just because I hate rats because a rat bit me once doesn't mean that I cannot be empirically correct when I claim that rats are found to be, largely, annoying pests. — ToothyMaw
just because we draw on emotion to form our beliefs about right and wrong does not necessarily mean that moral realism is impossible. Moral sense theory is, however, definitely right, imo, about the fact that "moral facts and how one comes to be justified in believing them are necessarily bound up with human emotions." — ToothyMaw
And if rats are found to be ideal pets within another culture is that culture empirically incorrect? — Joshs
Prinz argues that the basis of our moral values are not in fact propositional beliefs but pre-cognitive preferences. — Joshs
How does he support the assertion that they cannot be propositional in addition to being pre-cognitive preferences? — ToothyMaw
A common understanding of what makes a pest is a consensual understanding of the meaning of the word pest, but this is not the same thing as a consensual experience of the feelings of revulsion, disgust, etc that make rats a pest for some people and not others. — Joshs
A functional human brain free of disease knows what is moral and immoral long before it is fully developed. It is ingrained and hard coded. — Outlander
I have come across the claim in another thread that no moral claims are true because all extrinsic moral claims rely on unverifiable or untrue moral axioms and, thus, that the only truth moral claims are subject to is relational to other claims and the axioms those claims are based on; extrinsic justifications for moral claims just pass the buck until a(n) (incorrect) moral axiom is reached.
Therefore, if we cannot produce correct axioms, then we must have no objectively correct moral claims. — ToothyMaw
I have come across the claim in another thread that no moral claims are true because all extrinsic moral claims rely on unverifiable or untrue moral axioms and, thus, that the only truth moral claims are subject to is relational to other claims and the axioms those claims are based on; extrinsic justifications for moral claims just pass the buck until a(n) (incorrect) moral axiom is reached.
Therefore, if we cannot produce correct axioms, then we must have no objectively correct moral claims. — ToothyMaw
You are conflating specific moral beliefs with logical truth of a claim. Take for example Mill's explanation of offense-- freedom from assault, the right to ban intoxication in public, the right to ban smoking inside buildings, etc. -- the Harm Principle.Therefore, if we cannot produce correct axioms, then we must have no objectively correct moral claims.
However, there is something implicit in this assertion; there could be multiple reasons we cannot produce correct moral axioms: — ToothyMaw
As I see it, morals mostly express human values, not facts. Morals are not true or false, they work or they don't. Where do those values come from? I think some are inborn and some are learned. — T Clark
Morality limited to "the law" is a very low morality. A higher morality is a good understanding of virtuous thinking and action. — Athena
You are conflating specific moral beliefs with logical truth of a claim. — L'éléphant
philosophers are also aware of the universal implication of individual experiences -- so they come up with universal claims such as the golden rule, veil of ignorance, the harm principle, categorical imperative, etc. — L'éléphant
Again, I said there have been moral axioms written that if denied the truth, we would implode internally. True and not-true cannot logically exist.But that doesn't give us logically true moral claims that express whether or not something is objectively right or wrong. — ToothyMaw
I think claims should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as some morals are definitely formed from emotional responses to experience, yet others are the result of careful thought. — ToothyMaw
Jonathan Haidt argues that our moral values are the product of inborn evolutionary adaptations. He lists the following 5 innate moral foundations:
Care/harm
Fairness/cheating
Loyalty/betrayal
Authority/subversion
Sanctity/degradation
These intuitions are the tail that wags the dog of the reasoned propositions that you are counting on to give us objectively true moral axioms. — Joshs
Since this objectively true goal would in principle satisfy that which all yearn for, it would then be an objective good - a good that so remains independently of individuals’ subjective fancies.
Since this good would be objectively real to one and all, a proposition regarding it could then be conformant to its reality and, thereby, true. — javra
Jesse Prinz argues that all moral values depend on emotional dispositions , and these are subjective and relative. Therefore, moral realism is impossible. He does, however, believe it is possible to determine one moral position as being objectively better than another on the basis of non-moral meta-empirical values such as consistency, universalizability and effects on well-being. — Joshs
As I see it, morals mostly express human values, not facts. Morals are not true or false, they work or they don't. Where do those values come from? I think some are inborn and some are learned. — T Clark
That morals must work is indisputable, but that some are inborn, or tied to human nature, and others learned, says little about whether or not those morals are justified. That is mostly what I am concerned with. — ToothyMaw
Isn't the point that TC is arguing there are no moral facts, just ideas which work or don't in context? This means justification is moot and context dependent, for we do not have access to some transcendental realm of moral truths. — Tom Storm
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