The CAT tool suggests translations based on what I have already translated. — Daemon

"The store has bananas" might be translated by the CAT tool from another language; perhaps it's translating to French, and it would map "banana" to "banane". That's a mapping of symbols to symbols.

But the referents for bananas aren't in English or French dictionaries... they are in store shelves, inside pies, and so on. What TMF is talking about is a mapping from "banana" to the stuff on the store shelf, the stuff infused within banana bread, the stuff in banana cream pies.

I think TMF is just having problems expressing this... on a forum, we generally use words. But the referents here are not words.

Not really. I am using the example to illustrate what is a fact. — Olivier5

But it sounds a bit confusing:

My point here is that the only undeniable facts are the grainy footages and their metadata (how and when they were collected). — Olivier5

(A) Is it a fact that the US air forces have released these vids? Yes.
(B) Is the footage genuine? Most probably yes.
(C) So the vids are facts. — Olivier5

By including line (B), it sounds like you're suggesting the footage being genuine is a fact. By your prior statement it sounds like you're binding undeniability to factuality. By your prior statement and your current one (the one I'm replying to) it sounds like you're including the video's genuineness in what you're calling undeniability. I disagree that the video's being genuine qualifies as undeniable.

...and yet, you also sound like you're paying heed to this... in line (B), you call the video's footage "most probably" genuine. The whole question here is where you draw the line.

So to follow up... do you consider the notion that the videos are genuine a fact? If so, it sounds like you do not really consider undeniability to be a trait of facts ("Most probably" not "undeniable"?)

Roughly, here's what I'm getting at. We might could have a "pragmatic fudge"; certain and undeniability really mean "for all practical purposes". But suppose we put a number to it; let's say using some Bayesian analysis, anything more likely than p is certain; less likely than p is uncertain. Then I'm not sure there is such a number beyond which are only facts, and before which are only theories.

For example, I'd happily accept that the videos were faked way before I accept that someone built a perpetual motion machine.

My point here is that the only undeniable facts are the grainy footages and their metadata (how and when they were collected). The rest is interpretation and therefore, highly technical. — Olivier5

It sounds like you're saying that, for example, GOFAST is very likely some form of fowl. But it is possibly an alien craft. But whatever it is, it is definitely a genuine video with authentic metadata. Is that correct?

In other words, is the contrary position you're ruling out something akin to this?: "Most likely, GOFAST is some form of fowl. Not quite as likely, it is not an authentic video and has faked metadata. Even less likely, it's an alien craft."

So you think object permanence is a theory. — Olivier5

Correct.

No, I'm saying that once you've drawn it doesn't matter if you were more likely to draw what you did or less likely. — Srap Tasmaner

Once I've drawn 100 marbles it wouldn't matter if I were more likely to draw what I did or less likely.

I meant that your accumulated net winnings would gradually increase. — Srap Tasmaner

No, my accumulated net winnings would probably increase. There's a probability that it would. The contradiction here is that you're appealing to probability in the multiple case yet ignoring it in the single case. Either probability matters, in which case it matters on a single draw; or it doesn't, in which case it doesn't matter on multiple draws. The only thing multiple draws gives you is another probability.

What distinction did you describe, exactly? — Olivier5

Well let me phrase it another way. You observe some particular and derive some truth about the particular, where "truth" is simply something to your own satisfaction. That's a fact. You collect a bunch of facts and find some generalized explanation for it... that's a theory. Incidentally this isn't just a mathematical or logical net; a mathematical relationship between several facts isn't considered an explanation; that is just a law, not a theory.

Short version please. — Olivier5

As requested, kept it very short.

Neither. It's an absolute presupposition for astronomy. — Olivier5

I'm unconvinced that being a presupposition implies "neither". We learn object permanence at an incredibly young age. It has the hallmarks of a theory; we observe objects going out of view, and coming into view, but there's some consistency of the observations that appears to arise out of the data... objects going out of view still seem to "be out there", potentially to come back into view again. We infer then that objects stay there even if we don't see them. This would make it a theory.

The reason science shows little interest in it is because it's primitive and ubiquitous; approximately all humans learn it at an incredibly young age. The tools of science simply aren't necessary to use to get to the theory.

It's a simple point. — Srap Tasmaner

It's contradictory.

It doesn't matter that you made the smart bet, that the odds were in your favor, you owe me $5. — Srap Tasmaner

So what you're saying is because I might draw a blue marble, it does not matter what the probability is that I draw a red one.

If we made the same bet a great number of times, the odds would tell, and you would make money on the exercise. — Srap Tasmaner

But that doesn't change anything. If we play 100 times (with replacement), I might pick 51, or 52, or 53, all the way up to 100 blue marbles. In all of those cases I would owe you money. If what might happen means probability doesn't matter, it wouldn't matter here either. There is no number of times we can play where it's not true that you "might" win.

That's easy, and already explained: data, empirical evidence, are facts. Theories are not. — Olivier5

You replied, but you did not answer the question.

If facts are theory, explain to me why we need facts (data, observations)? — Olivier5

If you're talking about the use of the terms in science, there's a distinction, but it's what I described, not what you described.

In my mind it's an absolute presupposition. I.e. it's part of metaphysics. — Olivier5

Again, you replied, but you did not answer the question. Is it a fact that planets exist when you aren't looking at them, or a theory that planets exist when you aren't looking at them?:

What a planet is doing when you're looking at it, let's say, is an "accurate observation". But when you look away, to posit that the planet is still there would be an induction: "induced theories tying the observations in a logical or mathematical net" (incidentally, this sounds more like a scientific law than a scientific theory). "Now, logicians tell us that induction never provides certainty," ...well, we can't be certain the planet is still there when you aren't looking at it. "Therefore our induced theories are provisional." ...so if we can't be certain objects aren't there when we aren't looking at them, it must be a theory. "But the observations that were done, remain done, factum," ...but that's a contradiction. You're using certainty as a criteria, and we can't be certain an object is there when we are looking at it either. "Any new theory would have to contend with past observations." ...we never observe the past. "So observations (and only they) are facts." ...but observations aren't certain.

Certainty eliminates the distinction from fact and theory that you suggest are distinct. So it's not really certainty you're after.

How we decide what to bet on -- interesting though it may be, and important as it may be if you want to make a living doing this sort of thing -- doesn't matter in the least as far as the bets themselves are concerned. — Srap Tasmaner

Be more specific. The bet(1) is an offer; the bet(2) is a contract; betting is the act of negotiating a bet(2). Again in the bridge analogy, the bet(1) is a bid; the bet(2) is the result of bidding, and betting is bidding. "How we decide what to bet on" is equivalent to "how we bet(1) to arrive at a bet(2)" which is just betting. If we're betting on something we do not get to interfere with, then once we have a bet(2), we don't have any input. It sounds like that's what you're saying. Yes, that's true. However, we don't get to a bet(2) without betting, and when we are betting, we have inputs. We've been over this; you control your bet(1) as you negotiate the bet(2). Again with the bridge analogy, there's an entire skillset associated with betting; not only that, but there's a series of complex "signals" you give through bets (bidding systems) to communicate information critical to arriving at a bet(2).

You can pick your horses using an ingenious system that needs a Cray to run it or you can close your eyes and jab the racing form with a pen — Srap Tasmaner

I have no idea what you're trying to convince me of, but you're very unconvincing. Relating this to bridge, I translate what you're saying as that it does not matter how you arrive at your bet(1)'s to select the bet(2) as far as the bet(2) is concerned. And that is quite plainly false. It does indeed matter. If you bet(1) by jabbing your pen onto a board of possible bets, your partner will be furious and your opposition will wipe the floor with you.

Being better at predicting is generally nice if you do it a lot, but you still don't get paid for making better predictions overall or for doing a better job of analysis than someone else; you get paid if and only if the horses finish as you said they would. — Srap Tasmaner

This makes no sense. Probability does matter, even for a single event; that's why it's useful in the first place. Even so, all you are doing if you bet "a lot" is changing the probability that you win (e.g., if there's a 60% chance you win a single symmetric $5 bet, there's a 81/125 chance you'll come out ahead in 3 such bets).

You have promised Joe that if the Celtics win you'll give him the dishwashing job. — Srap Tasmaner

The dishwashing job is an agreement between myself and Joe for Joe to do something for me in exchange for the consideration of $20, which is a contract. The contract is agreed to based on a condition.

since he had no claim on you. — Srap Tasmaner

IANAL, but you do realize that verbal contracts in the US where we both live can be legally binding, right?

Most contracts can be either written or oral and still be legally enforceable, — FindLaw

What Contracts are Required to Be in Writing? (FindLaw)

Their interpretation relied on theory. — Olivier5

Yes, and scientifically speaking, they are facts.

but there is still such a thing as the brute picture taken of a distant galaxy, its spectrum analysis and the likes. Brute facts, the data, this data and not another. — Olivier5

Back to drawing lines? Do the planets exist when you aren't looking at them, or is that just theory? Where does object permanence lie?

This just gets back to the lines you're drawing. Where do you draw the lines and what is your good reason to draw the lines there? We've explored, btw, my response.

I've brought it up before on the thread: — Olivier5

Ah, in that case, as I understand it, a scientific theory will explain why a set of facts is the case. To contrast, and also to use in a moment, there are scientific laws... those do not explain a set of facts, but rather suggest there's a relationship between the facts. So for example Tycho Brahe's observations of the motion of the planets led to the development of Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion. Newton's Law of Gravity simplifies this law. General Relativity is a theory that explains and refines Newton's law.

So we have a theory of matter that describes matter as being made up of molecules, and molecules of atoms, and atoms of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Using this theoretical framework we build up theories of radiation that explain how spectra are produced that includes emission and absorption lines. Using all of these theoretical constructs and more, we can make observations of stars to measure the speed they are moving away from us (Doppler effects); similarly, we can use techniques such as standard candles to measure the distance that objects are away from us. This gives us a bunch of facts. Using these facts we observe that overall, the speed at which objects move away from us is proportional to the distance the objects are from us, and from those facts we infer Hubble's Law. Applying this and other laws of physics leads us to the Big Bang theory.

Note that the second paragraph flips your script on its head:

Therefore our induced theories are provisional. But the observations that were done, remain done, factum, unless they were poorly done of course. — Olivier5

...because the stellar/galactic facts that lead to Hubble's Law themselves rely on theory.

And since theories can (at least in theory!) be true, equating facts with truth erases that distinction. — Olivier5

I'm not sure which concept of theory you're after, but it sounds like you just came up with a distinction on your own. A fact must be true. A theory may or may not be true. (I must explicitly point out that this is not the concept of a scientific theory, given this is a common misconception).

Why don't you try and do a better job than me? This is indeed an important distinction, which I am trying to uphold. — Olivier5

I don't think it's a matter of where you draw the line in the first place. You establish that something is the case to your own satisfaction, and that becomes a fact from which you can infer something else. Maybe you're wrong sometimes, but that's okay; this is a game you play with a pencil and an eraser, not a pen.

And then the hypothesis that this blown fuse was the reason your car was not starting occured to you and you changed the fuse and then the car started, proving that the blown fuse was at least in part responsible for the condition. — Olivier5

You're clearly not talking about this:

It is a fact that there was a blown fuse. — InPitzotl

So the facts of the matter are that you found a blown fuse and that the car started when you replaced it. The rest, ie the idea the your car didn't start yesterday because of that blown fuse, are theories, not facts. — Olivier5

Your distinction sounds completely arbitrary. If you're trying to clarify the difference between the totally disparate "fact" and "theory" concepts, you're doing a bad job illustrating the difference.

Is it really a fact of the matter that I found a blown fuse? Or is the fact of the matter that I came under the impression that I appeared to have found a blown fuse, and the notion that I did in fact appear to have found a blown fuse a theory, as is the notion that I found a blown fuse a theory? Are there any facts at all, or is everything a theory? If we're just drawing a line somewhere about what we get to presume, there had better be a good reason to draw the line here versus there. Where do you draw the line, and what is the good reason to draw it there?

Yes, it's an observable and verifiable fact, empirical, the kind I like. — Olivier5

Yes, if I open the fuse box, I might see the blown fuse. But it does not seem to matter whether I'm doing so to verify there's a blown fuse or figure out if there's a blown fuse. It might be quicker if I check the fuse box first, but both are observing and verifying, quite frankly, the same exact fact.

No, I really did mean to say we're not competing, because I don't think betting is competing.
When you're competing in a contest — Srap Tasmaner

"Competing in a contest" and "competing" denote distinct things.

This is hard to see clearly, I think, but if this were a contest, I could make an effort to make it more likely that if the Lakers win, you'll owe me, or to make it less likely that if the Celtics win, I'll owe you. — Srap Tasmaner

But it's wrong (in the sense that it does not follow). We cannot interfere in the Lakers game, but that does not entail we're not in a contest. We're not playing basketball; we're playing a prediction game. You chose the basketball game we bet on. You chose to bet on the Lakers winning. You chose the $5 wager. I chose to accept the wager. These are the variables that went into the bet.

Once again, the bridge analogy is great here... it's pretty clear when you're bidding how you're playing a game in and of itself, and the distinction between and relationships to that game and the game you play with the hands, and the bidding is half the fun of the game.

what's being referred to is the fact that the problem is a fact that I do not know. — InPitzotl

What work is the word "fact" doing in this sentence, that would be missing if it wasn't there? — Olivier5

Presuming you mean that one, I do the investigation myself. Turns out it's a curious one... there is a blown fuse. It is a fact that there was a blown fuse.

What doesn't seem helpful to me is to shoehorn the word 'fact' in places where another word would work better. — Olivier5

That's weak. None of your alternatives is better in this scenario than "fact of the matter". "Reason why [my] car won't start" is definitely not what is being meant here; sure, there is a reason it doesn't start, but what's being referred to is the fact that that reason is a fact I don't know. "Cause" is the wrong idea... my car doesn't aka does not start. "Problem" is not what's being expressed... there certainly is a "problem", but the same idea applies for "reason"... what's being referred to is the fact that the problem is a fact that I do not know. Think of the term "counterfactual definiteness" as an alias for "fact of the matter" in this scenario... contrast this to something like Bell's Theorem. What's being conveyed is that there's a very specific thing that's wrong with my car... it's a thing that's true about the car's state at the time that I do not know it; it doesn't merely "become true" once we start looking for it. If I were to explain it I would convey this using a fact; a true statement that describes that state. I'm trying to find out what true statement describes that state that conveys why the car does not start. Hypothetically, someone else could know it; hypothetically, and possibly realistically, I could know it the future but it would still be true right now.

Avoiding using the precise word you mean just because you can use another word that is not what you mean is not using a better word; it is exactly the opposite of using the better word.

That's what I would say to the mechanic, not "there ought to be some fact of the matter about it not starting". — Olivier5

I'm not talking to the mechanic; I'm talking with you. You dragged the mechanic in. See above for the idea being conveyed.

Might I suggest it would be better to explain what problem you're talking about here:

But to say it was a fact during the cambrian, when nobody knew what carbon was, rings improper to my ear. — Olivier5

...than to convince me that I meant something I did not in fact mean?

So we compete by assigning differing truth values to a statement — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, that's the general idea. But again, it's a game that you win or lose.

The Lakers and the Celtics will compete. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. They are playing a scheduled basketball game.

You and I are not competing. — Srap Tasmaner

I think what you mean to say is that we're not playing basketball. But we are indeed competing. There's a winner of the bet and a loser of the bet. If I win, you lose; if you win, I lose. That's a competition.

We have simply agreed to take certain actions -- one paying the other what is owed -- based on the outcome of an event. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't think this cuts to the idea of what a bet is. Suppose Joe needs $10 and offers to wash my dishes to earn it. I tell Joe, "sorry, I only have $5, and I just bet on the Celtics game with Srap. Tell you what, though. If the Celtics win, I'll let you wash my dishes for $10." Despite what Joe and I have being conditioned on the same actions and events our bet is conditioned on, Joe and I do not have a bet... it's simply a conditional contract.

How do we play? If I say, "I'll bet you five bucks the Lakers win," are we playing now? — Srap Tasmaner

Actually, yes, we are. But in our discussion we just brought up two senses of the word bet... bet(1) and bet(2), and the game you're talking about here is neither a bet(1) nor a bet(2). Back to the bridge analogy, the entire bidding process is part of the game. When South says two no-trump, that's a bet(1). There's no bet(2) until bidding is complete. But the bidding process in itself is "betting", and that's a game. When you and I are deciding which team to bet on and what to wager, we are "betting" and that's a game in the same sense.

Actually, our beliefs don't even enter into it. — Srap Tasmaner

Correct.

But it's not betting, it's predicting. Betting "proper" is making a prediction with stakes. — Srap Tasmaner

So close! A prediction is not the same thing as a bet. A prediction is either true or false, but a bet is either won or lost. When you bet on a prediction, you're adding something personal. Suddenly it's not just a matter of some X being true or false; it's about you, winning if X is true; and you, losing if X is false. Even if it's just a token win, that's a stake, and it's precisely that that makes a bet and a prediction distinct.

But to say it was a fact during the cambrian, when nobody knew what carbon was, rings improper to my ear. — Olivier5

I'm not sure why. My car won't start... I would like to be able to say there's some fact of the matter that explains why it won't start. It doesn't seem helpful at all to consider whether there exists a person who knows that or not.

I don't see any problem here. Nobody was around during the Cambrian era. But Carbon has always had 6 protons. So "Carbon had 6 protons in the Cambrian era" is true, and "In the Cambrian era, it was considered a fact that Carbon atoms have 6 protons" is false. The lack of people in the Cambrian era doesn't restrict people living in the year 2021 from talking about things; it just implies that people in the Cambrian era cannot talk about things (because there were no such people).

I do indeed restrict the meaning of 'fact' to statements known to be true. I believe using it for pretty much anything out there ("actualities") is simply improper. — Olivier5

Improper how? The difference between "known to be true" and "actuality" is that the former appeals to my mental states and the latter does not. The latter treatment is much more pragmatic precisely because it unbinds factuality from my mental states. For example, this allows me to talk about yesterday, when I mistakenly thought X was a fact and the idea of Y did not even occur to me, in such a manner that I consider (with hindsight) X to have not been a fact yesterday and Y to have been a fact yesterday.

My position, as you see it, is this: — Srap Tasmaner

No, that's wrong. I don't know your exact position. But I do know you said this:

(M) I don't consider that offer, absent a way of verifying your virtual signature, a fact. — Srap Tasmaner

...and this:

(N) No one has to wonder whether you were kidding or musing or expressing your degree of confidence; — Srap Tasmaner

So this isn't really what my assumptions of your position are:

My position, as you see it, is this:
(a) someone has to know you've made a bet(1) for there to be one;
(b) which means if no one knows it, then there isn't one, it's not a fact;
(c) and thus once they know about it, somehow their knowledge brings the fact about, which is crazy because it was the action of the bidder that brought about the fact of an offer having been made. — Srap Tasmaner

It's not that "someone has to know [I've] made a bet(1)" so much as it is that you explicitly said you don't consider a bet(1) ("offer") to be a fact absent something you called "a way of verifying" something you called a"virtual signature".

Whatever "virtual signature" means to you, it's some mental state I have, per my reading of (N). What I'm presuming is that these two are connected... that you don't consider my bet(1) to be a fact because you cannot verify my "virtual signature" which is some mental state only I have access to (ala "kidding" or "musing" or "expressing ... degree of confidence"). The implication appears to be that a offer would be a bet if I "meant" it, but that can't be a fact even if I did because you can't verify that I meant it.

Incidentally, I'll bring this up now... it's been bugging me for a while. I think you're distracting yourself with the contract business... bets can be contracts, but bets are not fundamentally contracts... rather, they are fundamentally games. More precisely, bets are things you win or lose. The thing you bet on defines the win condition. The wager is simply an add-on to give a penalty and/or reward for winning or losing.

Hence, "if you cut my grass I'll pay you $20" is not a bet, despite being a type of contract, because there's no win/lose condition here. Likewise "I bet Jerry will be late to work today" is a bet but not a contract.

but specifically about the making of a binding offer, what we're calling a bet(1) — Srap Tasmaner

No, a bet(2) is binding; a bet(1) need not be. When South bid two no-trump, that's a bet(1); South is offering to play a game of no-trump with a win condition of scoring 8 tricks. But it's not binding until after West, North, and East all pass.

Were West to say three clubs instead of passing, that bet(1)--the offered game... the offer to play the next hand as no trump with a win condition of scoring 8 tricks--would be off the table. If North, East, and South proceed to pass in this case, West would be bound to play a game with clubs as trumps, with a win condition of scoring 9 tricks.

No one has to wonder whether you were kidding or musing or expressing your degree of confidence; in these circumstances, that is unambiguously a bet(1). — Srap Tasmaner

But nobody has to resolve this for there to be a fact of the matter regarding it. It's basic theory of mind that each of us knows things the other has no clue about, but it's kind of perverse to suppose that if you don't know a thing, there cannot be a fact about it. We often have to revise what we consider to be facts as we get new information. When we do so, it's a bit ridiculous to propose that it's the facts that are changing.

The magician tricked me into thinking the red ball was under the middle cup. But when he showed me it wasn't, I don't believe he created a red ball ex nihilo as he lifted the cup... I simply revise my beliefs to the point that I consider it a fact that there was no ball under the cup at the time at which I thought it was a fact that there was one under it. I have to believe facts and what I consider to be facts are distinct things, or I will never survive a magic show.

Okay, let's start here.

While I recognize the common usage of "I bet you ..." to mean "I am offering to enter into a wager with you such that ...", — Srap Tasmaner

So you acknowledge bet can have this meaning. Let's call this bet(1).

There is a wager once the parties have a contract, and the word "bet" is also used in this sense. — Srap Tasmaner

Sure. "Bet" can also have this meaning. Let's call this bet(2).

Such a contract is certainly some kind of fact, — Srap Tasmaner

Let's suppose your name is East, and my name is South. We are negotiating a contract. During the "bidding process" (that being the formalized negotiation mechanism for such bets), I say "two no-trump". Immediately afterwards, someone called West says "pass", followed by someone called North saying "pass", and then you, East, say "pass".

I claim that it is a fact that I bet(1) two no-trump. My bet(1) of two no-trump happened on my "turn" of the bidding. You claim that it's certainly some kind of fact that the four of us bet(2) something akin to that North and I would collect eight tricks if we played our current hands as a two no-trump hand; said bet(2) happening after you say "pass". But you are trying with several paragraphs of nonsense to argue that by contrast, it is not a fact that I bet(1) two no-trump.

But how does this work exactly? How can it possibly be a type of fact that the four of us collectively bet(2) on this contract if it's not a fact that I bet(1) two no-trump?

Why not? — InPitzotl

This is what you quoted. Here's what you left out:

It's natural to say "I do not accept that bet". — InPitzotl

Who pays out if you win? Nobody? Then what were the stakes? Nothing? Then no wager. — Srap Tasmaner

You have already sung that song. And the answer was already given to you. In order for me to be obliged to pay, I must accept "it". But the "it" I must accept is called a bet; hence, it being natural to say "I accept that bet". If I reject "it", I am not obliged to pay out; but again, the "it" that I reject is called a bet; hence it being natural to say, "I reject that bet".

I'm appealing to natural use of the language as the standard by which we judge what "to bet" means... that would be the part of my quote that you left out. So I added it back in for you... just in case you want to actually reply to me.

Or because he wasn't even offering a wager but expressing his confidence by saying "I'll bet I can ..." --- an alternative which you passed right over. — Srap Tasmaner

I discussed that too, right here:

Arguably, the speaker's probably (but not necessarily) making a bet anyway; they're just being satirical about the wager. (A case where the speaker might not be making a bet may be if the speaker is teasing; e.g., using that language to suggest Jerry may have had lots of fun last night). — InPitzotl

...unprompted even.

But you're conflating two distinct things: (a) the fact that I can make a bet by saying "I bet I can x", and (b) the fact that I can say "I bet I can x" without making a bet.

And no, it's not a bet if no one accepts. — Srap Tasmaner

Why not? It's natural to say "I do not accept that bet".

Suppose he just hoists his empty and points at the bin saying, "Five bucks." You nod. Now there's a bet. What statement of fact did he make? What statement of fact did you make by nodding? — Srap Tasmaner

Sure, it's possible to make bets without statements. But... (a).

I don't quite understand the point of this. Are you trying to earn your $5?

(A) I made that bet — InPitzotl

No you really didn't. Suppose you and a buddy are drinking behind the 7-11. Your buddy finishes his beer and says "Ten bucks says I can make it." You say nothing as he arcs his empty bottle into the recycling bin across the aisle. (B) Do you owe him ten bucks? — Srap Tasmaner

Why did you bother with this example? I've already explained this to you. No, I don't (B) owe him ten bucks. But what's in dispute is (A) that my buddy made a bet. The reason I don't owe him ten bucks isn't because my buddy didn't make a bet; but because I did not accept the bet.

There is no necessary connection between the words spoken, in themselves alone, and any fact brought about in the world by speaking them. — Srap Tasmaner

That's irrelevant. Bets tend to have an unspoken by demonstration rule. If I bet my buddy I can touch the ceiling, and I jump up and touch it, I win the bet. It doesn't matter whether or not I can necessarily touch the ceiling, or whether I can touch the ceiling regardless of circumstances. I demonstrate "can" by a successful attempt.

You're arguing for irrelevancies not on the table.

And that's especially wrong. — Srap Tasmaner

I'll bet you $5 that I can make something a fact just by saying it. — InPitzotl

Let Y be that phrase. By my producing that statement, Y is said. By Y being said, a bet is made. By the bet being made, it becomes a fact. The thing that becomes a fact is Y. You might could quibble about distinctions between performatives and factual descriptions, but Y is both the thing being said to make the bet, and a fact brought about by saying it.

Cool. Then what were you claiming, and what does it have to do with whether what we say is factual? — Srap Tasmaner

I'm not sure what's so complicated about this. If I am riding a bike, I would propel the bike by pushing on the peddles.

In like fashion, I said this:

I'll bet you $5 that I can make something a fact just by saying it. — InPitzotl

...and by saying that, I made that bet. By making that bet using these means, it becomes a fact that I made that bet. That fact is described by what I said to make the bet.

I thought you had claimed that because you had said something like "I bet $5 I can make a fact by saying something" you must have made a bet; I don't think that's true. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, you misunderstood. I don't think that's true either, but that's not what's being claimed.

For the record, no, that's not how bets are made. — Srap Tasmaner

You have failed to make your case.

Like the christening of a ship or any other speech act, it requires specific circumstances — Srap Tasmaner

"I'll bet a million bucks Jerry's gonna be late today" — Srap Tasmaner

You're over-interpreting here. A claim that x is how y happens (in this context) is a claim about means, not sufficiency. That the speaker can use the language of making a bet without really making one does not refute that this is how bets are made.

For example, we propel bicycles by pushing on their pedals, but that requires specific circumstances (wheels on the ground, you on the seat, chain hooked up, etc). Nevertheless, that is indeed how we propel bicycles. To say that this isn't how we propel bicycles because if the chain weren't there it wouldn't work would just be silly; there's nothing in the claim that this is how we propel bicycles that purports this to be sufficient.

Arguably, the speaker's probably (but not necessarily) making a bet anyway; they're just being satirical about the wager. (A case where the speaker might not be making a bet may be if the speaker is teasing; e.g., using that language to suggest Jerry may have had lots of fun last night).

and the cooperation of others. — Srap Tasmaner

"Bet I can beat you to the mailbox" might be met with "You're on!" and the kids race, — Srap Tasmaner

Let's call the person who said "Bet I can beat you to the mailbox" Jack, and "You're on!" Joe.

In natural English, Joe may say "Jack bet me that he could beat me to the mailbox; naturally, I accepted".

Let's say, instead, that Joe said "No way!". In natural English, Joe may say "Jack bet me that he could beat me to the mailbox, but I didn't feel like a race so I refused the bet."

What you seem to be doing here is considering a bet only having been made when it is accepted. But this does not match the language usage above, where bets are made when they are offered.

or with "Loser takes out the trash?" in which case there's now an actual wager being offered, but it's still not a wager until the other says "Deal!"

...this is just negotiating a wager.

So to summarize, you're suggesting that I'm wrong by misinterpreting a claim of means as a claim of sufficiency. Next you're suggesting I'm wrong by misinterpreting "to make a bet" as applying to acceptance as opposed to offer. And finally, there's that wager negotiation part, but I'm not sure what to make of it because prior to the negotiation your example explicitly uses the term "bet" (I'm not sure you're even suggesting it's not a bet until it has a negotiated wager?)

Hum, what mystical power do you have that you can make something a fact? Any of us can state a fact but how can we make one? — Athena

Well for one, the power to make a bet by stating that I'm making one. It's a fact that I made that bet; a fact made true by the fact that I stated that I made it (is that not how bets are made?)

Maybe you could persuade me that stipulations and tautologies should count as facts, but for now they feel way different to me. — Srap Tasmaner

You didn't really discuss my bet at all. I didn't name anything; I "made a bet".

ETA:

Maybe you could persuade me that stipulations and tautologies should count as facts, but for now they feel way different to me. — Srap Tasmaner

Might I suggest there are different "kinds" of facts, and they feel different because they're doing different things? But along those lines, "water molecules are composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom", "bishops always stay on their own color", and "Joe is married to Sue" all feel different to me... IOW, perhaps a taxonomy of facts would be preferred to a refinement of the concept?

That something is what people say is a fact, but what they say is not made a fact by their saying it. — Srap Tasmaner

I'll bet you $5 that I can make something a fact just by saying it.

Eventually, the two clones even though they think and act similarly, their expressions of action are different enough that they could be considered now as two different individuals in experience. — ExistenceofSelf

Nonsense. As soon as there are two of them, they can be considered two individuals. The fact that you count them and count to two ipso facto means there are distinct bodies. Assuming they're oriented as such, north body isn't "hearing" south body's thoughts, nor vice versa, and if they happen to be the same due to symmetry, then they just happen to be the same. Similarity is not identity; else you would just be counting to one.

Presumably, the government of a nation has no duty to prevent the abuse of children in other countries. — TheHedoMinimalist

Of course they do. If I start selling poison masqueraded as candy to children oversees, surely the government has a duty to stop me.

Suppose there was a hypothetical society that felt that adultery should be illegal but child porn should be legal. Why should I think that this society is inferior to our current society on the topic in question? — TheHedoMinimalist

Tobias is not making the best counterargument. We need not even consider production.

(Recap for others; J and C are in a monogamous relationship; P and J have relations violating this).

To the degree that P causes harm to C, the nature of said harm is that of a trust violation, not sexual exploitation; i.e., whereas this is considered a wrong and a harm, it is not considered a form of rape. By contrast, though the production of such pornography is indeed more severe and can create harms, the consumption of child pornography in and of itself is non-consensual sexual exploitation of a child's image. If P and J having consensual relations can be a harm to C, surely non-consensual exploitation of a child is a worse harm to the child.

Suppose that T stole some trade secrets from Company B that he used to work for. He sold those trade secrets to Company F. — TheHedoMinimalist

Your analogy is missing a key ingredient from the scenario... company F bought those trade secrets from T knowing that they were trade secrets for Company B (i.e., F must commit the act wantonly to be analogous).

Company F knows that he violated his agreement and Company F knows that this will harm Company B. Nonetheless, I think it makes sense to say that Company F is far less responsible for the harm caused to Company B than T is.

Nope. Company F is not "far less" responsible than T.

Because of this, Company B can only sue T for violating the agreement but they cannot sue Company F for buying the trade secrets regardless if they knew that T was violating the law. — TheHedoMinimalist

I'm not sure where you're getting this from. IANAL, but knowingly buying stolen trade secrets is clearly a crime in the US (arbitrarily chosen because you didn't specify, and that's where I live):

(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly—
...
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
...
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than $5,000,000. — U.S. Code § 1832 Part I Chapter 90

To use another analogous example, — TheHedoMinimalist

This is in no way analogous, and I don't know how to fix this one. You're completely missing two consensual parties wantonly and knowingly committing an action that causes harm to a third party; we simply have a drug lord planning an arson and you committing one. The drug lord is culpable for planning arson in this scenario, and you are culpable of committing one. My resignment to fate in this scenario is obviously compelled, and irrelevant. My emotional reaction is also irrelevant.

I would imagine that you probably wouldn’t care because you know that the drug lord would have done it anyways and I only decided to burn it down because I knew you were screwed regardless. — TheHedoMinimalist

There's something broken in your imagination then. It sounds like you're fishing for a weird sort of but-for theory that I quite simply do not subscribe to. At the heart of this is a very simple idea... you are responsible for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of actions you commit.

I actually don’t think that prostitution is really that bad though. — TheHedoMinimalist

Okay, but remember, we had to qualify prostitution to make this analogous. We're not just talking prostitution any more; it's prostitution where the prostitute is knowingly having sex with a person involved in a monogamous relationship.

If we qualify generic consensual sex to the same level, we get the same problem; the fact that prostitution involves an exchange of wealth does not seem to be a relevant factor here.

If some guy decides to cheat on his wife with a prostitute, I think that prostitute is far less responsible for that adultery than the guy himself is. — TheHedoMinimalist

I disagree. To give these names, let's say P is the prostitute; J is the client, and C is J's monogamous partner. It is the consensual sex between P and J that constitutes the cheating. To the degree that C is harmed, C is harmed by J breaking the monogamous agreement. The asymmetry here is in the fact that P is not a party to said agreement. So when it comes to breaking the agreement, P is not responsible, given P is not a party to the agreement. But when it comes to causing harm to C, P is just as responsible for causing this harm to C as J is. I can see a qualitative assessment of this as P being less responsible, but I cannot see a reasonable assessment where P is far less responsible.

Him cheating on his wife is probably not solely dependent on the existence of that given prostitute or even the existence of prostitution in general. He probably would have found a way to cheat regardless. — TheHedoMinimalist

I don't see the relevance of this. P is responsible for causing harm to C by virtue of the fact that P wantonly and knowingly consents with J to commit the act that causes the harm. Were P not to consent, P would not be responsible. Whatever J might do in this case with Q were P to refuse consent appears to be irrelevant to me.

I want to clarify that I was specifically talking about the possession of child porn as opposed to the production of child porn. — TheHedoMinimalist

But if you're going to use this argument:

Prostitution could enable adultery and that could harm the spouse of the prostitution client. — TheHedoMinimalist

...then possession could enable production and that could harm the child being exploited, and:

I agree that taking a video of a child taking a shower is worse than adultery. — TheHedoMinimalist

...that is worse than adultery.

I just don’t think that having a copy of that video of your computer is worse than adultery. — TheHedoMinimalist

Well here, the analog would be to prostitution; though, more specifically, in this case we've qualified this to the level of possession of child pornography specifically made via exploitation of children, versus just generic prostitution, so this analogy isn't quite analogous. To make it so, we should qualify the prostitution... something along the lines of, prostitution specifically where the prostitute knowingly caters to a person involved in a monogamous relationship. That analog being made, given that exploitation is worse than adultery, presumably possession of such child pornography should be worse than prostitution.

I agree that there being an agreement is not the only moral consideration. I think that cheating is quite harmful to people and I think that harm cannot be excused because you made an agreement not to cause that harm. — TheHedoMinimalist

I'm not talking about excusing the harm; I'm talking about comparing it to harms that do not involve agreement. It's breaking an agreement to cheat in a monogamous relationship, but it's not breaking an agreement to take photos of a child in a shower without their knowledge and share it online. We can't use the fact of agreement versus not to compare the latter to the former (I mean we can, but it doesn't seem to properly compare using this metric).

FYI, this is just an example of agreement breaking versus exploitation. Also, judging from the topic, this appears to be the point as I understand it... to compare cheating to drug use/prostitution/suicide/child pornography.

Well I wasn't going for a point; I was just trying to wrap my head around the metric being used. I get that monogamous relationships involve an agreement; but broken agreements are not the only moral considerations. I'm not sure I agree that if Bob pinky promises to buy Jane ice cream next week if Jane buys him some this week but doesn't, that Bob in breaking this promise is more in the wrong than if he stole ice cream from Jane.

So I'm not buying the agreement versus none aspect plays a real role here. Death and exploitation for example are big deals; we don't need broken agreements to make them so.