I understood perfectly what you said.
Feelings are internal. Though it is clear that others may have them, you do not have access to feeling of others. You only have access to evidence of the feelings of others; in their claims, in their behaviour and in your observations. Feelings are part of their internal world, not in your external world. — charleton

Their internal world is part of your external world. If they are not external to you, then that would mean that they are part of you.

Just because you don't have access to the feelings of others doesn't mean that it isn't external to you. There are atoms inside the table. We can't access them, but can deduce their existence from the behavior of matter. Are the atoms internal, or external to your perspective?

Ignorance.

By 'outer reality', I meant properties which are not inner feelings. You have asked not to called them 'subjective', and so I tried to call these properties of feelings something else. I think I will revert back to calling these 'subjective' though. After all, if these properties such as beauty are always feelings, and feelings are only within a subject and not within an object that cannot be a subject, then it makes sense to call them 'subjective'. — Samuel Lacrampe

No feelings are not part of outer reality - obviously!
You can talk about feelings - other people's inner reality, but you can't ask the painting if it is beautiful - that way lies madness.
And whilst we can agree that we "share" a love of the Mona Lisa, it is impossible that that love is equal, or that ANY "shared" feeling is felt in the same way.
Even if it was the case, that feelings were so dull and one dimensional in humans, we would only have an intersubjective agreement - the beauty of a painting is never a property of the painting. — charleton

Did neither of you understand what I said? From each of our perspectives, our feelings are external to the other. So, if your feelings are external to me, and mine to you, then how is it again that feelings are not part of the external world? Do you agree that you and I are part of the world, and to talk about each other and each other's feelings, would be to talk objectively about the world?

MU, why does it appear that we are inside individual bodies if we aren't?

As I explained, your questioning was nonsensical. You shifted from the assumption that the mind is part of the body, to the assumption that the mind is a process of the body. And I explained why it was nonsense to speak of the mind as a process. That's why I couldn't answer your question, it really didn't make any sense to me. — Metaphysician Undercover

You tried to explain but failed. It isn't nonsensical. You merely took one small meaningless difference in a part of my post, that wasn't part of the question, and focused on that, rather than answering the question.

"The body" doesn't include the process of digestion, that is something that the body is doing. It is this type of category mistake which makes discussion with you very difficult. See, in the act of digestion, something which is not part of the body becomes part of the body. Since this process necessarily includes something which is not part of the body, we cannot properly say "the body includes the process of digestion". You continue with your nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, something the body is doing isn't a process? Who's being nonsensical?

What's wrong with being inside a body? I don't see any problem with this. I would say that most likely we appear to be inside a body because we are. Does that answer your question? The problem that I have with what you have said, is that you have proceeded from the assumption "My mind is inside a body", to two distinct and equally invalid conclusions. 1, My mind is part of a body, and 2, my mind is the process of a body. — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said anything was wrong with being a body. Sheesh, MU. You are all over the place, jumping through impossible hoops in your mind - all in an attempt to not answer a simple question. Well, it's simple for me, but not for you because you assume that the mind isn't part of the body when that is how it forcefully appears. I'll tell you what, MU. I'll make a post with the question all by itself, so you can't get side-tracked with other stuff, that has nothing to do with the question, that I said. You can continue to respond to this post, but I'll just ignore it, as I'm only concerned with the answer to my question in the following post:

For the very simple reason that experience requires a subject, and ‘the subject’ can’t be an object of perception. — Wayfarer

So, then how is it that you can even talk about your mental processes and feelings if you aren't aware of yourself, or your own mind? How is it that you can talk about being aware of being aware, if the "subject" can't be an object of perception? How can you talk about your own perceptions?

When you look at fMRI data, you don’t see experience - you see a graphic representation of neural activities. But it’s not until those activities are integrated into a meaningful unity, that it becomes an experience; and the faculty that performs that integration isn’t seen in the fMRI data. That is not hyperbole - it’s an aspect of the neural binding problem. — Wayfarer

This doesn't answer my question at all.

When you look at fMRI data, or just look at someone's brain, WHY can't we see their experiences? Why is our mind cut off from other minds? WHY do we see brains/bodies instead of experiences? Is what we experience a model of their experiences? What I'm asking is, is there really a brain filled with neurons there, or is it experiences there and the brain only exists in our mind as a model of their experiences? There is no binding problem if brains don't really exist except in minds. The binding problem would be a problem of the model itself. That was my initial question: Do brains only exist in minds as models, or do minds exist in brains?

Brains don’t have delusions. Actually brains don’t have or do anything; they only operate meaningfully embodied in the body, in the nervous system, in the environment. — Wayfarer

What does "operate meaningfully embodied in the body" even mean, and what does that have to do with my question?

Let's talk like different (and differing) equals, rather than fighting like high-minded superhero warriors. Hopefully, it is not too late for that. — 0 thru 9

People may be equal, but their ideas aren't. Were we discussing people or ideas on this forum?

Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people.
-E. Rosevelt

But doesn't that impossibility result if you insist experience is something more than (a pattern of) neurons firing? — Benkei


This is exactly what is referred to as ‘the hard problem of consciousness’. — Wayfarer

Is the mind a model of the brain, or is the brain a model of the mind? When we look at another brain, why don't we see their experiences instead of neurons firing? Is the brain we see just the way our mind models their mind? Or is the mind a delusion of the brain?

It is you who is wiggling. Last post you said your body "includes my mind", implying that the mind is a part of the body. Now you say that the mind is a process of the body. Which are you claiming? If the former, I cannot agree, as I've already explained. If the latter, then I need an explanation from you as to how something which is referred to with a noun, "the mind", can be said to be a process, an activity. All I see is category error on your part, attempting to make something (the mind) which is understood as a thing engaged in the activity of reasoning, into a process, the activity itself.

Why don't you just come out and say what you are alluding to? You believe that the mind is the brain. I don't believe that at all, because contrary to what you are saying, it doesn't seem to me, to be that way at all. Nor does it seem like the mind is a process of the body, because the mind is the thing which is carrying out this process of reasoning, it does not seem to be the process itself. — Metaphysician Undercover

Congrats, MU. You win the award for the most pathetic attempt to avoid answering a direct question. What is it with you "philosophers" that like to question the basis of some scientific theory, but then don't question any "philosophical" theory that you hold and then have to perform these mental gymnastics in order to avoid answering the questions. It's quite pathetic to watch what I thought were intelligent people, behave as if they are delusional.

To get back at what you're saying, because I always answer questions and address all arguments made against my statements, unlike yourself, it isn't a contradiction to say that the body includes my mind and that that mind is a process. This is no different than saying that my body includes the process of digestion.

Science itself has shown that there aren't things, but only processes. Every "thing" is just an amalgam of smaller interacting "things", which is itself an amalgam of smaller interacting "things", all the way down. Things are just processes. Everything is a process.

Now, are you going to provide an answer that will show why we appear to be inside bodies? If you aren't going to answer it, MU, then don't waste your time posting a reply because I won't be continuing this conversation with you if you can't show me the same courtesy that I have shown you in answering your questions.

I agree with you that, in theory, we should not argue about properties of feelings, and should only argue about objective properties of outer reality. But this is still putting the cart before the horse, because some people might still argue about the beauty of the painting, claiming that beauty is in fact a property of outer reality. So far, we have found one solid criteria: touch. I will also add anything that is measurable by an instrument, because instruments cannot be biased with feelings. Thoughts? — Samuel Lacrampe

Are feelings not part of "outer" reality? Am I, and you, and charleton, all parts of reality? From each of our perspectives, the other two, and their feelings, exist in this "outer" reality. So to talk about each other's feelings is to talk objectively about the world. I don't really know how better to say what I've been saying all this time - that "subjective" language is either using shortcuts in speaking objectively, or misusing language by projecting properties of one object onto other objects that don't have those properties.

You premise that your mind is part of your body, so you're just begging the question. I can't answer that question because your premise is not something I'm willing to accept. And I do not agree with your use of "I feel it in my mind". Any time a bee has stung me (many times I might add), I have felt it in the part of my body where it stings me, not in my mind. Do you not recognize a distinction between the conclusion you make with your mind, "a bee is stinging me", and the observations which lead you to that conclusion? — Metaphysician Undercover

That is my perspective - of being inside the head of a body. If our minds are not processes of our bodies, then why does it seem that way? Why is it so brute? This isn't a rhetorical question. I expect an answer, MU. Please don't try to wiggle your way out of it.

I'm not denying that such theories can't be useful, but that they often occupy a position of exaggerated importance in the landscape. — Wayfarer

Ummm, yeah. So, some theory that explains the mind and how it came to be, which includes whatever theory you have on the subject as well, isn't important, and doesn't need to be useful to be important. Okay, Wayfarer.

Every animal is different from each other. If humans are special because they are different, then every animal is special because each species is different from another. — Harry Hindu

You make my point for me. — Wayfarer

Perfect. Then we finally agree on something. We finally agree that humans are just another species of animal and that differences doesn't make one special, because every species, and every individual within that species, is unique, and would make every one of them special, which would then just dilute the meaning of "special".

That's not an argument against anything I said. I can just say that you're way off on this because you read Wittgenstein. Meaning is not the use of words.

I'll address both of these together. Basically you're argument is that since we refer to reality and mind as two separate things, then it doesn't follow that they could be one thing, as if the words point to two different objects. Thus, since object X is separate from object Y, then my argument is incoherent or possibly inconsistent. This, to me is just a misunderstanding of how language is used. Use is key (Wittgensteinian use) here. It's true that sometimes words do refer to objects, but words don't exclusively point to objects. There are two many uses of the words mind and reality to give them such precise definitions. If you define these words as you have done, of course you're conclusion is going to be, " If 'mind' is the only thing to exist, then the 'mind' is simply reality and there is no such thing as 'mind'." It's like (Wittgensteinian e.g.) defining all games as board games, and thus someone who calls "playing catch" a game is incorrect because it doesn't fit the definition, or their definition.

This, it seems to me is a perfect example of how many of us create problems that don't exist. Part of the problem here is with the word reality, it's just to vague a term to try to fit it into some precise definition, that is, as something definitely separate from the mind. And since reality is objective, then it has to be separate from the mind. You're definition is keeping you locked into a particular view, as if the word has some definite sense (word = object).

I think both of you have fallen prey to this problem. — Sam26

Meaning is not use, and I have made that argument over and over again on these forums.

The thing is that there is a consensus on the use of the terms, "mind" and "reality". Look them up in the dictionary and you will see that they are mutually exclusive. Sure you can use any word you want to refer to whatever you want, but if you expect me to understand you, then you'd need to use the words how I understand them, not how you understand them.

Not only that, but saying that reality is actually a mind, just obliterates the definition of mind, and makes it the definition of reality. So to say that there still is a mind, is to confuse to the two. I don't see how a mind can exist all by itself and then you'd an all new explanation for the relationship between the contents of the "mind" reality, which includes the will and attention.

The issue of interaction is even more complicated than you might think. Plato proposes a tripartite person, such that interaction between the mind and body is carried out through a third thing, spirit, or passion. This third thing, which is a medium between body and mind, makes it even more difficult for science to get to the mind. Science cannot even get a grasp on the emotions, which are proper to that third thing, the medium, the spirit, because it has no access to the influence of the mind on the spirit. — Metaphysician Undercover

This third person makes it more difficult for science only because this third thing hasn't been clearly defined in order to be falsifiable. Not only that but it is more complicated in general. Proposing a third thing that isn't necessary makes things more complicated and goes against Occam's Razor.

That's not true. The scientific method is a very specific empirically based method. If two things are interacting, and only one of them can be observed empirically, then "scientific understanding" can only be extended to that thing which can be observed. One could make predictions about how the unobservable thing would influence the observable, and these predictions may or may not be reliable, but since this could produce no statements about what the unobservable thing is, it doesn't qualify as an explanation of that thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Now you seem to be confusing the term, "observable". How is it that I'm not observing the external influences on my body, which includes my mind? When I observe a bee stinging my arm, I feel it in my mind. Observing is done with eyes looking out on the world and a brain processing that information. Are you saying that you can observe your own mind and that is the only thing you can observe? Doesn't that lead to the infinite regress of the homonculus in the Cartesian theater? What is an "observation"? What does it entail?

The excerpt sounds like something a 17th century scientist might say about humans never learning how to achieve space travel, or understand the secrets of disease. It's based in ignorance — Harry Hindu
How dare a mere philosopher question the scientific consensus. — Wayfarer

That's funny, Wayfarer, because a few months ago, you said this about those that deny the scientific consensus of global warming:

The other political point I have noticed is a strong correlation between intelligent design and climate-change denial. The main ID website, Uncommon Descent, routinely ridicules any suggestion of human-induced climate change. To me, that shows up their basic inability to correctly interpret scientifically-established facts, or to confuse the same with matters of faith. — Wayfarer

If climate change deniers shows up their basic inability to correctly interpret scientifically-established facts, then how is it that you aren't doing the same thing when denying the useful theories of evolutionary psychology and sociobiology?

This also isn't much different than the religious notion that we are someone separate from, or above, nature. Haven't we learned that this isn't the case? — Harry Hindu


It never ceases to amaze me, the ease with which people seem to assume that 'we're just animals', when the difference between h. sapiens, and every other creature is so manifestly and entirely obvious. It's kind of a cultural blind spot, an inability to recognize the obvious. — Wayfarer

What an odd argument this is. As I was growing up, what I recognized is how similar we are to animals, with all animals sharing many features like having eyes, mouths, hearts, blood, and brains.

Every animal is different from each other. If humans are special because they are different, then every animal is special because each species is different from another.

This doesn't work, because we have experiences of things which aren't out there, and the things out there can't fully explain the things in here. — Marchesk

I'm trying to get at how the things which aren't out there interact with the things that are out there. Do you deny that your thoughts have an effect on things out there and vice versa? How is that possible? How is it possible that we can have a system of explanation for that stuff out here that doesn't apply to the things in here, if they both interact?

That different "stuff" can't interact is a nonsensical idea. It's only if you define those two sorts of stuff as incapable of interacting that the idea is supported. That the mental and physical can't interact is not supported by the concept of "causation" unless you limit causation to efficient cause. However, the concepts of will, intention, and final cause, demonstrate that such a restriction is unjustified. — Metaphysician Undercover

By making the argument that science can NEVER explain the mind, you are implying that they don't interact, for if science can explain the stuff out there, which interacts with the stuff in here, then why can't it explain the "in here", too?. When science does a good job of explaining all the other stuff, then why can't it explain the mind too? What makes it different? What is it that science will never get at? Is it that a "physical" explanation isn't good enough? What makes an explanation physical as opposed to something else?

So, it comes down to the "hard problem"? The excerpt sounds like something a 17th century scientist might say about humans never learning how to achieve space travel, or understand the secrets of disease. It's based in ignorance - an assumption that we will never be able to explain certain things. This also isn't much different than the religious notion that we are someone separate from, or above, nature. Haven't we learned that this isn't the case?

If the mind isn't "physical" (again I despise using these terms, "physical" and "mental" as it is what creates the problem Nagel is pointing at), or isn't made of the same stuff as "out there", then how is it that they both interact at all? Again, we should be talking about causation, not "physical" and "mental" substances.

If an idealist says, "Everything out there is made of the same stuff as in here." and the materialist says, "Everything in here is made of the same stuff as out there.", then they are both saying the same thing. "Physical" and "mental" is a product of dualism and is what creates a problem where there isn't one.

I've worked it all out. It seems that it is you that hasn't worked out his problems. I'm trying to show you, if you'd answer the question. Halloween is over, Apo. No need to be scared anymore. Answer the question. What is it that you fear - you being wrong? Believe me, it's not that bad.

I agree with much of this Harry, and I agree that people make claims about reality thinking their claims are objective when they're not. I think what's important is understanding that objectivity is contingent on many things, it's especially contingent/dependent on what we're experiencing within a given reality. What about the one who creates the VR, isn't that program objective for him/her? It has an existence, it's just a different kind of reality, a different metaphysical domain, so to speak. — Sam26

Well, does the VR simulate experiences as well? If so, the those experiences would be programmed, determined. The "people" inside the VR would have no control over their perceptions, or what they say about it.

Getting back to the title of the post, what if everything is simply a construct of consciousness, then everything we're experiencing could be within that consciousness or mind. There would be no reality outside that mind, every reality that's experienced could be a kind of holographic reality that we simply engage with from within a mind. There are some physicists who think that at the bottom of everything is simply consciousness, that reality is part of that consciousness. Consciousness may be the unifying theory of everything. In fact, the very particles themselves may be part of that consciousness. Of course much more needs to be done in terms of science, but it's very interesting. — Sam26

If this were the case, then calling it a mind would be incoherent. If there is no reality outside a "mind", then the "mind" would essentially become reality. We use different terms to refer to minds, and reality. To switch the meaning of the two is ridiculous and unnecessary. One simply needs to follow the implications of what they are saying. If "mind" is the only thing to exist, then the "mind" is simply reality and there is no such thing as "mind".

I think that is a reasonable answer. I agree with it. But maybe the example was a bit too easy. What about the colour of an object? Touch does not help us differentiate between different colours. — Samuel Lacrampe

Now, that is a good example to work with. Color exists only in minds. You could say that our visual experience is also a feeling. But colors are the result of reflected light interacting with the eye-brain system, and the light is reflected off the object. So color is a relationship between the object, light and our eye-brain system, as color carries information about all these things because they are all a cause of your experience of color.

So, when I say, "The apple is red." I'm really referring to this relationship, not just myself, not just the apple, but the whole relationship - which is objective. The same can be said about the painting, as you only get the feeling of beauty when looking at the painting, so beauty is a relationship between you and the painting.

I agree with everything you say, and that is because this sounds close to my relative-objective test, where I claim subjects cannot disagree on the ranking of degree of objective properties. Now I find it odd coming from you because I think this contradicts the following quote:

Agreement has nothing to do with it. People can agree on things that are just wrong. People agreed that the Earth was flat. Is the Earth flat, or does it only seem that way from our perspective? — Harry Hindu — Samuel Lacrampe

What I was attempting to do is to explain WHY subjects can or cannot disagree on the objective properties. We disagree about beauty ONLY if we mean that beauty is a property of the painting. If we are actually referring to our feelings, then we agree. So our disagreement comes from one, or both, of us misspeaking, or making a category error. You and I can still disagree on our theories of reality and our relationship with it, but we would both still be making objective statements about the world, so our disagreement isn't based on a category error, but simply a differing of explanations of the world and our place in it.

You are confusing the epistemic issue of direct vs indirect realism with the ontological commitments I might then argue concerning the mind~world issue. — apokrisis

I'm not confusing anything. I'm just trying to ask a question and to show you the consequences of your answer. If you don't want to answer because you fear the consequences, just say so.

To put this another way. Suppose you did not have the concept of a rabbit.

Duck-Rabbit_illusion.jpg

What would you see? — Cavacava

An animal.

Thanks, that's right, the post does not exist as a 'post' to them, and they tend ignore it, they don't see the meaning in it because they have not learn't the concepts that would enable them to understand it. — Cavacava

So then the post does exist prior to someone understanding it. To say that it doesn't exist is a bit incoherent. It exists, it just isn't understood.

Human infants are born with the ability to learn language. It is innate. Certainly it is in some sense a product of evolution, what I'm questioning is the extent to which language and abstract thought can be understood solely through the prism of evolutionary biology. Because to do so, invariably reduces the subject of the enquiry to 'how does that help the species survive?' That is the sense in which biological explanations are often reductive. While the neo-darwinian synthesis is a biological theory, it is often taken as a philosophical principle to support positions and conclusions which are outside the scope of biology per se. But it is, as I say, a separate question. — Wayfarer

Perfect. Then we agree that the form our ability to learn a language takes is innate - physical - a product of evolution. So then how do you go from saying it is a product of evolution to saying that those explanations don't explain some aspect of language that isn't biological. That seems like a pretty big assumption - that language isn't biological in every sense. If biology can't explain all of it, then what do you think will - and what is it that is missing? The way our minds work is also biological, and would therefore be acted on by natural selection. What do you think learning is, if not natural selection acting on our minds and shaping the way they interact with and understand the world in order to propagate genes more efficiently?

What do you mean by being “part of the world”? Are you making a claim about the properties of physical objects or neurological processes?

Our conception of the physical world says wavelength and not colour is part of that world. Our conception of neurological processes is that colour is somehow part of what brains do. But that is actually quite a mysterious thing when considered as a “property”. Most folk would call it a property of the mind and not the world. This then leads to entrenched dualistic issues.

So you seem intent on bypassing the complexities of the question. That isn’t very useful. — apokrisis

So the mind isn't part of the world? Then how do minds interact if not through the medium of the shared world? What is it that divides minds to call them separate? It seems that once you start down the path of claiming the mind isn't part of the world, you start down the path towards solipsism.

Once I know that I'm in a VR, then it would only be useful to refer to the things inside the VR when speaking to others inside the VR that AREN'T aware they are in a VR. In other words, I'd have to speak on their level of understanding, which would be different than mine. Ignorance doesn't make one's objective language actually true. We can make objective statements about reality all the time that simply aren't true. Just look at the rest of this forum. Every post is filled with objective claims about reality - most of which, if not all, aren't true.

So, when looking at a tree, are you aware of the tree or your mental representation of it. — Harry Hindu


I'm aware of the tree.

It's like asking, "Are you aware of the word, or what the word refers to?" They are both separate things that are linked together by representation. Because it is a representation, you could say that by being aware of one as a representation, then you are aware of what it represents. — Harry Hindu


But then what does a dream tree represent? — Marchesk

Maybe it represents nothing, just as some words can be generated in the mind that don't refer to anything. Or maybe we could say that it represents the neural firings of the sleeping brain. We could also say that you being aware of the real tree is also being aware of your own neural processes, as the appearance of the tree in the mind provides information about all processes along the causal link, from the tree, to the light, to the eyes and the brain's visual system. Your experience of the tree informs you of the state of all those things, as it is the effect of that entire causal chain. Seeing a tree informs you of the state of the tree, the wavelength of the light, the state of your eyes and visual system, not just the tree. That's why eye doctor's ask you to describe your visual experience to them, because it can inform them of the state of your eyes (you have cataracts, etc.)

My answer would be that you can't reach out and touch beauty on the painting. It's not a thing out there. It's a thing in here. You can reach out and touch the rectangular shape of the painting.

The visual of a rectangle refers to the shape of the painting. The feeling of beauty refers to the self, not the painting. This is why we can agree on the rectangular shape of the painting but not on it's beauty. We can only agree that you find the painting beautiful and I don't.

In talking about the beauty of the painting, we are really talking about each of our selves, not the painting, which is why we disagree on the beauty of the painting. In disagreeing, we are referring to each of our different states, one which has beauty and one which doesn't, not the painting.

We agree that the painting is rectangular because that is a property of the painting. We aren't referring to our selves, but rather the painting.

I'm not sure if that is clear or not.

This doesn't answer my question. You also keep avoiding questions.

This is what you said:

I stated that without the concept or idea of what a tree is, there is/may be no tree. — Cavacava

So, without the concept of what a post is, then there is no post. In other words, when a two year-old, or someone that hasn't learned what an internet post is, looks at this screen and doesn't have the slightest idea of what they are looking at, then your post doesn't exist. Without the idea of what a post is, then there is/may be no post.

Now, does your post exist prior to it being conceived by another? Yes, or no? If no, then you are being consistent, however you are saying your posts don't exist prior to someone understanding that they are an internet post. If yes, then you've disqualified your previous statement and you need to re-word it.

Here's the question you avoided:
If concepts were given to humans then that means they must have existed prior to humans. So, who, or what, gave them to us, and in so doing, is that just another concept, or are you saying something truthful and real, without your conceptual structures getting in the way? According to you, concepts can't be given to humans unless they have learned what a concept is.

Cavacava, when I read your post, is your post just another one of my concepts, and your post doesn't really exist except as my concept? In other words, your post, and your idea that generated it, doesn't exist until I read it and add it to my conceptual structure, right? Does that make sense to you?

Ok, but isn't that just another concept, and not a real state-of-affairs. When you write a post, is your post just another of your concepts, or is it about a real state-of-affairs that exists independent of your mind and it's concepts?

There were many more before that.

Let me help you:
What governs how we form concepts?

How did you come to agree on anything if we all have different concepts and different means of constructing our world? What is it that you are agreeing on - some concept or some real state of reality? Do animals really organize their experiences differently from us, or is that just another concept?

If concepts were given to humans then that means they must have existed prior to humans. So, who, or what, gave them to us, and in so doing, is that just another concept, or are you saying something truthful and real, without your conceptual structures getting in the way?

Answering my question with another question isn't helpful. Maybe you should make an attempt at answering my questions that were posed prior to yours.

If concepts were given to humans then that means they must have existed prior to humans. So, who, or what, gave them to us, and in so doing, is that just another concept, or are you saying something truthful and real, without your conceptual structures getting in the way?

I don't see your point. Maybe you should try being a little more detailed in your explanation.

Animals organize their experiences differently from us, we seem to agree on that. — Cavacava

Also, how did you come to agree on anything if we all have different concepts and different means of constructing our world? What is it that you are agreeing on - some concept or some real state of reality? Do animals really organize their experiences differently from us, or is that just another concept?

Animals organize their experiences differently from us, we seem to agree on that. — Cavacava

Then why does my dog swim when in water? I swim when I'm in water, too. It seems to me that not only did we organize our experiences the same way (we're in water), but we even respond in the stimuli the same way.