No, the computer is not perceiving inputs in the way you and I perceive things. Press a finger against the back of your hand. You feel a sensation. When you press a key on the computer keyboard, the computer doesn't feel a sensation.

Shall we try to agree on this before we move on to the rest of your ideas? — Daemon

No, because this is the primary point of contention, and you keep ignoring the contradiction that you keep making. What makes the hardware in your head special in that it feels, but computer hardware can't? What does it mean to feel?

If there is no perceivable difference between "simulated" intelligence and "real" intelligence, then any difference you perceive would be a difference of your own making stemming from your human biases.

Do you think a piano feels something when you press the keys?

Do you think a piano feels something when you press the keys? — Daemon

Again, what does it mean to feel?
You are driving all over the road. One lane at a time. We were talking about computers. You are the one using these terms that you then have a problem in defining, so why use them?

Is the piano not perceiving certain inputs from the keyboard? Does it not perceive the meaning of your keystrokes and make the correct sounds for you to listen to?

Harry I don't have a problem defining consciousness and suchlike. Like many words they are defined ostensively.

Wikipedia:
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colours or sensations).

the piano not perceiving certain inputs from the keyboard? Does it not perceive the meaning of your keystrokes and make the correct sounds for you to listen to? — Daemon

It appears that you've answered your own question.

Harry I don't have a problem defining consciousness and suchlike. Like many words they are defined ostensively.

Wikipedia:
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colours or sensations) — Daemon

There are terms that we currently have that can define these things. The problem is that you aren't even trying to think about it. What do you think the purpose of feelings and sensations are? Let's start there.

Harry I don't have a problem defining consciousness and suchlike. Like many words they are defined ostensively.

Wikipedia:
An ostensive definition conveys the meaning of a term by pointing out examples. This type of definition is often used where the term is difficult to define verbally, either because the words will not be understood (as with children and new speakers of a language) or because of the nature of the term (such as colours or sensations) — Daemon

But words are just colored scribbles and sounds. It seems like you'd have a problem defining the nature of words, too.

Then it would not be a simulation. The premise of a simulation is that, no matter the outcome of the simulation, there is no change in the real world.

Is the piano not perceiving certain inputs from the keyboard? Does it not perceive the meaning of your keystrokes and make the correct sounds for you to listen to? — Daemon

It appears that you've answered your own question. — Harry Hindu

The paper perceives the meaning of your penstrokes and makes the correct words for you to read?

And when you walk across the beach, the sand perceives the meaning of your footsteps and makes the correct footprints for you to look at?

And when you walk across the beach, the sand perceives the meaning of your footsteps and makes the correct footprints for you to look at? — Daemon

According to Fritjof Capra, the fundamental unit of cognition is a reaction to a disturbance in a state.

Was he saying that the sand on the beach (for example) was capable of cognition?

Was he saying that the sand on the beach (for example) was capable of cognition? — Daemon

That would be the fundamental unit of cognition - basic cause and effect. The sand acknowledges the pressure of the footprint and gives way accordingly. Its a long way from the complicated cognition we enjoy, but it is the start of it.

Then that explains nothing. The whole universe is cause and effect, but consciousness happens in individuated pockets. The "start of it" comes when the pockets are individuated, when there's a subject and an object, an inside and an outside, self and non-self. With the cell perhaps. But not with grains of sand washed by the waves or trodden by feet, not with a piano, and not with our PCs and smartphones. Those things are not appropriately individuated.

Then that explains nothing. The whole universe is cause and effect, but consciousness happens in individuated pockets. — Daemon

The entire universe is a process of self organization - cause and effect, not individuated pockets, and every moment of consciousness is a moment of self organization.

That would be the fundamental unit of cognition - basic cause and effect. The sand acknowledges the pressure of the footprint and gives way accordingly. Its a long way from the complicated cognition we enjoy, but it is the start of it. — Pop

Exactly! The relationship between cause and effect is information, and information is a fundamental unit of cognition.

Was he saying that the sand on the beach (for example) was capable of cognition? — Daemon

Isn't your footprint information that Daemon passed this way? Doesn't the sand have a memory of your passing - the persistent existence of your footprint in the sand? Once the footprint is washed away, the sand forgets you ever passed this way.

Exactly! The relationship between cause and effect is information, and information is a fundamental unit of cognition. — Harry Hindu

:up: Brilliant.

Isn't your footprint information that Daemon passed this way? Doesn't the sand have a memory of your passing - the persistent existence of your footprint in the sand? Once the footprint is washed away, the sand forgets you ever passed this way. — Harry Hindu

The problem is that this approach explains nothing. What are footprints in the sand? Information. What is consciousness? Information. What is memory? Information.

Memory is something that goes on in conscious minds. It's associated with conscious experience. There's a lot of very specific biological machinery involved, which has evolved over billions of years. It's an aspect of living beings. It's not an aspect of pianos, beach sand, or digital computers.

What makes the hardware in your head special in that it feels, but computer hardware can't? What does it mean to feel?

If there is no perceivable difference between "simulated" intelligence and "real" intelligence, then any difference you perceive would be a difference of your own making stemming from your human biases. — Harry Hindu

That's a shift of the burden of proof.

I feel pain.
I assume other humans also feel pain for various practical reasons, but also because if other humans were p-zombies they would have no reason to say that they experience pain.

Any claim beyond that, needs supporting arguments and data. In the case of animals, there are lots of good arguments for why at least some animals feel pain, but of course that's a big topic in itself.

But if someone wished to claim that computers, or non-living systems experience pain, the burden is on that person to provide an argument and data for this claim.

The problem is that this approach explains nothing. What are footprints in the sand? Information. What is consciousness? Information. What is memory? Information. — Daemon

Sure it does. It explains that everything is information. The problem is that you just don't like the idea because you haven't been able to supply a logical argument against it.

Memory is something that goes on in conscious minds. It's associated with conscious experience. There's a lot of very specific biological machinery involved, which has evolved over billions of years. It's an aspect of living beings. It's not an aspect of pianos, beach sand, or digital computers. — Daemon

This says nothing about what memory is, or how it is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery.

Do the footprints inform you of anything? What type of information can you acquire from footprints? What would a private detective use footprints for? Where are the footprints, in the sand or in the detective's brain? Where is the information that the footprints provide - in the detective's brain or in the causal relationship between the footprint (the effect) and the person who put them there (the cause). In other words, meaning and information exist prior to any observer interacting with it. The footprints inform you that someone walked this way recently, which direction they were walking, how big the person was, if they were running or walking, etc., all from an impression in the sand. Where does all of this information come from if not what caused the footprint?

That's a shift of the burden of proof.

I feel pain.
I assume other humans also feel pain for various practical reasons, but also because if other humans were p-zombies they would have no reason to say that they experience pain.

Any claim beyond that, needs supporting arguments and data. In the case of animals, there are lots of good arguments for why at least some animals feel pain, but of course that's a big topic in itself.

But if someone wished to claim that computers, or non-living systems experience pain, the burden is on that person to provide an argument and data for this claim. — Mijin

No. The burden is upon you to explain what pain is.

You can only claim that others feel pain because of their behavior. If a computer behaved like they were in pain, would you say that they feel pain? You seem to be asserting that pain is a behavior. If not, then some behavior is informative of some state of pain. What is pain? Information about the state of your body. If a computer possessed information about the state of it's body, and was programmed to engage in behaviors when that information appears in working memory, then how is that any different than what humans do?

a computer possessed information about the state of it's body, and was programmed to engage in behaviors when that information appears in working memory, then how is that any different than what humans do? — Harry Hindu

Depends on whether the computer lacked a subjective experience of pain.

This says nothing about what memory is, or how it is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery. — Harry Hindu

https://www.the-scientist.com/reading-frames/book-excerpt-from-the-idea-of-the-brain-67502

In the 1970s, British researcher John O’Keefe revealed that as well as encoding memories, the hippocampus contains a map of the animal’s environment. This cognitive map, consisting of what are called place cells, also contains information about how to get from one location to another, enabling the animal to navigate the world and to predict what it will find in different places. In species with different ecologies these hippocampal maps have different forms—for example, while the maps are 2-D in rats, they are 3-D in bats—but they are always cognitive, not simply spatial.

Despite the key role played by the hippocampus and adjacent structures in creating or accessing memories, what we remember is not found in a single place. Memories are often multimodal, involving place, time, smell, light and so on, and they are distributed across the cortex through intricate neural networks.

Modern research can study these networks in exquisite detail, by controlling the activity of single neurons through optogenetics—using light to activate neurons. In Nobel Prize winner Susumu Tonegawa’s lab at MIT, false memories have been created in the rodent hippocampus, leading an animal to freeze in a particular part of the cage as though it had previously been shocked there, although it had never had any such experience.

No. The burden is upon you to explain what pain is. — Harry Hindu

Haha, what?
I didn't claim to know what pain is, why would I have a burden of proof on me?

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve.

You can only claim that others feel pain because of their behavior. If a computer behaved like they were in pain, would you say that they feel pain? You seem to be asserting that pain is a behavior. — Harry Hindu

I don't know where to begin with this. No, saying that X is evidence for Y is vastly different from saying X = Y.
If I say I think a murder happened because there are blood stains on the floor, that doesn't mean I am asserting that blood stains *are* murder.

I said that I assume (don't know) that other humans experience pain, because they freely claim that they do. P-zombies could of course claim to be in pain, but this would require the universe to be trying to fool me for some reason -- the simpler explanation for sentient beings claiming to have subjective experiences is that they actually do.

That's evidence and an argument for the existence of pain in other humans, not a claim that that is what pain *is*.

With regards to computers, yes, if an AI were able to freely converse in natural language, and it repeatedly made the claim that it felt pain, despite such sentiments not being explicitly part of its programming, and it having nothing immediate to gain by lying...then sure, I'd give it the benefit of the doubt. I wouldn't know that it felt pain, but I'd start to lean towards it being true.

Depends on whether the computer lacked a subjective experience of pain. — Marchesk

What is a subjective experience, if not information in working memory about the environment relative to your body.

A subjective experience is when the world appears to be located relative to your sensory organs.

It's not all perceptual. A dream of a red apple isn't information about an apple in the external environment.

Haha, what?
I didn't claim to know what pain is, why would I have a burden of proof on me? — Mijin

Haha, then why are you using a word that you don't know what it means. You literally don't know what you are talking about.

That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

Then why do you use terms that you don't what they mean? That is ludicrous.

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system. — Mijin

What does it even mean for "an unpleasant subjective experience that follows activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system"? How do subjective states follow from physical states?

I said that I assume (don't know) that other humans experience pain, because they freely claim that they do. P-zombies could of course claim to be in pain, but this would require the universe to be trying to fool me for some reason -- the simpler explanation for sentient beings claiming to have subjective experiences is that they actually do.

That's evidence and an argument for the existence of pain in other humans, not a claim that that is what pain *is*. — Mijin

This makes no sense. You assume that other humans have it because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it. You assume IT exist in humans without even knowing what IT is. You're losing me.

It's not all perceptual. A dream of a red apple isn't information about an apple in the external environment. — Marchesk

This just causes more confusion about what a subjective experience is. Why do people keep using terms that they have no idea what it means? Is this not clear evidence that use and meaning are not one and the same? Can people use words that they don't know how to use?

This says nothing about how memory is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery. — Harry Hindu

Dreams could be simulated subjective experiences.

Was that a mistake Harry?