It's really not obvious these three stand on their own. Plenty of people will reduce (2) to (1). You could reduce (3) to (2) or (1). Some might claim that (1) and (2) are actually in the service of (3). — Srap Tasmaner

Reducing (2) to (1): While the thought of being good may result in a pleasurable feeling, I don't think this is the end goal for most people. In fact, some would argue that if personal satisfaction was really the goal, then the intention would be selfish, thus not really good.

Reducing (3) to (2) or (1): That is possible. There is sense in asking "What is the point of living if not for duty or pleasure?"

Reducing (1) and (2) to (3): Yeah maybe pleasure is for health, and social ethics is for the preservation of our species. But I find the end of surviving for the sake of surviving to be absurd. The word despair comes to mind. I am more inclined to reduce (3) to (1) and (2), than reducing (1) and (2) to (3).

Avoidance of pain might have an even stronger claim than pleasure here.

Agreed. I guess seeking the end implies avoiding its opposite.

I am sure that I could find a coin or a paper currency that is no longer legal tender but some collector would love to keep. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

But why would they love to keep it, if not for the end of subjective pleasure? I am using the term 'pleasure' broadly here, to include interest, passion, curiosity etc.

And if it is dark and I do not have a flashlight, a dollar bill could be valuable as a light source after I strike a match or flip a cigarette lighter.

Yes, but the light source is valuable only as a means to see something. If you did not care to see anything at that time, then you would not use the dollar bill.

I don't think pleasure can be an end in itself, it has to hold hands with something else to be experienced. — Cavacava

In my movie example, it seems the end is only pleasure, as it is neither necessary nor morally good (or bad) to watch it. Is there another end?

Maybe duty can be an end, but if the outcome of what duty commands is bad, then was the act moral?

Maybe not, but it is at least the perception of duty that will give value to the means; until the perception is gone, and at which point, the means no longer has the same value.

Self preservation may also be an end, but it is a biological end, like birth, death and so on, so not so much so much value as a non-cognitive necessity.

Does it not make it an end in its own right? People value safety. They are willing to spend more money on a car with safer features.

That's a good one actually. Kant says to treat people as ends and never only as means. I think I would throw that in the ethics bucket (2), that is, social ethics.

I guess you are right. What was your argument though? I thought you too were just giving an opinion.

I'll try an argument for fun: one fundamental law of our logic is the law of non-contradiction. Now if another universe does not have our logic, then it does not have the law of non-contradiction. But if it does not have it, then it also has it (since contradictions are allowed if the law is not present). But once it has the law, then it cannot not have it (since contradictions are not allowed if the law is present). Therefore, all universes have the law of non-contradiction, which is a fundamental law of our logic.

Those assumptions have a strong emotional component; maybe that component isn't exactly the basis, but the emotional element is key to the ethic. The emotion gives content to the ethic. — Noble Dust

Maybe your definition of 'emotion' is really the definition of 'feeling'. Emotional feelings are only one type of feelings. Other types are physical, 'gut' feelings (like guessing an answer on a test), and moral feelings, also called conscience. I think you are referring to this last one, which is different from emotional feelings.

What is innate knowledge? That idea isn't enough for me, unless you can give a compelling case otherwise. — Noble Dust

A typical example of innate knowledge is that of logic. Laws of logic are not discovered by scientific experiments, because science presupposes logic. Logic is a first principle, the starting point used to infer everything else. I think most people agree that logic is innate, though not everyone agrees it is the case for ethics. Yet, nobody can disagree that ethical things like justice, respect and honesty are good, and others like injustice, disrespect and dishonesty are bad. The Golden Rule of ethics is called that because it is found in nearly every religion and ethical tradition, suggesting it is part of human nature.

How can you be sure "we" have that innate knowledge? It seems obvious that not everyone has that. — Noble Dust

I have a reductio ad absurdum argument for it: If we supposed that not everyone had that same innate knowledge of ethics, then we could never have a moral judgement of anyone, because a person's act, no matter how immoral it may seem, could be an honest mistake if the person did not know it was wrong. As such, it would be possible that Hitler's act of the Holocaust was an honest mistake, on the grounds that he did not know it was wrong, and what's more, thought it was his duty. And that is absurd.

If we observe something to be unimaginable, then that proves it is unimaginable within our universe, and it is impossible within our universe. — BlueBanana

Yes, and also impossible in all universes. Example: It is impossible for Caesar not to cross the rubicon in our universe, because we cannot change the past. But I can image Caesar not crossing the rubicon. It is therefore possible in another universe. However, I cannot imagine Caesar crossing and not crossing the rubicon at the same time. That last statement is therefore impossible in all universes.

1) You are correct that if you are ethical, then you will (or should) feel proud, and if you are unethical, then you will feel guilty. That said, what causes the feeling of pride/guilt? The feeling is an effect of the ethical act; such that if you don't perceive the act to be ethical, then you will not feel proud. Consequently, ethics is the end, and the feeling is only an effect of that end, not the end itself.

(A) But you can't escape from Fate. Whatever you choose, what must happen will happen. (B) People should choose whatever they want to choose and this whole thing i mentioned shouldn't affect their choices. — Johnler

Aren't A and B contradicting statements? How can choices exist if fate exists? For disclosure, my opinion is that choices (free will) exist, and fate does not.

emotion is not the same thing as pleasure — Noble Dust

I guess I did assume that 'pleasure' meant the same as 'emotions'. But is it not? Emotions are either emotional pleasures (joy, excitement, relief...) or pains (anger, sadness, stress...). What else is there?

Emotion is the driving force of why ethics and duty, for instance, are ends in themselves. Ethics can't be an end in itself without an emotional source — Noble Dust

This cannot be the case. Or else, logically, Hitler could be have been a very ethical person if he performed the Holocaust out of emotional bursts towards the Jews.

Emotion is the driving force of why ethics and duty [...] how would ethics obtain without emotion? On what do you base a philosophy of ethics or duty? — Noble Dust

Ethics is based on innate knowledge of justice; just like logic is innate to everyone. One cannot imagine justice to be bad and injustice to be good. You have it backwards: we get a feeling of right and wrong because we have a knowledge of ethics, not the other way around.

Logic and natural laws or part of our universe — BlueBanana

If by natural law, you mean laws of physics, then I agree about that; but it is not possible for logic. "Being illogical" does not mean "standing outside of our universe's laws logic", but rather "making no sense". It is an error made by the subject of discussion, and does not say anything about the object of discussion. As such, saying "2+2=3" is not any more sensical than saying gibberish like "the smell of purple has". Practical test: if it is unimaginable, then it is illogical, then it is impossible.

One last thought before we part ways. If we have zero ability to judge a religion and to differentiate a probably true one from a probably false one, then any religion whatsoever, like the Flying Spaghetti Monster, ancient greek religions, or any cults, would need to be taken as seriously as established religions like Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism.

We live for emotions. — Johnler

Hello. While pleasure is indeed an end and not a means to any other ends, there exist other ends as well, like ethics or duty. A parent may feel no pleasure in punishing a child, but do it because it is the right thing to do.

Also everything happens for a reason. — Johnler

It sure does, but the reason may not be a good one. Be careful about this 'Karma' ideology. It can lead to absurd conclusions, like deciding not to help anyone in need, on the grounds that they only got what they deserved, and that helping them out would disrupt destiny.

One cannot know the intentions of the Lord. — Rich

This statement is not a logical necessity. For one thing, we could know God's intentions if he told them to us. This Lord you speak of fits more into deism rather than theism.

I don't see what the problem is with that. If God ordains us with the ability to understand him, say through human reason, then we can understand his ways through it.

A typical example is goodness and logic. If God created us in his image, then our idea of goodness and logic must be the same as God's.

I agree with you that to claim to know everything about God is also to claim to transcend God; and this is not only pretentious, it is also false, because since God is above all things by definition, we can never fully know him.

Having said that, we can know some things about God: If God exists and is the creator of all things, then he is the creator of human reason. Therefore we can trust our reason to help us find truth, including some truths about God, if these can be found through reason. Not all, but some.

Hello again. I have finally read the blog. As I understand it, its argument against free will is as follows:

p1: If God is omniscient, then he can foresee my future acts with certainty.
p2: If my future acts are known, then they will occur necessarily (not that knowing is what causes the act, but rather the act is the necessary cause to knowing).
p3: If my future acts are necessary, then I have no free will.

I reject premise 1. God might exist outside of time. If so, then all instants, past, present and future to us, are always "live" or "now" to God. There is no foreseeing if there is no future from God's point of view; there is only seeing. If you eat an apple right now in front of me, I know with certainty that you are eating an apple because I see it. It does not follow that you don't have free will in the act, as it is not foreseeing.

Way better universe. You can actually shake hands.

While I agree with Mr. LeMaitre that religion and science should be separate, it is not fair to keep the 'creation ex nihilo' hypothesis while removing the 'supernatural cause' hypothesis; because the 'creation ex nihilo' hypothesis implies that the 'supernatural cause' hypothesis is false. Both should be removed on the ground that they are both unscientific (above the realm of science).

It's the same with ↪Samuel Lacrampe's attempt to prove ex nihilo with arithmetic: he interprets 1 apple + 1 apple =/= 3 apples as saying that an extra apple cannot appear outta nothin'. But, if arithmetic is his tool of choice, then all this says is that if you got an apple and another apple, then together you have two apples (and not three). If then, by some miracle, another apple appears outta nothin', then with the two apples that you already had, you will have three apples all told. — SophistiCat

I understand your point, that at the time that there were 2 apples, then there were 2 apples, and at the time that there were 3 apples, then there were 3 apples. And to that I agree. But my argument says more than this:

In theory, 2≠3, that is, 3 cannot result from 2 and nothing else. But in the apple thought experiment, if 'nihil ex nihilo' is false, it follows that in practice, 3 apples could result from 2 apples and nothing else. The consequence is that there is a discrepancy between theory and practice, or between logic and reality. And this is absurd.

If then, by some miracle, another apple appears outta nothin' ... — SophistiCat

'By some miracle'? As in 'caused by a miracle'? But a miracle is not nothing. What this says is that, while miraculous events escape the laws of physics by definition, they too don't escape the nihil ex nihilo principle. And neither do you in practice, apparently. ;)

I never thought God as being logical or religion for that matter. I always thought that both were a matter of faith so whatever they say is it. — Rich

Truth does not contradict truth, and so if a claim is illogical, then it cannot be true. That goes for all types of truths, including religious claims. That is not to say that there cannot also be faith. One may have faith that a claim is true, but only insofar that the claim is not illogical.

I will read the blog and get back to you on it.

God's omnipotence is not defined as the ability to do anything whatsoever, but the ability to do anything that is logically possible. If God wills for us to have free will, then he cannot logically will to remove our free will at the same time.

Are you asking whether Calvinists believe in free will, or are you asking if there is room for free will if God willed whatever comes to pass? If the former, I don't know the answer, and I too would like to know what Calvinists believe.

If the latter, then free will is logically compatible with God willing everything. In short, God willed humans to have free will. At which point, we have full control (and responsibility) over our intentions.

It is true that for a mirror, our right becomes its left and vice versa, and I think the same would apply for coordinate systems.

Alright, new attempt to find a difference, by involving free will. In this universe, my duplicate necessarily replicates my every move, or vice versa. Therefore if I have free will, it does not. If I am the master, it is the slave. Or vice versa, but we cannot both have free will or be the master. Kind of like the characters in 's Youtube videos (hilarious by the way).

We need to differentiate between 3 modes of reality:
(1) Impossible, (2) possible and not actual, (3) possible and actual.

(1) 2+2=3 is impossible. It is unimaginable. It cannot exist in any universe.
(2) A unicorn is possible and not actual. It is imaginable. It can exist in another universe, or in ours later.
(3) A horse is possible and actual. We have observed it. It exists in our universe.

Mr. Pippen's argument is aiming to make 'something from nothing' impossible, thereby making 'nihil ex nihilo' a necessary principle. Your argument here would at best make 'something from nothing' possible and not actual, but not impossible.

I'll play devil's advocate. Just because we don't see something from nothing, it does not mean that we can't see something from nothing.

Having said that, since we have indeed never seen it, then it becomes the prima facie, and the other side has the onus of proof to demonstrate that something from nothing is indeed possible.

Hello. I never learned to read logic symbols like this, and just caught up by reading wikipedia for 5 minutes. But what happens if we reverse the variables, as such?

1. Let n stand for nothingness.
2. Then ~n is not nothingness, that is, something.
3. ~n→n means we can get nothing from something.
4. ~n & ~n→n leads to a contradiction, so it's false that 'nothing can come from something'.

But... it seems possible to get nothing from something, by common sense.

Fun. I can think of one "move" that would not be the same, if we use the term generally to mean things like events and outcome: I raise my right hand and say "I am raising my right hand". The difference between me and my duplicate is that I am telling the truth, where as my duplicate is lying.

I agree with when he says that even money has no intrinsic value and only has extrinsic value as a means for exchange of other goods. The question is thus, what good can you think of that has any intrinsic value? It seems that me that all tangible things that can be stolen only serve as a means to a greater end, ends such as pleasure, necessity (like surviving) or ethics.

It is true that the method gives the same step-by-step solution to both (1) perception of malicious intentions, and (2) perception of looking down on others. That said, it is useful to make the distinction.

If you want to avoid being the conflicter: A lot of honest people will understand that they must avoid (1), but may not know about avoiding (2). Avoiding (1) is like the negative form of the golden rule "don't do onto others as you don't want them to do onto you". Avoiding (2) is like the positive form of the golden rule "do onto others as you want them to do onto you". Both are needed to avoid conflicts.

If you want to avoid being the conflicted: It is valuable to determine if your conflicter fits into (1) or (2), as it may change the approach you take to bring the perception to light. If you suspect (2) and not (1), then the conflicter has no motive to lie, and so you can be more forward about it. If you suspect (1), then the conflicter may lie, and so further investigation would be needed to get to the bottom of the conflict (while still assuming innocence until proven guilty ... not an easy thing to do).

It is true that if there is no end, then the means to that end becomes obsolete. But back to your original question about if there is something worth stealing, are you saying that it is not worth stealing the plans from the nazis, even if it would serve to end the war?

Good question.
They are both unethical behaviours for failing the golden rule; but 'malicious intent' is a dishonest mistake, where as 'looking down on someone' is an honest (yet unreasonable) mistake.

Example of malicious intent: I talk trash about you behind your back and humiliate you in public. My intent is to harm you.

Example of looking down on someone: I consistently forget my daughter's birthday, yet always remember my son's birthday. Or, I invite my whole group of friends for a BBQ, except for Tom, out of negligence. My intent is not to harm anyone, and yet I evidently see my daughter as having lesser value than my son; or Tom as having lesser value than the other friends in the group.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that stealing the plans is only a means to the end of the good cause, and thus not the end itself. This is true, but then again, this also applies to stealing money does it not? Nobody steals money for the sake of keeping money, but always as a means to purchasing other things. So just as money acquires value as a means to purchase other goods, so do the nazi plans acquire value as a means to another good, like ending the war.

Maybe this falls outside of your 'economical' theme, but what about stealing for a good cause?
For example, stealing plans from the nazis to stop their next attack?

You are missing out on a really fun conversation. But as you wish. See you later.

I agree with you that 'some' does not necessarily mean 'all'. But it is also just logic that there are only 3 ways to see the proposition: (1) everything can come from nothing, or (2) some things can come from nothing and some things cannot, or (3) nothing can come from nothing.

Looking at (1): the I+I≠III argument must be addressed, because it contradicts that proposition.
Looking at (2): those things that can come from nothing must escape the I+I≠III argument.
Looking at (3): it is compatible with the I+I≠III argument, and unless (1) and (2) can be defended against the I+I≠III argument, then (3) becomes the only possibly true proposition.

Interesting claim. If I understand you correctly, you reject the proposition that "anything can come from nothing", and say that "some things can come from nothing, and some things cannot". I also take it you agree that apples are part of the things that cannot, as demonstrated in the I+I≠III argument (unless you see a flaw in that argument).

What follows is that the things that can come from nothing must escape the I+I≠III argument. Is that correct so far?

Alright. See you later.

It's so not a necessary consequence. — Srap Tasmaner

To be more specific, which following statement do you disagree with?
1. If a thing can come from nothing, then an apple can come into existence from nothing.
2. I put 1 apple and another 1 apple in a closed system. Then a third apple comes into existence from nothing, thereby resulting in 3 apples in the closed system.
3. From statement 2, we conclude that "1 apple + 1 apple = 3 apples" is possible in practice.
4. I+I=III is impossible.

Here is my point: If the necessary consequence of a hypothesis is impossible, then the hypothesis is false. For the hypothesis 'Something can come from nothing', a necessary consequence is that 3 apples could logically result from 2 apples; because the third apple could come into existence from nothing. But we agree that "I+I=III" is mathematically impossible; thereby making the event of 3 apples resulting from 2 apples impossible.

Conclusion: the hypothesis of 'Something can come from nothing' is false.