• What's the big mystery about time?
    Are you trying to ask how the coordinates are laid out in graphics? — InPitzotl

    No. I'm asking what the increase in the x-coordinate - that you mentioned earlier - represents. This applies equally to your hill example. What does an increase in the x-coordinate represent there? Again, I imagine it represents something spatial concerning the image or the hill, not something concerning an algorithm.

    ...Banno's image consists of an array of pixels. The x coordinates form a finite ordered sequence. The colors associated with the x coordinates form a corresponding finite ordered sequence. — InPitzotl

    Why must the ordered sequence of the colours in the picture be from left to right? More to the point, why must the sequence approach "n" at all? Who or what is calculating the ordered sequence to "n" to enable the "approach"? In other words, what initiates the ordered sequence being followed?

    or why the sequence's order had to have been specified by "as the x coordinate increases".
    — Luke

    Because that's the phrase under question:

    The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases.     — InPitzotl

    That's circular. The x-coordinate increases because of the sequence's order and the sequence's order had to be specified by "as the x coordinate increases"...because that's what's in question? That's no explanation.

    I find these to be opposing views.
    — Luke

    "View" is not the right word to apply here; these are manners of speaking.     — InPitzotl

    I was talking about your viewpoint(s) or opinion(s). I meant that I find them to be conceptually opposed; contradictory, incompatible.

    According to this latter view, "as you change the x coordinate, you get a change in color".
    — Luke

    Almost. This phrasing is x-coordinate relative, not time relative. "as you change the x coordinate" is telling you what it's relative to.     — InPitzotl

    Sure, it's the space-relative view, analogous to the time-relative view. I understood that you were drawing an analogy. But you still hold these relative views and don't consider them to be problematic or incompatible with your opinion that nothing moves or changes position, right?

    This is the view of change-over-space that you and Banno believe is possible without time?
    — Luke

    It's not time relative; it does not matter when you say it. And it's not time fixed; it's not talking about a particular point in time. It is x-coordinate relative.     — InPitzotl

    Like I said, "without time".

    There isn't an O-ghost that moves from O-at-A to O-at-D. There's just the O-at-A and the O-at-D. And there's no coordinate ghost that moves from 850 to 900. There's just a coordinate of 850 and a coordinate of 900. — InPitzotl

    But on the time-relative view that you endorse, which is analogous to the space-relative view, there is an O-ghost. The O-ghost on the space-relative view is the increasing x-coordinate.

    And there's no coordinate ghost that moves from 850 to 900. There's just a coordinate of 850 and a coordinate of 900. — InPitzotl

    What about the increasing x-coordinate(s) and their associated colour(s) "approaching" the colour on the right? Isn't 900 to the right of 850? Doesn't the colour at 850 "approach" the colours to its right, including the colour at 900?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    Given an ordered sequence of values v1, v2, v3, ..., vn, and a distance metric D; if the sequence has the property that i<j⇒D(vj,vn)<D(vi,vn), then we say that the sequence approaches vn. — InPitzotl
    Consider three points: B1=(900,10), B2=(850,1), B3=(850,17); their colors are C1=(253,204,155), C2=(253,216,218) and C3=(253,216,218) respectively.

    Given this particular set of points and associated colors, the statement above is describing the ordered sequence (253,216,218), (253,204,155). Each element in this sequence is "the color at an x coordinate". The sequence's order is specified by "as the x coordinate increases"; the order of said x coordinates is 850, 900. The statement is claiming that this sequence approaches the color on the right.     — InPitzotl

    This doesn't tell me what the increase in the x-coordinate represents. I imagine it represents something in space?

    I don't see why you've needed to introduce an ordered sequence of values, or why the sequence's order had to have been specified by "as the x coordinate increases".

    O doesn't do that either. There's no such thing as a time when O is not at A.

    "Change in time" with "in" contrasts with this; to me, this indicates a time relative view. O changes in time; as you change time coordinates, you get a change in position. Analogously, the color changes in x coordinates; as you change the x coordinate, you get a change in color.     — InPitzotl

    So you maintain that there is no time when O is not at A, that nothing moves or changes. Right? Or, as you expressed it earlier:

    When O moves from A=(1,1,1,1) to D=(2,1,1,2), nothing is changing time. O moves because O is at A and is at D, D and A are at different times, and D and A are at different places (and more reasons which I'll ignore here for now). O never stops being at (1,1,1) at t=1. There's no such thing as a thing that moves from (1,1,1) at t=1 to (2,1,1) at t=2: — InPitzotl

    This describes your view that nothing "changes time".

    However, you also hold the view that things do "change in time"? I find these to be opposing views. The latter is, as you say, "the time relative view". According to this latter view, "as you change the x coordinate, you get a change in color". This is the view of change-over-space that you and Banno believe is possible without time? But in your view nothing "changes time"; nothing changes its x-coordinate or its t-coordinate. "O never stops being at (1,1,1) at t=1", like you said. So how can you hold both the time relative view where "you change the x coordinate" and the time absolute view where you don't?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    such as how a colour in Banno's image can "approach" the rightmost x-coordinate,
    — Luke

    This is a Type A question. A time analog would be a video     — InPitzotl

    I’m asking you to explain this “approach” to the rightmost x-coordinate absent of time, so your analogy that includes time doesn’t help.

    or how an x-coordinate can increase.
    — Luke
    This is a Type B question. Single points do not change     — InPitzotl

    You said earlier:

    The colors are changing their distance to (252,176,65). The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases. That is equivalent to saying the color-distance of the color to the color at the right approaches 0. — InPitzotl

    I’m looking for you to explain this “increase” in the x-coordinate. You said it, not me. I asked you what this change in the x-coordinate represents and how it increases.

    You're demanding that a single point change — InPitzotl

    No, I’m asking how can the x-coordinate “increase”, or how can any colour “approach” the colour on the right, given that there is no time and nothing changes position.

    It seems logical to me that if nothing is changing in time then nothing is changing in place, either.
    — Luke

    But it is changing in time     — InPitzotl

    You said in your previous post that I was responding to:

    When O moves from A=(1,1,1,1) to D=(2,1,1,2), nothing is changing time. — InPitzotl

    Now you are saying that something is changing in time? Well, which is it?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    There's a lot of repetition here so I'm going to cull my responses down to focus. — InPitzotl

    It seems to me that you have ignored some of the more difficult questions I put to you, such as how a colour in Banno's image can "approach" the rightmost x-coordinate, or how an x-coordinate can increase.

    I think you're confused. This statement refers to the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate in Banno's image to "the color on the right"
    — InPitzotl

    Surely the statement refers to a change in the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate?
    — Luke

    No, it refers to a change in degree of difference of the color over different x coordinates.     — InPitzotl

    Okay, thank you for correcting (my correction of) your original statement.

    You're just misconceiving change. When O moves from A=(1,1,1,1) to D=(2,1,1,2), nothing is changing time. — InPitzotl

    According to the definition of motion you gave the other day:

    Motion by the way is change in position over change in time. — InPitzotl

    Per this definition of motion, how can O move if "nothing is changing time"?

    Analogously, how can O move if nothing is changing position?

    Perhaps you allow for an object to change in position (even though you do not allow for an object to change in time)? I only ask because you appear to suggest so here:

    Nay, O cannot possibly be said to move from (1,1,1) to (2,1,1) unless O is at (1,1,1) at some t coordinate t1, and then finds itself at (2,1,1) at some different t coordinate t2, with the further requirement (due to the use of move from...to) that t2 is in the future direction of t1. — InPitzotl

    It seems logical to me that if nothing is changing in time then nothing is changing in place, either. According to such a view, there can be no change over time or place.

    There's no such thing as a thing that moves from (1,1,1) at t=1 to (2,1,1) at t=2 — InPitzotl

    Then nothing moves or changes (according to your definition of motion).
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    How can the change have a direction without time?

    You said that the colour "changes over the distance from left to right".

    I think I understand what you mean by the distance - I take it you mean the horizontal length of the image. But I can't make much sense of directionality without time. Do you mean that the change occurs or happens from left to right? Do you mean that the colour change can be seen in the image if we look at it "from left to right"? Can you provide any explanation about what you meant by "from left to right"?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    I meant from left to right. What else? — Banno

    Does it mean that you start on the left and end on the right?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    This from the preson who claims not to know what "...from left to right" means: — Banno

    I asked what you meant by it.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    Either get engaged in the discussion or keep out of it.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    The colour does not change over time. It does change over the distance from left to right. — Banno

    What do you mean by "from left to right"?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    That's great, except that (until now) you have been talking about a change in distance, not merely distance.
    — Luke

    I have not used that phrase in this thread.     — InPitzotl

    You have variously referred to changes in the x-coordinate, distance, position and place. I have taken all these to amount to roughly the same thing. For example, you said:

    A to B represents a change in place of dx1 (along the x coordinate), and a change in color of dy1. I remind you the claim is that there can be a change from place to place. Well, there's a change in place with a change in color. — InPitzotl

    Please correct me if 'dx1' does not represent a change of place (or change of distance/position/x-coordinate). I'm happy to use 'change of place' or 'change of position' instead of 'change of distance'. I think it more clearly emphasises my point.

    I think you're confused. This statement refers to the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate in Banno's image to "the color on the right" — InPitzotl

    Surely the statement refers to a change in the degree of difference of the color at a given x coordinate?

    You are simultaneously asserting that nothing changes place while relying on a change of place (change of x-coordinate) in your calculation.

    The colors are changing their distance to (252,176,65). The claim is equivalent to saying the color at an x coordinate approaches the color at the right as the x coordinate increases. That is equivalent to saying the color-distance of the color to the color at the right approaches 0. — InPitzotl

    In what sense do the colours change their distance to the colour on the right? In Banno's static image, the colour (at each x-coordinate) is a fixed distance from the colour (at the x-coordinate) on the right. Where does change enter the picture? How does any colour "approach" the colour on the right?

    You can see exactly what I described in this graph; as x increases, the trace of color distance of that color to the color at the right approaches 0. — InPitzotl

    What does the increase in x represent? And how does x increase? Remember, you have agreed that nothing moves.

    The hill is changing height over distance analogous to how O changes position over time.
    — InPitzotl

    This would imply that it is the hill that changes its distance.
    — Luke

    Why would it imply such a thing?     — InPitzotl

    If there is a change in time for O, then there must be an analogous change in distance for H.

    Or is it only part of the hill? — Luke

    Is what only part of the hill?     — InPitzotl

    I meant: Is it the whole hill or only part of the hill that changes its distance? In the example of Banno's image, you seem to indicate that only part of the image changes its distance to the x-coordinate on the right.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    Why don't you tell me what is moving, given that it appears to be part of your calculation.
    — Luke

    Sure. Nothing is moving. The distance from my head to the wall is about four feet. The direction from my head to the wall is west. Neither of these statements require a thing to move from my head to the wall.     — InPitzotl

    That's great, except that (until now) you have been talking about a change in distance, not merely distance. What does it mean to say that there is a change in distance from your head to the wall? Something's gotta give. Once again, what is it that changes distance?

    ...this is just narrative. The problem is that there's no way to take this narrative seriously, as there's no sane reading of "there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right" in a non-metaphorical sense. — InPitzotl

    Then there must also be no sane reading of "the hill changes its height" in a non-metaphorical sense. If the change in distance is metaphorical, then the change in height must also be metaphorical.

    The hill is changing height over distance analogous to how O changes position over time. — InPitzotl

    This would imply that it is the hill that changes its distance. Or is it only part of the hill? Which one does 'O' represent?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    Contrast change-over-place now with change-over-time. Forget the concept for a moment and look at those those two phrases. In the phrases, what's different? — InPitzotl

    One says "place" and one says "time". I invite you to also consider the idea of change-over-place (without time). In such a scenario, there is no change at any spatial location; nothing changes or moves at (or from) any spatial coordinate.

    Contrast this with a hill. In 150 feet (unit-of-distance), the hill rises 50 feet (unit-of-distance). So the hill has a gradient of 50 feet over 150 feet. The units cancel and we're left with a gradient of 1/3. The hill changes its height by 50 feet over a run of 150 feet. — InPitzotl

    How does the hill "change" its height? I understand that you can calculate all this, and that a change of distance or spatial location or x-coordinate is required for your calculations, but the hill doesn't actually change at all (without time). All you are doing is comparing one part of the hill to another in order to obtain a mathematical result.

    Wrong... and I'll repeat this:

    The problem here isn't in what I'm saying. The problem here is only that you're insisting what I mean by change isn't what you think change means.     — InPitzotl

    Begging the question. That's what is in dispute here. You are also insisting that what I mean by change isn't what you think change means.

    You are asking how something ("you") moves irrespective of time. — InPitzotl

    I asked this question in response to your statement that "there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right". You have since backpedalled, at first claiming this motion is only "metaphorical", and now pretending as though you never said anything at all about motion.

    That question presumes something is moving in the first place. But nothing moves when a hill changes its height by 50 feet over a run of 150 feet. You're the one insisting it's a valid question... you're the one insisting something must move for a hill to change its height by 50 feet over a run of 150 feet, so you tell me what it is that is moving. — InPitzotl

    Why don't you tell me what is moving, given that it appears to be part of your calculation. The two main examples that have been offered are change-in-colour and change-in-height over change-in-distance. If something changes distance, then doesn't it move? I'll ask again: what changes distance in these examples? If nothing changes distance, then why is it part of your calculation?

    Luke is the only one insisting something must be moving. Motion by the way is change in position over change in time. Change in height over change in position (the hill) is not motion. Change in color over change in position (the image) is not motion. — InPitzotl

    Change in position...is motion. If nothing changes position, then why measure change in position? I take it that when you measure change in position, you are measuring the change in position of something?

    Change in color over change in x coordinate is not motion (i.e., it is not change in position over change in time). — InPitzotl

    Yes, a change in position requires time. That's my point.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    Because it has nothing to do with the claim you're objecting to. — InPitzotl

    I'm objecting to Banno's claim that there can be change-over-place irrespective of time. The question I asked you was:

    there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right
    — InPitzotl

    How can you “move from left to right” irrespective of time?     — Luke

    My question has everything to do with the claim I'm objecting to and is completely valid.

    Metaphorical motion is not motion; literal motion is motion. I repeat the question... why must things move? — InPitzotl

    You said "there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right". You subsequently clarified this as "metaphorical motion". I don't understand why you are now asking me why things must move. I guess because you said that there is change "as you move from left to right".

    Yes. And if it has different heights at different parts, then it must have different heights in different places. Therefore a change in place can correspond to a change in height. So what's the problem? — InPitzotl

    I imagine there must be something that actually changes place. Wouldn't that take some time to move?

    Then you're either insane or you're lost. — InPitzotl

    Nice.

    Nothing has to actually move from A to B for that change to be a change of dx1 in x coordinates or a change of dy1 in color. And nothing has to move from B to C for that change to be a change of dx2 in x coordinates or a change of dy2 in color. — InPitzotl

    Nothing needs to move for something to change its spatial coordinates (or for what is at a spatial coordinate to change)? And exactly what is changing coordinates here? The hill? Part(s) of the hill? The part of the hill you are looking at?
  • The Thickness of the Present (revisited)
    We think of ourselves as living in time, having an autobiographical past, as well as a future, and present opportunities that we are liable to miss. This distinguishes us from non-rational animals who, although they also perceive and act on present opportunities (J.J. Gibson's affordances), don't self-consciously conceive of themselves as living in time. But what distinguishes us from them isn't merely our rich conception of time, but the impact this conception has on what we are and what we can do. In part, it enables us to live in (and build) a much thicker present, or so I would argue. — Pierre-Normand

    I take it, then, that your interest here is not really to do with debates over the ontological nature of time itself, or perhaps even to do with the present moment, but is more about our (at least partially) socially-constructed lives within the "autobiographical present", which is enabled by our language and current knowledge about the world. Or something along those lines? Interesting concept, but I'm not actually sure what the description/analogy of "thickness" is supposed to represent. In what sense is our present moment "much thicker" than that of non-rational animals? Can we imagine further into the future and remember further into the past? Or imagine and remember better?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    Time is required to perceive the change from white to yellow. That's not in question. — ZzzoneiroCosm

    Hell yeah it's in question.

    @Banno's original claim was that:

    Time and change have no special relation.

    Change occurs from place to place as well as from time to time.     — Banno

    That is, Banno has claimed that change can occur "from place to place" without time (because he draws a distinction here between change-over-place and change-over-time).

    The only support for his claim that time is not required for change-over-place is the image he presented. This image, he claims, "changes from white on the left to yellow on the right." So it is very much in question whether time is required to perceive any change from white to yellow (or for the static image itself to somehow "change" from white on the left to yellow on the right).
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    I could suggest a better question... "how can you explain the change without a metaphorical walk"? The question you asked, though, is simply invalid. — InPitzotl

    It's a different example, so I don't see how my question is invalid.

    Why must something move? — InPitzotl

    Because you said there was metaphorical motion.

    The claim is that change can occur place to place as well as time to time. The height of the hill changes (change) as a function of where you are on the road (place to place) without involving any movement. — InPitzotl

    Unless you can actually move "place to place" and change "where you are on the road", then it makes no sense to say that "the height of the hill changes (change) as a function of where you are on the road (place to place)". And I don't see how any motion is possible without time.

    IF I move left to right, THEN I will go lower. But I don't have to move left to right for that function to be lower at higher values of x. The motion is entirely unnecessary; it can be discarded. It's a factual matter that the curve on the right has lower values than the curve on the left. — InPitzotl

    What does that have to do with change? The height of the hill does not change (at any given time). It has different heights at different parts. I still don't see support for your stronger claim that the height of the hill not only has different parts with different heights, but that its height changes (at any give time); especially that we can speak of any sort of change here without involving time.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    One can see that the colour changes from left to right. — Banno

    As I noted in my first post and have re-stated a couple more times since:

    Time is required to get "from place to place" or to perceive (and compare) one place and then another. — Luke

    You still haven't addressed this point as yet. I won't hold my breath.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    What’s the right question?
    — Luke

    Depends on what you want to ask, but it certainly isn't the question of how I can do what I do not actually do. I'm certainly not literally walking left to right on the image.     — InPitzotl

    It’s your responsibility to clarify what you meant by “as you move from left to right”, not mine. You explained it as a “metaphorical motion”, which is not any actual motion or change, is it? I fail to see how you get actual change from metaphorical motion.

    From the samples above, the transition from the RGB value at x-coordinate 492 to that at x-coordinate 615 changes towards the color RGB (252,176,65). — InPitzotl

    You still haven’t told me what moves or what is “in transit” from one x-coordinate to another, even if metaphorically speaking.

    It sounds like a conditional: that if you were to gradually move (or look) from one place to another, left to right, then you would see the colour change from white to yellow. Okay, but how is that potential motion (or perception) possible without time?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    How can you “move from left to right” irrespective of time?
    — Luke

    That's the wrong question.     — InPitzotl

    What’s the right question?

    Certainly you don't think when I "move from left to right", I'm actually walking on my monitor along that path, right? I don't "move from left to right" in the first place. This is metaphorical motion. — InPitzotl

    If the motion is metaphorical then the change is also metaphorical (i.e. not actual).

    The metaphor specifically conveys degree-of-change-in-place in the image along a particular direction; namely, to the right. — InPitzotl

    I don’t know about “degree-of”. The metaphor simply seems to indicate change-of-place in the image along a particular direction. But what changes place? Nothing in the image.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    there is a gradual change in degree of difference as you move from left to right — InPitzotl

    How can you “move from left to right” irrespective of time?

    Not to mention you are saying that it is “you” that moves or changes, not the image.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    It's the same image I saw yesterday. Nothing about it has changed.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    But it's not the image that changes. — Pierre-Normand
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    This argument that you are having over the ordinary meaning of the word change is bizarre. What it clearly shows though is that change as a definition of time is of no use. The specific meaning of change in this context is change-over-time, which of course cannot be understood without already understanding what time is. — SophistiCat

    We were not attempting to define time or change. We were instead criticising Banno's bizarre assertion that "Time and change have no special relation", and his attempt to argue that there can be change-over-space without change-over-time.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    The image is made up, at any given time, of all of its parts and this totality doesn't change just by dint of the fact that its parts are distinguishable from one another. — Pierre-Normand

    Just like the flooring in Banno's house.
  • The Thickness of the Present (revisited)
    What I want to argue is that the present moment is real because it is perspectival and thick in a way that is loosely similar to the way in which, say, paper money has real value because, through our social practices, we invest it with value. — Pierre-Normand

    I'm not sure I follow. Non-presentists take the present moment to be unreal despite its perspectival (indexical) appearance. As someone with more presentist leanings, I consider our apparent aging and movement through time to be objective facts that are independent of our social practices.
  • The Thickness of the Present (revisited)
    its thickness is context dependent and hence relative to whatever wider context of experience gives meaning to the very many moments of shorter duration that make up this experience or activity. — Pierre-Normand

    I agree with this. The meaning of the word "present" is found in its use, and it can be used to mean the present second, minute, hour, day, month, year, millennium, etc., just as the word "here" can be used to mean here where I am standing or here in our galaxy.

    In order to spell it out more fully and make it more plausible, it will prove useful to mention the main source of the intuition that the objective flow of time can be understood as the movement of an instantaneous present moment that represents a moving cutting edge between the growing past and the shrinking future. — Pierre-Normand

    I look forward to it! From what I've read it is more the concern of presentism's critics who question the length of the present moment. Whatever its length, our experience of aging and being conscious through time need to be accounted for by non-presentists and/or those who argue that the present moment and the flow of time are illusory. What sort of illusion is that?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    According to your own theory of change, would you say that natural numbers change from being even to being uneven, and back to being even again, alternatively, from one number to the next? What is it that is changing then? — Pierre-Normand

    :up:
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    It is there before you. Use your eyes. — Banno

    Of course it is, but a change in perception requires time. As I said.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ...from right to left. — Banno

    The only change here is your implicit assumption of a change in perception as you look "from right to left", from room to room, or "from place to place". But as I said earlier, a change in perception requires time.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    The house has a floor that changes from room to room. — Banno

    How does the floor change? One room has a wood floor, the other room has a bamboo floor.
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    One room has a wood floor; the other room has a bamboo floor. That changed just now?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    When?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    ↪Banno
    I would say you just have different flooring in different rooms. How does it change?
  • What's the big mystery about time?
    Time and change have no special relation.

    Change occurs from place to place as well as from time to time.     — Banno

    Two places might be different at a point in time, but nothing changes at a point in time.

    Time is required to get "from place to place" or to perceive (and compare) one place and then another.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    No one knows the meaning of the words. Therefore no one can judge whether his actions indicate that he attaches the right meaning or not. — Metaphysician Undercover

    We are told that his actions indicate that he attaches a meaning to the word, but not the right one. This is why only the last sentence of 269 is about private language.

    ↪jamalrob

    I’ve stayed on topic and tried to correct MU in his reading of the PLA because I’m passionate about Wittgenstein. I also engaged with other posters earlier in the discussion. I don’t want to have a private discussion with MU, so thanks for having me.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    Luke, we've been through this. He has no criterion, there is no such thing as "right". Therefore it is impossible that he could identify and "know" the thing which "S" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Where does it say at 258 that he does not or cannot know what "S" refers to? What is it that "S" refers to that he does not or cannot know?

    And your explanation of "thinking one understands" doesn't make any sense to me, and is clearly not consistent with Wittgenstein's use. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Probably because you overlooked the important part. I said:

    ‘Thinking he understands’ is not acting as if he understands. On the contrary, his behaviour shows that he has attached the wrong meaning to the word and that he does not understand its meaning. — Luke

    This is perfectly consistent with what W says at 269:

    269. Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man’s behaviour for...his ‘thinking he understands’, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. — PI 269

    You claim that 'thinking he understands' means acting as if he does understand, but at 269 Wittgenstein distinguishes between the criteria in a man's behaviour for 'thinking he understands' and for 'understanding the word correctly'. It is only the latter where the man shows that he understands.

    Wittgenstein tells us that the man does not understand because he attaches a meaning to the word which is not the right one. That is, he misunderstands the meaning of the word. Here we might speak of a "subjective understanding", but Wittgenstein distinguishes this from the criteria in a man's behaviour for understanding the word correctly (i.e. right).

    This may not make any sense to you because you don't understand it.

    Because the meaning attached to the words by the person is not the right meaning, his behaviour is that of "appearing to understand" (he thinks he understands and therefore is pretending to understand) when he really does not understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

    If he appeared to understand then he would not appear to not understand. Wittgenstein tells us that the criteria in a man's behaviour for 'thinking he understands' is that he attaches a meaning to the word which is not the right one. If he understood the meaning of the word, then the criteria in his behaviour would be that he attaches the right meaning to the word and understands the word correctly. Alas, he does not.

    As I explained to you, the situation in which we cannot talk about right, is necessarily not right. — Metaphysician Undercover

    It's not necessary. The situation could be that we can talk about neither right nor not right.

    When "right" is excluded as a possibility, such that we cannot even talk about the possibility of the person being right, then the person is necessarily "not right" — Metaphysician Undercover

    What is excluded is our talk about right, not that the person is right. Therefore, it is not implied that the person is "not right".
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    At 243 "private language" requires that what the words refer to is "known" to the user of the language. This is shown to be incoherent by the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

    How is the incoherence shown to be a result of the private language user’s knowledge at 258?

    I think it's very clear that "sounds which no else understands, which I appear to understand", is a form of what has been called "subjective understanding". What he is saying can be described in this way: these are words which no one understands (there is no 'right' here), but I pretend to understand. That's why i used the word "pretense" earlier, which you objected to. The person is "thinking he understands", and so is acting as if he understands, even to the point of exuding certitude, when he really does not understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Pretending one understands means appearing to understand without the belief one understands.
    Thinking one understands means appearing not to understand with the belief one understands.
    These are not the same.

    ‘Thinking he understands’ is not acting as if he understands. On the contrary, his behaviour shows that he has attached the wrong meaning to the word and that he does not understand its meaning.

    We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2).
    — Luke

    What kind of nonsensical argument is this? Why do you think Wittgenstein uses the word "appear" here?     — Metaphysician Undercover

    What does the word “appear” have to do with the man attaching the wrong meaning to the word?

    Furthermore, Wittgenstein does not use the word "wrong" here, he says "attaches some meaning to the word, but not the right one". By removing this sort of understanding from that which is said to be "right", Wittgenstein is completely consistent with 258, "here we can't talk about 'right'", making the rest of your argument irrelevant gibberish. — Metaphysician Undercover

    If you think that we can talk about ‘not right’ or ‘wrong’ wrt a private language, then you don’t understand why we can’t talk about right.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    What Wittgenstein "means by a private language" is distinctly different at 243, from what it is at 269. — Metaphysician Undercover

    What's your argument for this?

    The example at 258 shows that a "private language" as described at 243 is completely incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

    How is the private language described at 269 completely coherent?

    What produces the incoherency in Wittgenstein's "private language" definition, is the condition that the person "knows' what the words refer to. If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. The person at 258 does not "know" what the symbol "S" refers to, as required by 243. — Metaphysician Undercover

    258 does not mention the word "know".

    So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover

    You are conflating two things here. 269 states:

    269. Let us remember that there are certain criteria in a man’s behaviour for his not understanding a word: that it means nothing to him, that he can do nothing with it. And criteria for his ‘thinking he understands’, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one. And lastly, criteria for his understanding the word correctly. In the second case, one might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”. — PI 269

    The last sentence of 269 does not refer back to the earlier sentences. There are two separate descriptions here:

    (1) We might speak of a "subjective understanding" in relation to the behavioural criteria of a man 'thinking he understands' the meaning of a word, but who does not really understand because he attaches the wrong meaning to the word.

    (2) Sounds which no one else understands but which I 'appear to understand' might be called a "private language".

    You seem to think that (1) and (2) both continuously refer to a private language. I disagree as I think that only (2) refers to a private language.

    We are told that the man attaches the wrong meaning to a word at (1), but not at (2). However, as I have argued, if you accept the reasons for the incoherency of a private language given at 258, then we can talk about neither "right" nor "wrong" regarding the meaning of a word/sign in a private language, because it lacks any criteria of correctness and/or incorrectness. As such, it is not possible to correct the private language user on the use/meanings of its signs, which can have no regularity or rules for their usage. We might give the name "private language" to the sounds which only one person appears to understand, but this doesn't abrogate the incoherency issues of a private language cited at 258.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    Clearly, at 270, "my blood pressure is rising" is not verified by others, so it remains a private principle. And if the individual refuses, it cannot be verified. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Of course you don't actually know what Wittgenstein means by a private language. No wonder this has been so difficult. Here are two separate explanations:

    If someone were to behave as if they understood a language of which no one else can make sense, we might call this an example of a private language. It is not sufficient here, however, for the language to simply be one that has not yet been translated. In order to count as a private language in Wittgenstein's sense, it must be in principle incapable of translation into an ordinary language – if for example it were to describe those inner experiences supposed to be inaccessible to others. The private language being considered is not simply a language in fact understood by one person, but a language that in principle can only be understood by one person. So the last speaker of a dying language would not be speaking a private language, since the language remains in principle learnable. A private language must be unlearnable and untranslatable, and yet it must appear that the speaker is able to make sense of it. — Private language argument (Wikipedia)

    The idea of a private language was made famous in philosophy by Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in §243 of his book Philosophical Investigations explained it thus: “The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language.” This is not intended to cover (easily imaginable) cases of recording one’s experiences in a personal code, for such a code, however obscure in fact, could in principle be deciphered. What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others. — Private language (SEP)

    All that matters regarding the rising blood pressure is that it is possible that others can know it.

    So, do you think that what is said at 270 relates to the "private language" described at 243, or to the one described at 258 and 269? — Metaphysician Undercover

    I think that they all relate to the same concept of a private language.
  • Some remarks on Wittgenstein's private language argument (PLA)
    This is done when the speaker recognizes that "S" (private) is a "sensation" (common), rather than "S" (private) means "my blood pressure is rising" (private). — Metaphysician Undercover

    The private language described at 243 is one where the word/symbol refers to what can only be known by the speaker. This is not merely “a sensation” or just any old sensation. It is a “certain sensation” or a “particular sensation”, the nature of which is private and known only to the speaker (one’s “immediate private sensations”). The word/symbol does not simply refer to any general sensation, or to the common meaning of the word “sensation”, as you suggest. And “my blood pressure rising” is not private in principle, because it can be verified by others.

    In the situation described at 258, if there is neither right nor wrong, we can say that whatever the diarist is thinking, is not right, because the possibility of being right has been excluded. And that is exactly what is said about the private language at 269, attaching a meaning but not the right one. — Metaphysician Undercover

    Not right = wrong. If there is neither right nor wrong, then we cannot say that whatever the diarist is thinking is not right. That would be wrong. You know what “neither” means?


    Regarding 269, I view it as Wittgenstein’s view of the only possible thing that we might actually call a private language, which is where some individual behaves as though they actually understand sounds or words that nobody else understands. We are not told what the words or sounds of this language refer to, and I don’t see how such an individual understanding would be possible, but it is Wittgenstein’s concession regarding the possibility of a private language.
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