But Hanover, where does the censorship end? What about the greased precipice?

Seriously, though, I think the argument in favor of free speech absolutism is more often that it is binary - either free speech exists and all speech is allowed, or speech is limited and it doesn't exist - and you definitely should want it to exist, whether because it advances knowledge through dialogue or censorship is a slippery slope.

But I don't know about applying the same kind of scrutiny we apply to journalists to regular people. I think most people qualify as unethical journalists, honestly. I mean, who on this forum actually abides by those principles all that consistently?

Not to mention it would be a tremendous pain in the ass to actually sift through shitty far-right and far-left memes all day looking for people not acting like ethical journalists. It only even works on this forum because you guys shut off the inflow of shit-posters and trolls - some of which still get through.

You're making a classic error if you hold that that reason only supports views you like. — Tom Storm

It generally supports things I find much less problematic than those things that would be allowed under relativism. Selective infanticide for babies that will live short lives in agony? Unpleasant. But the systematic mutilation and oppression of millions of women in the Middle East? Evil.

Sometimes intuition has to take a hit for the team. And yes, no matter how much you reason you still derive your ethics from values. I state as much in the OP. But some values make more or less sense when evaluating if they will cause or reduce suffering.

Are you going to capitulate to your self-doubt, or will you at least try to support something that makes sense given some common goals?

Those are not adequate answers, as they just assume things. And while those assumptions are commonly held, and perhaps even reasonable, they do not address the claims in the OP.

Btw, I don't see why you added in the criticism of relativity. I criticize relativity in the OP. And I also agree that morality doesn't need justifications to exist. But assuming some - admittedly - basic things about morality, while practical, doesn't get us true moral claims.

Meta ethics has supplanted Ethics it is just that people are slow to realise this. — I like sushi

I think the vast majority of people have no idea what meta-ethics is, and I have honestly never heard any regular people talk about anything even related to meta-ethics.

In a few hundred years it will likely be viewed as laughable ad phrenology is. — I like sushi

I have no emotional attachment to meta-ethics and wouldn't really care if that were to happen.

I can justify killing someone but justification is just as likely an ‘excuse’ as a ‘reason’. — I like sushi

I'm not sure why you think this is relevant. Yes, people sometimes retroactively justify their shitty actions, but that's not really salient.

Honestly, I'm not sure if you are being serious here.

I don't think it's irrelevant. It explains that, and why, murder is wrong but war is right, why there are the moral strictures there are and how they are not arbitrary in the main but sometimes they are, and why different environments produce different moralities in the same species. — unenlightened

It addresses why people believe those things are wrong and right but doesn't address at all whether or not moral claims can be objectively true. I have made this argument about ten times in this thread.

The justification of any morality is 'group interest' - nature demands it, the ancestors say it, God says it, everyone says it except the individual, who insists on asking "why should I?" as though they are not part of a larger whole. — unenlightened

That is a practical justification, not a moral justification. You are committing a fallacy - that something is right because it is natural. Again, group interest might give rise to morality but that doesn't tell us if something is objectively right or wrong.

Dilemma questions such as this (if I understood you) arise out of consideration of group conflict - ie conflict of scale. Family, tribe, nation, species, ecosystem, all have a claim on the individual's loyalty and self-sacrifice. We are seeing the result of the failure of traditional moralities to consider the interests of the environment. We have not been taught to make that identification in particular by Capitalist economics, which is founded on the merciless exploitation of environmental resources as slaves, as ancestor fossils, and as the living environment. 'Why should I not burn fossil fuels?' has a very clear, very cogent answer, that we need to learn to internalise as a species. Antisemitism, racism, the persecution of any sub-group, corrodes the cooperative functioning of society and prevents us from acting together to address global issues. — unenlightened

I agree with this, but my point was more so that not bowing to the will of others doesn't make right.

my good friend Hume — unenlightened

You have either read a lot of Hume or are really old.

my good friend Hume did not deny morality, He merely denied the authority of reason. Thus you cannot get an ought from an is, nor a will be from a has been, nor an object from a sensation by any reasoned argument. But he was no more against morality than he was against science. — unenlightened

I didn't say Hume was against morality, but rather that the is/ought issue is unresolved as far as I can tell.

look up "Hume's Fork"

What metaphysical process do you have access to that can demonstrate why my values are better than theirs, other than already agreeing to my suppositions about wellbeing? As Hanover says you need to believe in some transcendent guarantor of morality to do this definitively and then you also need to demonstrate that your version of transcendent is in agreement with your version of morality. How is that done? — Tom Storm

Would you rather throw your lot in with an ethic reached with reason and some basic assumptions that reduces suffering, or one that could allow all of the worst things imaginable? It seems likely that logic and reason will get us closer to said transcendental good than a denial of moral facts gets us to truth. Not to mention, many relativistic arguments are confused because they make multiple claims including (1), (2), and (3), which are not always compatible.

The only ‘right’ thing we can do is acting as we see fit rather than bending to the will of others mindlessly. — I like sushi

Would antisemites be doing a good thing if they refused to bow to the will of people who aren't assholes?

we can hardly ever judge what we do as being right or wrong but we are always unable to escape from the idea that what we have done, or do, is a defining part of how we navigate through life. — I like sushi

Okay, you seem to be assuming (2), which would need some sort of justification.

Morality and ethics are social apparatus. We are not bound by pure subjectivity yet we are enchanted by the idea that we choose as an individual for ourselves and independent of others’ views. — I like sushi

That morality can be viewed as a social apparatus relates not a bit to whether or not we can justify our morals. And yes, people largely operate under the illusion that they are coming up with original, carefully considered positions, that might not actually be so original and carefully considered.

It is a sea of hidden nuances and dead ends. I this respect it has more in common with the general outline of science being a constant riling against convention for the sake of seeking ‘better’ pathways to fuller understanding. — I like sushi

Finding better ways of applying our morals does not concern whether or not those morals are justified, and I don't think anyone has really physically verified that any morals are true, even if it is possible to do so. So, you seem to claim (2) is true, yet that we verify and falsify our morals in a scientific manner.

I haven't read any Hume. I know of his fork, however.

If murder is bad - as the very meaning of murder is that of a certain kind of killing that is bad - then murder is bad. — I like sushi

Murder is bad because it is defined as bad? Really? I guess on a local level it is bad, but something doesn't become objectively true just because it is defined as bad, and I'm concerned with objectively true claims.

I could define the sky as being turquoise, but that doesn't mean the sky isn't still blue.

Nuance in language and interpretations of events and circumstances does not take away from the general meaning of the term ‘murder’ being bad. — I like sushi

I would not argue against that.

Not everyone likes the taste of strawberries but that does not mean that strawberries are considered to taste bad, yet no doubt there is someone out there who thinks something most consider to taste awful to taste bad. The experience of tasting something nice and something bad exists. The variance of experiences does not detract from the existence of such experiences. — I like sushi

The important point is not that variance of experience does or does not exist and does or does not detract from the existence of experience, but rather that emotional responses to experience are subjective.

Morality is as meaningless as ethics. There is meta ethics and we are never within its reach yet constantly craving its presumed judgement our lives even if that means said ‘craving’ is non-existent. What we do is what we do. How we interpret what we do is merely that … an interpretation of NOT a complete understanding of. — I like sushi

I agree, we don't entirely understand what we do, but that doesn't mean we can't be doing something right.

The "is" of morality doesn't address justifications for morality, which is the point of this thread. I know evolutionary psychology is great and all, but it is kind of irrelevant to this discussion.

The monkey video is great, though.

This is where one might be mistaking an axiom with reasonableness. An injunction against murder is reasonable and ethical, though we might find that there is not an axiom that specifically calls out that murder is false. — L'éléphant

This is not an axiom. This is an example of harm principle. Oh yeah, Mill's harm principle is not an axiom -- it is a moral assumption with strong, reasonable backing such as the golden rule. — L'éléphant

I'm using it as an example of something that could be logically true based on some axiom, not claiming that it is axiomatic that murder is wrong. Reasonableness doesn't enter.

And yes, the moral claim "murder is wrong" has a strong backing in reason, but you acknowledge that that which justifies the claim is an assumption. Honestly, I think you and I agree more than we disagree on this: morals are possible and can be reached via reason and minimal assumptions.

I'd rephrase it: correct (what is right) is good; incorrect (what is wrong) is bad. Don't know, but am thinking this might make significant differences to your question. — javra

It makes no difference.

I'm working with the presumption, if one can call it that, that everyone is fallible. — javra

Yes, but it remains that if correct means good and incorrect means bad, there would be contradictions, even if people are fallible.

If one wants to assume some infallible proclamation of truth, correct proposition, etc. — javra

I don't see anything outlandish about "correct propositions" existing.

edit: you literally just based your entire thing on correct propositions existing

Could you clarify this question? — javra

If one says that good is to be associated with correct, then wouldn't wrong be associated with false? And if that is so, then how does falsifying things tie into your assertion that we consider correct answers to be good regardless of their actual correctness? You could have a claim that is believed to be true that may actually be false, and then the values "wrong" and "good" are assigned to the same answer, even if it is unbeknownst to the people reaching the answer. That is, if you believe that perceived correctness actually makes something good.

edit: and even if you don't believe that perceived correctness makes something good, there could still be a contradiction if two or more people disagree on the correctness of an answer.

As do I, as I believe I previously expressed via "verification and falsification". — javra

You shoe-horned that in. Your claims about the reality of people equating good and correct mentioned nothing about people falsifying things. I don't see how your statement about an apple being added to an apple constitutes any serious account of the fact that people often times recognize that they are wrong, and do not just assume that anything they have determined to be correct (whether or not it is actually correct) is good.

So, you acknowledge that people falsify things. But what value does a false thing have if not wrong if good is assumed if a thing is correct?

Perhaps god needs to host a show on Fox News. — Tom Storm

I would hang on every word.

I have some sympathy for Frankenstein's monster, even if he was grotesque. Kind of relatable, I think.

All the same, do you find that appraisal discordant to the way thing are in the world? — javra

Yes, I think people pursue correct answers and acknowledge when they don't find them. And no one just equates "good" and "correct". That would be like saying that 2 + 2 = 4 could be a moral principle because it is correct.

The problem with theistic morality is that it provides no objective basis for right and wrong. — Tom Storm

It could if God made himself apparent. But that probably won't happen.

I wasn't speaking ill of such a project.

Yes, your phrasing was so confusing I couldn't even comprehend what I was writing as I was writing it.

In simplistic terms — javra

Yes, I am a simpleton.

when one appraises if 1 + 1 = 2 is correct, one's judgment will be fully relative to that concerned in one's appraisal (differing from, say, if it is correct that 236 - 45 = 6) but in all such cases the notion of correctness remains constant irrespective of that addressed. — javra

So I was right: if something is correct it is correct only with respect to a certain object if it is not related to other things. And things can still be correct despite this.

We furthermore universally deem correct answers good - so that we all seek correct answers to questions, irrespective of what we may deem to be the correct answer in concrete terms (e.g., if we deem it the correct answer that 1 +1 = 1 we will then abide by that answer on account of deeming it correct). — javra

So, we blindly pursue correct answers because they are considered "good", and we may not reach correct answers but still call them correct, and also inevitably go with our account of what is correct because we deem it correct (and, thus, "good").

That doesn't seem circular to you? And that seems as much a sociological claim as a philosophical one.

I hear you, but I rule them out anyway since there is no way we can demonstrate 1) what they are or 2) if they exist. We have no choice but to be pragmatic - for me humans create morality to facilitate social cooperation in order to achieve our preferred forms of order. — Tom Storm

Honestly, Sam Harris is the best on this one, imo. If we do what Javra says and try to form some sort of Frankenstein's monster of psychology, ethics, and neuroscience, we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God.

I actually appreciated your contributions. That verse is apt, although I appear to be on the wrong side of it.

In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant. — javra

I have determined that that means that if something is true it is true only with respect to a certain object if it is not related to other things. And things can still be correct.

edit: or maybe it doesn't mean anything

I wasn't addressing lack of disagreement. I was addressing the possibility of an objectively true psychological reality that universally applies to all psyches. If it were to be somehow discovered, all would have it, true. But it's objective truth wouldn't be a product of agreements. — javra

Then what would make it right or wrong to reduce conscious suffering? What would tie a shared psychological state to objectively true moral claims about reducing suffering? It would remain that suffering would have to be wrong, or we are just forming propositions based on a shared understanding of something objective that doesn't directly inform morality. That doesn't resolve is/ought.

Would this analogy help?: In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant. — javra

I don't know what this means. Not even a little.

Isn't the point that TC is arguing there are no moral facts, just ideas which work or don't in context? This means justification is moot and context dependent, for we do not have access to some transcendental realm of moral truths. — Tom Storm

I agree that we don't have access to transcendental moral truths, but we cannot rule them out, which is the point of my OP. Many arguments that are not as cogent as TC's misfire because they argue some newfangled combination of (1), (2), and (3). TC's argument is honest, simple, and makes sense.

Btw, javra basically just plagiarized Sam Harris as far as I can tell. Maybe unintentionally.

Since this objectively true goal would in principle satisfy that which all yearn for, it would then be an objective good - a good that so remains independently of individuals’ subjective fancies.

Since this good would be objectively real to one and all, a proposition regarding it could then be conformant to its reality and, thereby, true. — javra

A lack of disagreement doesn't mean that something is objectively true, merely that everyone agrees on it. You could indeed fashion propositions after this common goal of reducing conscious suffering, but it remains that these propositions would be only correct with regard to something subjective: everyone's common desire to not suffer.

Yes, one could make moral claims that would be correct, but these claims would still be relative. What difference is there in what you propose and proposing that female genital mutilation is okay relative to those in your culture if everyone in your culture agrees it is okay?

You could make an argument from unlikeliness that it is unlikely that our morals - obviously the result of many different things - are true, but that does not mean (1), (2), (3), or any combination thereof, is true.

While it is apparent that Haidt's views might be compelling, they don't seem to address justifications for morals, although he addresses why we have the morals we have. It is like using a scientific conclusion to support a policy decision: science might provide the facts necessary for a decision to be made, but these facts have to be interpreted such that a conclusion about what is best to do can be reached.

But yeah, many of our moral beliefs could have been reached via "inborn evolutionary adaptations". To say, however, that our moral beliefs are correct because they are adaptations is fallacious, obviously, and to say that they are objectively incorrect, or that (2) follows, because they are adaptations, is also fallacious or unfounded.

I know very little about Haidt, so if he does address justifications for morals, please link me something.

Think: "murder is wrong".

I'm not saying true and not-true can logically exist, but rather that an injunction against something like murder could be true and represent a statement claiming something is immoral.

In my OP I do at least recognize that some moral axioms could be true, and that some (many?) attempts to refute them don't make sense.

Ah. Okay. My bad. I didn't understand you.

You are conflating specific moral beliefs with logical truth of a claim. — L'éléphant

Extrinsic moral claims, such as that animal abuse is wrong, must always eventually be traced to an axiom, and for that extrinsic moral claim to be true one must have a true axiom - which doesn't really have to be proven logically, but must be reasonable or capable of being evaluated for truth, or have plausible conditions that exist under which it could be true. That is, if we are expressing those moral claims in the form of propositions and not "rats are gross" or something.

philosophers are also aware of the universal implication of individual experiences -- so they come up with universal claims such as the golden rule, veil of ignorance, the harm principle, categorical imperative, etc. — L'éléphant

That animal abuse is objectively wrong requires that its harm is not just undesirable, but provably wrong. Many things are undesirable, such as going to the dentist, but we wouldn't say that one is doing oneself a wrong by going to the dentist, or that the dentist is evil for drilling your teeth. Your examples of universalizations are, of course, reasonable, but we cannot say that they represent anything objectively correct.

I get what you are saying - that we can decide that something is wrong if it can be tied to measurable negative outcomes, and that these moral claims do not reference moral facts, but rather have their base in universalizations formed from the collation of individual experiences.

But that doesn't give us logically true moral claims that express whether or not something is objectively right or wrong.

As I see it, morals mostly express human values, not facts. Morals are not true or false, they work or they don't. Where do those values come from? I think some are inborn and some are learned. — T Clark

That morals must work is indisputable, but that some are inborn, or tied to human nature, and others learned, says little about whether or not those morals are justified. That is mostly what I am concerned with. I appreciate what you are saying, but it is somewhat irrelevant, unless you are trying to demonstrate that morals cannot be justified.

You don't really seem to be saying that, but rather that it doesn't matter if morals are justified via reasoning - they only matter insofar as they are functional. If that is a misrepresentation, please correct me.

Morality limited to "the law" is a very low morality. A higher morality is a good understanding of virtuous thinking and action. — Athena

Agreed - I think that just because something is illegal doesn't mean it cannot be moral in certain circumstances, and that some things that are legal can be immoral in certain circumstances.

But it is different when considering the existence of moral facts. Moral facts could be vague, or very specific, and could be applied by a virtuous person in novel ways. There would be room for creativity, even, when considering the application of moral facts in a way that we don't have when considering the application of some of the very specific laws we have.

A common understanding of what makes a pest is a consensual understanding of the meaning of the word pest, but this is not the same thing as a consensual experience of the feelings of revulsion, disgust, etc that make rats a pest for some people and not others. — Joshs

My argument would not be that moral claims must be both emotional responses to experience and also propositions, but rather that both can exist and are tied up, and that (2), an assumption you and Prinz seem to make on the grounds that emotional reaction to experience forms morals, is not reasonable, as it is conceivable that there could be an objective grounding for a moral claim if it can be expressed in a way such that it could be true or false. So maybe it is a proposition, or maybe it isn't. One cannot claim then that (3), a refutation of us knowing any moral facts, follows from whatever version of (2) one subscribes to.

If I make a genuine moral claim like: "sand-bagging is despicable and ought be punished", then this is indisputably a proposition, and to dismiss it would require some justification - if it is being dismissed on the grounds of (2). It seems you and Prinz take (2) to be true because we cannot evaluate moral axioms to be true, to which I would respond that (2) is itself an axiom in need of some justification.

Furthermore, I think claims should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as some morals are definitely formed from emotional responses to experience, yet others are the result of careful thought.

Dude, I can't understand shit that you write. Your writing is not bad by any means, but your style is difficult for me.

Also: I could list the many characteristics of rats - dirty, vicious, etc. - and use this as a basis for the belief that rats should be considered pests, and this would be empirical based upon the common understanding of what makes a pest. You might disagree, but you cannot argue that my foundation for believing they should be considered pests is not empirical, even if I am deriving an ought - "rats ought be considered pests" - from an is - "rats are dirty, vicious, etc." You might say this jump is unjustified, but "rats are pests" is a proposition regardless of anyone's opinions.

btw I love rats

And if rats are found to be ideal pets within another culture is that culture empirically incorrect? — Joshs

Note that I amended myself to "are, largely, found to be", not "are".

Prinz argues that the basis of our moral values are not in fact propositional beliefs but pre-cognitive preferences. — Joshs

How does he support the assertion that they cannot be propositional in addition to being pre-cognitive preferences?

Does this necessarily require "everything is A or B?" — Edmund

I think that if something is not true, that means it is false. At least if you frame it the way you do in the OP.

However, I don't think it is a requirement that something, or everything as you say, must necessarily be false if not true - at least in the context of belief.

The OP is obviously a reference to belief in God - must God not exist if we cannot prove he exists? No, but it is likely he doesn't. Or at the very least we don't have to cite evidence for dismissing his existence. And saying you don't believe in him doesn't mean you think he cannot exist.

I should amend my OP: when I mention (2), I realize that axioms in logic and math do not need proving, but a moral axiom would need some sort of self-evident reason or means of being evaluated for truth, as we are not building a logical system, but rather discussing a first principle for an ethic. (2) could mean that axioms merely cannot be evaluated for correctness, that no axioms are reasonable, or that the conditions under which axioms could be correct don't really exist.