That seems correct as well, for this definition is compatible with mine. Non-empirical truths are abstract and tend to be (always?) universal; and if abstract, then we need clear and distinct definitions to describe them; and if sense observation is the primary tool for empirical truths, reason is the primary tool for non-empirical truths.

You're omitting a crucial ingredient, namely, observation (and experiment, which is a type of observation). — Wayfarer

Observation in science is based on the idea that sense observation gives truth; and that idea is part of epistemology.

Philosophers like Hume accept that idea for particulars, but not for generals, on the grounds that uniformity in nature is not a necessity. Then extreme rationalists like Descartes will even reject that idea for particulars, on the grounds that there is the possibility of dreaming the sense observation.

The word itself can be translated as "love of wisdom" and since we live in the West, there are Western academia biases as to what is wisdom. — Rich

My take is that the essence of 'wisdom' is: correct judgement. And a judgement may only be correct if the facts and values are true, which brings it back to the search for truth. Though I admit it's a bit of a stretch... I am not sure if wisdom is an essential property of philosophy, but it is a nice effect of it.

Science (modern definition) was not created by science, but by philosophy; and more precisely, by logic and epistemology. As such, if science is a discipline, then philosophy must be a discipline too. You don't get order out of chaos.

I too find scientific truths pretty boring, if not for their usefulness.

That was an interesting article. So realists give value to scientific theories according to their level of truth; and instrumentalists give them value according to their practical use. As philosophers, should we side with truth or usefulness?

I think we need to differentiate between two kinds of truths: (1) eternal / rational / necessary, and (2) temporal / empirical / contingent. Examples of (1) are logic, ethics, essence of things, and values of beings. Examples of (2) are matters of fact, accidental properties of things, and laws of physics.

Since eternal > temporal, rational > empirical, and necessary > contingent, it follows that type (1) truths > type (2) truths. My bottom line is that we ought to value truth for its own end for (1), and truth as a means to another end for (2).

Yeah you are probably right about this topic being too convoluted. I usually walk away whenever someone pulls the Quantum Mechanics card into a philosophical debate.

- "Nothing can come from nothing."
- "Actually, in QM, particles pop in and out of existence ..."

I'm sure Ockham will be rolling in his grave. — Wayfarer

That's okay. There should a universe where he is not. :D

In current cosmology, the big debate on whether 'the universe' is 'only one' of a possibly infinite number of 'multiverses', which might forever be undetectable, even in principle. — Wayfarer

How is this hypothesis backed up? Because if the other universes are undetectable, then I am guessing that it was not brought up from empirical data. Then was it deduced somehow?

Hmm... Good point. So our choices are (1) a simpler hypothesis with a more complex conclusion, or (2) a more complex hypothesis with a simpler conclusion. It appears that Occam's razor is not effective here. I'll take that card back.

Occam's razor would judge that a hypothesis involving finite things is simpler than one involving infinite things. As such, until it is refuted, we should stick the simpler 'finite chain of causes' hypothesis.

Better yet, I think gave a pretty good argument here (point #2).

Understood. First I thought that by 'unchanging', you meant 'does not change its mind', not 'action-less'. But now I have two objections to this new meaning:

(1) An action-less thing is not 'good' but neutral. Not moral or immoral, but amoral. A rock comes to mind. I think good acts are required to be a morally good being.
(2) This argument points to deism, not theism. A passive being, not the passionate being that I have heard being described by Aquinas.

Regarding causality: Isn't the existence of causality necessary anyways? Everything that begins to exist necessarily requires a cause outside of itself for its existence. And we observe that some things begin to exist; therefore causality necessarily exists.

Regarding your first argument on X being good: Can you expand on premise 2: Evil implies change? It seems to me it is possible for a thing to be evil and unchanging; and conversely, for a thing to be good and changing, that is, changing for the better. As such, this unchanging X could be unchangingly evil.

This is nitpicking, but I would slightly modify Premise 1: Not everything in the world has a cause, if we include the first cause as part of the world (part of the things that exist). Rather, everything that begins to exist has a cause, due to the ex nihilo nihil fit principle. That way, the first cause conclusion does not contradict premise 1, and it follows that it has no beginning.

I think both are innate and different starting points. Logic is the starting point for truth. Ethics is that starting point for good. They meet when the true good is found.

If it is true that nothing has a value in itself except as a means to an end, then it follows that the means acquire value because the end must have value, and that if the end has no value, then neither does the means. Therefore, if beings are ends, then they must have value, because the means (like being just to all) has value.

If people had value, what would that value be in relation to? — Noble Dust

In relation to the value of other beings, like God, angels, other people, animals and plants. And the hierarchy of value is in the order shown. Thus we should treat plants as ends (that is, do good to them), as long as it does not conflict with the end of higher beings.

Try as we might, we can't remove ourselves from our own experience, so the ultimate end for us has to be something that we can parse within our finite experience, and God as ultimate ends doesn't parse. — Noble Dust

I agree that 'ought' implies 'can', that is, our end must be achievable. But this does not mean that we cannot achieve the end of treating God as the ultimate end, by obeying his will, such as loving our neighbours as ourselves. Such act is within our reach.

You may be right about free speech, but it is not a representative example because it is by no means an absolute. Let's look at Justice. Imagining justice to be bad and injustice to be good is impossible, like imagining a square circle. It is thus a moral absolute, independent of cultures. That is not to say that everyone is just, but that everyone understands justice to be morally good and injustice to be morally bad.

I have heard ethics being called "The three R's": Right Response to Reality, or else, treating things according to their proper values. People are ends because they have a high value, but they are not the only thing. If God exists, then he has the greatest value of all, and is thus the ultimate end. Then comes angels, then humans, then animals, then plants, and so on, if we follow the Great Chain of Being. With regards to ethics, each ought to be treated as ends, proportionally to their proper values.

Surely, you and I both know of one person that treats others as they want to be treated. It only takes one example to demonstrate that, at least once, somebody acted for the end goal of ethics in itself. And even if the moral good was not a real thing, it is at least the perception of a moral good that makes it an end in itself. Side note: I also happen to think it is a real thing.

Fair enough. I looked up the concept of 'possible worlds' here. In it, it does define 'impossible propositions' as propositions being true in no possible world. And impossible propositions are ones that have contradictions. Thus logical contradictions are true in no possible worlds.

I think you are right about the second half. Man arguing about logic itself is hard.

Still, what was your argument for thinking that other universes may have a different logic? To say that something is possible implies that it is logically possible. But as such, to say that another logic is possible is to say that another logic is logically possible, which is nonsensical.

I see. So the end is preservation and propagation of the human species. This kind of fits into the bucket (3) of necessity, health and safety, if taken broadly enough. But I have an objection to this being the only end, and reducing (1) and (2) to means: If this was true, then the individual would be valued based on genes, where the one with desired genes would be at the top, and the undesired genes and infertile one would be at the bottom of the hierarchy. But this yields to eugenics, which goes against traditional ethics, to treat all individuals as having the same value and rights.

I agree. And even though being morally good can make give pleasure in the long run, that is usually not the reason why people are good. I.E., they would still be good even if it did not give them pleasure. Pleasure in that case is more of a side effect than an end.

Pleasure can only be experienced in doing something such as watching a movie, it is never experienced on its own, it never an end in itself, it is always experienced along with something else which is the end. If you go to view a movie, you take pleasure in the story, its aesthetic, the actors and so on, it is only experienced as a means, never as an end in itself. — Cavacava

It raises an interesting question. Do we perceive a thing to be good because it gives us pleasure, or do experience pleasure because we perceive the thing to be good? Here is my take: It is the former when it comes to subjective values, and the latter when it comes to objective values. The goodness of a movie is subjective, and so we perceive it to be good because it gives us pleasure. The goodness of justice and health is objective, and so we experience pleasure because they are good. As such, pleasure is an end when it comes to things with subjective value.

All three can be reduced to the ends of propagating one's genes. — Harry Hindu

Interesting claim. So the most successful person in life is the one with the biggest and healthiest line of descendants? What reason do you have to believe that? It seems that the ethical behaviour of willing the good to everyone, not just family members, goes against that end.

I think happiness has intrinsic value. Everything else can be reduced to means for achieving happiness. — TheMadFool

I think 'happiness' either means 'pleasure' (1), or 'blessedness', which is pretty much ethics (2). Do you mean another thing by 'happiness'?

Also, truth has intrinsic value. — TheMadFool

That's a good one. Aristotle says man desires truth for its own sake, entirely apart from its utility. I will think more about that one, and consider if it cannot be reduced to the other ends (1), (2), or (3).

Another thing that has intrinsic value is life. — TheMadFool

This fits into (3), does it not? Or if you include preserving other life forms in nature, then it might fit into ethics and duty (2), but I am not sure.

By the way, I like the terms 'intrinsic value' and 'instrumental value'.

It's really not obvious these three stand on their own. Plenty of people will reduce (2) to (1). You could reduce (3) to (2) or (1). Some might claim that (1) and (2) are actually in the service of (3). — Srap Tasmaner

Reducing (2) to (1): While the thought of being good may result in a pleasurable feeling, I don't think this is the end goal for most people. In fact, some would argue that if personal satisfaction was really the goal, then the intention would be selfish, thus not really good.

Reducing (3) to (2) or (1): That is possible. There is sense in asking "What is the point of living if not for duty or pleasure?"

Reducing (1) and (2) to (3): Yeah maybe pleasure is for health, and social ethics is for the preservation of our species. But I find the end of surviving for the sake of surviving to be absurd. The word despair comes to mind. I am more inclined to reduce (3) to (1) and (2), than reducing (1) and (2) to (3).

Avoidance of pain might have an even stronger claim than pleasure here.

Agreed. I guess seeking the end implies avoiding its opposite.

I am sure that I could find a coin or a paper currency that is no longer legal tender but some collector would love to keep. — WISDOMfromPO-MO

But why would they love to keep it, if not for the end of subjective pleasure? I am using the term 'pleasure' broadly here, to include interest, passion, curiosity etc.

And if it is dark and I do not have a flashlight, a dollar bill could be valuable as a light source after I strike a match or flip a cigarette lighter.

Yes, but the light source is valuable only as a means to see something. If you did not care to see anything at that time, then you would not use the dollar bill.

I don't think pleasure can be an end in itself, it has to hold hands with something else to be experienced. — Cavacava

In my movie example, it seems the end is only pleasure, as it is neither necessary nor morally good (or bad) to watch it. Is there another end?

Maybe duty can be an end, but if the outcome of what duty commands is bad, then was the act moral?

Maybe not, but it is at least the perception of duty that will give value to the means; until the perception is gone, and at which point, the means no longer has the same value.

Self preservation may also be an end, but it is a biological end, like birth, death and so on, so not so much so much value as a non-cognitive necessity.

Does it not make it an end in its own right? People value safety. They are willing to spend more money on a car with safer features.

That's a good one actually. Kant says to treat people as ends and never only as means. I think I would throw that in the ethics bucket (2), that is, social ethics.

I guess you are right. What was your argument though? I thought you too were just giving an opinion.

I'll try an argument for fun: one fundamental law of our logic is the law of non-contradiction. Now if another universe does not have our logic, then it does not have the law of non-contradiction. But if it does not have it, then it also has it (since contradictions are allowed if the law is not present). But once it has the law, then it cannot not have it (since contradictions are not allowed if the law is present). Therefore, all universes have the law of non-contradiction, which is a fundamental law of our logic.

Those assumptions have a strong emotional component; maybe that component isn't exactly the basis, but the emotional element is key to the ethic. The emotion gives content to the ethic. — Noble Dust

Maybe your definition of 'emotion' is really the definition of 'feeling'. Emotional feelings are only one type of feelings. Other types are physical, 'gut' feelings (like guessing an answer on a test), and moral feelings, also called conscience. I think you are referring to this last one, which is different from emotional feelings.

What is innate knowledge? That idea isn't enough for me, unless you can give a compelling case otherwise. — Noble Dust

A typical example of innate knowledge is that of logic. Laws of logic are not discovered by scientific experiments, because science presupposes logic. Logic is a first principle, the starting point used to infer everything else. I think most people agree that logic is innate, though not everyone agrees it is the case for ethics. Yet, nobody can disagree that ethical things like justice, respect and honesty are good, and others like injustice, disrespect and dishonesty are bad. The Golden Rule of ethics is called that because it is found in nearly every religion and ethical tradition, suggesting it is part of human nature.

How can you be sure "we" have that innate knowledge? It seems obvious that not everyone has that. — Noble Dust

I have a reductio ad absurdum argument for it: If we supposed that not everyone had that same innate knowledge of ethics, then we could never have a moral judgement of anyone, because a person's act, no matter how immoral it may seem, could be an honest mistake if the person did not know it was wrong. As such, it would be possible that Hitler's act of the Holocaust was an honest mistake, on the grounds that he did not know it was wrong, and what's more, thought it was his duty. And that is absurd.

If we observe something to be unimaginable, then that proves it is unimaginable within our universe, and it is impossible within our universe. — BlueBanana

Yes, and also impossible in all universes. Example: It is impossible for Caesar not to cross the rubicon in our universe, because we cannot change the past. But I can image Caesar not crossing the rubicon. It is therefore possible in another universe. However, I cannot imagine Caesar crossing and not crossing the rubicon at the same time. That last statement is therefore impossible in all universes.

1) You are correct that if you are ethical, then you will (or should) feel proud, and if you are unethical, then you will feel guilty. That said, what causes the feeling of pride/guilt? The feeling is an effect of the ethical act; such that if you don't perceive the act to be ethical, then you will not feel proud. Consequently, ethics is the end, and the feeling is only an effect of that end, not the end itself.

(A) But you can't escape from Fate. Whatever you choose, what must happen will happen. (B) People should choose whatever they want to choose and this whole thing i mentioned shouldn't affect their choices. — Johnler

Aren't A and B contradicting statements? How can choices exist if fate exists? For disclosure, my opinion is that choices (free will) exist, and fate does not.

emotion is not the same thing as pleasure — Noble Dust

I guess I did assume that 'pleasure' meant the same as 'emotions'. But is it not? Emotions are either emotional pleasures (joy, excitement, relief...) or pains (anger, sadness, stress...). What else is there?

Emotion is the driving force of why ethics and duty, for instance, are ends in themselves. Ethics can't be an end in itself without an emotional source — Noble Dust

This cannot be the case. Or else, logically, Hitler could be have been a very ethical person if he performed the Holocaust out of emotional bursts towards the Jews.

Emotion is the driving force of why ethics and duty [...] how would ethics obtain without emotion? On what do you base a philosophy of ethics or duty? — Noble Dust

Ethics is based on innate knowledge of justice; just like logic is innate to everyone. One cannot imagine justice to be bad and injustice to be good. You have it backwards: we get a feeling of right and wrong because we have a knowledge of ethics, not the other way around.

Logic and natural laws or part of our universe — BlueBanana

If by natural law, you mean laws of physics, then I agree about that; but it is not possible for logic. "Being illogical" does not mean "standing outside of our universe's laws logic", but rather "making no sense". It is an error made by the subject of discussion, and does not say anything about the object of discussion. As such, saying "2+2=3" is not any more sensical than saying gibberish like "the smell of purple has". Practical test: if it is unimaginable, then it is illogical, then it is impossible.

One last thought before we part ways. If we have zero ability to judge a religion and to differentiate a probably true one from a probably false one, then any religion whatsoever, like the Flying Spaghetti Monster, ancient greek religions, or any cults, would need to be taken as seriously as established religions like Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism.

We live for emotions. — Johnler

Hello. While pleasure is indeed an end and not a means to any other ends, there exist other ends as well, like ethics or duty. A parent may feel no pleasure in punishing a child, but do it because it is the right thing to do.

Also everything happens for a reason. — Johnler

It sure does, but the reason may not be a good one. Be careful about this 'Karma' ideology. It can lead to absurd conclusions, like deciding not to help anyone in need, on the grounds that they only got what they deserved, and that helping them out would disrupt destiny.

One cannot know the intentions of the Lord. — Rich

This statement is not a logical necessity. For one thing, we could know God's intentions if he told them to us. This Lord you speak of fits more into deism rather than theism.

I don't see what the problem is with that. If God ordains us with the ability to understand him, say through human reason, then we can understand his ways through it.

A typical example is goodness and logic. If God created us in his image, then our idea of goodness and logic must be the same as God's.

I agree with you that to claim to know everything about God is also to claim to transcend God; and this is not only pretentious, it is also false, because since God is above all things by definition, we can never fully know him.

Having said that, we can know some things about God: If God exists and is the creator of all things, then he is the creator of human reason. Therefore we can trust our reason to help us find truth, including some truths about God, if these can be found through reason. Not all, but some.

Hello again. I have finally read the blog. As I understand it, its argument against free will is as follows:

p1: If God is omniscient, then he can foresee my future acts with certainty.
p2: If my future acts are known, then they will occur necessarily (not that knowing is what causes the act, but rather the act is the necessary cause to knowing).
p3: If my future acts are necessary, then I have no free will.

I reject premise 1. God might exist outside of time. If so, then all instants, past, present and future to us, are always "live" or "now" to God. There is no foreseeing if there is no future from God's point of view; there is only seeing. If you eat an apple right now in front of me, I know with certainty that you are eating an apple because I see it. It does not follow that you don't have free will in the act, as it is not foreseeing.