I am impressed by your knowledge of God and the reasons for evil in the world.

One small disagreement is when you say we cannot have any knowledge of God. Thomas Aquinas says that while we cannot have complete knowledge of God, we can have some. For one thing, we can know what he is not: If he is perfect, then he has no properties that are imperfect (weak, shy, ...). We can know he is the first cause, from the cosmological argument. We can know that there can only be one perfect being, as argued here. Finally, we can know some things about the cause from its effects: If we are truly created in his image, then our image must be somewhat close to his, even if only a little.

You are presuming that the essential nature of a button MUST be defined in utilitarian terms. What if my friend Mr X insists that the essence of a button is fundamentally a question of aesthetics (beauty). The onus is now on you to prove that Mr X is mistaken and that his thesis that the perfect button is the most beautiful button is false. — John Gould

Sorry for the late response on this discussion.
A property of a thing is essential if the thing no longer retains its identity once the property is removed. Is a beautiful button a button? Yes. Is an ugly button still a button? Yes. Therefore beauty is not an essential property of buttons. On the other hand, is "a button that cannot hold two pieces of fabric together" still a button? No; just scrap material.

What then is free will, if not freedom of intentions? A good will is one that intends on doing the good. We may not always be able to do good deeds, but we always have the freedom to intend to do good. A saint that is in captivity is no less a saint just because he is unable to do saintly things; rather he is a saint as long as his intentions are aimed at doing saintly things if he could.

I accept the analogy, and will add that the sailor has the freedom to set the goal to whichever direction he likes, even if the path that lies ahead has many constraints.

Good point. I think we need to differentiate between two kinds of praises/blames:

(1) Praises/blames to the face of the person, as a means of conditioning them to another end, as you said.
(2) Praises/blames not necessarily to the face of the person, and because their act was judged to be praiseworthy/blameworthy. Judging an act as being praiseworthy/blameworthy only makes sense if there was a conscious choice made by the person. If I unintentionally saved a person's life, say by accidentally bumping into them, then I shouldn't be praised for it.

I was referring to the second meaning in my argument.

I don't know what is Free Will. I do know that as humans, we makes choices as to the direction of some action, by virtue of will. Choices are not free. They are constrained, and outcomes are always unknown. We are trying to navigate. — Rich

Free will is synonymous to freedom of intentions. These intentions are usually categorized as good and bad intentions. We may not always have freedom of choices if the choices are restricted, nor know the outcome ahead of time, but we can intend for a good or bad outcome.

To answer the question "what is a perfect button", we must first answer the question "what is a button", that is, what is its essence. I am guessing you mean a shirt button as opposed to a button you press to activate something. I think its essence is: a device designed to hold pieces of fabric together at one spot. Now, as mentioned, a perfect thing is one that does its job properly, or one that fulfills its nature perfectly. Thus a perfect button is a device that perfectly fulfills its nature of holding pieces of fabric together at one spot. After that, all physical properties that provide a means to that end is part of the perfect button, although these are relative to each situation.

Good point. I think a 'being in every way' is one that transcends all other things; otherwise it is not as perfect as a thing can be. As such, this being would transcend space and time, if that is logically possible, and thus have no space-time attributes.

This is for my own info: What about animals? I think most people would agree that animals don't have free will, and that their acts are determined by instinct or genes. Wouldn't a determinist say that man is nothing but a complex animal?

Supposing that all actions are deterministic, what is the purpose of cognition, and consciously planning your actions? — Daniel Sjöstedt

Thomas Aquinas has a similar reductio ad absurdum argument for free will:
If free will did not exist, then all praises and blames, rewards and penalties, would be in vain. But everyone acts as if these concepts are relevant. I personally have yet to find someone who does not. Therefore everyone acts as if free will exists. If the data does not back up the hypothesis, then it is likely be false.

By what? — Rich

I am not a determinist, but I suppose they would say by the same laws that move objects and animals in determined ways, namely our genes and external forces in the environment.

And what is it that makes us feel like we are planning and choosing? — Rich

Feelings are not infallible. A friend once told me of his experience in being hypnotized. He said that while under, he felt that he wanted to do the things the hypnotist was telling him to do, and only realized that it wasn't his choice once he snapped out of it. Pretty scary stuff.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it sounds like your argument is: If all actions are deterministic, then planning is pointless because the actions will occur whether we plan them or not. If so, then I think this is an error because determinism is still compatible with causality. Thus it could be both that the planning is determining the actions, and the planning was itself determined.

Sorry if this as already brought up before.
Thomas Aquinas has a similar argument using 'perfection' instead of 'omnipotence', as so:

P1: If two beings are distinct, it means that one possesses an attribute that the other does not possess.
P2: A perfect being in every way possesses all attributes that make it perfect.
C1: Therefore if two perfect beings existed, they would both possess all attributes that make them perfect, making them non-distinct, or one and the same.
C2: Therefore there can only be one perfect being.

Hello. I think P1 is correct. (1) Descartes first determines that he is at least thought, for it is a self contradiction to think "I have no thoughts". (2) We find that a body is not an essential property of thought. For one thing, angels are possible, and are defined as rational immaterial beings, or thinking beings without bodies. Conclusion: it is logically necessary that we are made of thought, but not logically necessary that we are made of bodies.

Where I personally disagree with Descartes, is his conclusion that our mind must be separate from our body. Just because it is logically possible does not mean that is it actual.

Hello. I think it is a matter of defining the term 'being'. If being is defined as "a thing that exists", then a "non-existing being" is a self-contradiction. If on the other hand being is defined as "a thing that is a unity or individual", then a "non-existing being" is possible. I am leaning towards the latter definition, because I have heard other people talk about "imaginary beings" like unicorns. That said, I don't think that contradictions can be beings, like "a thing that is both a unicorn and not a unicorn".

I once saw somebody once put it this way: "Science is a nicely-packaged philosophy". — WISDOMfromPO-MO

Science or the scientific method is a method built on philosophical premises such as "sense observation gives truth", "illogic gives falsehood", "uniformity of nature", and "causality". Science cannot analyze these premises because it presupposes them; but philosophy can.

That seems correct as well, for this definition is compatible with mine. Non-empirical truths are abstract and tend to be (always?) universal; and if abstract, then we need clear and distinct definitions to describe them; and if sense observation is the primary tool for empirical truths, reason is the primary tool for non-empirical truths.

You're omitting a crucial ingredient, namely, observation (and experiment, which is a type of observation). — Wayfarer

Observation in science is based on the idea that sense observation gives truth; and that idea is part of epistemology.

Philosophers like Hume accept that idea for particulars, but not for generals, on the grounds that uniformity in nature is not a necessity. Then extreme rationalists like Descartes will even reject that idea for particulars, on the grounds that there is the possibility of dreaming the sense observation.

The word itself can be translated as "love of wisdom" and since we live in the West, there are Western academia biases as to what is wisdom. — Rich

My take is that the essence of 'wisdom' is: correct judgement. And a judgement may only be correct if the facts and values are true, which brings it back to the search for truth. Though I admit it's a bit of a stretch... I am not sure if wisdom is an essential property of philosophy, but it is a nice effect of it.

Science (modern definition) was not created by science, but by philosophy; and more precisely, by logic and epistemology. As such, if science is a discipline, then philosophy must be a discipline too. You don't get order out of chaos.

I too find scientific truths pretty boring, if not for their usefulness.

That was an interesting article. So realists give value to scientific theories according to their level of truth; and instrumentalists give them value according to their practical use. As philosophers, should we side with truth or usefulness?

I think we need to differentiate between two kinds of truths: (1) eternal / rational / necessary, and (2) temporal / empirical / contingent. Examples of (1) are logic, ethics, essence of things, and values of beings. Examples of (2) are matters of fact, accidental properties of things, and laws of physics.

Since eternal > temporal, rational > empirical, and necessary > contingent, it follows that type (1) truths > type (2) truths. My bottom line is that we ought to value truth for its own end for (1), and truth as a means to another end for (2).

Yeah you are probably right about this topic being too convoluted. I usually walk away whenever someone pulls the Quantum Mechanics card into a philosophical debate.

- "Nothing can come from nothing."
- "Actually, in QM, particles pop in and out of existence ..."

I'm sure Ockham will be rolling in his grave. — Wayfarer

That's okay. There should a universe where he is not. :D

In current cosmology, the big debate on whether 'the universe' is 'only one' of a possibly infinite number of 'multiverses', which might forever be undetectable, even in principle. — Wayfarer

How is this hypothesis backed up? Because if the other universes are undetectable, then I am guessing that it was not brought up from empirical data. Then was it deduced somehow?

Hmm... Good point. So our choices are (1) a simpler hypothesis with a more complex conclusion, or (2) a more complex hypothesis with a simpler conclusion. It appears that Occam's razor is not effective here. I'll take that card back.

Occam's razor would judge that a hypothesis involving finite things is simpler than one involving infinite things. As such, until it is refuted, we should stick the simpler 'finite chain of causes' hypothesis.

Better yet, I think gave a pretty good argument here (point #2).

Understood. First I thought that by 'unchanging', you meant 'does not change its mind', not 'action-less'. But now I have two objections to this new meaning:

(1) An action-less thing is not 'good' but neutral. Not moral or immoral, but amoral. A rock comes to mind. I think good acts are required to be a morally good being.
(2) This argument points to deism, not theism. A passive being, not the passionate being that I have heard being described by Aquinas.

Regarding causality: Isn't the existence of causality necessary anyways? Everything that begins to exist necessarily requires a cause outside of itself for its existence. And we observe that some things begin to exist; therefore causality necessarily exists.

Regarding your first argument on X being good: Can you expand on premise 2: Evil implies change? It seems to me it is possible for a thing to be evil and unchanging; and conversely, for a thing to be good and changing, that is, changing for the better. As such, this unchanging X could be unchangingly evil.

This is nitpicking, but I would slightly modify Premise 1: Not everything in the world has a cause, if we include the first cause as part of the world (part of the things that exist). Rather, everything that begins to exist has a cause, due to the ex nihilo nihil fit principle. That way, the first cause conclusion does not contradict premise 1, and it follows that it has no beginning.

I think both are innate and different starting points. Logic is the starting point for truth. Ethics is that starting point for good. They meet when the true good is found.

If it is true that nothing has a value in itself except as a means to an end, then it follows that the means acquire value because the end must have value, and that if the end has no value, then neither does the means. Therefore, if beings are ends, then they must have value, because the means (like being just to all) has value.

If people had value, what would that value be in relation to? — Noble Dust

In relation to the value of other beings, like God, angels, other people, animals and plants. And the hierarchy of value is in the order shown. Thus we should treat plants as ends (that is, do good to them), as long as it does not conflict with the end of higher beings.

Try as we might, we can't remove ourselves from our own experience, so the ultimate end for us has to be something that we can parse within our finite experience, and God as ultimate ends doesn't parse. — Noble Dust

I agree that 'ought' implies 'can', that is, our end must be achievable. But this does not mean that we cannot achieve the end of treating God as the ultimate end, by obeying his will, such as loving our neighbours as ourselves. Such act is within our reach.

You may be right about free speech, but it is not a representative example because it is by no means an absolute. Let's look at Justice. Imagining justice to be bad and injustice to be good is impossible, like imagining a square circle. It is thus a moral absolute, independent of cultures. That is not to say that everyone is just, but that everyone understands justice to be morally good and injustice to be morally bad.

I have heard ethics being called "The three R's": Right Response to Reality, or else, treating things according to their proper values. People are ends because they have a high value, but they are not the only thing. If God exists, then he has the greatest value of all, and is thus the ultimate end. Then comes angels, then humans, then animals, then plants, and so on, if we follow the Great Chain of Being. With regards to ethics, each ought to be treated as ends, proportionally to their proper values.

Surely, you and I both know of one person that treats others as they want to be treated. It only takes one example to demonstrate that, at least once, somebody acted for the end goal of ethics in itself. And even if the moral good was not a real thing, it is at least the perception of a moral good that makes it an end in itself. Side note: I also happen to think it is a real thing.

Fair enough. I looked up the concept of 'possible worlds' here. In it, it does define 'impossible propositions' as propositions being true in no possible world. And impossible propositions are ones that have contradictions. Thus logical contradictions are true in no possible worlds.

I think you are right about the second half. Man arguing about logic itself is hard.

Still, what was your argument for thinking that other universes may have a different logic? To say that something is possible implies that it is logically possible. But as such, to say that another logic is possible is to say that another logic is logically possible, which is nonsensical.

I see. So the end is preservation and propagation of the human species. This kind of fits into the bucket (3) of necessity, health and safety, if taken broadly enough. But I have an objection to this being the only end, and reducing (1) and (2) to means: If this was true, then the individual would be valued based on genes, where the one with desired genes would be at the top, and the undesired genes and infertile one would be at the bottom of the hierarchy. But this yields to eugenics, which goes against traditional ethics, to treat all individuals as having the same value and rights.

I agree. And even though being morally good can make give pleasure in the long run, that is usually not the reason why people are good. I.E., they would still be good even if it did not give them pleasure. Pleasure in that case is more of a side effect than an end.

Pleasure can only be experienced in doing something such as watching a movie, it is never experienced on its own, it never an end in itself, it is always experienced along with something else which is the end. If you go to view a movie, you take pleasure in the story, its aesthetic, the actors and so on, it is only experienced as a means, never as an end in itself. — Cavacava

It raises an interesting question. Do we perceive a thing to be good because it gives us pleasure, or do experience pleasure because we perceive the thing to be good? Here is my take: It is the former when it comes to subjective values, and the latter when it comes to objective values. The goodness of a movie is subjective, and so we perceive it to be good because it gives us pleasure. The goodness of justice and health is objective, and so we experience pleasure because they are good. As such, pleasure is an end when it comes to things with subjective value.

All three can be reduced to the ends of propagating one's genes. — Harry Hindu

Interesting claim. So the most successful person in life is the one with the biggest and healthiest line of descendants? What reason do you have to believe that? It seems that the ethical behaviour of willing the good to everyone, not just family members, goes against that end.

I think happiness has intrinsic value. Everything else can be reduced to means for achieving happiness. — TheMadFool

I think 'happiness' either means 'pleasure' (1), or 'blessedness', which is pretty much ethics (2). Do you mean another thing by 'happiness'?

Also, truth has intrinsic value. — TheMadFool

That's a good one. Aristotle says man desires truth for its own sake, entirely apart from its utility. I will think more about that one, and consider if it cannot be reduced to the other ends (1), (2), or (3).

Another thing that has intrinsic value is life. — TheMadFool

This fits into (3), does it not? Or if you include preserving other life forms in nature, then it might fit into ethics and duty (2), but I am not sure.

By the way, I like the terms 'intrinsic value' and 'instrumental value'.