My answer would be that you can't reach out and touch beauty on the painting. It's not a thing out there. It's a thing in here. You can reach out and touch the rectangular shape of the painting. — Harry Hindu

I think that is a reasonable answer. I agree with it. But maybe the example was a bit too easy. What about the colour of an object? Touch does not help us differentiate between different colours.

This is why we can agree on the rectangular shape of the painting but not on it's beauty. We can only agree that you find the painting beautiful and I don't. In talking about the beauty of the painting, we are really talking about each of our selves, not the painting, which is why we disagree on the beauty of the painting. In disagreeing, we are referring to each of our different states, one which has beauty and one which doesn't, not the painting. We agree that the painting is rectangular because that is a property of the painting. — Harry Hindu

I agree with everything you say, and that is because this sounds close to my relative-objective test, where I claim subjects cannot disagree on the ranking of degree of objective properties. Now I find it odd coming from you because I think this contradicts the following quote:

Agreement has nothing to do with it. People can agree on things that are just wrong. People agreed that the Earth was flat. Is the Earth flat, or does it only seem that way from our perspective? — Harry Hindu

Yes, it is a relative example. It is a relative objective example. Your own example I quote below is an example of a relative objective statement. You yourself call it objective, and it is describing an object relative to a standard.

The objective truth about snow is that it is colder than 0 centigrade, and that a hot tub is colder than 100degrees centigrade. — charleton

So relative things can be objective at the same time; and therefore to say "snow is colder than hot tubs" is an objective statement. It is either true or false.

I think this is wholly nonsensical. — charleton

Maybe I can help you understand, but I'm gonna need more productive input from you than saying it is nonsensical.

You misunderstood me. I did not ask for your position, but the reason why you have this position. Why do you think that beauty is a mere feeling of the subject, as opposed to a property of the painting; and why do you think 'rectangular' is in turn a property of the painting, and not a mere feeling of the subject? In other words, the title of this discussion: How to determine if a property is objective or subjective?

For me the issue is that language itself is a "container" -- at least to the degree that we believe in translation. Do we think in words? In my experience, we do, with maybe a little wiggle room for some kind of spatial-temporal reasoning. Can we generally strip meaning from its body? It's not so clear. — t0m

You bring a good point, but yet I think we can still think without using words or images, or imagining any other containers. Think of the concept of 'justice'. Can you describe this concept with words? It may be possible but I can't because I don't know its essence yet. Can you use an image for it? The concept itself does not seem to be physical. And yet, the word 'justice' is not a meaningless word, and I'm sure we can all use it correctly to describe a specific situation. This goes to show that we can think about some concepts like 'justice' without having to rely on containers.

I agree that some media or containers are better suited to convey specific types of information, much like it is better to use a picture than to describe a place using words. That said, you could still describe the place using words and convey the same information; it would just take a lot of words.

Perhaps put more simply : It is up to the information processor to establish the identity between the information particulars encountered across multiple mediums. This identity belongs to the interpreted information, not to the information medium, and therefore does not inform us on the medium, which means that this does not contradict the claim that information is material. — Akanthinos

Sorry, I did not understand that paragraph. Could you perhaps rephrase it?

So you don't seem to buy into my Relative-Objective test. In which case, how do you yourself claim that such a property as 'beauty' is only a feeling but a property like 'rectangular' is a real property of the object?

Your contention that "most would find...." is totally humancentric. Even if you could test every human, this would not be objective in the way people want it to mean; regardless of human interest or opinion. — charleton

Then how would you test if a property is objective or not? Otherwise, do you agree with the following example? Some people may not find snow to be that cold, and some others may not find a hot tub to be that hot; but everyone finds a hot tub to be more hot than snow. As such, coldness and hotness are objective properties. They are relative, but still objective, because everyone finds that X is hotter than Y. We don't see that phenomenon with subjective things like beauty.

Sharpness is a value judgement — charleton

Assuming that this is true, this still would not be a proof that it is subjective. There is such a thing as objective values. ;)

How can it be objective and subjective.This is an abuse of language. — charleton

I'll explain. If 'beauty' is subjective, then the statement "This painting is beautiful" says nothing about the object which is the painting, and says everything about the subject, namely that he feels beauty when observing the painting. But then saying "I feel beauty when observing the painting" is now an objective statement, because the property 'feeling beauty' is about the object which is 'I' in that statement.

This is the point which I objected to in this thread. It is physically impossible to strip away the container from the information package, because then the information would be lost. Without the container, there is no information. So the container, which makes the existence of information possible is just as essential as the contents. There is no contents without a container. Therefore it must be accepted that the container is part of the information package. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that with no container, there is no information. But as I have previously stated, it does not follow that the container is an essential property of information, as it could simply be the cause to its existence. Or to use Aristotle's language, the container could be the efficient cause of information, not necessarily its formal cause. And I claim the efficient cause is the correct one, because I can acquire the same information from different containers which have no properties in common. E.g. obtaining info from a purely visual media like a book, or purely audio media like an audiobook.

Furthermore, we can prove that a container is not essential to information because we can imagine information being acquired directly through telepathy. The fact that we can imagine a thing proves that it is logically possible. And if logically possible, then a container is not an essential property of information.

I honestly don't see a difference between your definition and mine. Regardless, under this definition, it is coherent to use the word 'subjective' when describing a statement such as "this painting is beautiful".

But surely, you see a distinction between the two previously stated sentences A and B, do you not? That A is related to the subject's feelings (what I call subjective), and B is related to the object.

There is evidence to suggest that for every person raised in a 1st world economy, 5-8+ people could be raised without malnutrition or neglect in a 3rd world economy. — XanderTheGrey

Should we really place any moral value on individual human life? Personally I can see no value. — XanderTheGrey

Hello. I see a contradiction between these two statements. If humans have no "moral" (I think you mean ontological) value, then your argument in the first quote has no effect. 1 x 0 = 8 x 0 = 0.

Why would a "good and just" God not destroy the Devil, if the Devil is the sole perpetrator of all evil in the world? — Jamie

Free will. God gave to some of his creatures, namely men and angels, the power of free will. I think it is logically contradictory to give a creature free will, while also decide to destroy the creature as soon as it chooses evil.

Also, the devil is not the sole perpetrator of evil in the world. We create our own evil too. It is possible that the devil influences us into choosing evil, but the decision is ultimately ours. This is once again due to free will.

God kind of opened a big can of worms when he decided to give free will.

I want to summarize what I learned so far on the original post, including the arguments and counter-arguments.

(1) The original post serves to demonstrate that the container of information is a separate thing from the information itself, because while all the properties of the container may fully change (say from purely visual properties of a letter to purely audio properties of a speech), the information does not. In other words, the metadata is a separate thing from the data. It may be that information is dependant on a container as a necessary cause for its existence (at least in our physical universe), but it remains that they are separate things, as an effect is separate from its cause.

(2) By the law of identity, the information stripped of its container is not merely a copy in each separate container, but is in reality one and the same thing, because all the properties that make the information is the same in all containers. The same info is acquired whether it is obtained from a book, an ebook, or an audiobook.

(1) and (2) together should be sufficient to deduce that information is not physical, as a single set of info may be located in many places at the same time; but let’s back it up with another argument.

(3) By the law of conservation of mass and energy, all physical things transmitted from an emitter to a receiver must be lost by the emitter by the same amount that is gained by the receiver. Information does not behave that way because the emitter does not lose the info transmitted. The containers abide to that law, but as previously demonstrated, the info contained is a separate thing from the containers.

Bob’s your uncle.

EVERYTHING in the cosmos is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual.

I too read this as saying that each particular thing has a particular form associated to it. But I could be misreading it, because my understanding is that forms are generals, not particulars. E.g., particular rocks participate in the one form of rock-ness, and particular rivers participate in the one form of river-ness.

Yes, that is all correct. So subjective means a feeling in the subject when observing the object. And the feeling is itself objective to the subject.

Now for the next question. Consider the following two statements again:
A. "This painting is beautiful."
B. "This painting is rectangular."
We have thus far only assumed that statement A is subjective, and B is objective. But can we back this up? I claim we can by using the Relative-Objective Test, as per the original post.

A. When testing two different paintings, some subjects will observe painting (1) to be more beautiful than painting (2), and some will observe the opposite. Since there is no agreement in the order of degree of beauty, this means that beauty is subjective.

B. When testing two paintings of different shapes (not just size), a large majority of subjects will observe one painting (say painting (1)) to be more rectangular than the other, while the minority (likely blind) will not see a difference; but no one would observe painting (2) to be more rectangular than (1). Since there is an agreement in the order of degree of 'rectangular', (at least no opposite order is observed), this means that 'rectangular' is objective. Thoughts?

I agreed that the input could come from outside the mind. I see no reason to believe that it necessarily does, nor do I see reason to believe that all of the input comes from outside the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are correct about not all concepts coming from outside the mind. Just because I have a concept of a unicorn, it does not follow that unicorns exist outside the mind (sadly). Only 'simple impressions' as Hume says, like colours, sounds, and basic shapes, must exist outside the mind.

As for your test, it's as I told you, a matter of whether or not we agree, and often we do not. As I told you, I often disagree with people as to the colour of something. So your test, and the fact that we often disagree about things, indicates that input must come from within the mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes... We are back to that special case when perceptions of objects are false. But if we assume that the perceptions are true (I don't think this is a stretch), then the test would work, would it not? You and I observe a ball and both agree that it has roundness. Conversely, you and I observe a cube and both agree that it does not have roundness.

I still do not understand your use of English. I would not say that I recognize a triangle in the three sided object, I would say that I recognize the three sided object as a triangle. Do you see the difference? I recognize a certain object as a car, or another object as a house, meaning that for me these objects fulfil the conditions required for calling them by those names. I do not see the concept of a car, or the concept of a house within these objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

Honestly, I don't see a difference. The concept of X is by definition composed of all and only those properties essential to X. If you recognize a certain object as a car (again assuming no false perceptions), then some of the properties of that object must be essential to the concept of a car; or else, you would not recognize it as such. And if so, then the object has the concept of a car, by definition.

Saying the same thing with math:
Let concept X = A+B
Let observed object Y = A+B+C
Therefore Y = (A+B)+C = X+C

Our concepts can be compared if we find their essential properties, based on our implicit knowledge of them. E.g. my concept of triangle-ness has the following essential properties: 'flat surface' and 'three straight sides'. If yours has the same essential properties, then this proves they are the same.

Finding the essence of concepts from our implicit knowledge of them is basically what Socrates did in Plato's dialogues, sometimes successfully; and this method presupposes that concepts are the same in everyone.

Abstracted things are artificial, and decided upon too. What else, other than a human mind would perform the act of abstraction, and whether the abstraction is correct or not, is decided upon by the human mind as well. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought we agreed that the input cannot come from the same place as the output, and that we cannot conceive simple concepts we have not yet observed, as was the case for the blind person not conceiving colours, a deaf person not conceiving sound, and an emotionless person not conceiving sadness. I accept that the abstraction process is happening in the mind, but the input must come from outside. Or else, how would we test that what I conceive as green is the same as what you conceive as green, if not by both of us observing the same colour located outside of our minds?

I don't get this at all. We do not recognize a concept within things. The concept is within the mind, and when we apprehend a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept, we feel justified in calling the thing by the name which corresponds to that concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not sure I understand your distinction between "recognizing a concept within things" and "apprehending a thing as meeting the conditions of the concept". If we apprehend a particular object which has a flat surface with three straight sides, then we recognize a triangle in that object. And if our perceptions are true, then the object truly has triangle-ness as part of it.

Objectivity is only that which is agreeable to a community of humans. — charleton

This might be what happens in practice, but in theory, we are aiming to find properties that exist in things in themselves, even if unachievable.

Regarding your example on sharpness, you may be right that it is not possible to objectively find if a lemon is sharp in the absolute sense, because it is may be a relative term. But while relative, it could still be objective. Let's test it with my Relative-Objective Test (still working on the name): If all subjects were to rank the sharpness of two lemons with different degrees of sharpness, what would happen?

(1) Most would find that lemon A is more sharp than lemon B; the rest would find no difference; and none would find that lemon B is more sharp than lemon A.
(2) Some would find that lemon A is more sharp than lemon B; some would find no difference; and some would find that lemon B is more sharp than lemon A.

If result (1) happens, then sharpness is objective, according to my relative-obejctive test. If result (2) happens, then sharpness is subjective.

I think we are very close to reaching an agreement.

You agree that beauty is a feeling about something and that "subjects" only have feelings, so why say that nothing has beauty in itself? — Harry Hindu

By "nothing has beauty in itself", I mean it in the sense that nothing is beautiful in itself; not that nothing has beauty as a feeling. As you demonstrated, if beauty is a feeling, and this feeling is in the subject, then subjects have beauty. But this is different than saying that subjects are beautiful. I suppose it is a matter of distinction between data and metadata. The 'feeling of beauty' is data within the subject, where as 'being beautiful' would be metadata about the subject. And the latter is false because beauty is only a feeling. Therefore, although I agree that 'feeling of beauty' is an objective statement about the subject, 'being beautiful' is not an objective property; and as such, 'being beautiful' is what we call subjective.

Another thing that can be subjective are statements: E.g. "This painting is beautiful".
In this statement, the object is 'painting', and as we have established, 'beauty' is not about the object but about the subject of the statement; therefore the statement is subjective. Granted, we can change the statement into an objective one without really changing the meaning, as so: "I feel beauty when observing this painting". In this statement, the object is 'I', and the property 'feeling of beauty when ...' is objective. But I still see two challenges that remain:

1. Since we will still use the first type of sentence in our everyday language, it is useful is make the distinction between subjective and objective statements.
2. We don't always need to say "I feel that X is Y" to make sure the statement is objective; as this depends on the property Y. E.g., if the property 'rectangular' is objective (not merely a feeling), then to say "This painting is rectangular" is already an objective statement. It would be pointless to say "I feel this painting is rectangular".

First let's clarify a few things, just in case there is a misunderstanding with these.

1. Words are not concepts. Words point to concepts. Words are man-made and decided upon; concepts are abstracted. The word 'bird' in english is different than the word 'oiseau' in french, yet they both point to the same concept: the flying beaky thing.

2. Just because I claim that concepts have essential properties, it does not follow that the particular thing we observe necessarily has these essential properties too. We could have false perceptions. E.g. a colourblind may observe a grey chair, and thus have 'greyness' in mind at that moment, but it does not follow that the chair is objectively grey.

Now, I will attempt to break down my previous argument in steps:
1. An property of a concept is called essential if, when it is removed, then the concept is no longer present (not recognizable). Conversely, a property is called accidental if the concept remains after the property is removed. This is easy to see: A triangle in which we remove its three sides is no longer a triangle; therefore 'three sides' is an essential property of triangle-ness. Conversely, a triangle in which we remove its colour remains a triangle; and therefore colour is an accidental property of triangle-ness.
2. The fact is that we recognize a concept in some things X, and not in other things Y.
3. This means that properties of that concept exist in X and not in Y.
4. If all the properties in X were accidental to the concept, then the concept would still be present in Y, as established in step 1; but it is not.
5. Therefore some of the properties found in X are essential properties of the concept.

To answer you question directly, I too think 'beauty' is just a feeling. That is a consequence of it being subjective (which we assumed). This also means that nothing has beauty in itself, as it is always a feeling within the subject when observing the object. And if nothing has beauty in itself, then it is never an objective property.

My question for you is, do you know of a way to find if a property is objective or subjective?

The point is. that things are only "wet" because we call them "wet". That constitutes "the fact" that some things are wet, we agree to call them wet. If we didn't call them wet, then there would be no fact that they are wet. If we agree to call certain things wet, this does not prove that wetness has certain essential properties, it proves that we can agree about which things to call wet. — Metaphysician Undercover

Unless I misunderstood what you said, I think I agree with you that just because we agree on the meaning of the concept 'wet', it does not follow that the particular thing we observe is in fact wet. It could be a false perception of wetness. But this is besides the point about essential properties. If you and I mean the same thing when using the word 'wet', then the meaning has some essential properties. More explanation further down.

[...] but this does not mean that any particular word necessarily refers to any particular set of essential properties. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it does. Let's say you and I observe a chair. Assuming no false perceptions are present, you would be confused if I said "This is a lake", and rightfully so. Because the observed things correspond to the properties attributed to a chair, not a lake. Sure, some of the observed properties would be accidental, like its colour and location, but some would be essential like having a backrest or being a structure. And no observed properties would correspond to properties essential to the concept of lake, like 'a large body of water'.

If we cannot define "greenness", only experience it, then how can it have essential properties? — Metaphysician Undercover

This concept is so basic that it has only one essential property: being green, or this; which does not help. Another reason why 'greenness' was a bad example to prove my point. I should really stick to triangle-ness haha.

According to what you say, I assume that I am correct in calling this green, and the others are correct in calling this blue, because this is how we each experience the colour. How can there be essential properties of greenness when the same colour is correctly called green by me, and blue by others? — Metaphysician Undercover

Essential properties are essential to the concept; not necessarily essential to the particular things we observe. We could have false perceptions of the things we are observing. And when you call the thing green and we call it blue, we may disagree on the fact, but we still understand what each other mean by green and blue.

By projecting beauty onto the painting, I just mean that I, the subject, get a sensation or feeling of beauty when observing the painting, which is also what you mean I think; I don't mean any physical projections.

Also, what is beauty? Besides being what you call, "subjective", what is beauty? Is it not a feeling? Isn't it a feeling you get when looking at the painting, and not a projection (because that doesn't make any sense)? And in this case, the feeling would be attributed only to you. You are an object, no? — Harry Hindu

This is the part where I claim you are making an error. Yes, my feeling of beauty is a property of me, and is therefore objective. But no, 'beauty' is not a property of me, as it is only a feeling I get when observing the painting, and neither is it a property of the painting. It is therefore subjective.

Let me put the same point in a different way. Consider the following two statements:

• (1) "This painting is rectangular."
• (2) "This painting is beautiful."

Statement (1) is objective because 'rectangular' is attributed to the object, which is the painting. Statement (1) is not objective because 'beauty' is not attributed to the object. It is therefore subjective.

I hope this clarifies things.

Hey! Don't make the topic more confusing than it already is.

We agree that certain things are wet, and that certain things are not wet. But this does not produce the conclusion that "wetness" has essential properties, it just means that we agree about which things we should call wet and which things we should call not wet. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, the fact that some things are wet and some are not, is sufficient to prove that wetness has essential properties, as so: Properties of a concept are essential if, should these properties be removed, then the concept would no longer be present. Conversely, properties are accidental if, should they be removed, the concept would still be present. Now, some things (1) have wetness and some things (2) don't. It means that properties of wetness are present in (1) and not in (2). If all these properties were accidental, then their absence in (2) would not result in the absence of wetness. But wetness is absent in (2). Therefore some of the properties of wetness absent in (2) must be essential to the concept of wetness.

I don't agree that order necessarily implies quantity. One comes after the other, which comes after the other, and so on. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

I was going to object, but I find I have trouble arguing about this topic. If you don't mind, I will drop it to focus on the other topics.

When we allow for negative as well as positive integers, then quantity becomes irrelevant. [...] There is no such thing as a quantity of negative two, or negative three, these are completely imaginary, and nonsense quantities. [...]. — Metaphysician Undercover

This might get a bit off topic, but I think your claim here is a non-issue, because in real life, there is no such thing as a negative number in the absolute sense. E.g. there is no negative absolute temperature, pressure or mass. So I agree that quantities do not allow for negative values, but this is in conformance to reality.

But this doesn't make sense. What if the blind person learns about the different wavelengths of light, and learns which wavelengths produce the sensations of green. Would you not agree that this blind person has a concept of greenness? Would you think that human beings have no concept of xray, ultraviolet, infrared, and such wavelengths, just because we cannot see these colours? — Metaphysician Undercover

Greenness, the thing in itself, is not this 'range of wavelength of light' you describe. If it were, then it would be logically impossible for us to imagine greenness without imagining a light source, inasmuch as we cannot imagine a triangle without imagining three sides; but we can imagine greenness by itself. The true concept of greenness is not about wavelengths, but is simply this. Rather than being one and the same thing, this 'range of wavelength of light' is a cause of us sensing greenness, or to use Aristotle's terminology, it is an efficient cause of greenness, not its formal cause.

We have concepts of ultraviolet and infrared as wavelengths, but have no concept of the colour they may produce if we were able to see these. By the way, I think it is impossible for us to conceive a new colour, for the same reasons.

Maybe greenness was a bad example to use. Instead, imagine if you were incapable of feeling the emotion sadness. I can do my best to describe to you that it is the emotion one gets when being aware of a good that no longer exists; and from this, you may be able to infer that it is a painful thing; but it would not substitute the experience of the feeling itself. And the concept is the thing in itself.

You are making an error. To say "the painting is beautiful" is not the same as to say "I feel the painting is beautiful". In the first statement, the object is 'painting', and the property is 'beautiful'. In the second statement, the object is 'I', and the property is 'feeling the painting to be beautiful'. In the first statement, 'beautiful' is subjective, because it is only a projection of my feeling and not a property of the painting in itself; where as in the second statement, 'feeling the painting to be beautiful' is objective, because it is a property of me at that moment.

To put this finding in general terms, properties such as 'beauty' is always subjective, where as properties such as 'feeling of x' is always objective. The trick is to remember that 'beauty' is not the same property as 'feeling of beauty'.

Yeah you're right; my bad. I have changed my last post to assume that 'beauty' is subjective. My point was not to focus on how to prove if a thing is subjective, but to determine the relationship between a subjective property, and the subject and object.

See you later.

Subjects are just other objects. Just as we can describe the differences between objects based on their attributes and properties, we can also make distinctions between subjects based on their attributes and properties. We also refer to subjects as if they were objects. — Harry Hindu

I see your point, Mr. Hindu. Let me try again to describe the difference between an objective and subjective property. A property is objective if it is attributed to the object. So far so good. But, a property is subjective, not if it is attributed to the subject, (for as you say, this is still objective towards the subject), but if it is projected by the subject onto the object. This sounds complicated, so here is an example.

(Edited) I observe a painting and say "this painting is beautiful". Let's assume we know that 'beauty' is subjective. So 'beauty' is not a property of the painting in itself. It is also not a property of me, because my expression of 'beauty' was never about me; only about the painting. Rather, this property is a projection of my feeling of beauty onto the painting. This is what we call subjective.

True, but neither does it turn impossible just because we add the concept of nonsensicalness in front of it. — BlueBanana

I aim to reductio ad absurdum this one. If omnipotence is capable of creating nonsense, then this omnipotent being may both exist and not exist, may be you, and me, and everyone else, may turn truth into falsehood, and good into evil. As a believer of such a being, are you an atheist, a theist, and a pantheist, all at the same time?

Making sense or being logical are properties and laws of our universe, and they don't necessarily apply outside it. — BlueBanana

I don't agree that other universes may have different laws of logic; only different laws of physics. Can I back that up? Alas I cannot because any logical and sensical argument I could come up with would only beg the question. That said, I suspect you of being inconsistent: if you entertain the idea of having different laws of logic in other universes, then why not entertain it for our universe as well?

So, how do you conclude that because the input is not in the mind, therefore the abstraction is not in the mind? "Abstraction" refers to either the process, or the output, it doesn't refer to the input. The input is what the abstraction is abstracted from. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, I agree that the abstraction is likely in the mind. Just not the input. My point was that concepts are abstracted from outside of the mind to inside of it.

What is being discussed is the possibility of a concept which is not within our minds. If your claim is that a concept exists as a definition, that definition is only symbols on a piece of paper, which needs to be interpreted by a mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

I claim concepts exist as things in themselves, found in particulars, and later abstracted in the mind. We describe concepts with words and definitions, but these are merely signs pointing to the concepts.

I don't buy this at all. By the method you've proposed, accidentals can be mistaken for essentials. Suppose I want to know the essential properties of the concept of "wet". I have some cold water which is undeniably wet. And I have some warm sand which is undeniably dry. According to your logic, this property, "cold", which is found in the water, but not in the sand, is an essential property of "wet". — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you. My method was not to separate the essential from the accidental properties, but merely to demonstrate that the essential properties existed. Thus in your example, 'cold' is not necessarily an essential property of 'wetness', but we know that 'wetness' has essential properties because some things are wet and some things are not.

I think that the essence of five is defined by order. [...] What if we were to trade places between five and three? Then five would represent a different quantity, and a different place in the order. In reality, the essence of fiveness is just a convention, one which we can't even agree on. What kind of convention is that? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure we can say that five is defined by order, but that is by order of its quantity. 4 comes before 5 comes before 6 because IIII < IIIII < IIIIII with respect to quantity. We cannot trade 5 and 3 in order of quantity, because IIIII > III. The only thing we can do is switch the symbols so that 5 points to III and 3 points to IIIII; but we cannot switch the concepts.

How do you propose that the immaterial concept could exist within the material symbols, independently of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

I side with Hume and Descartes, among others, when they say that we acquire most of our concepts from observation of the outer reality. The proof is that a blind man born blind has no concept of greenness, because he cannot conceive the difference between different colours. Therefore the concept is not conceived in the mind, but is abstracted from observation of outer reality. One might argue that since colours are physical, then so is the concept of greenness; but I counter-argue that since size and location is not an essential property of greenness, then the concept is not physical.

What counts as objective? I mean, what is the criterion which, when met by a candidate, counts as that candidate being objective? Subjective? — creativesoul

In theory here are the criteria: a property is objective if it is attributed to the object; and subjective if it is attributed to the subject. In practice, I don't know of any way other than my relative-objective test. Maybe my test is flawed, but there is no denying that some properties are attributed to the objects and some properties are attributed to the subjects. Again, if in reality the earth is round, then 'being round' is an objective property of the earth.

Where did Gandhi say that? Also I thought last time was your last comment on this. ;)

It sounds like you want a reason to believe that logical contradictions are not part of omnipotence. Alright. To say something that is illogical is simply to say something that is nonsensical. As such, saying "a triangle can have four sides" is no more sensical than saying "the smell of purple is tall". The former statement may appear more sensical than the latter, but it is not insofar that a contradiction is present. And a nonsensical statement does not turn into a sensical statement just because we add the concept of omnipotence in front of it. As such, an omnipotent being cannot create a triangle with four sides, any more than it can create a tall smell of purple.

I heavily disagree. Most people would recognize that object, or a triangle with rounded angles, as a triangle. Furthermore, it's only our culture that has taught us what is a "proper" triangle; without that influence, a human could recognize the three examples as equally triangle-like. — BlueBanana

They are like triangles, and it might be a useful description in everyday talk, but they are not triangles. Similar to an egg being like a sphere or close to a sphere, but it is not a sphere. Besides, one property of triangles is that the sum of the angles equals to 180 deg. These rounded triangles don't have this property.

Now, my favourite part of the argument (which unfortunately is a tad off-topic so no further comments on this): an omnipotent being could create a triangle with four sides. This is, however, independent of whether the definition of triangle is its triangleness or that it has three straight sides and angles. — BlueBanana

I am not sure if you are saying that an omnipotent being could in fact create a triangle with four sides, or if you are saying that this idea is absurd. My position is the latter. As Aquinas says, contradictions do not fall under the omnipotence of God.

So, what's being said is not talk? — creativesoul

When one is talking, the content of the talk is not necessarily about talking. Ironically, we are talking about talking right now, but we could be talking about unicorns too. Analogy: A story book has a story in it. The story is not necessarily about books, although the story is told through a book.

"Round" is a word. — creativesoul

Round is indeed a word, said by me, the subject, about the earth, the object when I observe it. The question is, when I say "the earth is round", am I saying something about me or about the object?

I don't want you to take me the wrong way here. I'm not so much as disagreeing with what I think that you're trying to do. Rather, I'm attempting to save you from all the troubles that will surely come from employing the objective/subjective distinction. — creativesoul

At this point, I suspect that you and I are not on the same page; and if we are not, then we cannot have a productive argument. Maybe it is best to leave it at that. It could be due to my own limitations by the way.

The abstraction occurs within the mind, a process which the mind carries out. So how does this make an argument that concepts are outside of a mind? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because abstraction is a process, from A to B, from input to output. Yes, the output is in the mind, and so could be the process; but the input is not from the mind; or else what would change from A to B? It would be like shovelling dirt from one place to put it back in the same place.

So what happens if no one can say what the essential properties of "justice" are, or, like in Plato's republic, there is no agreement as to what the essential properties are? — Metaphysician Undercover

It just means they have not yet found the explicit definition of the concept. Not a big deal in everyday discussions because we still all have the implicit definition of it. E.g. you and I can still agree on whether a particular event is just or unjust; we just could not figure out general truths such as if justice is by definition always more profitable than injustice. For this one, we need the explicit definition.

What makes you think that there is such a thing as the essential properties of "justice"? — Metaphysician Undercover

A property is essential to a concept if, should it be removed, the concept would no longer be present. Thus, if there exists a case (1) that is undeniably just, and a case (2) that is undeniably unjust, then there must be some properties in case (1) to make it just, which are not found in case (2) to make it unjust. And these, by definition, would be the essential properties of justice.

• Case (1): Two workers having the same work qualities (skills, seniority, quality of work, etc) are paid the same.
• Case (2): The same two workers are not paid the same; one's pay is the double of the other.

How does that make sense? You say that the essence of "fiveness" is that there is five of them. So the essence of justice is that it is just? ... — Metaphysician Undercover

I have mislead you by adding the things in parentheses. I meant that fiveness can be represented by IIIII or *****. The particular object doesn't matter, as long as the quantity is correct. So the essence of triangle-ness is not to be a triangle (that would be circular), but to be a flat surface with three straight sides.

Say that to Samson.

E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me?
— Samuel Lacrampe

Much easier to deploy with 'triangles', that argument. ;-) — Wayfarer

This critical question is the sole reason I took on philosophy. Still searching for the answer.

Sorry for the long wait on this.

I defined it as what is helpful to one's goals. — Harry Hindu

I am intrigued about this definition of 'good'. Does it follow that if there is no goal, then there is no good? What if I say "something is good looking". What goal would that refer to?

I may not have the last word, but I am claiming the title of posting the 500th comment. I declare myself above the rest of you until the 1000th poster shows up. See you then.