Glad to see we can still find some solid ground in math. But now I see a possible contradiction with what you said earlier, regarding the apple scenario. I asked if, by denying the principle that 'nothing comes from nothing', you expected that 3 apples could result out of 2 apples; and you said it was logically possible:

That's not to say that there is something logically wrong with that scenario, but nomologically I would not expect it to happen. — SophistiCat

But if we agree that I+I=III is mathematically impossible, then it is impossible for 3 apples to result from 2 apples. We just need to replace the bars "I" with apples to see this.

Some non-standard logics are of the mathematical sort, but many are attempts at remedying perceived shortcomings in classical logic as a tool for reasoning. — Srap Tasmaner

That is my thought as well. Non-classical systems are an addition to the classical system when classical logic has reached it limits, and not in opposition to it. What follows is that if one was able to logically prove a case using classical logic, then no non-classical systems would be able to disprove it.

No, you were clearer before, and going back to vague expressions like "things don't come from nothing" or "just the sum of all things in it" is not helping. — SophistiCat

I will put this argument on hold to focus on the next one for now.

Not possible if what you are trying to model is intuitive arithmetics. Otherwise, of course, you can redefine any of the symbols and introduce different axioms. — SophistiCat

You can change the symbols (such as from decimal system to duodecimal system as discussed above) but the concept of the number remains the same. For simplicity, we can strip the symbol away from the number, and thus 1=I, 2=II, 3=III, 4=IIII as so on. Thus the question can phrased as:
Is it possible to change the math axioms such that I+I=III is mathematically possible?
I will go with no. Objections?

This is a non-personal conflict as per what I mean by 'personal'. Admittedly, I am not very clear about what I mean. Personal conflicts are ethical issues with a perception of unethical or unjust behaviour from a specific person. I have trouble finding a better definition, and so I will use case examples:

Your example of conflict is non-personal because neither the dad nor the son is perceived to act unjustly by the other. The root cause is not about the dad or the son, but about the mutually exclusive desires.

In contrast, the following would be a personal conflict: My son wants to watch tv with me and I say no. Then my daughter wants to watch tv with me and I say yes. There is here a perception of injustice.

Thanks. I have ventured in that weird place before. I am no expert at this non-classical logic thing, but my understanding is that, although different, no system of logic contradicts any other system. Rather, they each have their unique strength suitable to different applications; much like calculus is different than statistics while not contradicting each other. That said, I wonder if "changing axioms of mathematics" means something different.

So it does. But this is merely changing the symbols of numbers, not the concepts the symbols represent. The number 4 can be symbolized as 4, four, IV, or really anything as long as we are clear and consistent. But its actual concept, which we can approximate as "IIII" does not change. (Note: the real concept is not necessarily made of bars, but we've got to write it down somehow.) Thus whether we write 6+6=12 in decimal system, or 6+6=10 in duodecimal system, we still mean "IIIIII"+"IIIIII"="IIIIIIIIIIII" when simplified to its concept.

Reducing the symbols to their concepts, I'll ask again:
Is it possible to change the math axioms such that I+I=III is mathematically possible? If all that is meant by 'changing axioms' is things like changing the decimal system, then I am leaning towards no.

A mathematical or logical system is given by its axioms and definitions, and those can certainly be varied. — SophistiCat

Is it possible to change the math axioms such that 1+1=3 is mathematically possible? If not, then the scenario of 3 apples resulting from 2 apples is logically impossible. [Note: this is a lot like the argument 0≠x above, except here we don't need to agree about what 0 really is. I trust that numbers 1, 2 and 3 are much less ambiguous.]

But what would be the context for the universe as a whole? — SophistiCat

Maybe I was not clear. Let me rephrase what I meant in a syllogism:
- The prima facie for all things in the universe is to expect that things don't come from nothing.
- The universe is just the sum of all things in it. (Just like the ocean is just the sum of all water drops in it).
- Therefore, the prima facie for the universe is to expect that things don't come from nothings.

This is once again describing an economical or political conflict, and not a personal one as per the original post is about. A personal conflict is about a person's personality or behaviour, not about disparities.

Regarding math: I wouldn't disconnect it from reality. Engineers design planes to stay in the air using math. Furthermore, it seems to me that 2+2=4 is a necessary truth, as I cannot imagine it to be otherwise. For my knowledge, could you give an example of an axiom that would change the classic logic? I have heard that claim before but never saw an example of it.

That's not to say that there is something logically wrong with that scenario, but nomologically I would not expect it to happen. — SophistiCat

Very well, but if you expect things in the universe to behave that way, (i.e. apples don't just appear by themselves) then why not expect it for the universe as a whole? The universe is just the sum of its parts.

And you have once again locked yourself into this faulty analogy in which nothing is like an empty bag. — SophistiCat

This is a misunderstanding. I was merely using the empty bag to represent a closed system. The nothingness is represented by the non-existence of the third apple, before it coming to existence by itself; and this non-existence state is independent of the bag.

The conflicter may be a bad person and have false perceptions, but also occupy a position from which the conflicted can not reach them. For instance, the CEO of the company might dislike homosexuals and harbor all sorts of false views about them, and might frustrate their desires to advance. The conflicted homosexuals in the company may not be able to arrange any sort of significant face-to-face confrontation. [...]
The conflicter may not care what the conflicted thinks, and be in a position to ignore the conflicted's objections.
The social structure of organizations can wrongfully disadvantage some people (conflicted) without any one worker (conflicter) being responsible. If organizations intend to disadvantage some individuals, they will have no redress.
Sometimes the conflicted need to combine their individual strengths and address conflicter(s) as a group. — Bitter Crank

Everything you said above fits into the outcome (ii) in my original post, that is, real malicious intentions from the conflicter. You are correct that there is no full-proof solution to solve the problem. My method only gets you to the point where you can have a confident judgement about the conflicter and the situation. After that, it will not prevent you from getting murdered if that is the conflicter's true intention.

The conflicted and conflicter may have both true and false impressions of the other, which more than a little negotiation will be required to sort out. — Bitter Crank

Not 'negotiation', but 'conversation', which is a means to the end of removing any possible misunderstandings. The point is that perceptions are not always accurate, and so it is necessary to validate them before deciding what to do next to resolve the conflict.

Perception is necessary. Let's say that I indeed would be upset if you had something I did not have.
- If it is true but I don't know about it, then I would not be upset.
- If it is not true but I think it is, then I would be upset.

Additionally, I would not classify this case as a 'personal' conflict, that is, a conflict with the person's personality or behaviour, because the conflict is about the 'something' that the conflicter possesses, and not about the conflicter himself. This would be instead a 'technical' or 'economical' conflict.

0! = 1 — Srap Tasmaner

Yes; that is because there is 1 way to arrange 0 objects. But then it is also true that there is 1 way to arrange nothingness, and so this does not prove that 0 and nothingness are not the same thing.

most mathematicians most of the time would say 00 = 1 — Srap Tasmaner

Wow. I had no idea some people thought that. Who knew that arguing about math would be so hard. I guess Descartes was over-optimistic when he claimed that math was the one field without any ambiguity.


Possibly. Let me try one last attempt from a different approach: If you believe that the principle 'nothing comes from nothing' is not always true, then does it follow that you would not be surprised, when putting one apple and another apple in an empty bag, to sometimes find three apples later?

I disagree with your claim that 0 is only analogous to nothing, and I claim they represent the same concept. 'Nothing' means 'no things', means 'zero things' means 'zero'. 0x = 0y = 0z = 0, and this is true for whatever x, y, or z may be, including properties.

I will grant you that at least one thing remains: the laws of logic; since I rely on mathematics (logic of numbers) to demonstrate that 'nothing comes from nothing' is true. But I trust you agree that logic transcends the physical world, as opposed to being dependent on it.

Here is my attempt to demonstrate that the principle 'Nothing comes from nothing' is necessary:

Let nothing=0. Let something=x, where x>0.
Mathematically, 0≠x, and 0+0≠x
Therefore x cannot result out of 0; otherwise 0=x, or 0+0=x would be possible.
Therefore nothing can come from nothing.

You can always rescue a vague premise by retreating to less controversial, though usually less interesting positions, and this is what you've done by reducing what sounded like a universal and far-reaching metaphysical principle to some particular references to popular physics. — SophistiCat

You keep saying that the principle has been reduced to the laws of physics. When in our conversation has it been reduced? Here is an example that uses the principle without it being reduced to the laws of physics: knowledge and information. If I give you info, you gain the info, and I don't lose it; thus this causal relation does not follow the law of conservation of mass and energy. And yet, it follows the principle that 'no effect can be greater than its causes', because you can gain the exact amount of info I give, or less (by not listening or forgetting), but cannot gain more from me than what I give. This is also implied in Hume's work when he claims that 'each simple idea is derived from a simple impression, so that all our ideas are ultimately derived from experience'.

I suggest we drop the big bang conversation because it was always just a thought experiment on my end to see what conclusion to draw if only the laws of physics exist; which I don't believe to be the case.

You are assuming that there was a process, which is the assumption that I challenge.

If there is a cause to the existence of the universe, then there is a 'process' from the cause to the effect. If not, then not. I suppose this brings us back to the original disagreement on the 'Nothing comes from nothing' principle. Do you really believe this principle to be false? If so, then we should focus on this fundamental point before anything else.

You are kidding, right?

Too soon?

I think your definition A is the old definition prior to an established 'scientific method', back when the words 'science' and 'philosophy' were interchangeable. B sounds like the modern use of the word, and I agree with the three points as being the necessary ingredients. I would also add 'quantifiable' as an ingredient, but it may not be necessary.

With one singular, possible exception, there is absolutely nothing of scientific knowledge (in sense B) that “necessarily leads to materialism”. — javra

I agree, and I think it can be proven: If a non-materialist philosophy is about things that are not observable, and science deals only with things that are observable, then science could never prove or disprove such a philosophy, as the things in question stand outside of the data set of science.

the mainstream paradigm in most fields of empirical science contains the inference that awareness has developed from out of a perfectly non-aware universe (such as in, life having developed from nonlife)… thereby implying [...] the metaphysics of materialism — javra

Science could indeed prove that life (at least simple living things) is material, if it can create life out of non-life in a test; but this would not prove or even suggest that everything is material. For this to be a valid inference, science would have to prove through testing that all things we can think of can be created out of material things.

Hey. I am trying to access the page to your article but your link appears to be broken. Could you fix the link, or else summarize your argument here?

I don't know what you think you are getting out of this line. Your initial premise has been reduced to well-known conservation laws — SophistiCat

The thought experiments refute your claim that the principle 'no effect can be greater than the sum of its causes' fails in the example of water boiling. As such, the principle still stands. I have apparently failed to convince you of it, but it has yet to be refuted. I can provide more supporting examples upon request.

No, I am saying that it's more complicated than you suppose and can't be adequately summed up by a simple aphorism. — SophistiCat

I am not sure if you are saying yes or no. Either the law of conservation of mass and energy applies in the case of the big bang, or it does not. If it does, then the big bang necessarily possessed all the mass and energy found in the universe today. If not, then not. While the laws of physics may change, logic does not.

These assumptions seem to be completely unjustified — SophistiCat

You are correct that the argument is founded on these assumptions, but they also seem rather common sensical. As such, they are the prima facie and the onus of proof is on the other side.
Regarding assumption 2: We don't need to know what is outside of the universe. We can just use logic: either the process is random or it is not. If random, then it results in the existence of our configuration to be highly improbable, therefore making the 'random' hypothesis highly improbable in return. If not, then the process is deterministic or designed, which in turn points to a designer.

You make a good point that empiricism is classified as an epistemology, whereas materialism is classified as a metaphysics, and so they are not synonymous. As such, I was mistaken in saying that all that is empirical is material.

Back to the original question, I wonder if all things that fit under the umbrella of natural science must be material. I am now leaning towards no, by thinking about your example of experiencing happiness: The statement "studies show that those who live in this particular way tend to be more happy" is a valid scientific statement, and does not necessarily lead to materialism.

First, to be clear, by 'configuration' I meant the narrow range of settings (such as the gravitational constant G) that allow for life to be possible. I am assuming this statement to be true, as I am no expert on the necessary ingredients for life. Let's just buy into it for now.

Now if I understand correctly, [the probability of an outcome] = [the number of desired outcomes] / [all possible outcomes]. In this case, the number of desired outcomes, that is, the configuration with all settings that allow for life to be possible, is close to 1 (assuming a really narrow range of settings). And the number of all possible outcomes is the number of combination of all possible settings. It appears to me that this number is infinite, if each setting has logically an infinite possibility of values. This results in a very low probability of our configuration to occur. Thoughts?

Are you saying that the laws of thermodynamics don't apply to the early post-Big Bang universe? I thought they were called laws because they applied to all cases (in physics).

Good point. But by limitations, I meant that God would not be above all things if he was a material being. As all matter and energy is subjected to the spatial and temporal laws, so too would be a being made of matter and energy, regardless of the amount.

Another argument for fun: If an infinite material being existed, then as you said, no material boundaries would exist outside of that being. But boundaries exist: I occupy a space and time and I am not part of that being. Therefore an infinite material being does not exist.

Science couldn't get going without maths and the rules of inference, and the like - so maths is prior to the sciences. — Wayfarer

I agree with this. Science presupposes logic, and math is the logic of numbers.

there are always some mathematical Platonists, i.e. those who believe that number is real but not material. — Wayfarer

That's me. We cannot conceive a universe where 2+2≠4. Therefore math is part of eternal truth.

What actually is meant by 'empirical' is simply 'something tangible' i.e. something that can be touched, felt, measured, either by the senses or by scientific instruments, which are extensions to the senses. — Wayfarer

That is why I ask if the natural sciences can deal with anything that is not material, because it seems that all that can be touched, felt or measured is either matter or energy. This would make naturalism and materialism equivalent terms.

'multiverse' speculation - the idea that the Universe we know, is one of countless 'bubble universes' that never come into contact with one another. — Wayfarer

At first glance, I see only two logical possibilities in that multiverse hypothesis:
1. The universes are connected in some way. Thus we can think of the whole as one big system, which would be equivalent to our view of our universe, where the laws of physics might be more diverse, but the laws of logic would be the same. Therefore the argument from first cause would still apply to the system.
2. The universes are not connected in any way. In which case, Occam's razor would deem this as an unnecessary hypothesis and shave it off.

So you say that empiricism encompasses all experiential things, which includes but is not limited to material things. Could you provide an example of an experiential thing which is not a material thing? Note: I think Aristotle was considered an empiricist because he claimed that experiences precedes our knowledge of universals, and he also believed in forms or essences which are not material things. However, the topic of essences in not part of the natural sciences.

So the move here is to point to a transient property, such as "boiling," and say that it always existed in potentia, and needed only a suitable cause to be actualized. This clever get-out-of-jail clause can paper over any difficulty with properties that appear to be new in effects. But why not use the same move on every property? Well, then it would be hard to link back to the original idea, that of invariant property transfer from cause to effect. For that you have appealed to energy, matter and other more-or-less conserved quantities, chosen ad hoc for each particular case. — SophistiCat

That's an interesting point. Here are thought experiments to show that the claims are not arbitrary:
1. Keeping the same source (fire), and replacing the receiver from water to another liquid (say oil), it follows that the energy increase will be the same for both receivers. Therefore the energy effect is independent of the receiver, and the property must come from the source.
2. Keeping the same source (fire), and replacing the receiver from water to another liquid (say oil), it follows that the property of boiling will not be the same for both liquids (different boiling points). Therefore the boiling effect is dependent of the receiver, and the property must come from the receiver.

Your 2-step argument is a good summary. It is however based on a lot of presuppositions that objectors will demand to defend. To name a few:
1. The universe has a beginning, to deduce that a first cause or causes exist.
2. This beginning has a single first cause, and not many.
3. 'Nothing can come from nothing', to deduce that the first cause itself has no beginning.
4. 'No effect can be greater than the sum of its causes', to deduce that the first cause is the greatest of all.
5. Time has a beginning, so that the first cause caused it to existence and therefore transcends it.
6. The first cause has no end. I think we can deduce this from the premises 4 or 5, but I am not sure.

But why didn't it simply culminate in wreckage, 'greater entropy'? Why did it give rise to the exquisite order of nature? 'Just happened' doesn't strike me as any kind of hypothesis. — Wayfarer

I'm with you on that one: The undeniable order in the universe strongly points to an order-giver.

I think an objector might say that "while improbable, this current configuration of the universe could have happened at random, and maybe countless of different random configurations failed before that one happened". Now maybe this hypothesis is not possible if, as you say, there can be no 'before' prior to the big bang. I just don't know much about this.

the referent of 'naturalism' is 'what is subject to study by the natural sciences', whereas materialism is the belief that only material objects and forces are real. — Wayfarer

I wonder still if the definitions are not essentially saying the same thing in different ways. Aren't natural sciences dealing only with things that are empirical; and all that is empirical is material? Maybe math is the exception, but I can't think of another one.

Yeah. Materialism does not leave room for the existence of God. God is conventionally considered a spiritual, non-material being, because a material being has limitations, whereas God does not.

I think all this new argument proves is that the Big Bang (assuming it is the first cause) was very massive and powerful.

Interesting. I am not advocating materialism, but I also thought that naturalism and materialism were interchangeable words. What is the difference between the two?

I was referring only to natural or material things. Indeed, non-material things like meaning, information, knowledge, values, moral law, etc., do not necessarily fit into the categories of either matter or energy.

What does the argument look like stated in those terms? — Srap Tasmaner

It changes my argument drastically if we only consider material things, but we can try it out for fun anyways:

- The first cause possesses all properties from all effects, and to an equal or greater degree.
- If all that exists is material (matter and energy), then all properties from all effects are material things.
∴ The first cause possessed all the matter and energy that currently exists in the world, to an equal or greater degree.

I say possessed (past tense), because due to the law of "conservation of mass and energy", the first cause no longer possesses the matter and energy that have been passed down to the effects.

So does your thesis of "conservation of properties," if we're calling it that, come down to a restatement of the first law of thermodynamics (with a nod to the second), once you've reduced everything to matter and energy? — Srap Tasmaner

I think that indeed we can reduce the thesis "conservation of property" to "conservation of mass and energy" when it comes to the natural or material world.

You also mentioned genes, so there's an issue about information... — Srap Tasmaner

Information or knowledge is neither matter or energy, because it can be shared without being lost by the emitter. Thus information fits the "conservation of property" thesis in the sense that the receiver may not receive more than what is emitted, but it does not follow the laws of thermodynamics because the information is not merely transferred, but duplicated.

Energy transfer is causal. I may have miswrote something along the way. In fact, I think we can generalize that in the natural world, all the properties passed down from cause to effect always come down to either matter or energy, because things in the natural world fit into either categories of matter or energy. Therefore properties of causal relationships of natural things must fit either of these two categories as well.

Sure there is. The effect of the word inscription on paper is caused not only by the typewriter but also by the writer using the typewriter. No writer = no inscription, because the typewriter does nothing on its own.

The motion of the typewriter keys onto the paper is caused by the motion of your hands. Or to generalize a bit more, there is energy transfer from you to the device.

I think I see where the misunderstanding lies. Let's go back to the principle:
"No effect can be greater than the sum of its causes (with an 's'). An effect can be have many causes, and thus only the properties in the causal relationship are found in both cause and effect. One of the only times a cause has all properties of the effect, is when the cause causes the effect into existence, because the effect has a single cause.

In the fire-to-water example, the fire did not cause the water into existence, and so the water may have several properties not found in the fire. The only causal relationship between the fire and water is the energy transfer. To break down the process into basic steps:
The energy from the fire (property 1) causes an energy increase in the water (property 1). Then the energy increase in the water (property 1), combined with the potential of water molecules to boil at 100C (property 2), causes the water to boil (property 2 actualized).

Another example where the cause causes the effect into existence: I am the product of my parents. All my genes are found in my parents. And if I never interacted with anyone or anything other than my parents, then I would never know anything more than what my parent know.

Well we are getting into small details, but it goes something like this:
The computer has the potential to inscribe words, and remains passive until you give it some input. To put it simply, that potential is actualized by the transfer of energy from your hands to the computer. (Really, your motion only causes a closed circuit in the keyboard-to-word system, and the energy is mainly brought up by the power socket, but this is too specific to this example only.)

To say the same thing with a clearer example, let's use a typewriter instead of a computer. Words on the paper are caused by the ink and the motion of the typewriter. The ink is from the cartridge, and the motion gets its energy from you. The ink is the shared property between the words and the cartridge. The energy is the shared property between you and the typewriter.

That is the gist of it. "Inscription" is a better fit for the property too.
Indeed, you are not the direct cause of the inscription because if we remove the computer, then unless you write with blood, there can be no inscription. On the other hand, being the author of the sentence, you are the direct cause of the meaning the words are intended to hold.

We can just modify the premise slightly, to say "Everything that we can conceive must exist in their simple components". The argument then becomes:

- No effect can be greater than its cause(s). (I still defend this)
- A first cause exists. (assumed)
∴ The first cause contains all properties from all effects, and to an equal or greater degree.

- Everything that we can conceive must exist in their simple components. (Hume)
- All that exists must be an effect from the first cause, directly or indirectly. (by definition)
∴ The first cause is composed of all simple components of all that we can conceive.

∴ ∴ The first cause is that which nothing greater can be conceived. (drops mic)

The fire underneath the boiling pot has neither the energy nor the temperature of the boiling water. It also does not possess the property of boiling. — SophistiCat

I don't understand your position. Are you denying that there is energy transfer from the fire to the water? If yes, then what is the causal relationship between the two, if any? If no, then what is wrong with my premise? That energy is the common property between the cause and the effect.

(Insert witty comeback with a monopoly reference here)