I agree. That is why I said earlier:

This does not mean that just because I can imagine a unicorn, that unicorns exist, but that the basic components of the unicorn (colours, shapes, sounds, ...) must exist. — Samuel Lacrampe

Does it make my reasoning invalid?

The first premise is, at best, a rather optimistic statement about our cognitive faculties. But, even if it happens to be true, I wouldn't take it as a metaphysical first principle: the world has no obligation to be comprehensible to the human intellect. And if you take it definitionally (possibility is conceivability) then you are trivializing your conclusion. — SophistiCat

Yep. I stand corrected. Upon further thinking, I too don't actually believe that all that exists can be conceived. Thanks for finding the flaw in that reasoning.

Corollary: God (should he exist) should be defined as "that which nothing greater can exist", and not merely as "that which nothing greater can be conceived". The latter implies maximum possibility, where as the former implies that we could conceive such a being, which is incorrect from a christian standpoint.

A boiling pot, for instance: neither the fire under the pot nor the water prior to the onset of boiling have the property of boiling. — SophistiCat

The fire emits the energy received by the water to boil, and the "boiling" effect is just the combination of the energy (caused by the fire) and the potential of water molecules to boil (not caused by the fire). And we know the energy received cannot be more than the energy emitted, due to the first law of thermodynamics.

For that matter, the fire that brings the water to a boil does not have the property of being at 100C. — SophistiCat

Indeed. The fire has a property of being greater than 100C, which agrees with my point that the cause(s) may be greater or equal to the effect.

I just caused that sentence to exist. It has the property of being composed of words; I am not composed of words. — Srap Tasmaner

Still an incorrect causal relationship. The words have a physical property (say pixels on the screen), and a meaning. The meaning of the words is caused by you directly, and they are also a property of you because you can think (i.e. you meant what you wrote). You are not composed of pixels, but the direct cause of the pixels is the computer, which has the ability to create these pixels.

Interesting article. So what it says is that if I died tonight, another "me" could still go to China, thus making that possibility actualized somewhere in this infinite universe. But I would like to refute that there are other "me" out there. The reason I am an individual is because my attributes are unique. Not all of them are unique (probably most of them are not) but the entire configuration is. There may be another being that looks identical to me, but at least we do not share the same position (x,y,z) attributes, thereby making that being "not me".

No probs. I was just paraphrasing. Here is the link. Additionally, I can summarize the argument on how he got to that conclusion, if requested.

Unless we have a means which would in principle decide the truth-value of a given statement, we do not have for it a notion of truth and falsity which would entitle us to say that it must be true or false.

This sounds like a self-contradiction: Do you (or Michael Dummett) have a means which would in principle decide the truth-value of that very statement? If not, then according to that statement, we do not have for it a notion of truth and falsity which would entitle us to say that it must be true or false.

So you should at least be aware that there are philosophers who have qualms about drawing "logical" conclusions about matters we can in principle know nothing about. — Srap Tasmaner

While I take your statement in consideration, I do not base truth on philosophers and their authority, but rather on philosophy. I trust you do the same.

I think some philosophers have said something similar in the past; but this seems absurd to me. Here is an example: I have never been to China. It is possible for me to go there. But say that I die in my sleep tonight. Then this possibility will never be actualized, even with infinite amount of time, past or future.

In any case, your conclusion (that the cause must possess all properties of its effects) obviously does not follow. — SophistiCat

But conservation of properties does not follow from this. — SophistiCat

I tried to prove this here. Where do you see a flaw in the reasoning?

That's fine. I too have trouble coming up with clear examples to illustrate general statements. But then let's provisionally accept that the statement 'no effect has a property not possessed by its cause' is not patently false, until either a clear exception arises, or a flaw is found in the reasoning of the original argument here.

"Everything that begins to exist requires a cause for its existence" is just a variation on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which I don't think we are obligated to accept as a dogma. — SophistiCat

I think this is logically provable: Once again, let's start with the self-evident principle that 'nothing can come from nothing'. Therefore the event 'a thing begins to exist' must come from something. And a thing cannot cause itself into existence, because to cause something, one must first exist, which is self-contradictory. Therefore everything that begins to exist requires an external cause for its existence.

I think someone, maybe Alvin Plantinga, has argued that if God is possible then he must exist--that his existence in some possible world would be necessary in that world, and that if he's necessary in that possible world then he's necessary in all of them, and therefore he exists. It was something like that. — Srap Tasmaner

Very interesting. I will stay away from it because its complexity makes it hard to convince.

Kool! I will accept either the first or second correction. And so if we buy into the assumption that a first cause exists, then this first cause is 'that which nothing greater can exist or be conceived'. I'll recap:

- An effect cannot be greater than its cause(s) (I defend this here)
- A first cause exists (we assume this)
∴ The first cause it that which nothing greater exists

- If something can exist, then it can be conceived of, because we can conceive all logical possibilities.
- If something can be conceived of, then it must exist. (as defended by Hume)
∴ If something can exist, then it must exist.

∴ The first cause is that which nothing greater can exist.
Side note: this is what christians mean by 'God'.

Not what I'm talking about. Bivalence is different. We do not have to accept that "has a cause" is either true or false of entities that are in principle unobservable. — Srap Tasmaner

I disagree. I will explain my same point (original here) in smaller steps: Using the law of noncontradiction, either a thing has a cause or not. This is true regardless if the thing is observable or not, because the law of noncontradiction is an absolute. If it does not have a cause, then it does not have a cause for its existence. But everything that begins to exist requires an external cause for its existence, and cannot cause itself into existence, because to cause something, one must first exist. Therefore if a thing has no cause, then it cannot begin to exist, therefore it must possess eternal existence.

As an aside: I did some googling, and it looks like a lot of your ideas come from apologetics. I just want to commend you for coming here to test them out among people with different backgrounds and commitments. — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks bro. I hope this will not be seen as a fight between theists vs non-theists, but merely philosophers looking for truth.

You know you just emptied the predicate "has a cause" of all content by extending it to everything, right? — Srap Tasmaner

Maybe I am misunderstanding what you are saying, or you are misunderstanding me, because I am with you, that we cannot say that 'everything has a cause', only that 'everything that we can observe (the natural universe) has a cause'.

Some of us are going to balk at extending the principle of bivalence to propositions that, as you just told us, are in principle unverifiable. I might. — Srap Tasmaner

But the law of non-contradiction is an absolute. "A is B" and "A is not B" are mutually exclusive. And this is true regardless of what A and B are.

Sure, but the event without the object is only the movement of the objects, that is, the movement of the hammer causing the movement of the nail. And movements are quantified by energy (kinetic), which brings me back to my first point, that there can be no greater energy in the effect than in the cause.

Now if 'all that can exist' is 'anything that we can conceive', and 'anything that we can conceive' is 'anything that must exist', then 'all that can exist' is 'anything that must exist'. — Samuel Lacrampe

While it may be hard to pronounce, the argument is really a simple syllogism in the form:
If A is B, and B is C, then A is C.
- Replace A with 'all that can exist'
- Replace B with 'anything that we can conceive'
- Replace C with 'anything that must exist'

Your premise is that everything has a cause. — SophistiCat

Actually, I don't think that 'everything has a cause'. Only that 'everything in the natural universe has a cause'. There is no need to extend the principle further than the data set that we can observe, which is only the natural universe.

It is very much debatable that this is a self-evident truth or that we have no choice but adopt this a metaphysical axiom. — SophistiCat

Logically, either a thing has a cause or else it is an eternal being which has always existed, because everything that begins to exist requires a cause for its existence. It could be that eternal things exist in the natural universe but I cannot think of one off the top of my head.

What's important is (a) not to assume that what carries the authority of common usage is true — Srap Tasmaner

Agreed. Common usage or common sense determines the prima facie or default position, but is not a proof.

If that seems too clever, here's another: striking the nail with a hammer causes the nail to enter the board. The nail entering the board has the property of wood being displaced by steel; the hammer striking the nail does not. — Srap Tasmaner

This is not the causal relationship between the hammer and the nail. The only effect to the nail caused by the hammer is the energy from the hammer received to the nail. And we know that the energy received is not greater than the original energy due to the second law of thermodynamics, which states that no energy can be created.

Begging the question by assuming that there is a God and that the Bible is his words. — Michael

I agree. But my intent was not to prove God's existence, merely to answer the question of 'how do people go from the first cause to God?' This is my answer for believers.

And thirdly, it wouldn't follow that the first cause is that which nothing greater can exist, only that the first cause is that which nothing greater does exist. — Michael

Mmm... You may have a point here... But I'll attempt to refute it anyways.
Can we agree that 'anything that can exist' is 'anything that can be conceived' without contradiction? Now I summon Hume's principle that there are no innate ideas, that all conceptions must come from experience; and thus anything that we can conceive must exist at some point. This does not mean that just because I can imagine a unicorn, that unicorns exist, but that the basic components of the unicorn (colours, shapes, sounds, ...) must exist.

Now if 'all that can exist' is 'anything that we can conceive', and 'anything that we can conceive' is 'anything that must exist', then 'all that can exist' is 'anything that must exist'. (wow that was hard).

We define a "greater cause" to be a cause which possesses all the properties that its correlated effects possess. — Srap Tasmaner

Just nitpicking: Your definition makes the cause 'equal', not necessarily 'greater'.

No effect has a property not possessed by its cause.
This is patently false, as a moment's reflection would show. — Srap Tasmaner

Can you show me why?

Premise 1 is a claim about language use among I don't know what community of speakers, which doesn't seem like it would suit what seems to be a metaphysical argument. There's also something there about this community's imaginative capacity, and I don't know what to do with that that either. I don't know how to verify any of those claims, or what I would have if I did. Even if Premise 1 is true in some specified sense, what good is it? — Srap Tasmaner

That's okay if you have not heard of God being defined in that way before. You just need to 'buy' into the definition for us to have a meaningful argument; because we cannot argue if we are not on a common ground when it comes to the terms used. We could technically replace the word 'God', with the word 'X', and this would not change the validity of the syllogism, as long as we agree on the meaning of the terms.

Regarding 'an effect cannot be greater than its cause(s)'. You've all asked what it means and how to back it up. Here goes.
'Greater' here means that the effect cannot possess a property that was not present in its cause(s). This follows from the self-evident principle that 'nothing can come from nothing', or 'nothing can bring itself into existence'. Therefore, whatever property the effect has (be it physical or not) must come from its cause(s). Now if we assume that a single first cause exists, then it must possess all properties that its effects possess, because the effects' properties must have been received by the first cause.

The inference is valid from the premises.
Premise 1: God is traditionally defined as 'that which nothing greater can be conceived'. You can look it up; I did not come up with the definition.
Premise 2: No effect can be greater than its cause(s). This is a principal in causality. If you object, you would need to find an exception to this principal.

Why not? Where do you see a flaw in the logic?

The structure AND meaning of the word, "supernatural", shows that it stems from the world, "natural", which means that it is dependent upon the existence of the natural, which means that the natural came first and then the supernatural. — Harry Hindu

I see your point. We just need to differentiate between the epistemological order and metaphysical order of the two words. Epistemologically, we humans first experience the natural world and then may call some things supernatural when these don't behave as per the laws of our natural world. Metaphysically however, the supernatural is the cause of the natural, and thus existed prior to it. Sure, you can switch the labels around if desired, as long as the definitions are clear to everyone. For practical purposes though, I would stick to the conventional definitions.

The problem is that it's quite a leap to go from "the first cause doesn't behave according to the laws of physics" to "the first cause is God". — Michael

It is. But we can bridge that gap a couple of ways:
1. In Revelation 22:13: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the First and the Last, the Beginning and the End". God himself says he is the first cause.
2. God is traditionally defined as 'that which nothing greater can exist'. Combine this with the principle that 'no effect can be greater than its cause(s)', and we deduce that the first cause is that which nothing greater can exist, and therefore the first cause is God.

If the universe was the effect of some cause, then that cause would be "natural" too, as there would be a causal relationship between the cause and the effect. — Harry Hindu

You are contradicting yourself, because you agreed earlier that "everything in the natural universe has a cause". The first cause, by definition, has a causal relationship, but no cause.

Perhaps there was a misunderstanding and you meant instead that "everything in the natural universe has a causal relationship"? But that statement is false: Miracles have a causal relationship with the thing acted upon, and yet they are not classified as natural events. God has a causal relationship with his creation, and yet is not classified as a natural being.

Why must there be a "first" natural thing? Why isn't it natural all the way down? — Harry Hindu

Because if the universe has a beginning, then there must be a first thing. The only logical alternative is no beginning. But finiteness is a simpler hypothesis than infinity, and so, as per Occam's Razor, it becomes the prima facie until proven otherwise.
- Then this first natural thing is caused by another thing which has no cause (the first cause), for nothing can be the cause of itself.
- And everything in the natural universe has a cause, as we have established earlier.
- Therefore this first cause must be supernatural.

I also agree with here. Maybe we should find clear definitions of 'natural' and 'supernatural', if it is not already done.

No problem. Good luck.

Let's go for solution 2 then: I have recently wrote a 20-page document which provides a practical method on how to solve emotional problems. It can be read or downloaded here. It takes about 1 hour to read, and about 3 hours for the full treatment (which does not need to be done all in one go). I will summarize the content here:

• It first gives a rational explanation of what an emotional feeling is, its purpose, and limitations.
• It then differentiates between a legitimate feeling (one that should be there) and an illegitimate feeling (one that should not be there).
• It then establishes a strong parallel between an illegitimate emotional feeling and what is called a 'physical allergy'. Thus 'illegitimate emotional feelings' can be called 'emotional allergies'.
• It then describes a method to eliminate emotional allergies, based on a similar proven method designed to eliminate physical allergies.

It has worked for me and hope it works for others too. I am aware that it takes a bit of homework to get the benefit of the solution, and so if I can provide any help along the way, just let me know.

First check: Do you have stomach-related problems? I recently read a book that talks about how the stomach health plays a critical role in our emotional state, and I can attest from experience. I am talking about evident stomach problems, not the occasional one from drinking too much. If yes, then I would look no further for the cause. I can then provide what I know on this.

If no, then there is another solution I can offer, but will wait for the answer before giving more details on that one.

(Y)

Hey. I tried your link and it does not seem to work.

Hello. May I ask, would you define the cause of the depression more as rational or emotional? Rational would be like the philosopher Satre who was convinced that life is meaningless. Emotional would be like finding no particular reasons for the depression and yet there it is. If rational, then I think us bunch of amateur philosophers in this forum can come up with strong arguments to change your mind. If emotional, then I may be able to provide a few solutions based on experience with my own depressions, which I have for the most part defeated.

Sorry, I don't think I can provide much insight on interpreting your dreams.

Hello. I like your position of prima facie. Thus us supernaturalists have the onus of proof that not all phenomena can be explained by natural causes. Have you looked at Aquinas's five ways? He uses them to prove God but it can be modified slightly to prove supernaturalism. Here is a summary of one them:
- Everything in the natural universe has a cause. We have yet to find an exception to this rule, therefore that becomes the prima facie.
- But then the first natural thing must have a cause, which itself either does not have a cause or is not a natural thing, because otherwise that antecedent thing would be the 'first natural thing', and not the other one.
- Therefore supernatural things exist.

I don't know the facts but will take a reasonable guess at Plato's rationale. Implicitly, we all understand the word God to mean 'that which nothing greater can be conceived' (later explicitly stated by St. Anselm). This definition implies perfection, which includes moral perfection.

I know that the greek gods were not seen as perfect, but I think Plato, just like Socrates, was referring to a different concept of the word god, much closer to our modern definition.

Hi. Let's remove the word 'new'. Do we need axioms for philosophy? Yes.
To avoid for a claim to be arbitrary, the claim must be backed up by premises, then these premises must be backed up by further premises, and so on, until we reach a starting point, Archimedean point as Descartes would say, or first principle. Examples of first principles of ethics for Thomas Aquinas: do good and avoid evil. Seek truth and reject falsehood.