But, once again, you are just claiming I was being uncharitable without engaging with me - an indication that you have no responses to my criticisms. It's fine; we all make bad arguments sometimes.

It's not relativism if the person is a narcissist, or, specifically, an epistemic narcissist or egotist. — baker

they believe they can directly perceive the truth. — baker

I know quite a few of those: the universe was created just so that I can have a relationship with some supreme celestial creator/father figure, and all of his edicts in my special book are truth.

(not because it's wrong)

That was funny.

No, I criticized you before I said more succinctly that I didn't think you made a good argument for moral objectivity. Go back and read what I wrote if you want to have a discussion.

What constitutes it not being avoidable. If you had to give up all your money to prevent someone stubbing their toe would you do so? — Isaac

No, because living in poverty would lead to more suffering than someone stubbing their toe. Obviously.

The trouble with balancing something as nebulous as 'suffering' is that virtually everything can be framed in those terms. — Isaac

I disagree; just because suffering is subjective doesn't mean we can't observe people's suffering; they can often times explain, quite explicitly, how they are suffering and how intensely; it really isn't nearly that nebulous.

measuring 'suffering' doesn't answer any questions because the questions aren't about the measurement unit, they're about the relative quantity of it. — Isaac

But suffering can, in some ways, be quantified, because we all (usually) do not suffer in ways entirely unique; we can get a general idea of what it is like to lose a loved one even if we haven't. Like I said - people can report on what causes them suffering, and how intensely they are suffering, even if there are no strict units.

Do you have no other preferences? What gives your preference to not suffer it's superlative status? — Isaac

Yes, I do have other preferences, such as a will to live. But at a certain point I suppose the will to live could lead to more suffering than would be incurred if one died, an unfortunate fact. So I suppose that is one circumstance where my intuitions lead me away from the negative utilitarian position; if you can take the pain then keep going, no matter how much it sucks.

Can you foresee any circumstance where the negative utilitarian position on an issue might, nonetheless feel wrong? If no, then no need for any moral thought at all, you already know what's right in any situation just by gut instinct. If yes, then what do you do? You only came up with negative utilitarianism because it's how you feel, so when it advises some course of action which clashes with how you feel in some other way, it has no greater claim to rightness. — Isaac

It does if I can actually make a case for suffering being inherently wrong. Which I really can't except for the idea of expanding my own experience to those of others - I have a preference to not suffer, and so does everyone else, so it should be avoided whenever possible, regardless of whether or not other people suffer in unique ways.

I can't think of any circumstances under which I would permit suffering if it could be avoided (or a greater amount of suffering incurred in exchange for a smaller amount).

Then reply to my criticisms, please. Saying I was uncharitable doesn't negate them.

I know. But I think moral absolutism might be possible, along with objectivity. I suppose I could arbitrarily specify that suffering is inherently bad, and then adopt a negative utilitarian position. That would lead to an absolute morality I think, even if not objective. I suppose that is more my position - but how I feel enters into me specifying that suffering is bad; I have suffered and don't like it a whole lot - like most people. Thus I think it is wrong.

If some moral theory proved that killing some small child was the 'right' thing to do would you do it, or would you question the theory? — Isaac

That is similar to the two horned Euthyphro Dilemma. Either what god commands is arbitrary, or moral facts exist independently of god. Most theists won't just bite the bullet and say it is arbitrary - in fact the few theists I've proposed it to just claimed the dilemma was "ridiculous" and rejected it.

"worst possible misery for everyone" he calls it.

So how is following what 'seems best to me' not precisely relativism? — Isaac

Oh yeah, I just assume that minimizing suffering is pretty much indisputably right, because that is how I and many people other feel. At its base I have no justification for this other than that one thought experiment by Sam Harris (I don't like the guy that much, but his thought experiment about the worst possible world makes a lot of sense to me).

Meanders and needs re-formatting. A distinct thesis statement at the beginning might help - you only mention the "crux" of your paper halfway through.

Read your essay. It would help to change the format and have an introductory paragraph. It is difficult to tell where it is going; it meanders.

Plug your papers elsewhere please. And if no one wants to comment on your threads you should just write better OP's.

You've not given any reason why we'd prefer either of these outcomes. — Isaac

The one that causes less suffering seems best to me.

Really? It's not something I've ever encountered. I've sat on an ethics committee for a short while, permitting just about anything didn't come up, and absolute moral rightness wasn't even mentioned. The entire talk is about what people consider moral from different perspectives. What ethical committees are you thinking of where relativists say "anything goes!"? — Isaac

It is totally possible my perception is skewed - I mostly hear about people on ethics committees from people who have talked about ethics committees without being on them necessarily.

Indeed, tautologically so. And assuming a divine command theory stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would result in a happier God... Assuming a virtue ethical stance - advising a company to do what is more virtuous would lead to a more virtuous acting company... — Isaac

Yeah, I corrected myself. Sorry.

My former post doesn't totally make sense. I should have said: if there is an absolute morality and what is absolute is absolute because it causes less suffering then it would be right to advise a company to follow the course of action dictated by the absolute morality as opposed to simply saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it".

I'm sounding like a stuck record, but... why? If a firm has gone to the trouble of consulting an ethicist what difference is it going to make to the outcome whether that ethicist believes in absolute morality? — Isaac

If they believe in absolute morality then they won't simply posit that ethics is relative - which is often equivalent to permitting just about anything within the scope of different cultures having different ethical beliefs. It seems to me that unless the application of the absolute morality posited caused more net suffering - assuming a negative utilitarian stance - advising a company to do what is absolutely right would cause less suffering and therefore be sound. It is also salient to recognize that this advisement is distinct from merely saying "most people think x is immoral so therefore we ought not do it", which is relativistic.

Which do you think is going to have the most normative force with the company? — Isaac

I'm not sure which of those ethical claims would hold more normative force with a company.

Are you familiar with Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral reasoning?

According to this theory, people at different stages of moral reasoning reason differently about issues of morality. On a metalevel, this explains the differences between people and how the same person can reason differently about the same moral issue, in different times of their life. — baker

That is interesting stuff; I remember being taught about it in psychology in high school. Many students appeared to be stuck at stage four of conventional morality - follow laws to maintain order in society.

An objective morality would still examine an action within the context it takes place. — Cheshire

Potentially, but not necessarily. There could be the law: "Do not steal", which has no context, as opposed to the law: "Do not steal on the Sabbath". Both could be objective.

Ignoring the context just doesn't seem reasonable. — Cheshire

Good point; If you still want to take into account context you need either objective laws that take into account context or some sort of relativism.

Whether morals actually are objective, absolute, subjective, or relative matters not one jot when it comes to people following them. They will do so on the basis of a little bit of biology and a huge slice of enculturation. No matter what philosophers think. — Isaac

There may be some truth to this but ethicists/bio-ethicists contribute disproportionately to the policies of organizations/corporations/government, and it matters whether or not they believe in an absolute morality. So it can be fruitful to search for an absolute morality imo.

We find a book clearly written by God called "All the Morals" and in it is a passage which say "FGM is immoral". People who want to do FGM say "Well we're Immoral then" and carry on. — Isaac

At the very least we could justify implementing laws that prevent things like FGM if there were an absolute morality.

Furthermore, there is obviously a connection to what the vast majority of people believe is permissible and their philosophical assumptions - even if those assumptions are naïve. Most people, even if they don't know what the term "free choice" means, for example, have a concept of what it is - or so I've noticed in some of my discussions with people who don't read philosophy - and it contributes to their conception of moral culpability.

The same goes for morality I believe: people often act on their beliefs, or believe them justified and thus try to codify them, based on the belief that their morality is absolute - an assumption many people share. If enough people believe themselves to know that their shared morality is justified they may push to outlaw abhorrent practices such as FGM.

I, once again, acknowledge that while there is nothing to guarantee that an absolute/objective morality would prevent people from acting counter to said morality, moral relativism gives cover for horrible stuff.

Well, since you quote everything but the what you're asking about – and by your less than charitable reading of what you did quote – it's fair to assume you're looking for an ticky-tack argument and not a discussion. I can't help you with that. — 180 Proof

What would a charitable reading look like? And yes, I am looking for a discussion, I just think you made a poor case for objective morality, that's all - otherwise I actually think your views on ethics are pretty solid.

Good point. I agree.



I was talking to Tom, I know you meant that.

What you just wrote is quite similar to the postmodern perspective of ‘religion after religion’ philosophers like John Caputo and Simon Critchley. — Joshs

That was unintended.

Perhaps it would help to examine your assumptions. Seems like you are missing the point. Hitler thought what he was doing was good - engaged in righteous foundational work for a new epoch of human greatness. It's you that's determining what's justified and what is totally unjustified. You don't find it a useful comparison because it looks like you can't see the perspectivism inherent in this matter. — Tom Storm

No, I see what you are saying, I just don't see why it matters. And it isn't a matter of perspective which beliefs are justified in this case - one belief is based in science whereas the other in something else entirely. Surely that makes a difference?

I think we might disagree semantically, but the understanding of the implications seems to be the same. The opinion of the actor isn't a determining factor in the result. — Cheshire

Yes, but it is more difficult to justify an objective morality than an absolute morality it seems to me. If you just want the act to be right regardless of opinion absolute morality satisfies that without you needing to prove that moral facts exist.

No, I was focusing on your claim that there are just evil
people doing evil things. That is a quintessentially theological notion. Even if you don’t think of yourself believing in God, you clearly believe in Good( which is what defines as evil as what it is) , and for many theologians and philosophers this amounts to the same thing as God. — Joshs

I think that there might be some moral facts, and that maybe good can exist, but I have no faith in the matter. That would be the most important difference between my view and a theologian's.

My position on normative ethics is (aretaic) negative utilitarianism, wherein 'harm suffering misery' of members of any sentient species (at minimum) are consider 'moral facts' — 180 Proof

Suffering may be observable and obvious, but how does suffering constitute a moral fact? A moral fact is an invariable law, not a subjective experience like suffering, harm, misery, etc. - even though I concede that it is a fact that people suffer.

'moral facts' (that is, facts which entail reducing or preventing increases of them). — 180 Proof

It might be a fact that certain actions will increase or decrease suffering, but how are these moral facts? They do not provide an objective moral criterion, even if they tell us what to do given we accept that suffering is wrong.

The answers here are the same in large part because the criterion proposed in objectively grounded. Harm is the objective moral fact at issue: objective because it is specie member-invariant — 180 Proof

I'm not sure what you're saying here. If you mean harm/suffering is invariant between members of the same species that isn't true. One person's suffering often cannot be compared to another's.

The answers here are the same in large part because the criterion proposed in objectively grounded. — 180 Proof

It seems to me none of this is objectively grounded.

I do, however, think beliefs are highly relevant when it comes to moral culpability, which I've written about elsewhere.

I think that all religions are latently dangerous, but Islam is probably the worst. In general, however, no. I know what you are getting at - if I associate evil with a particular set of beliefs then I must think that evil is mostly perpetrated as a function of beliefs, and not just evil people doing evil things.

I'm not even sure what my question means.

One might even venture a developmental model of a cultural history of morality. connecting empathy with a gradual evolution from one-dimensional foundationalism to increasingly multi-dimensional , differentiated social understanding. What we judge in hindsight as genocidal evil becomes a necessary phase in that development. (I’m trying not to sound too Hegelian, or modernist). — Joshs

Not going to lie, dude - that was exceedingly abstruse. What does any of that even mean? That genocide was necessary as part of the evolution of a more pluralistic morality?

The point is not that he was full of shit, the point is he thought he had a plan for improving the world and millions of people agreed with this plan. — Tom Storm

Yes, I get that, but on one side you have justified beliefs, and on the other totally unjustified. There is no symmetry except in terms of zeal perhaps. So I do not find it to be a useful comparison.

This is the key. When we retrofit our own moral judgements and assume people are 'justifying' actions using post hoc rationalisations we are assuming that 'evil' is done by people who know they are evil and what they are doing is wrong. — Tom Storm

I literally said that beliefs cause many good people to do bad things; I totally acknowledge this here:

While beliefs don't force evil people to do evil things, beliefs often times influence good people to do bad things - something that could be more easily avoided imo. — ToothyMaw

I must correct myself, however: some evil people believe they are agents of good, but I still hold that evil people often times just want to do evil things.

When we retrofit our own moral judgements and assume people are 'justifying' actions using post hoc rationalisations we are assuming that 'evil' is done by people who know they are evil and what they are doing is wrong. — Tom Storm

Not all justifications are post hoc rationalizations. They can just mean "the action of showing something to be right or reasonable", which is what I meant when I used the word originally. So it seems we are splitting hairs; I totally agree with you.

I think it is situational. Many evil people try to justify their evil actions, whereas some believe they are, as you say, agents of good.

Appealing to some twisted morality might convince more people that your cause is righteous, but, ultimately, I think it makes little difference what evil people think they are doing - they are doing evil things and should be stopped. And I think we should not compare someone like Greta Thunberg to Hitler - there is good reason to believe that human contributions to climate change matter, whereas Hitler was obviously full of shit.

And it happens that humans are fallible enough to believe some of these justifications.

Good point. But I think many evil people will create justifications for evil acts because of a deeper issue - a lack of empathy, fanaticism, tribalism, etc.

How? No one seems to be presenting a mechanism connecting objectivity of morals to people being somehow unable to act or form beliefs contrary to them — Isaac

I'm saying accepting that morality is subjective gives cover for some pretty horrible beliefs - such as female genital mutilation being acceptable. I know that people could always just form beliefs counter to whatever is the - supposedly - absolute morality, but that doesn't mean we have to allow something like FGM.

Furthermore, even though FGM is absolutely horrible, the people who do it might just see it as justified - and I wouldn't even call them evil. If it could be argued coherently that they shouldn't do it because of some sort of absolute morality then maybe it could be stopped, however. All indicating that creating a justified absolute morality could potentially curb some suffering.

I acknowledge, however, that there is no direct mechanism that would connect the objectivity of morals to people not being able to develop beliefs counter to said morals. But really what we should be talking about is moral absolutism, not objectivity.