I think you might be confused by the use of "subject" in this instance.

How so?

By 'outer reality', I meant properties which are not inner feelings. You have asked not to called them 'subjective', and so I tried to call these properties of feelings something else. I think I will revert back to calling these 'subjective' though. After all, if these properties such as beauty are always feelings, and feelings are only within a subject and not within an object that cannot be a subject, then it makes sense to call them 'subjective'.

No feelings are not part of outer reality - obviously!
You can talk about feelings - other people's inner reality, but you can't ask the painting if it is beautiful - that way lies madness.
And whilst we can agree that we "share" a love of the Mona Lisa, it is impossible that that love is equal, or that ANY "shared" feeling is felt in the same way.
Even if it was the case, that feelings were so dull and one dimensional in humans, we would only have an intersubjective agreement - the beauty of a painting is never a property of the painting.

By 'outer reality', I meant properties which are not inner feelings. You have asked not to called them 'subjective', and so I tried to call these properties of feelings something else. I think I will revert back to calling these 'subjective' though. After all, if these properties such as beauty are always feelings, and feelings are only within a subject and not within an object that cannot be a subject, then it makes sense to call them 'subjective'. — Samuel Lacrampe

No feelings are not part of outer reality - obviously!
You can talk about feelings - other people's inner reality, but you can't ask the painting if it is beautiful - that way lies madness.
And whilst we can agree that we "share" a love of the Mona Lisa, it is impossible that that love is equal, or that ANY "shared" feeling is felt in the same way.
Even if it was the case, that feelings were so dull and one dimensional in humans, we would only have an intersubjective agreement - the beauty of a painting is never a property of the painting. — charleton

Did neither of you understand what I said? From each of our perspectives, our feelings are external to the other. So, if your feelings are external to me, and mine to you, then how is it again that feelings are not part of the external world? Do you agree that you and I are part of the world, and to talk about each other and each other's feelings, would be to talk objectively about the world?

Did neither of you understand what I said? From each of our perspectives, our feelings are external to the other. So, if your feelings are external to me, and mine to you, then how is it again that feelings are not part of the external world? Do you agree that you and I are part of the world, and to talk about each other and each other's feelings, would be to talk objectively about the world? — Harry Hindu

I understood perfectly what you said.
Feelings are internal. Though it is clear that others may have them, you do not have access to feeling of others. You only have access to evidence of the feelings of others; in their claims, in their behaviour and in your observations. Feelings are part of their internal world, not in your external world, they are hidden behind a veil of material.

It's not only that you can be fooled by another, but that no matter how hard you try to understand another's feelings, you cannot feel their feeling, only your own.

I understood perfectly what you said.
Feelings are internal. Though it is clear that others may have them, you do not have access to feeling of others. You only have access to evidence of the feelings of others; in their claims, in their behaviour and in your observations. Feelings are part of their internal world, not in your external world. — charleton

Their internal world is part of your external world. If they are not external to you, then that would mean that they are part of you.

Just because you don't have access to the feelings of others doesn't mean that it isn't external to you. There are atoms inside the table. We can't access them, but can deduce their existence from the behavior of matter. Are the atoms internal, or external to your perspective?

It's like you can't read.

Do you have a point here? If so, why not make it?

That isn't an argument against anything I said. It seems that you can't answer simple questions.

If something is internal, how does that mean that it isn't part of the external world? How is it that someone's feelings can have an effect on you, if their feelings and yours aren't part of the same world?

So - let's imagine that other people's thoughts and feelings are part of your external world. let me take your point.
So what? What's the point of thinking that way? How does it advance any argument?
Do tell!
Is everything objective? What's the point of having the words objective and subjective if they don't mean anything?

Exactly!

I agree with you, that there is merit in calling the world of feelings the 'inner reality', because while it is part of objective reality, feelings are always in a subject, and never in an object that is not a subject like a painting.

Harry.
We are on the same page that even feelings are part of objective reality about the subject. Where we disagree however, is that the term 'subjective' becomes obsolete as a result. This is not true. Consider once again the following statements:

A: "This painting is rectangular."
B: "This painting is beautiful."

First, there is clearly a difference between these two types of statements. A is literally true, while B is not, as you also pointed out earlier. This alone is enough to use the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' to differentiate between the two types of statements. But there is more.

In statement A, the property 'rectangular' is directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'rectangular' is clearly an objective property of the painting. In statement B, the property 'beautiful' is not directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'beauty' is not an objective property of the painting. But is it an objective property of the subject? I claim that it is not. If it was, then it would mean that the subject is objectively beautiful. But the subject is not beautiful; the subject only experiences the feeling of beauty when observing the object. Feeling x is not the same thing as being x. The painting is really rectangular. Neither the painting nor the subject is beautiful. Therefore the property 'beauty' is subjective.

I agree with you, that there is merit in calling the world of feelings the 'inner reality', because while it is part of objective reality, feelings are always in a subject, and never in an object that is not a subject like a painting. — Samuel Lacrampe

Really? I thought feelings are always part of a body, not a subject. I think that is the reason why you can't escape using the word, "subjective".

We are on the same page that even feelings are part of objective reality about the subject. Where we disagree however, is that the term 'subjective' becomes obsolete as a result. This is not true. Consider once again the following statements:

A: "This painting is rectangular."
B: "This painting is beautiful."

First, there is clearly a difference between these two types of statements. A is literally true, while B is not, as you also pointed out earlier. This alone is enough to use the terms 'objective' and 'subjective' to differentiate between the two types of statements. But there is more. — Samuel Lacrampe

What is so difficult about this? By saying that the sentence isn't literally true, is saying that you mean something else when you say it - something objective, not subjective!

In statement A, the property 'rectangular' is directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'rectangular' is clearly an objective property of the painting. In statement B, the property 'beautiful' is not directly linked to the object 'the painting'. Therefore 'beauty' is not an objective property of the painting. But is it an objective property of the subject? I claim that it is not. If it was, then it would mean that the subject is objectively beautiful. But the subject is not beautiful; the subject only experiences the feeling of beauty when observing the object. Feeling x is not the same thing as being x. The painting is really rectangular. Neither the painting nor the subject is beautiful. Therefore the property 'beauty' is subjective. — Samuel Lacrampe

Give me a break! Did we not agree that beauty is a feeling?! Doesn't that mean that the person has the feeling of beauty?! Again, when you utter the sentence, "The painting is beautiful." you are talking about your feelings toward the painting. If you mean that "I am beautiful." then you'd be committing the same mistake as saying the painting is beautiful. You'd wouldn't mean it literally! So no, you aren't being a feeling. You are a person that currently has the feeling of beauty - a property of a person.

Really? I thought feelings are always part of a body, not a subject. — Harry Hindu

I'm pretty sure feelings are never part of a body that is not a subject. Paintings don't have feelings, and neither do corpses (former subjects). On the other hand, properties like 'heaviness' can be part of paintings, subjects, or corpses.

What is so difficult about this? By saying that the sentence isn't literally true, is saying that you mean something else when you say it - something objective, not subjective! — Harry Hindu

Then what makes statement A literally true, and statement B not literally true, if not the type of property described?

Give me a break! Did we not agree that beauty is a feeling?! Doesn't that mean that the person has the feeling of beauty?! Again, when you utter the sentence, "The painting is beautiful." you are talking about your feelings toward the painting. If you mean that "I am beautiful." then you'd be committing the same mistake as saying the painting is beautiful. You'd wouldn't mean it literally! So no, you aren't being a feeling. You are a person that currently has the feeling of beauty - a property of a person. — Harry Hindu

Again, feeling or sensing x is not the same as being x or having x. E.g. "I sense the painting is rectangular" is not the same as saying that I, the subject, is rectangular, or have rectangular-ness. Similarly, feeling or sensing beauty is not the same as being beautiful or having beauty. If nothing has beauty in itself, then beauty is not a property of any object, and is therefore not objective. Conversely, some objects are rectangular, and therefore 'rectangular' is objective.

Another way to look at it: objective properties are in the object, independent of subjects or other objects. If the painting is rectangular, it remains rectangular even when no subjects are present. Conversely, subjective properties, while in the subject, are dependant on objects. If I feel beauty about the painting, then the feeling of beauty is dependant on the painting being observed. I may not feel beauty in another painting, even though I, the subject, am the same in both cases.

I'm pretty sure feelings are never part of a body that is not a subject. Paintings don't have feelings, and neither do corpses (former subjects). On the other hand, properties like 'heaviness' can be part of paintings, subjects, or corpses. — Samuel Lacrampe

Corpses aren't alive and therefore all the bodily processes have ceased, which includes the nervous system and how it feels. You're still getting hung up on there being a "subject". There is simply a body that is alive, or not - a body that feels a particular way, or not.

Then what makes statement A literally true, and statement B not literally true, if not the type of property described? — Samuel Lacrampe

Because you are attributing a property to something that just doesn't have it. Paintings don't have feelings. Organisms that are alive do. It isn't literally true that the painting has the feeling of beauty. You do. So what you really mean is, "I have the feeling of beauty when looking at this painting." when you say, "the painting is beautiful." Didn't we already go over this?

Again, feeling or sensing x is not the same as being x or having x. — Samuel Lacrampe

This isn'y my position, so you are attacking a straw-man. "Being" and "having" are not the same verbs with the same meaning. Having something is part of your being - like having feelings. That doesn't mean that you are being your feelings. You are being a body having a particular feeling at this moment.

Another way to look at it: objective properties are in the object, independent of subjects or other objects. If the painting is rectangular, it remains rectangular even when no subjects are present. Conversely, subjective properties, while in the subject, are dependant on objects. If I feel beauty about the painting, then the feeling of beauty is dependant on the painting being observed. I may not feel beauty in another painting, even though I, the subject, am the same in both cases. — Samuel Lacrampe

I just don't get why you can't get away from using those terms. I don't know what a subject is, if not an object that has particular qualities, like feelings. When I talk about your feelings, I'm talking about your body having a particular feeling at this moment.

Exactly , what?

That's it. It's syllogism time. If you disagree, can you point to the precise statement you disagree on?

P1: A property is called 'objective' if it is attributed to an object, independent of subjects observing the object. E.g. If a painting is rectangular, then it is so even when it is not observed.
P2: Beauty is also a property attributed to an object, because if I feel the painting to be beautiful, then the feeling is about the painting, not about me. But it is not independent of the subject observing the object, because if I feel the painting to be beautiful, it is I who feels this, and others might have different feelings.
C1: Beauty is not an objective property, as defined in P1.

P3: If a property is not objective, then it is called 'subjective', because they are opposite terms.
C2: Beauty is a subjective property.