That's because transgenderism isn't concerned with genotypes. — Michael

Then why do many transpeople have sex changes?

People who are transgender do not claim to have sex chromosomes that they don't have. — Michael

Then what are they claiming? That is the question.

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you.
— Harry Hindu

The specific word or exclamation here is obviously completely irrelevant. We don't need to be taught to experience pain. — Mijin

You said that you are able to determine that something has subjective experiences by its behavior - by exclaiming, "Ouch!", yet now you are saying that the word or exclamation is completely irrelevant. If they exclaimed, "Yippee!", would you say that they are having a subjective experience of pain?

All these arguments over consciousness might as well take place inside a simulation. — Marchesk

Daydreams could very well be simulated subjective experiences, or views of some process or event. The only difference between daydreams and nightdreams is that you don't have the real world imposing itself on your senses. Daydreams are like an overlay of the real world subjective experience. When sleeping, there is nothing but the simulation so the mind assumes it is reality.

I think it's become a moral/political issue only because it's a metaphysical/epistemological issue that hasn't ever really been solved. — McMootch

Yes, and there are many that don't want to solve the metaphysical aspect because they want to keep it a moral/political issue so that they can use it as a weapon against their moral/political opponents.

Gender is performative, a matter of behaviors and traits that find themselves somewhere on the masculine/feminine spectrum, which has nothing to do with one's body (sex). — McMootch

All this does is re-enforce the idea that there are only two genders (masculine and feminine). When a trans-person claims to be one or the other, they too are re-enforcing the two gender idea. Not only that, but they re-enforce those biases that women wear dresses and men wear pants by claiming to be one or the other by simply dressing a certain way. If they claim to be a woman because they dress like one, then that just re-enforces the idea that to be a woman, you need to wear a dress. They continue to put people in one of two boxes based on how they dress or behave.

Human sexes have a wide range of behaviors that overlap. These behaviors, then, shouldn't be defined as masculine or feminine. They are simply human behaviors, and have nothing to do with sex/gender. There are behaviors and physiology that we can point to that are masculine or feminine, like giving birth and being able to stand an urinate without getting urine all over your legs and pants.

So in a sense, yes there are male and female souls (and souls in between), in that humans have psychological pre-dispositions (biologically and culturally influenced) causing them to exhibit behaviors that are mostly what we would call "masculine," mostly what we call "feminine," or anywhere in between.) But because this disassociation is awkward and takes time, people are revolting against the thing that seems most immediately to hold it together (gendered language). — McMootch

I don't believe in the idea of souls. For me, it's more of an issue of how they were raised. Parents have a tendency of projecting their expectations onto their children. For instance, telling your daughter that she thinks like a man, or dressing your boy in dresses. As children, they adopt these behaviors as norms, so when they become adults they become confused because the expectations of society is different than their parents'.

They claim that gender is a social-construction, but a social construction is a shared idea - meaning that members of some society mutually agree that these ideas are good and useful. But if a person claims to be something else, then they are not agreeing with the rest of society. Therefore, their disposition doesn't qualify as a gender. Either gender is a social construction, a feeling, or the same thing as sex.

I said no such thing — Mijin

I quoted you:

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

:roll:

you were asking me about the mechanism by which physical neurology causes subjective experience. That's what we don't know. — Mijin

That's part of the problem - dualism. You're left with the impossible task of explaining how physical processes cause subjective processes.

It's like I am saying we don't know exactly what dark matter is, and you're repeatedly saying "If you don't know what dark matter is, how can you use the word?". The word still has meaning in referring to a specific phenomenon, even if we have no concrete scientific model yet. — Mijin

No one has ever observed dark matter. Dark matter is just an idea to account for the observed behavior of real matter, just like how subjective experiences is an idea to account for the observed behavior of human beings.

Well the program PRINT "Ouch!" has an exclamation of pain as part of its programming, so does not fulfill the requirements. — Mijin

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you. If you were born in another country with a different language, you would have been programmed differently. Your genetic code is a program defining the limits of your behaviors and logic defines the limits of your ideas.

What if we designed a robot to program itself (teach itself), or learn from it's mistakes?

You assume that other humans have [subjective experience] because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it.
— Harry Hindu

Note that this single quote from you has two issues: firstly chastizing me for assuming that p-zombies don't have subjective experience, when this is true by definition. But also secondly, saying I would not believe a computer that claimed to have subjective experience, when the post you are quoting actually says the precise opposite. — Mijin

My point was that you had already claimed to not know what a subjective experience is, yet you go on to claim that you know what has it and what doesn't. I already went over this in my last post, which you ignored. I'm done going back and forth with you.

I defined pain. I've answered all your questions about pain. I've told you I can elaborate on the mechanisms of pain as much as you like, because it's a topic I've studied at postgrad level.
The only one of your questions I couldn't answer, was how physical mechanisms within the brain give rise to subjective experience because no-one can.

So drop this nonsense about me not knowing what pain is, unless you also mention that you're defining "knowing pain" in such a way that no living human knows what pain is. — Mijin

You said:

I didn't claim to know what pain is — Mijin

Then you said:

I feel pain. — Mijin

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

So what you seem to be defining pain as is a unpleasant subjective experience, and then go on to say that you don't know what a subjective experience is. If pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is, then you don't know what pain is. You aren't saying anything useful about pain by asserting that pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is. It's really that simple.

I have defined pain without the use of the phrase, "subjective experience", because it's a meaningless term, as you point out. Pain is information. What is information? The relationship between cause and effect. Pain informs you of injury. Injury informs you of the cause of the injury, etc. If it's causal, it's information.

Your response to that post, was to then say I would not believe an AI could be conscious even if it claimed it was i.e. the exact opposite of what I said. — Mijin

My response was a question trying to confirm what you had said. I often paraphrase what people say, and they often recant what they said because the paraphrasing gives them a different look on what they said. But this is beyond the point. The point being that if you don't know what subjective experiences are, then you aren't in any position to make judgements about who, or what has them, or not. It's like saying a blind person doesn't know what polka-dots are, but then they can pick out what has them and what doesn't have them. It's illogical.

With regards to computers, yes, if an AI were able to freely converse in natural language, and it repeatedly made the claim that it felt pain, despite such sentiments not being explicitly part of its programming, and it having nothing immediate to gain by lying...then sure, I'd give it the benefit of the doubt. I wouldn't know that it felt pain, but I'd start to lean towards it being true. — Mijin

What do you mean, "not explicitly part of its programming"?

You were saying I was wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experiences. This showed that it is you that do not understand what a word (p-zombie) means. — Mijin

Where did I say that? I have only been questioning your use of the phrase, "subjective experience" because you use the phrase without knowing what it means. Why use terms that you don't know what they mean, especially if there are alternative ways of describing pain with words we do understand? :chin:

Seeing the world through the eyes of a child is to try and look at the world as if for the first time - without the biases and the things we take for granted. That is how most discoveries and revelations are made - in thinking about things differently.

Don't you already know what pain is? Are you one of those rare individuals who can't feel pain? What's that like? — Marchesk

I already said that its information.

Mijin is the one that doesnt know what pain is.

Are you asking what pain feels like, or asking what pain is? Is it the same thing?

So why are you challenging the idea that humans learn things at all? — Kenosha Kid

I wasnt. I'm challenging how the information about unconscious processes got into the book we are learning about unconscious experiences from.

What pain is, how pain sensation works, what we mean by subjective experience and how much we (don't) know about how exactly subjective experience works. — Mijin

If you can't tell me what pain is then how do you expect to tell me how it works? Can you use a word when you don't know it's meaning?

And I note that you still haven't said why your argument is not a shift of the burden of proof. i.e. The whole reason you and I are in this exchange in the first place. — Mijin

You haven't provided a consistent method of determining what type of system is conscious and which type of system isnt.

I said that under certain conditions I could gain belief that a computer was experiencing pain, and I mentioned what those conditions were. Does the program PRINT "Ouch!" fulfill those conditions?
If you read what I wrote, you would know the answer to this. — Mijin

What were those conditions?

This response is a complete non sequitur. — Mijin

No. If a pzombie is defined as having no subjective experiences and you can't define subjective experiences, then You haven't properly defined P zombies much less subjective experiences. How can you use words when you don't know what they mean?

Yes, and I'm not sure whether Sara was arguing epistemology or ontology. It sounded like she wanted to expand physics to incorporate the emergent biological information. — Marchesk

It sounded like she was saying that biology is ontological and physics is epistemological.

Physics, biology and chemistry are different views of the same thing. Each view is dependent upon the present goal, so I think that the emerging levels and scales are epistemological in nature.

An amalgam of physical states IS a chemical state. An amalgam of certain chemical states IS a biological state.

All this started from me suggesting that your argument was a subtle shift of the burden of proof.
Call me naive, but I honestly expected a simple response like "oh, you're right, let me rephrase that" or "I don't believe it is, because..."

But instead of that we get this bizarre freakout of you claiming I don't know what "pain" means.
Well I just gave a definition of pain, in the very post you are replying to.
But, since pain sensation was a core part of my postgraduate degree I can actually talk a lot about it. At the end of that, would you respond to the point? — Mijin

I didn't claim to know what pain is, — Mijin

That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. — Mijin

You keep contradicting yourself. You go back and forth between knowing what pain is and not knowing what pain is. You call it a subjective experience and then claim to not know what a subjective experience is. You aren't being very helpful.

Nobody knows. There is no scientific model (meaning: having explanatory and predictive power) for that part. If this is a "gotcha" consider yourself, and every other human, "got". — Mijin

I'm not playing "Gotcha". The fact that you think that I am just shows how you aren't even attempting to think about what you are saying. I am simply trying to get you to clarify the terms that you are using.

Possibly I am losing you because you don't read my posts? I just said I could believe that a computer could experience subjective states if it were to claim it i.e. the exact opposite of the thing you're accusing me of saying. — Mijin

Then all I have to do is program a computer to produce some text on your screen, "I have subjective states" and you would assume that the computer has conscious states?

But on p-zombies, think through what you're saying. You're suggesting that I am wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experience? Their definition is that they do not have subjective experience. — Mijin

Yet, you claim that no one knows what subjective experiences are. :roll:

Nope. Your reply doesn't address how memory is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery.

Around 57:45, Sara tells Sean that she doesn't think the Standard Model is up to the task of explaining life, because at the scale of chemistry, the physics of information emerges. Sean mentions a paper by Mark Bedau which argues that the weak emergence is when the higher level properties of whatever systems like life could have been in principle simulated by a computer prior to life. — Marchesk

She says the desire is to reduce biology to physics, but physics (as a field of human knowledge) emerges from biology. — Marchesk

Seems like you could say the same thing about biology. The question is whether or not the scales and levels of the universe are epistemological or ontological.

It's just possible that we didn't evolve the capabilities to perfectly model the cosmos. Or that our modeling leaves something out since it's abstracting the patterns from empirical experience. — Marchesk

What would a perfect model of the cosmos look like compared to imperfect models? It seems to me that it is the nature of models to leave things out - things that are not useful to what your goal is in modeling some aspect of the cosmos. Why do we model?

Dreams could be simulated subjective experiences.

Iirc you were asking about how an unconscious mental process could feed into a conscious experience. — Kenosha Kid

Here you seem to be asserting that the neurologist is conscious of the patient's unconscious processes before the patient is conscious of them:

There was a famous experiment a while ago that showed that neurological behaviour associated with motor responses fired before correlated decision-making processes in the prefrontal cortex. The subjects remember, from their limited but direct phenomenal experience, deciding to act, then acting, when in fact the action appeared to be unconsciously chosen and only consciously ratified -- or rationalised -- after the act. — Kenosha Kid

This reminds me very much of Daniel Kahneman's System 1 / System 2 model of the brain and his tests of it. Problems that appear amenable to pattern-matching (the thing that makes it easier to add 5 or 9 to things than 7 or 8) but that pattern-matching would lead to the wrong answer for follow a similar pattern. Human subjects swear blind they worked out the answer, when in fact they seem to be *receiving* an answer and ratifying it. Badly. That is, System 2 (the so-called rational, algorithmic part of the brain associated with conscious decision-making) receives a putative answer from System 1 (the dumb but hard-working pattern-matching part of the brain that acts without conscious input). — Kenosha Kid

Iirc you were asking about how an unconscious mental process could feed into a conscious experience. We just ended up at how humans learn anything at all by a regression of lazy 'Why?'s. Since there's no end to that, and I have good reason to believe that humans learning things is not something you doubt, I'm drawing a line there. It is sufficient to accept that humans can learn within the scope of this question. (A different matter if the thread were about, say, child development.) — Kenosha Kid

No. For the umpteenth time, I'm asking what observable difference is between conscious and unconscious processes are.

This says nothing about how memory is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery. — Harry Hindu

It's not all perceptual. A dream of a red apple isn't information about an apple in the external environment. — Marchesk

This just causes more confusion about what a subjective experience is. Why do people keep using terms that they have no idea what it means? Is this not clear evidence that use and meaning are not one and the same? Can people use words that they don't know how to use?

Haha, what?
I didn't claim to know what pain is, why would I have a burden of proof on me? — Mijin

Haha, then why are you using a word that you don't know what it means. You literally don't know what you are talking about.

That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

Then why do you use terms that you don't what they mean? That is ludicrous.

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system. — Mijin

What does it even mean for "an unpleasant subjective experience that follows activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system"? How do subjective states follow from physical states?

I said that I assume (don't know) that other humans experience pain, because they freely claim that they do. P-zombies could of course claim to be in pain, but this would require the universe to be trying to fool me for some reason -- the simpler explanation for sentient beings claiming to have subjective experiences is that they actually do.

That's evidence and an argument for the existence of pain in other humans, not a claim that that is what pain *is*. — Mijin

This makes no sense. You assume that other humans have it because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it. You assume IT exist in humans without even knowing what IT is. You're losing me.

Depends on whether the computer lacked a subjective experience of pain. — Marchesk

What is a subjective experience, if not information in working memory about the environment relative to your body.

A subjective experience is when the world appears to be located relative to your sensory organs.

Oh, I can explain it. I just can't learn it for you. We have reached an impasse: I shan't embark on a lengthy post describing how human beings learn things without a sign of good faith from you that this is a serious conversation, and you can't provide a sign of good faith, presumably because you have none. That, as far as I see it, is that. — Kenosha Kid

LOL. That is what I've been asking this whole time -- how human beings learn things. How is a scribble about unconscious processes, and what is the observable difference between conscious processes and unconscious processes?

As I said, you can't logically doubt that we can learn things and at the same time ask questions expecting to learn my viewpoint, or expect me to discern your meaning. — Kenosha Kid

I only doubt that we can learn things based on what you have said, not what I have said. You are the one that can't explain the difference between conscious and unconscious processes. If what you said works for you, then good for you.

Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works?
— Harry Hindu

It is often used that way. — Marchesk

What is often used that way? It was a question. Read it again.

What is the relationship between brain and mind?
— Harry Hindu

One's three pounds of flesh, and the other has something to do with the resulting subjectivity, intelligence, intentionality and behavior. — Marchesk

This doesn't tell us anything about the relationship between mind and brain. All you are doing is just re-explaining the differences. How do these different things relate to the point where they can be metaphors for each other? IS the brain a metaphor for the mind?

But then you're stuck with explaining everything from that monism. And some things don't fit quite so well. Take information before the evolution of life. What does it mean for a bunch of rocks to be information? Information to whom? — Marchesk

As I have said numerous times: Information is the relationship between cause and effect. A bunch of rocks is the effect of what caused the bunch of rocks - a landside, earthquake, etc., therefore a whom is not a necessary part for information to exist - only causal relationships are necessary.

Your second question is asking what information is useful, and for what purpose, so you are asking questions about usefulness and purpose, not information. Do you agree that some information is useful and some is not? It's not that the information doesn't exist. It's a judgement of which information is useful or not for some goal in the mind.

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. — Wayfarer

Is the brain a metaphor for how the mind works? Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works? What is the relationship between brain and mind?

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. It doesn’t process bits of data. Conversely, computers don’t make judgments. — Wayfarer

This is circular. Why is the computer a metaphor for the mind, and not a chair? It seems to me that it is because computers do make judgements (IF-THEN-ELSE), just like we do. Brains process bits of data. The bits are the distinct "boxes" that we put everything in. We think in bits of sensory data - shapes, colors, sounds, feelings, etc - the smallest, most fundamental forms that we can think in.

Actually, the hard problem of consciousness is recognised by neuroscience. In a paper called The Neural Binding Problem(s), Jerome S. Feldman addresses the 'problem of the subjective unity of perception': — Wayfarer

Sure, because the problem is dividing the world into physical and mental parts, and then explaining how the two interact. The solution is to not divide the world into two separate parts - monism.

That's a shift of the burden of proof.

I feel pain.
I assume other humans also feel pain for various practical reasons, but also because if other humans were p-zombies they would have no reason to say that they experience pain.

Any claim beyond that, needs supporting arguments and data. In the case of animals, there are lots of good arguments for why at least some animals feel pain, but of course that's a big topic in itself.

But if someone wished to claim that computers, or non-living systems experience pain, the burden is on that person to provide an argument and data for this claim. — Mijin

No. The burden is upon you to explain what pain is.

You can only claim that others feel pain because of their behavior. If a computer behaved like they were in pain, would you say that they feel pain? You seem to be asserting that pain is a behavior. If not, then some behavior is informative of some state of pain. What is pain? Information about the state of your body. If a computer possessed information about the state of it's body, and was programmed to engage in behaviors when that information appears in working memory, then how is that any different than what humans do?

The problem is that this approach explains nothing. What are footprints in the sand? Information. What is consciousness? Information. What is memory? Information. — Daemon

Sure it does. It explains that everything is information. The problem is that you just don't like the idea because you haven't been able to supply a logical argument against it.

Memory is something that goes on in conscious minds. It's associated with conscious experience. There's a lot of very specific biological machinery involved, which has evolved over billions of years. It's an aspect of living beings. It's not an aspect of pianos, beach sand, or digital computers. — Daemon

This says nothing about what memory is, or how it is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery.

Do the footprints inform you of anything? What type of information can you acquire from footprints? What would a private detective use footprints for? Where are the footprints, in the sand or in the detective's brain? Where is the information that the footprints provide - in the detective's brain or in the causal relationship between the footprint (the effect) and the person who put them there (the cause). In other words, meaning and information exist prior to any observer interacting with it. The footprints inform you that someone walked this way recently, which direction they were walking, how big the person was, if they were running or walking, etc., all from an impression in the sand. Where does all of this information come from if not what caused the footprint?

I do not need to back up a claim that we can learn things from study. The claim is not seriously in doubt. — Kenosha Kid

Everything you said is to be doubted because you can't explain the observable difference between conscious processes and unconscious processes. In other words, you have no idea what you're talking about.

Worlds of difference. A camera image is either chemical emulsion if it's old-fashioned film, or patterns of pixels if it's digital photography. It's arguably not even 'an image' until it's recognised by an observer; cameras don't recognise images. An image is not an image to a camera, because no camera is capable of intentional action or interpretation. — Wayfarer

The same can be said about eyeballs. Connect eyeballs to a brain, or a camera to a computer, and then you have interpretations of images.

Let me ask you a counter question: do you know what an 'ontological distinction' is? Do you know why it might be argued that there is an ontological distinction to be made between devices (which are constructed by humans) and sentient beings? — Wayfarer

What is the distinction? Both cameras and sentient beings are physical objects. Seems to me that you'd have just as difficult of a problem explaining how images are in brains.

Please clarify, if possible. If not possible, no worries. — bongo fury

Read the rest of the post. The tree ring example doesn't clarify things for you?

I am saying much more than that. If you did not read those parts, or refuse to comprehend what I wrote, that's not my fault in presenting my opinion. — god must be atheist

If you want to point to where you said more than that, I'd be happy to address it, but it seems to me that you are the one not reading posts, and just providing knee-jerk comments to things you think I said, but didnt.

Here you demonstrated perfectly what you need ot deny: that words (scribbled or uttered) have meaning. — god must be atheist

I never denied scribbles have meaning. I said scribbles are images and images have meaning.

You, yourself, explained what the red of the apple is, without presenting an apple. You presented to me on sensory idea of "red", only verbal idea of "red". Therefore words have meanings, and we think in words. — god must be atheist

Would you have understood anything I said if you never experienced the visual of the redness of an apple?

All you are saying is that we use images and sounds to refer to other sensory impressions which can include other visuals and sounds, or even other scribbles.

All sensory impressions have meaning to them. Red of an apple means the apple ripe. Hearing you speak English means you know how to speak English. The smell of coffee means coffee is being brewed, etc.

The color isn't the ripeness. The sound isn't your knowledge. The smell isn't the coffee. They are all about these things.

Again, this is nothing but an infinite regress of childish 'Why? — Kenosha Kid

No. Its an effort to get you to back up your own statements. You can't even answer my question about the observable distinction between conscious an unconscious processes. So again, you continue to make statements using terms that you can't even explain or define in any coherent way.

You're right, I should have been more clear- what I meant was, in asking the question, I'm presupposing the distinction. In other words, what I mean is: supposing the distinction sound, what do they refer to? — McMootch

If the distinction were sound then there would be no reason to ask your question. Your question stems from the fact that the distinction between gender and sex isn't clear.

But these days folks are arguing that they're different, and then insisting upon certain uses in a way that, I think, doesn't really make clear how they're conceiving of the relationship between sex and gender and the pronouns. — McMootch

People can insist that people use certain terms all they want, but in a society with free speech, they can't dictate what words others should or shouldn't use.

If what they claim isn't clear, then what could they be insisting?

Is this a moral/political issue, or a metaphysical/epistemological issue? What does a person mean when they claim to feel like, or be, a man or woman? Is it a mental problem? Is it possible that we have souls that are male and female that get put in the wrong bodies, or what? The fact that there seem to be so many people willing to just accept what others insist that they do without asking these questions is a great example of how political propaganda has an effect on weak minds.