it could be concluded that it is an objective truth that all conscious beings seek optimal freedom from conscious suffering - this despite complexities such as weighing short-term suffering against long-term suffering.
If objectively true that we all seek optimal freedom from suffering - what in western thought could be termed the search for optimal eudemonia - then that means which in fact best liberates us from suffering will be the objectively true goal relative to all conscious beings, irrespective of (or else, in manners independent of) one’s beliefs on the matter.
Since this objectively true goal would in principle satisfy that which all yearn for, it would then be an objective good - a good that so remains independently of individuals’ subjective fancies.
Since this good would be objectively real to one and all, a proposition regarding it could then be conformant to its reality and, thereby, true. — javra
A lack of disagreement doesn't mean that something is objectively true, merely that everyone agrees on it. — ToothyMaw
Yes, one could make moral claims that would be correct, but these claims would still be relative. — ToothyMaw
I wasn't addressing lack of disagreement. I was addressing the possibility of an objectively true psychological reality that universally applies to all psyches. If it were to be somehow discovered, all would have it, true. But it's objective truth wouldn't be a product of agreements. — javra
Would this analogy help?: In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant. — javra
John Dewey had a rebuttal to this notion, as explained by Putnam. Just substitute ‘avoidance of suffering’ for ‘pleasure’.
If “agreeableness is precisely the agreeableness or congruence of some objective condition with some impulse, habit, or tendency of the agent,"
then
"of course, pure pleasure is a myth. Any pleasure is qualitatively unique, being precisely the harmony of one set of conditions with its appropriate activity. The pleasure of eating is one thing; the pleasure of hearing music, another; the pleasure of an amiable act, another; the pleasure of drunkenness or of anger is still another." — Joshs
Of course, all this is contingent on there being a) a universal, foundational, (one could add, metaphysically real) drive to all conscious beings in everything we do and b) some means of satisfying it in principle. Yet, if (a) and (b), one could then well make sense of objective ethics and morality – in so far as there being an objective good to pursue by which all actions can be judged as either better or worse. — javra
That morals must work is indisputable, but that some are inborn, or tied to human nature, and others learned, says little about whether or not those morals are justified. That is mostly what I am concerned with.
— ToothyMaw
Isn't the point that TC is arguing there are no moral facts, just ideas which work or don't in context? This means justification is moot and context dependent, for we do not have access to some transcendental realm of moral truths. — Tom Storm
I agree that we don't have access to transcendental moral truths, but we cannot rule them out, which is the point of my OP. Many arguments that are not as cogent as TC's misfire because they argue some newfangled combination of (1), (2), and (3). TC's argument is honest, simple, and makes sense. — ToothyMaw
In parallel, all analytical judgments of correctness will always be relative to those particulars address, yet the notion of correctness remains constant. — javra
I agree that we don't have access to transcendental moral truths, but we cannot rule them out, which is the point of my OP. — ToothyMaw
To me this means we know the right thing to do from our hearts, from inside. — T Clark
I hear you, but I rule them out anyway since there is no way we can demonstrate 1) what they are or 2) if they exist. We have no choice but to be pragmatic - for me humans create morality to facilitate social cooperation in order to achieve our preferred forms of order. — Tom Storm
If we do what Javra says and try to form some sort of Frankenstein's monster of psychology, ethics, and neuroscience, we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God. — ToothyMaw
we could come the closest to having some sort of objective moral project short of throwing our lot in with God. — ToothyMaw
In simplistic terms — javra
when one appraises if 1 + 1 = 2 is correct, one's judgment will be fully relative to that concerned in one's appraisal (differing from, say, if it is correct that 236 - 45 = 6) but in all such cases the notion of correctness remains constant irrespective of that addressed. — javra
We furthermore universally deem correct answers good - so that we all seek correct answers to questions, irrespective of what we may deem to be the correct answer in concrete terms (e.g., if we deem it the correct answer that 1 +1 = 1 we will then abide by that answer on account of deeming it correct). — javra
So, we blindly pursue correct answers because they are considered "good", and we may not reach correct answers but still call them correct, and also inevitably go with our account of what is correct because we deem it correct (and, thus, "good").
That doesn't seem circular to you? — ToothyMaw
I wasn't speaking ill of such a project. — ToothyMaw
All the same, do you find that appraisal discordant to the way thing are in the world? — javra
Yes, I think people pursue correct answers and acknowledge when they don't find them. — ToothyMaw
And no one just equates "good" and "correct". That would be like saying that 2 + 2 = 4 could be a moral principle because it is correct. — ToothyMaw
As do I, as I believe I previously expressed via "verification and falsification". — javra
I don't see how your statement about an apple being added to an apple constitutes any serious account of the fact that people often times recognize that they are wrong, and do not just assume that anything they have determined to be correct (whether or not it is actually correct) is good. — ToothyMaw
But what value does a false thing have if not wrong if good is assumed if a thing is correct? — ToothyMaw
Could you clarify this question? — javra
If one says that good is to be associated with correct, then wouldn't wrong be associated with false? — ToothyMaw
And if that is so, then how does falsifying things tie into your assertion that we consider correct answers to be good regardless of their actual correctness? You could have a claim that is believed to be true that may actually be false, and then the values "wrong" and "good" are assigned to the same answer, even if it is unbeknownst to the people reaching the answer. That is, if you believe that perceived correctness actually makes something good. — ToothyMaw
I'd rephrase it: correct (what is right) is good; incorrect (what is wrong) is bad. Don't know, but am thinking this might make significant differences to your question. — javra
I'm working with the presumption, if one can call it that, that everyone is fallible. — javra
If one wants to assume some infallible proclamation of truth, correct proposition, etc. — javra
Sounds similar to Christianity where preachers will often say that morality is 'written on the human heart' by god. In other words, we already know what is right and wrong. I've worked with too many hard core criminals to accept this — Tom Storm
In my OP I do at least recognize that some moral axioms could be true, and that some (many?) attempts to refute them don't make sense. — ToothyMaw
This is where one might be mistaking an axiom with reasonableness. An injunction against murder is reasonable and ethical, though we might find that there is not an axiom that specifically calls out that murder is false.I'm not saying true and not-true can logically exist, but rather that an injunction against something like murder could be true and represent a statement claiming something is immoral. — ToothyMaw
This is not an axiom. This is an example of harm principle. Oh yeah, Mill's harm principle is not an axiom -- it is a moral assumption with strong, reasonable backing such as the golden rule.Think: "murder is wrong". — ToothyMaw
We have no choice but to be pragmatic - for me humans create morality to facilitate social cooperation in order to achieve our preferred forms of order. — Tom Storm
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