I agree with everything you say (some of it is actually quite insightful), up to the following part:

These things that are neither include thought, belief, meaning, and truth. There is nothing that can be said which does not require all of these things. All things said consist of things that are neither subjective nor objective. That is... the content of all talk consists of that which is both, objective and subjective... Thus, all talk is neither. — creativesoul

This simply cannot be true. Let's suppose that the earth is round in reality (a safe supposition I think). It is therefore round whether subjects like us exist or not. Therefore 'round' is a property of the object, and is fully independent of subjects and their talks. Now I, a subject, say "The earth is round". According to you, "the content of all talk consists of that which is both, objective and subjective... Thus, all talk is neither." But as previously stated, 'round' is an objective property of the earth in reality. Therefore, the content of this talk, being about an objective property of the object of talk, is objective.

What's being said, as compared to the subject saying it?
Help me out here. What counts as "the content" of talk? — creativesoul

Correct. The content of talk is what is being said.

If being within a mind is not an essential property of a concept, then we must consider concepts which are not within a mind. So the concept which you speak of "fiveness", is not necessarily in a mind. What identifies it as a concept then? — Metaphysician Undercover

Indeed, concepts are not necessarily in the mind, because they are first abstracted from the particulars. E.g. 'triangle-ness' is abstracted from particular triangles we observe.

To me, what identifies something as a concept is that it is an idea, a notion in the mind, so being in a mind is an essential aspect of a concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

There may be an ambiguity of the term 'concept'. In philosophy, concepts are the essence of things. In informal language, it is indeed synonymous to a mere idea. I think ideas are essentially in minds, but concepts are not, because they are abstracted into the mind, from "somewhere outside of it", so to speak.

So ideas and notions within your mind are not necessarily concepts either, they could be something else. I have a notion in my mind of "fiveness". I cannot assume that it is the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover

Technically, you may be right that we could be mistaken about our notions and the real concept, but I am optimistic that it is not the case; because if my notion of "yes" could be your notion "no" and vice versa, then it would be utterly hopeless for us to try to communicate.

Where can I find the concept of fiveness in order that I can confirm that my idea of fiveness corresponds with the concept of fiveness. — Metaphysician Undercover

As Aristotle says, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts; this is how we can have intelligible conversations; but not necessarily the explicit knowledge. E.g. we can all use the word 'justice' correctly in a sentence, but we don't necessarily know its essential properties. Plato and Socrates used dialogues to obtain the explicit knowledge. I think their underlying assumptions is that the concept is found if all parties agree with the definition. Let's try it with fineness. I think its essence is: "IIIII" (or whatever other object, as long as there are five of them). If this corresponds to your notion of it, then we can conclude that we have found the real concept.

Which part specifically? Otherwise, the view that man is a rational animal with free will comes from Aristotelianism and Scholasticism. Source

if there is such a thing as a universal conscience and sense of duty, then why are there psychopaths and sociopaths? — Matthew Gould

I don't know much about psychopaths, but will attempt to explain it anyways. Sure, maybe they lack a sense of duty, but it does not follow that objective morality does not exist. Much like most people will see the red of a red chair, colourblind people will not, but this does not change the fact that the chair is red.

why is it that we impose laws on people without a conscience when we are basing our moral code on our consciences and senses of duty? Isn't that a form of tyranny? — Matthew Gould

This depends what we impose. If we impose our subjective preferences on others, then it is tyranny. But if we impose justice on people, then it is not tyranny, because tyranny is unjust by definition.

If there was a universal moral code then why is it that certain laws are implemented in one place and not in others? — Matthew Gould

There may be different moral laws in different places, but then it could say something about the quality of the law-making of the place, and not of the universality of the moral law. Some regions have the caste system. Would you not agree that this system of law is unjust?

I was unclear about your position in the last comment. My bad. I think the theory is very close to what you suggest. It is about stripping off the accidental properties and retaining the essential ones, the unchangeable ones, the ones that, if removed, then the object would lose its nature. E.g. a property of me is to have long hair. If I lose this property, I am still me? What if I lose the property 'ability to think'?

Indeed, if we could draw concepts or visualize them physically in our imagination, then that would make concepts physical. The fact that we can't, supports the claim that they are non-physical.

... Unless your point was that if we cannot physically visualize them, then concepts are not real? This would presuppose the maxim that what cannot be physically visualized is not real. But this is a self-contradiction, because maxims cannot be physically visualized.

I think you are confusing the content of the talk with the talk itself. Sure, the talk is linked to the subject insofar as the subject is talking. But the content of the talk may be about an object. E.g. "This animal is dead". The property 'dead' is clearly about the object, not about the subject saying it.

And if this still does not address your objections, then we can leave it here.

OK, so your principle of identity involves "exact same properties". How does the concept of "five-ness" which is in my mind, qualify as the same concept of "fiveness" which is in your mind, when they are described by these different properties ("in my mind" and "in your mind"). Clearly they don't have the exact same properties, and are therefore not the same concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alas, a concept is a peculiar thing, which by definition is composed only of essential properties, and contains no accidental properties. Using again the triangle example: A particular triangle may have accidental properties such as a size, colour, and location. But the concept "triangle-ness" may not have any accidental properties, or else it is not a concept, by definition. Consequently, the accidental property of 'being in my mind' or 'being in your mind' cannot be attributed to concepts. Instead, when we say "the concept in my mind is the same as the concept in your mind", this is just an informal way of saying "The concept I speak of is the same concept you speak of".

If the thought content is about the object, then it is objective; and if it is about the subject, then it is subjective. The important thing is to figure out if it is in fact about the object or about the subject. "The ball is round" is an easy enough example of an objective statement. But what about "the ball is beautiful"? Is 'beauty' an objective or subjective property? The relative-objective test can determine this.

Who does not like justice, and likes injustice done to themselves? Who does not like being treated with respect? Who likes being lied to? Virtually nobody. But maybe I misunderstand your statement. Maybe you can provide an example, and I will see if I can clarify how the Golden Rule applies.

If that were the case than all thoughts about the object would be equally objective and subjective. — creativesoul

Indeed they are. If I say "God exists" and you say "God does not exist", both of our claims are equally objective, even though one must be true and the other one must be false.

This is what I suspected before; and I find a contradiction in the following two statements:

(1) "... because everything ever thought/believed and/or spoken comes through a subject, there is no such thing as an objective thought, belief, and/or statement thereof."
(2) "I would agree that we can find ourselves defining(talking about) that which is not existentially contingent upon human thought/belief and/or language."

Best I can agree with, is that the thought is subjective in the sense that the subject produces it, but the content of the thought can be objective, if it is about the object.

Here are all the essential properties of the concept of triangle-ness: 'flat surface' + 'three straight sides'. This implies that it also has three angles, and so it would be redundant to add it as a property, similar with the property that the sum of its angles is 180 deg.

What if there was hypothetically speaking a shape that only had one of those properties? — BlueBanana

There is: a flat surface with three angles and rounded sides. Like this. Clearly, this is not a triangle.

And on a related note, how should we approach the fact that real life triangles don't have straight sides, or that we can recognize this as a triangle? — BlueBanana

Perfect triangles can exist, even if only in our minds. I am guessing you know what I am talking about, and this fact proves that we both have the same concept of what a triangle is. As for your linked example, sure I can guess the shape of a triangle in there, but I would not bet all my money on it, because it does not clearly show the aforementioned essential properties.

Maybe I was attacking a straw man the whole time. Can you clarify what position you have in this discussion? I genuinely thought you were claiming that it is impossible for us to determine if a property is objective or subjective, that is, linked to the object or the subject. If that is not the position you are defending, then just ignore my previous comment.

I am not saying that everyone presupposes that; and just because some do not, it does not follow that it is false, because no one's opinion is infallible. Admittedly, neither is C.S. Lewis. Let's raise the quality of the arguments on both sides.

I summon the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you want them to do unto you. The fact is that this rule occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition. Source. And this rule implies that all humans have equal ontological value, or else we would not demand to treat them as equals.

A triangle with an amount of sides other than three can exist, as triangles aren't defined by having three sides. — BlueBanana

What do you mean "triangles are not defined by having three sides"? What is the true definition then?

I would think that finding necessary properties of concepts would be sufficient to prove that we can in fact escape said dichotomy. But here is another reason: How do you explain the phenomenon that many subjects agree on a given property of an object? E.g. all subjects observe that the chair has four legs.

Hey! This is my discussion and I can talk about whatever I want in it. >:)

If by 'human nature' you mean that all humans share some same essential properties, then yes, morality presupposes there being a human nature, for the following reasons:

(1) Morality implies voluntariness, and voluntariness implies free will. Thus if morality applies to all humans, then all humans must possess free will.
(2) Morality is also called practical reason, which implies reason in general. Thus if morality applies to all humans, then all humans must possess reason.

And lo and behold, the essence or nature of humans is traditionally: an animal with reason and free will. Note, this may not be the only part of human nature, but it is a part of it.

Hello.

First, I disagree with the claim that the moral code is different depending on where you are. The concept of the Golden Rule, do unto others and you want them to do unto you, occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition. Source.

Now the source of moral code that is the Golden Rule, is our conscience, or sense of duty. E.g. if a baby is drowning and the situation is such that you can safely rescue it, I am pretty sure you and everyone else will experience a sense of duty to do so. That is not to say that everyone would actually choose to save the baby, but everyone would experience the duty of doing so.

Finally, everyone seeks justice and rejects injustice, at least to themselves. Combine this with the Golden Rule, and it follows that there is a universal way of acting that is righteous. E.g. nobody wants to be lied to, so we ought not to lie.

Hello.

My view is that this is primarily a safety issue. Why are seat belts required by law? Because statistics show that there is a correlation between the use of seat belts and the severity of injuries in car accidents. Similarly, we should look for the correlation between gun ownership and injuries, regardless if these are intentional or accidental. By collecting data points on these two parameters in as many states as possible throughout the world, we can determine the statistical correlation between the two; and one of three possible results would follow:

(1) There is a correlation, with an upward slope where more gun ownership increases the probability of injuries. As such, gun ownership should not be legal.

(2) There is a correlation, with a downward slope were more gun ownership decreases the probability of injuries. As such, gun ownership should be legal, and perhaps even required.

(3) There is no correlation. As such, gun ownership is not a significant factor in the safety of the citizens, and so its legalization is a matter of personal preference.

Now I am not a hard-working scientist but a lazy philosopher; and so I don’t know the final answer; but I think this is the best way to end the debate.

So it is quite clear that each of these answers does not carry the same information, despite the fact that they might all be the correct answer to some specific questions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that each thing (a) to (d) do not have all the same properties, because they all look physically different, but they still all have the same property of pointing to the concept of "five-ness". This should clarify why only V is the correct answer to the question "what is the Roman numeral for five?", while all of them are correct answers to the question "What results from 2+3?".

By what principle of identity do you claim that these are the same concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

I will indeed use a principle of identity: If things have the exact same properties, then they are one and the same thing; and if not, then not. Two sticks may look identical, but are not one and the same because they have different x, y, z properties. What about the concept of 'triangle'? To me, its essential properties are 'surface' + 'three straight sides'; nothing else. What about for you? If your concept has the exact same essential properties as my concept, then they are one and the same.

The claim that "the same" information is carried by different media is a false premise. The fact that we interpret 5 in a different way from V, and in a different way from ***** is evidence of this. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am late in this discussion so I apologize if this was already addressed, but why do you say we interpret these differently? It seems to me that they all point to the same concept.

What results from 2+3?
(a) five
(b) 5
(c) V
(d) *****

Are these answers not all true? If they are, then this also answers your objection on what basis could we claim that the media is different: Different media may point to the same concept. And the fact that these media can be physically different show that they are separate things from the concept they point to.

“When a wise man points at the moon the imbecile examines the finger.”
― Confucius

You are making me doubt, and I don't like it. While I am now no longer certain about it, I will nevertheless continue to defend the position that some form of information is non-physical. Let's differentiate between two forms: meaningless and meaningful info. Meaningless info is raw data; noise. I imagine a TV set with visual and audio static. I concede that this form of info is purely physical, for the reasons you have given.

Meaningful info on the other hand, gets meaning by containing concepts. Concepts are not made of physical things, because every physical thing is a particular (at least in their x, y, z, t properties), where as concepts are generals. Therefore meaningful info is, at least in part, non-physical.

Are concepts not objectively real and only man-made? If so, why would Socrates argue with the Sophists about the essence of concepts like 'justice', instead of arbitrarily making up a definition that they can all choose to agree on?

Good argument. Here is another argument to prove that information is indeed non-physical.

P1: All that is physical abides to the law of conservation of mass and energy. E.g. if I give you a physical thing, I have less of it.
P2: Information does not abide to this law. E.g. if I give you information, I don't have less of it.
C: Therefore information is not physical.

Those sorts of things are "true" by definition. Our definition. — creativesoul

This is getting interesting. I challenge your claim about man-made definition of things, by summoning Plato and his theory of forms or essences. Words, such as 'triangle', are indeed man-made; but concepts, such as 'the surface that has three sides', are part of reality. Words are signs that point to concepts, and us subjects can discover these concepts through abstraction. This explains how Socrates could argue with others about the objective definition of concepts like 'justice', instead of arbitrarily making up a definition that they can all choose to agree on. To sum up, if we know the essence of a word, then it follows that the essential properties are objective properties of the concept. E.g. 'having three sides' is an objective property of the concept we call 'triangle'.

Yes, I see what you mean now, and think you are correct. For a while, I was wandering what the difference was between the terms 'truth' and 'reality'. As I now understand, reality cannot be true or false; it just is. Only statements/thoughts are true or false, and these necessitate a subject. So reality is linked to the object, where as truth is linked to the subject, even if the truth is about an object.

Right on. To loop back to the original topic: If ontological values are real, then morality is objective. Failure to prove that ontological values are real, then we may be able to rely on the relative-objective test to prove that morality is an objective property of reality.

This quite mistakenly presupposes that everyone has the same morality and/or personal value system, i.e; not everyone likes being treated the same way in the same situation. — creativesoul

I think everyone does. To quote C.S. Lewis:
"The human mind has no more power of inventing a new [moral] value than of imagining a new primary colour, or, indeed, of creating a new sun and a new sky for it to move in." - The Abolition of Man

Who would want injustice and not want justice done to them?

Truth. Meaning. Thought. Belief. All of these things require, consist in/of, and/or are existentially contingent upon both, a subject/agent and something other than the subject/agent. — creativesoul

I agree when it comes to thought, belief and perhaps meaning, by definition of the words; but why truth? Is it not true that the Earth revolved around the sun way before subjects like humans existed?

Everything ever thought, believed, spoken and/or written comes through a subject. Strictly speaking, nothing ever thought, believed, spoken, and/or written is objective. That doesn't mean that everything is subjective. It means that the objective/subjective dichotomy is fraught. Best to abandon it altogether... — creativesoul

I understand the inherent challenge; but what about things that are indubitably objectively true, such as "2+2=4", or "a triangle has three sides"?

If I understand, you would like to find first principles of morality, is that it? That is up my alley.
How far do you want to extend the topic? Ethics of humans only, or of all beings? I'll keep it about humans for now. I think most of your questions can be answered by the concept of 'ontological value', or 'value of beings', where if every human has the same ontological value, then it follows that they all deserve the same level of respect.

So to answer some of your questions:
Q: "How does one justify what in fact is objectively good?"
A: By definition, Ethics is the study of how a being ought to treat other beings, and the ethical is essentially to treat each being according to their proper ontological value.

Q:"Why would a maximized control-over-[others] be immoral (unjust) in the first place?"
A: Because all humans have the same ontological value.

Note, this does not necessarily lead to communism, where all humans are equal in every way: jobs, skills, wealth, power etc. I only claim we are equal in ontological value; and as such, we ought to treat all humans as ourselves (also human) would want to be treated if we were in their shoes.

I mentioned conflicting goals earlier. This is an example of that. You have two conflicting goals. One is that you want to experience the taste of donuts, the other goal is that you want to live a long time. — Harry Hindu

I agree that the goal of wanting to be healthy can cause the negative value about eating the donut. But where does the goal of "wanting to experience the taste of donuts" come from? Just because I like the taste of donuts, it does not follow that I have a goal associated to it, does it? One does not control their taste buds like they can control their hands. Maybe with time and perseverance, we may be able to change our habits and modify our subjective preferences, but it can't happen by mere will power.

I think it would be more accurate and simpler to use the terms, "healthy" and "unhealthy" rather than "good health" and "bad health", as that is what you objectively mean by using the terms "good health" and "bad health". — Harry Hindu

This sounds ad hoc. You could do this for any type of good: goodness in taste is tasty or delicious; goodness at a task is skilled; goodness of a song is pleasurable, and so on. I will resist the temptation to ask for a definition of 'goodness'... Instead, let's just agree that we all have an implicit knowledge of what goodness means. With that, let's consider the following dialogue.

Person P1: "I don't want to eat this food because it does not taste good."
Person P2: "You should still eat it because it is good for you".

Both persons are using the word 'good'. P1 uses it to mean taste, and P2 uses it to mean health.

I’d say a lot of people are this way and find a sense of satisfaction in so being: bullies, for instance — javra

No bully wants to be bullied. Therefore even the unjust person perceives the unjust treatment to be bad. They do it not because they believe it is moral, but typically to gain pleasure or avoid displeasure. E.g. it is easier to lie than to tell an uncomfortable truth. So I claim that no one, not even the immoral ones, can perceive object 2 to be morally better than object 1.

Myself, I’d for example here lean more on Buddhist-like philosophy of suffering and the desire to minimize it--or at least something similar to this perspective. — javra

This seems to be a good goal in general, but there are exceptions to it. Would it be okay for me to withhold truth from you, on the grounds that learning it would make you suffer? E.g. I know your spouse cheats on you, and you ask me if this is true or not. Lying to you would be moral according to your philosophy of minimizing suffering, but immoral according to the Golden Rule, because nobody wants to be lied to.

As I said, if something is good, it helps you achieve your goal. Your goal would be to seek pleasurable experiences and the food's taste does just that. This is why some people turn to food in order to alleviate stress. Feeling good, rather than feeling bad or stressed is a goal that every human has. It's just that different things make different people feel good. You eating good food and me listening to good music are two different actions but achieve the same goal for each of us - providing stress relief. — Harry Hindu

Assuming what you say is true, it still does not follow that all that is subjectively good is necessarily a value statement. Let's say I like the taste of donuts, so their taste is, to me, good. But because of health reasons, I have a negative value about eating donuts. Well this does not change the fact that they taste good to me. So a negative value is compatible with a subjective good.

Being healthy is a sub-goal of survival. To say that one has good or bad health is to say that their health is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival. — Harry Hindu

I agree. Now, in your last statement, the object is 'one', and the property is 'good or bad health', or 'health that is beneficial or a hindrance to their survival'. The property is linked to the object; therefore 'goodness of health' is objective.

What you say isn't literally true. — Harry Hindu

I see what you mean now. "This food is good" is not literally true because it is formulated as as though goodness is a property of the food, which it is not. I accept the distinction. Just a side note that this type of statement would be an expression of common language, and everyone understands what the speaker means by it.

I agree with everything you have said, up to the quotes below:

So, to say that something is "the color white", is to say something about the object. To say that something is "good" is to make a value statement. — Harry Hindu

Could we generalize that all that is considered good is a value? What if I said "I find this food to taste good, and yet I do not value taste"? I don't see anything contradictory in that statement, and it would imply that not all that we find good is a value statement. It seems to me that we consciously choose our values, but we don't necessarily consciously choose what tastes good to us.

There is no objective good and bad - only goals and what is helpful and harmful to achieving them. — Harry Hindu

I disagree when it comes to two values, which I claim are objective: health, and morality. The second one may be harder to prove, so I will focus on the first one for now.

What is good in terms of health is objective. I am sure there is a standard criteria in evaluating if a living cell is healthy or not. And so, using the relative-objective test, every subject observing two cells of different health state would agree on which cell is the healthiest. Furthermore, if health was only a matter of opinion, then there would no health practitioners to tell us what is healthy for us.

1. "Everything is subjective" is a self-contradiction, because it means that nothing is objectively true, not even this very statement.

2.

Can we even access this objective reality? — TheMadFool

Sure we can. The previous statement "Some things are objective" is undeniably true and objective, as previously demonstrated. Another example is the laws of logic and math: Even if there were an evil demon feeding me false data my whole life, he could not feed me illogical or mathematically wrong information, like seeing a square circle, or seeing 2 apples and 2 more apples, and only seeing 3 apples as a result.

Your method that many same observations is objective amounts to saying subjective + subjective + subjective +... = objective and that means the objective is only a subset of the subjective. — TheMadFool

It could be the case, but how would you account for the fact that all subjects observe the same property? There is indeed the hypothesis that we all coincidently project the exact same subjective property onto the object, but this hypothesis is much less likely than the hypothesis that we are observing a property of the object.

One is simply making a value statement, not a truth statement. — Harry Hindu

A subjective statement can still be true or false. Say that in truth, I feel that yellow is the best colour. So if I say "Yellow is my best colour", then I speak the truth. But if I say "Blue is my best colour", then I don't speak the truth. I guess subjective truth is synonymous to honesty.

Then I don't get why they'd say "This food tastes good", as opposed to "My mental state is this food tasting good." Both are true, and objective. — Harry Hindu

I guess you are right that we can always turn a subjective statement into an objective one by making ourselves the object, and our feeling or perception into the property; and since feelings and perceptions are objective properties of ourselves, then this will always result in an objective statement.

However, we must be careful to avoid doing this when the original property in question is already objective. E.g. the statement "This tree is 2 m tall" is already an objective statement. No need to change the statement into "I perceive this tree is 2 m tall", just to make sure the statement is always objective. The former statement is more informative than the latter, and also more interesting for others.

Bringing it back to the original topic of discussion, it appears that some properties are inherently linked to the object, and some are inherently linked to the subject, regardless of the way the statement is said. 'Goodness in colour' will always be a subjective property; and 'tallness' will always be an objective property.

I agree. I think that some things are purely subjective, and some things are purely objective. I also think it is important to find out which it is for a given property, because there are consequences. We should fully allow subjective disagreements, but should work on (respectfully) finding the correct thing for objective disagreements.

BTW, a day ago you asked about the possibility of such things as moral goodness being objective. As far as I understand things, goodness can only hold the possibility of being objective from the vantage of being a lowest common denominator that is universal to all first-person points of view. — javra

Let's rely on the relative-objective test to determine if moral goodness is an objective property of human behaviour. Object 1: A man acts towards others as he would want them to act towards him. Object 2: The man acts in such a way that he would hate others to act towards him. Which object would subjects observe to have the highest degree of moral goodness? I foresee that a large majority would say object 1, and the remaining few, if any, would be indecisive. But I also expect that virtually nobody would choose object 2. If this is the case, then moral goodness is objective.

Thoughts?