing they were naked, they indeed became self-conscious.

I reject with the conventional definition of morality(as a code of conduct). I also reject the objective/subjective distinction, as you already know... — creativesoul

Ah yes! Hello again.

Murder is wrongful killing by definition. — creativesoul

I don't disagree. Did I say that murder was sometimes not wrongful? Otherwise, accidental killing is not wrongful, as it is accidental, and killing is not necessarily murder.

I am not sure what you mean by this; but how do you know that God does not have a sense of humour? Jesus' first miracle was to turn water into wine at a party. I find that humorous personally.

All codes of conduct are man-made. If morality is a code of conduct, then all morality is man-made. Universal and objective are not equivalent on my view. — creativesoul

But then how do you explain the fact that is it universal? All other things man-made seem to differ depending on time period, place, culture and so on; does it not?

Doing something other than what one was told to do(in the case of Adam and Eve) was evil prior to their becoming aware of it. God is the arbiter of good and evil in the story. — creativesoul

In christianity, God is not above goodness (i.e. he arbitrarily chooses what is good and evil), but he is goodness, that is, goodness is part of his essence. This is how christians escape the Euthyphro dilemma.

That's ethics, and again those are not objective. Rather they are subject to historical, familial, and cultural particulars. Attempted murder is punishable by law, because it is an act that we - as a community of people - have decided is unacceptable. — creativesoul

I admit I use the terms 'ethics' and 'morality' interchangeably, as I don't know what the difference is. But how can one disagree that attempted murder is unethical? Would you like to be the target? Would anyone? If not, then it is unethical by applying the Golden Rule.

As for unbaptised infants - that is what ‘limbo’ was supposed to be the solution for, although as I understand it, this has now been deprecated in Catholic theology. — Wayfarer

As I see it, there are only two logical outcomes: saying yes to God or saying no to God. The former is the state called heaven; the latter is the state called hell. There is one more transitional state called purgatory, which can be symbolized as the time it takes for the subject to make up his mind over the other two choices. But I cannot see limbo as a logical possibility, unless it is also temporary.

But I suppose on reflection one of the reasons that Catholics might oppose abortion, is that it prevents an infant from receiving the opportunity of salvation. — Wayfarer

This might be a secondary reason; the primary reason is simply that humans have ontological value and should not be harmed if it can be avoided.

Yes, but not in the strict sense of picking evil for the sake of being evil. I am optimistic that most people are not made of pure evil. Rather, picking evil is done as a means to the end of obtaining another good. This good cannot be a moral good (that would be a contradiction) but ultimately a physical or emotional good. E.g. 1: Hitler knew that his treatment of the Jews was evil, and it is reasonable to suppose he did so as a relief of his hatred for the Jews. This relief of hatred is a form of emotional good. E.g. 2: I know that giving money to charity is morally good, but I am tempted to avoid it because it would result in less money for me to buy physical goods.

P1 is false. Morality is a conventionally defined as a code of conduct. — creativesoul

If intention is not a necessary component of morality, how do we account for the fact that attempted murder is punishable by law? If only attempted, then there is no actual murder that occurred.

P2 mistakenly presupposes that the quality of an intention is existentially contingent upon the subject's knowledge of that quality. It's not. As if an intention's being evil/good requires the subject's knowing that. It doesn't. An intention is good/evil regardless of the subject's awareness/knowledge of that. One can have evil intentions and not be aware/knowledgable that they are. — creativesoul

How can I intend to do x if I don't know what x is? E.g. how can I intend to draw a quasar if I don't know what a quasar is? I suppose I could do end up drawing one by accident, by continuously drawing random lines, but then it would still be unintentional.

What counts as objective morality? — creativesoul

I mean to say that it is part of objective reality, not man-made.

I personally argue for universal morality, but it doesn't seem to be fitting to this thread's intentions... — creativesoul

It is fitting in the sense that universal (objective) morality is assumed in my argument. But more than that, I try to prove that its knowledge must be innate for it to apply to us.

following Augustine, holds that man is corrupted by sin, the result of which is death, and the only remission of which comes from faith in Jesus Christ. — Wayfarer

What you write is correct. But this 'corruption by sin' refers to the corruption of the body, from immortal to mortal and prone to physical suffering, and corruption of the appetite such as physical and emotional passions. It does not refer to going from a state of pure goodness to the ability to be evil. Salvation by Jesus is salvation from death and removal of the original sin which we carry similar to a birth mark; but even then, we still have the capacity of choosing against good, due to free will, and picking hell over God.

The Church recognises 'virtuous pagans' such as Plato et al, however, I'm fairly sure that they're not 'in heaven'. — Wayfarer

I am no theologian, but this idea seems absurd to me. If true, then an infant dying right after birth would end up in hell because it did not have time to 'know' Jesus.

That is precisely my point about your previous argument: Beauty is in the subject because it is a value; and values are things in the subject. We can simplify by saying "beauty is in the subject because it is in the subject". This is circular. How do you know it is only a value?

But to say that "beauty is a feeling in the subject because it is a value judgement" is begging the question, because value judgements are made only on things which are not properties of the observed objects.

the will has been corrupted by original sin — Wayfarer

This cannot be. If the will was uncorrupted (incapable of evil) prior to the original sin, then what caused the original sin? No, instead, the will being free from the start was always capable of both good and evil (by definition of free will), and the original sin resulted from choosing evil. And as described in my post, the evil was fully known for it to be a sin. It is not so much the act of eating the apple that corrupted Adam and Eve, as though the apple contained some kind of corrupting substance, but the disobedience towards God, which occurred prior to the act of eating the apple.

So even if we wish to do good, we might be incapable of recognising good, and therefore doing what is good, due to our fallen condition. — Wayfarer

How can one be blamed for a bad outcome if he could not have reasonably foreseen it? E.g. You give me food to bring to the hungry. Subsequently, they die from poison that you had injected in the food. Although I am part of the causal chain of events leading to the bad outcome, how can I be blamed if I had no knowledge of the poison?

It is only by virtue of receiving instruction, and thereby hearing of God’s saving grace - should we choose to accept it - that we then are able to choose what is truly good. — Wayfarer

The Good in christianity is no different than the Good spoken of by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, or Confucius, all of which existed before Christ. The Golden Rule of ethics, which is tightly connected with the Good, "occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition" (source).

I'm late for the discussion, but here is my two cents anyways.
The 'test of imagination', as Chesterton calls it, is useful for determining if a thing or event is logically possible or not: If you can imagine it, then it is logically possible; if not, then not. E.g. I can imagine a unicorn; I cannot imagine a triangle with four sides.

If I understand, your hypothesis is close to Kant's, which claims that the perceived data is modified in the mind, and is therefore different from the raw data from outside the mind? But then how do you explain that when both you and I read the message "Montréal is in Québec", we both perceive the same information, such that we can have a coherent conversation about it? It seems to me that the simplest hypothesis is that we are both observing the same outer object.

Now, that is a good example to work with. Color exists only in minds. You could say that our visual experience is also a feeling. But colors are the result of reflected light interacting with the eye-brain system, and the light is reflected off the object. So color is a relationship between the object, light and our eye-brain system, as color carries information about all these things because they are all a cause of your experience of color.

So, when I say, "The apple is red." I'm really referring to this relationship, not just myself, not just the apple, but the whole relationship - which is objective. The same can be said about the painting, as you only get the feeling of beauty when looking at the painting, so beauty is a relationship between you and the painting. — Harry Hindu

I think you are right that colour is in the mind, if we talk about what is being perceived only, because if the object or subject is travelling at high speed, then the colour perceived may change. But if we talk about the property that reflects only a particular light range, then it is a property of the object, because it is part of it.

We disagree about beauty ONLY if we mean that beauty is a property of the painting. If we are actually referring to our feelings, then we agree. So our disagreement comes from one, or both, of us misspeaking, or making a category error. You and I can still disagree on our theories of reality and our relationship with it, but we would both still be making objective statements about the world, so our disagreement isn't based on a category error, but simply a differing of explanations of the world and our place in it. — Harry Hindu

I agree with you that, in theory, we should not argue about properties of feelings, and should only argue about objective properties of outer reality. But this is still putting the cart before the horse, because some people might still argue about the beauty of the painting, claiming that beauty is in fact a property of outer reality. So far, we have found one solid criteria: touch. I will also add anything that is measurable by an instrument, because instruments cannot be biased with feelings. Thoughts?