Read what is written! It is "I" who uses the manometer, and "I" who can then say 'my blood pressure is rising'. There is absolutely no public verification described. And, if such a verification were proposed, the person who is "I" could decline it. Therefore a "public verification" is not even implied. — Metaphysician Undercover

In case you've forgotten, Wittgenstein is investigating the possibility of a private language. Moreover, he is investigating the possibility of a private language in principle. That you might choose to be uncooperative or to keep a secret are beside the point, These have nothing to do with the privacy of language, in principle.

At 270, the relevant word/sign is the symbol "S" that Wittgenstein uses to refer to a particular sensation that he has found to be associated with his blood pressure rising.

That's not what is written. He said "here we can't talk about 'right'". He does not say neither right nor wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says at 258:

I first want to observe that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. — But all the same, I can give one to myself as a kind of ostensive definition! — How? Can I point to the sensation? — Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation — and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. — But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be! A definition serves to lay down the meaning of a sign, doesn’t it? — Well, that is done precisely by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’. — PI 258 (4th edition)

A private language has no criterion of correctness. Having no criterion of correctness implies having no criterion of incorrectness. If I think that the connection between the sign "S" and this particular sensation defines the sign correctly, this implies that I think that the connections between the sign "S" and other sensations define the sign incorrectly. By implication, whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct and whatever is going to seem incorrect to me is incorrect. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'correct' or 'incorrect'.

The "correct" meaning of "S" is not established by the manometer, that's what Wittgenstein is explaining. That "S" means "my blood pressure is rising", is the "subjective understanding". The person thinks that they understand the meaning of "S", with reference to the manometer, but they really do not. The person has found a use, and therefore meaning, but it is not "the right meaning". It is the subjective understanding which is described at 269, as a "private language". The person appears to understand, having associated S with a meaning, but the meaning is not the right meaning.

The right meaning is that "S" is the name of "a sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

What makes you think that the diarist does not use "S" to refer to a sensation, or that they do not understand that they are using "S" to refer to a sensation?

270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign “S” in my diary. I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. This puts me in a position to report that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. — PI 270

After the diarist discovers, for himself (privately), with the use of a manometer, that the sensation coincides with a rise in blood pressure, he starts to say "my blood pressure is rising" instead of "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

Anybody else with a manometer could also measure his blood pressure. That's what makes it publicly verifiable whether or not his blood pressure is rising.

Now, his use of "my blood pressure is rising" is equivalent to his use of "S" at 258, and there is equally no such thing as "right" here. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is such a thing as "right" here. We can verify whether his blood pressure is actually rising with a manometer.

So he is just pretending to know when his blood pressure is rising, as described at 270 — Metaphysician Undercover

This is inconsistent with the presentation of the scenario:

I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. This puts me in a position to report that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result. — PI 270

There is no pretence in this discovery.

And, as he describes, if there was a public audience, they would have no way of knowing if he was getting it wrong — Metaphysician Undercover

They would have a way of knowing if his blood pressure was rising or falling: by using a manometer.

and it would be as if the machine (being replaced by him now) is just for show, not even turned on. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says this in relation to misidentifying the sensation, not in relation to being wrong about his blood pressure rising. We can verify whether or not his blood pressure is rising and whether he is right or wrong about that. What we cannot verify is whether he has correctly identified the sensation that he associates with his rising blood pressure. If he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, then it makes no difference whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not.

When he identifies the sensation correctly, he marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is measured as rising, so the association between the sensation and his blood pressure holds true. But when he does not identify the sensation correctly, then he still marks "S" in his diary and his blood pressure is still measured as rising. In other words, he was correct about his blood pressure rising even though he misidentified the sensation. Therefore. it makes no difference to the correct use of "S" whether he identifies the sensation correctly or not. (This explains the 'mere ornament in the machine' metaphor.)

But, of course, it does make a difference to the use of "S" whether his blood pressure is measured as rising or falling, because then we have a criterion of correctness and can say whether or not his use of "S" was correct.

This might now lead you to question whether "S" actually refers to a sensation at all. Wittgenstein is well aware of this and invites the question:

And what reason do we have here for calling “S” the name of a sensation? Perhaps the kind of way this sign is employed in this language game. — And why a “particular sensation”: that is, the same one every time? Well, we’re supposing, aren’t we, that we write “S” every time. — PI 270

The only reason to call "S" the name of a "particular sensation" is that the scenario presents it as such; that this is what is supposed. But the sensation effectively drops out of consideration as irrelevant here.

This is an example of the "subjective understanding" described at 269, he would appear like he knew when his pressure was rising, but he really didn't, because he really can't know the sensation called "S", as described at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is inconsistent with the scenario at 270 where he discovers from experience that whenever he has a particular sensation, a manometer shows that his blood pressure is rising. How can he discover this association from experience if he can't know the particular sensation called "S"?

Your conclusion "no possibility of error" implies 'always right', which is the exact opposite of Wittgenstein's conclusion "here we can't talk about 'right'", which implies 'always wrong". — Metaphysician Undercover

At 258 he says that whatever is going to seem right to the private linguist is right. This means that we public linguists cannot talk about either "right" or "wrong" here (in the public sense of these words).

That the use of "S" is always wrong is the basis for the description of "subjective understanding" at 269, "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". — Metaphysician Undercover

At 269 we can talk about "wrong" and "right", because Wittgenstein is using these words in the public sense. A person attaches a meaning to a word, "but not the right one". The judgment that the person attaches the wrong meaning to the word is based on their publicly observable behaviour. Wittgenstein tells us that "one might speak of a subjective understanding" in this case. And what might be called a "private language" are "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’".

"S" has a supposedly private use/meaning, so here we cannot talk about 'right' or 'wrong' (in the public sense of these words).

The meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising". But as described, it is a subjective understanding, and therefore "not the right" meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

The meaning of "S" was not established privately in principle, because the rising of one's blood pressure is not private in principle. It can be verified by anyone with a manometer. If the meaning of "S" is now "my blood pressure is rising", then "S" can be used correctly or incorrectly and one's blood pressure can be verified as rising or falling. This is neither a subjective understanding nor a subjective correctness.

It's not "contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario, it is the exact scenario. The person clearly does not know when their blood pressure is rising, it's all just a show, a pretense. — Metaphysician Undercover

That the person knows when their blood pressure is rising is not ruled out as impossible at 270. In fact, it's how the meaning of "S" was supposedly established in the first place. Once again:

270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign “S” in my diary. I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. This puts me in a position to report that my blood pressure is rising without using any apparatus. — PI 270

It appears as if the person knows when his blood pressure is rising but he does not, as 269 explains. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no mention of blood pressure at 269.

Sure it gets "off the ground", keep reading, by 270 "S" has a use. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've read it, thanks. The use of "S" cannot be private in the scenario of 270, as I explained.

The meaning of "S" cannot be known by the person. There is no disagreement between us here. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a disagreement. Unlike you, I don't presuppose that "S" has any meaning or use.

However, it does qualify as a "private language" as described at 269, where it is not required that the meaning is known. It is only required that the word has a use, as developed at 270. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only use "S" has at 270 is public. At 269 it is the public who describe the person as "appearing to understand" and as having a "private language". These descriptions are made in a public language, not a private one. At 270 "S" can only have a public use, as I explained.

That it might refer to something different every time he uses it does not negate the fact that it refers to something each time. He said "whatever is going to seem right to me is right". — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein says this in order to demonstrate that the repeatable technique for applying "S" cannot be established, not to say that "S" will simply have a different use each time. What sort of use is that? How can a word mean something different every time and still function as a word? How is that language? It's just some random association without any persisting meaning. It cannot have any meaning even on one occasion.

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood, and so on. — To follow a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. — PI 199

We have now uncovered a second sense of ambiguity, distinct from the other sense we discussed. What we discussed was using a word once, to imply possible different meanings, like your example of "bank". Now we have using a word numerous time "S" in the example at 258, each time potentially referring to something different. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only purpose of this "intentional ambiguity" line of argumentation is to account for your own inability to understand. You complain that the author is being intentionally ambiguous (why would he?) for no other reason except that you fail to grasp what he means.

Where we seem to disagree is whether "S" can have a use when its meaning is not known. You do not seem to be able to grasp this fact of language, that people sometimes use words when they do not know the meaning of them. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not using a private language; it is misusing the public language.

Every time he writes "S" in the book, it refers to something. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does it refer to?

This is simply incorrect. And that's very obvious. The symbol "S" does refer, and a use is developed, — Metaphysician Undercover

What is its use?

Sorry, I'm not interested in secondary sources, and appeals to authority. — Metaphysician Undercover

That explains your own terrible reading. Why trust the experts or even hear them out, right?

Regardless of what you got from SEP, the use described at 270 is purely private. "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." That's a private use, he is describing, regardless of how you depict as "something that can be publicly verified" — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not my depiction, it's Wittgenstein's:

270. Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign “S” in my diary. I find out the following from experience: whenever I have a particular sensation, a manometer shows that my blood pressure is rising. — PI 270

The manometer will say whether the blood pressure rises, but the private language user could say whatever he wants, refusing to cooperate with your proposed public verification. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not my public verification; it's the manometer's. Otherwise he would not be able to say that his blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus, as Wittgenstein tells us.

If you think 270 helps support the possibility of a private language, then why are you attempting to deny the scenario presented there? Do you think that Wittgenstein - as the diarist in the scenario at 270 - will refuse to cooperate with his own scenario at 270?

Therefore the use described at 270 is purely private. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the use described at 270 were purely private, then there could be no possibility of error. As 258 tells us, a private language has no criterion of correctness and whatever seems right to the private linguist is right. However, it is possible that the diarist could mark "S" in their diary and yet the manometer tells us that his blood-pressure is falling, not rising. But "S" is supposed to signify that his blood-pressure is rising. How do you account for this possibility of error if the use is "purely private"?

What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it?
— Luke

Obviously, that's what is explained at 270 — Metaphysician Undercover

I must have missed it. Could you explain it?

Something like the manometer would serve that purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Serve what purpose?

"Subjective understanding" is use for a purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is?

"Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least. And that alone shews that the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show. " — Metaphysician Undercover

How can the private linguist misidentify their sensation? What criterion of correctness is there? Whatever is going to seem right is right.

For the person using "S" there is purpose and use — Metaphysician Undercover

What purpose or use?

For the person using "S" there is purpose and use, for the public it is pure show, it appears like the person knows what he is doing. Neither of these justify "the person knows what he is doing". — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this make the private language possible? If the person doesn't really know what they are doing, then - contrary to Wittgenstein's scenario - are they not really able to say that their blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus?

The person privately develops a use for "S" without knowing what "S" refers to. — Metaphysician Undercover

The person does not "develop a use for "S"". Wittgenstein asks us to imagine this development, but upon closer inspection, this development cannot get off the ground.

At 258, he notes that "S" cannot be defined. However, he tries to give himself a "kind of ostensive definition" by "concentrating [his] attention on the sensation" while he writes the sign down. But this is problematic:

Well, that is done precisely by concentrating my attention; for in this way I commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation. — But “I commit it to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future. But in the present case, I have no criterion of correctness. — PI 258

Wittgenstein tells us at 258 that he cannot commit to memory the connection between the sign and the sensation because there is no criterion of correctness here. If he cannot commit the connection to memory, then no use for "S" can be developed. Therefore. "S" cannot refer to anything.

Here is the SEP article on 258:

Wittgenstein points out in the diary case ‘I first want to observe that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated’. (The translation here obscures the reason why. Wittgenstein’s word is ‘aussprechen’, better translated as ‘expressed’ than ‘formulated’: the point follows by definition from the fact that the case is one where the definition is private.) So if meaning is to be obtained for the “sign”, this must be achieved through a private exercise of ostensive definition, where I concentrate on the sensation and produce the sign at the same time. (In these circumstances, meaning cannot be extracted from a pre-existing practice of private use, since what is in question is how such a use could be established in the first place.) But if this exercise is to be genuine and successful ostensive definition, it must establish the connection between sign and sensation, and this connection must persist. As Wittgenstein says, ‘“I commit [the connection] to memory” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connection correctly in the future’. For I do not define anything, even to myself let alone anyone else, by merely attending to something and making a mark, unless this episode has the appropriate consequences. — SEP article on Private Language

But "private language" as described at 243 requires that the person knows what the symbols refer to (that's one of the conditions). — Metaphysician Undercover

You are still presupposing that the symbols can refer. You are missing the fact that a use for "S" cannot be developed.

It's not that knowledge of a private language is impossible; it's that a private language is impossible.

But usage is not excluded from "S". That's what Wittgenstein demonstrates(270). — Metaphysician Undercover

§258 and 270, for example, are attempts to give the interlocutor what he says he wants, but which, in the end, amount to nothing (in the case of 258) or bring us back to a publicly understandable language (in the case of 270). — SEP article on Private Language

I quoted the SEP article regarding 269 and 270 the other day if you'd care to read it. What 270 shows is that the sensation is irrelevant to the usage of "S" and/or that the usage of "S" is not really private.

"S" is said to signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Whether one's blood pressure is actually rising (or has actually risen) is something that can be publicly verified with a manometer.

If one incorrectly uses "S" at a time when one's blood pressure is not rising, then "S" does not actually signify the sensation that one's blood pressure is rising. Otherwise, one has made an error and misused "S". However, such an error is not meant to be possible in a private language with no criterion of correctness. On the other hand, if one correctly uses "S" at a time when one's blood pressure is rising, then there is no difference between using "S" to refer to one's sensation and using "S" to refer to one's (publicly verifiable) blood pressure. In this latter case, "S" is effectively a public sign.

Either way, "S" cannot be a private sign.

No, "subjective understanding", as Wittgenstein uses it does not qualify as understanding, it might make the person "appear to understand" though. — Metaphysician Undercover

What might make the person "appear to understand" though? If "subjective understanding" is not understanding, then what is it?

A good example of "subjective understanding" is your supposed "understanding" of Wittgenstein's "private language". — Metaphysician Undercover

There can be no such language, so there is nothing to "understand" (whatever "understand" means).

Of course the person speaks the private language, he just does not understand or "know" it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh right, of course. I speak Japanese, except that I don't know or understand it.

That definition of :"language" at 7, is itself logically incoherent, by a fallacy of composition. It is incoherent to have the whole, and the parts which make up the whole, go by the same name (language-game). — Metaphysician Undercover

How does that help your reading of Wittgenstein?

As demonstrated at 258, there is no criterion of correctness, no "right" here, so the condition, that what the words refer to is "known" by the speaker, is necessarily violated. — Metaphysician Undercover

This presupposes that the words have an established (private) use, are used to refer, and it is only that the speaker doesn't know how to use them. It is far more catastrophic than this: there is no such private language to be known, because there cannot be such a language.

This is no different for the purported "other" private language at 269.

Wittgenstein demonstrates at 258 that the diarist does not know or understand one's own usage of the symbol "S". That is what is intended with "I have no criterion of correctness". — Metaphysician Undercover

"S" cannot have a usage because there is no criterion of correctness. A usage implies a repeatable technique of applying the word; implies a rule for using the word/sign in such-and-such a way. Without this, there can be no language.

262. One might say: someone who has given himself a private explanation of a word must inwardly resolve to use the word in such-and-such a way. And how does he resolve that? Should I assume that he invents the technique of applying the word; or that he found it ready-made?

263. “Surely I can (inwardly) resolve to call THIS ‘pain’ in the future.” — “But is it certain that you have resolved this? Are you sure that it was enough for this purpose to concentrate your attention on your feeling?” — An odd question. — — PI 262-263

That, "the private language which they do not understand", I tell you, is the "private language" presented at 269. This is a fully coherent "private language" (if we overlook Wittgenstein's problematic definition of "language" referred to above, which is really not relevant at this point)), in which the speaker might "appear to understand" the use of the words, through some form of "subjective understanding", which does not qualify as "knowing" — Metaphysician Undercover

Does "subjective understanding" qualify as understanding? Because you are claiming that a person can have a private language which they do not understand.

How is it "fully coherent" that there can be a speaker of a private language who does not understand, know, or speak his own private language?

Everything okay, fella? You barely even touched my post.

Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts.
— Luke

Sorry Lujke, I don't follow your logic. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not my logic; it's Wittgenstein's. Did you read the part of PI 7 that I quoted above? Here it is again:

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a “language-game”. — PI 7

What Wittgenstein calls a language-game includes "the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven". As I said, you cannot have a language-game without a language.

What makes the "private language" described at 243 incoherent is the condition that the speaker "knows" what the words refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does this "condition" make it incoherent?

If we remove that condition, as Wittgenstein does at 269, and replace it with the condition that the speaker has a "subjective understanding", or might merely "appear to understand" what the words refer to in a private language, then "private language" is no longer incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

Appearances can be deceiving. What is it that he appears to understand? Wittgenstein tells us at 269 that the alleged private linguist is "attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one". Doesn't this imply that he does not understand the meaning of the word? To paraphrase 246, if we are using the word “understand” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then this person does not understand the meaning of the word. It is not coherent for a person to have or to know a private language that they do not understand.

Do you consider there to be a difference between having and knowing a language?

The SEP article offers a different reason for the incoherency:

...the private language argument is that the idea is exposed as unintelligible when pressed—we cannot make sense of the circumstances in which we should say that someone is using a private language. — SEP article on Private Language

Of course it is not a "private language" as described at 243, but now Wittgenstein has decided to call something else a "private language". — Metaphysician Undercover

Nah, he's talking about the same private language throughout.

(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".

How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)?
— Luke

You can take it as another condition if you want, that might be best way. — Metaphysician Undercover

How does (iii) differ from (i) and (ii)?

You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language.
— Luke

Where's your proof of this? — Metaphysician Undercover

I quoted PI 7. You failed to comment.

If a language consists of a multitude of language-games, then most likely there was a first language-game prior to there being a language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Then that language-game would constitute the language. See PI 7. Therefore, a private language and/or private language-game cannot exist because they are incoherent concepts.

It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S. You seem to be missing the gist of the example. "I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation", does not mean that I actually can do that. "Want" implies a lack of. That I want to know my own sensations implies that I actually do not know them. The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. Therefore, the supposed private language cannot get off the ground.

But you need to accept that "private language" as described at 243 is incoherent, and move along to Wittgenstein's next proposal of "private language", the one at 269, which is inconsistent with 243, as different from it. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a "next proposal" or a new proposal for a different sort of private language.

So at 269, there is a proposal that the "private language" user has a "subjective understanding" of what the words refer to, rather than actually knowing what the words refer to as "private language" at 243 requires . In this sense of "private language", at 269, the person might "appear to understand", rather than actually "know" which is required at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover

269 focuses only on a person's behaviour, and on the behavioural criteria for saying that a (another) person understands or does not understand a word. Wittgenstein also gives a third option: "criteria for his ‘thinking he understands’, attaching some meaning to the word, but not the right one." To be clear, this is about understanding a word of our public language, and the person does not actually understand here.

In this latter case, "sounds which no one else understands but which I ‘appear to understand’ might be called a “private language”." But that does not mean that it is a private language (or any language). Having shown the incoherency of a private language "from the inside" as it were, Wittgenstein allows for the possibility that, from an outsider's perspective, others might refer to this sort of behaviour as a "private language". The point is that this ascription has nothing to do with any private internal object.

Here is what the SEP article on Private Language says about it:

So far the argument has been conducted in terms of an ‘I’ not essentially related to body or related only to an inert body. At §269, however, it moves to examples where there is bodily behaviour but despite this there is still the temptation to think of private meanings for words independent of their public use. This suggests a further chance for a defender of the idea of a private language: that a private linguist might secure a meaning for his sign ‘S’ by correlating its private use with some public phenomenon. This would apparently serve to provide a function for the noting of ‘S’ in the diary (§260) and thus give a place for ostensive definition, and would give as well a guarantee that there is some constancy in the linguist’s use of the term ‘S’ independent of his impression of such constancy. Wittgenstein uses the example of the manometer in §§270–271 to consider this idea, and his criticism of it is in effect that this method of securing meaning works, but that the secured meaning is public: the so-called “private object”, even if there were such a thing, is revealed to be irrelevant to meaning. Presumably a defender of “private language” would hope that the example would work like this: if I keep saying, on the basis of my sensation, that my blood pressure is rising, and the manometer shows that I am right, then this success in judging my own blood pressure shows that I had in fact established a private meaning for the sign ‘S’ and was using the sign in the same way each time to judge that my sensation was the same each time. However, all the example really shows is that just thinking that I have the same sensation now as I had when my blood pressure rose formerly, can be a good guide to the rising of my blood pressure. Whether in some “private sense” the sensation was “actually the same” or not becomes completely irrelevant to the question of constancy in the use of ‘S’—that is, there is no gap between the actual nature of the sensation and my impression of it, and ‘S’ in this case could mean merely ‘sensation of the rising of the blood pressure’; indeed, for all we are told of the sign’s role, it could even mean just ‘blood pressure rising’. — SEP article on Private Language

Yes, the revised definition of "private language", offered at 269, is coherent, and describes something which could actually exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's the definition? Why is this not as incoherent as the private language of 243?

So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for?
— Luke

Perhaps you ought to read Wittgenstein a little bit closer, to provide yourself with a better understanding, then the answers to these questions might be revealed to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hiding behind your misplaced condescension does not answer the question.

Why do you think that associating a sign with a sensation does not qualify to be called a "language-game"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because:

It is explicitly stated at the end of 258, that there is no such thing as the correct use of S, there is no right here. "There is no criterion of correctness" Therefore we can conclude that the person cannot "know" the sensation called S... The conclusion at the end of 258 is that I cannot come to know "a certain sensation" in the way proposed by the example. — Metaphysician Undercover

To understand a language means to have mastered a technique. — PI 199

Your suggestion that one can speak or know or "have" a language that one does not understand is ludicrous.

Just like any logically incoherent proposal can have two conditions. That's why I presented the square circle example. In this example, the one alone is not logically incoherent, it is the inconsistency between the two which produces the incoherency. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your two conditions of the private language are:

(i) it refers to one's immediate private sensations; and
(ii) another person cannot understand it.

Is that right? If so, what about:

(iii) "the words of this language refer to what can only be known by the person speaking".

How does this fit in? Is it another condition? How does it differ from (i) and (ii)?

I don't consider these to be different conditions or criteria at all. Given your square circle example, your two conditions appear to be instead that:

(i) it's a language; and
(ii) it's private.

That it's a language is a given in Wittgenstein's description. At 243 he describes how it's private: it refers to one's private sensations, it refers to what only the speaker knows, and another person cannot understand it.

This is why I explicitly referred to it as a "private language-game" rather than a "private language", to avoid this problem. What is presented at 258 is a language-game. A "language" consists of a multitude of language-games. The example at 258 is not an example of a "private language". We discussed this already, it is an example of a private language-game (the private use of S to name something) within the context of a common language (S is a sensation). — Metaphysician Undercover

Nonsense. You cannot have a language-game without a language, and you cannot have a private language-game without a private language.

The person can have, and use this language In the same sense that the person has and uses the private language-game described at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is supposed that the person at 258 associates a certain sensation with the sign 'S'. Wittgenstein has us question the purpose of this ceremony and how or whether it could constitute a language, or a language-game.

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a “language-game”. — PI 7

We can imagine that a person might have an entire language full of such private language-games. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot imagine it.

This person does not know or understand the use of "S", but is still using "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

How is it a language? The person is using "S" for what purpose?

Don’t consider it a matter of course that a person is making a note of something when he makes a mark — say in a calendar. For a note has a function, and this “S” so far has none. — PI 260

If we remove this condition we could define "private language", such that the person has a "private" language, and does not know what the words refer to, as in the example at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is supposed that the person knows what "S" refers to at 258 because they are associating
"S" with a certain sensation and "writ[ing] this sign in a calendar for every day on which [they] have the sensation."

But the person might still "appear to understand" what the words refer to (269). That is why 258 is not an example of a "private language" as defined at 243. — Metaphysician Undercover

The language is not private because a person might appear to understand? What does "appear to understand" mean in terms of a private language? How can an outsider know how it appears to understand a private language?

I believe that what Wittgenstein was trying to demonstrate is that any proposed form of a "private" language could not produce "knowledge", as knowledge is understood in epistemology, requiring justification. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said that a private language was an incoherent concept and that we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by it, but you are now speaking as though it is not only a perfectly coherent concept, but that a private language could actually exist. That's quite a turnaround. Next you'll tell me that square circles can exist.

The proposed form of "private language", defined at 243, requires that the speaker knows what the words refer to, and so is ruled out as impossible. But other forms of "private" language, similar to the language-game described at 258, which consist of word use without knowing, might be very possible and very real. — Metaphysician Undercover

So it's a private language but the speaker does not know what the words mean? How is it a language? What is it used for?

There is no language-game described at 258. There is nothing more than an association of a sign with a sensation.

Luke, the concept of "a private language" is incoherent from the outset, so there is no point in trying to determine what Wittgenstein means by "private language". — Metaphysician Undercover

If we cannot understand what Wittgenstein means by a private language, then how does his private language have two conditions as you claim?

Furthermore, I think that Wittgenstein presents this as a common occurrence and feature of natural language, that a private language-game (one in which the user of the language-game cannot be said to understand or know the language-game being played) gets integrated into the common language. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can the concept of a private language be incoherent on the one hand, but then a private language can exist and become integrated into the common language on the other hand? How can a private language exist if the concept of a private language is incoherent?

A person could have a language, which oneself does not know or understand the usage of the words, yet the person could appear to understand the usage of the words — Metaphysician Undercover

In what sense could a person "have" this language? They don't know or understand the language, but yet they "have" it? How?

That is the second condition.

You see the two as one, because you think that the second necessarily follows from the first. But the second does not follow from the first, because of the incoherency of the first. If the hypothesis of a conditional is incoherent, then the proposed conclusion does not follow, and the two must be apprehended as distinct. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said earlier that "this proposed "private language" can be interpreted as such a conditional proposition."

That is, you earlier seemed to be saying that the private language is described by the conditional proposition, if X then Y. However, you now appear to be saying that the private language is described only by the premise X.

If the private language is described only by the premise X, then the conclusion Y does not describe the private language and cannot be a condition of the language. Therefore, it is not a second condition.

Also, you are now saying that only X is incoherent, but that Y is not. Whereas I see Wittgenstein as saying that both X and Y describe the private language and that both are incoherent. What makes you think that the conclusion, Y, is coherent? .

Don't you think that Wittgenstein's private language argument is an argument against the coherency of a private language; against the coherency of a language that another person cannot understand?

The premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations".
— Luke

This premise is the one shown to be incoherent, at 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're rushing ahead again and you've missed my point. Let's be clear on what the private language is before you start denouncing it as incoherent.

What Wittgenstein means by a private language is that its words refer to what can only be known to the speaker, and what can only be known to the speaker are his immediate private sensations.

If this is the premise, then Wittgenstein's private language does not have two separate conditions. You previously claimed that it did (e.g. see the quote at the top of this page).

As a result of this premise, the language cannot be understood by another person.

Regardless of whether this is incoherent or why, this is what Wittgenstein means by a private language. Do you agree?

The second sentence can be seen as a consequence of the first: The language refers to what can only be known to the speaker; to his private sensations. So [consequently] another person cannot understand the language.
— Luke

Right, so the question. Can we imagine a language which has words that refer to a person's private sensations, and this produces the consequence that every other person cannot understand the language? Remember, with a common language a person uses words to refer to one's private sensations, but this does not produce the consequence that other people cannot understand it. — Metaphysician Undercover

The premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations". You continue to overlook that the language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking. Remember, with a common language a person does not use words to refer to what can only be known to them.

Furthermore, you stated that you accepted the conditional proposition that another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking.

It is common in language that people use words to refer to their private sensations, and this does not lead to the consequence that others cannot understand. But Wittgenstein is asking can we imagine a situation where this will lead to the consequence that others cannot understand. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what he's asking because the premise is not only that the language refers to one's private sensations. The premise is that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations".

I think you can only draw that conclusion by omitting the fact that he is asking a question. 'Can we imagine such a language?' — Metaphysician Undercover

What language? We need to know what sort of language it is before we can answer the question of whether we can imagine such a language. Wittgenstein tells us what sort of language it is at 243:

The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

The first sentence can be read as:

The individual words of this language are to refer:
(i) to what can only be known to the person speaking; (that is:)
(ii) to his immediate private sensations.

The second sentence can be seen as a consequence of the first: The language refers to what can only be known to the speaker; to his private sensations. So [consequently] another person cannot understand the language.

You have been arguing against this reading for the last several pages. What's your reading?

I agree that this proposed "private language" can be interpreted as such a conditional proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you now agree?

However, you seem to take this proposition as a premise, from which to proceed, without recognizing that Wittgenstein has asked, could we imagine such a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said above that you agree that the private language can be interpreted as the conditional proposition.

You need to know what he means by a private language - what sort of language he is talking about - before you can proceed to question whether such a language can be imagined or whether it is a coherent concept. The private language is described by the conditional proposition; by the quote above of 243. Otherwise, what is the private language?

1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
— Luke

You are continuing to separate this phrase "what can only be known to the person speaking" from its context. It makes no sense to say that a person's private sensations can only be "known" to oneself. I can't even imagine what this could mean, to know one's own sensations. And it's clearly demonstrated at 258, that such a thing is impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover

The 3rd edition of 243 states:

The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.

My question was:

Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?

I'm not "separating" it from its context. Take it up with Wittgenstein if you can't imagine what it would mean, because that's what he says at 243. I want to know how you are reading 243 and what you think Wittgenstein means by a private language. That's why I asked you the question. But you just deflect and evade.

And it's clearly demonstrated at 258, that such a thing is impossible. There is no criterion of identity, no justification, and no such thing as "right". — Metaphysician Undercover

I want to know what you think Wittgenstein means by a private language as he describes it at 243, which is why I asked you the question. Whether or not this private language is possible or impossible is another matter. Let's get clear on what a private language is, first.

From the context, at 243, it appears very clear to me, that what Wittgenstein is talking about "knowing", is what the words of the private language refer to. He is not talking about knowing the private sensations themselves, whatever that might mean. — Metaphysician Undercover

What evidence do you have for this reading? This does not appear to be supported by the text at 243.

We might say that the passage at 243 appears ambiguous, if we were reading the book in order and hadn't gotten to 258 yet. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein describes what he means by a private language at 243. How is it ambiguous?

But then, at 258 it is made very clear that what he is talking about is knowing what the words refer to, the particular thing referred to with "S", "the sensation" which gets named this way. What else could "know that sensation" mean, other than to be able to identify what "S" refers to? — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's get clear on what he means at 243 before changing the subject to what he means at 258.

2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
— Luke

Yes, but this is the question he is asking. — Metaphysician Undercover

You do acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations? Then you must also acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. Right?

And if you acknowledge both of these things, then you must acknowledge that there are not two separate conditions of Wittgenstein's private language, but that it refers to one's immediate private sensations and that another person cannot understand it (both) because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking.

Can we imagine such a thing, is it logically consistent, that if only the person creating the language can know what the words refer to, does this necessitate (your use of "because" above) that the language cannot be understood by another? The answer is yes, but there are repercussions, the person speaking the language cannot even understand one's own private language. (But that is the consequence of another premise, Wittgenstein's restricted sense of "rule following", and "knowing" being dependent on justification and therefore rule-following. — Metaphysician Undercover

Let's not get ahead of ourselves. Let's first settle what Wittgenstein means by a private language.

I haven't removed the phrase from its context. That's a non-argument. If you think that "what only the speaker can know" does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know", then explain why not.
— Luke

The incoherency is clear in your question here. "Knowledge" for Wittgenstein is necessarily something public. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein says (in the 4th edition) "what only the speaker can know". Wittgenstein says in the 3rd edition "what can only be known to the person speaking". There is no incoherency in my question. I asked you how Wittgenstein's use of these phrases does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know". I am talking about Wittgenstein's own description of a private language at 243. You are evading the question and trying to change the subject.

The key sentence is the last one, "So another person cannot understand the language". — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "So" indicates that another person cannot understand the language because, or as a consequence, of the preceding sentence, which states that the language refers to "what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations."

1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?

So he is saying that only the speaker can know what the words refer to — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not what Wittgenstein says. You have it backwards. He says that the words refer to what only the speaker can know, or "to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations."

That is not a valid response because Wittgenstein tells us that the language refers to “what only the speaker can know”, which implies that it refers to what other people cannot know.
— Luke

You have removed the phrase from it's context, to give it your own private meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't removed the phrase from its context. That's a non-argument. If you think that "what only the speaker can know" does not imply or is not equivalent to "what other people cannot know", then explain why not.

In the context he is talking about what the words refer to, and he is saying that only the speaker can know this, such that only the speaker can understand the language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are trying to twist it to read as "only the speaker can know what the words refer to". What Wittgenstein actually says is that "the words refer to what only the speaker can know." Furthermore, he indicates quite clearly - in the same sentence - that what the words refer to, and what only the speaker can know, are the speaker's immediate private sensations.

However, it is demonstrated at 258-270, that this is not the case, others can know what the words refer to when they refer to inner experiences. — Metaphysician Undercover

That may well be, but we are still in the process of clarifying what Wittgenstein means by a private language. You initially said that you could not see the relevance of sensations, but you seem to have since changed your view on this. You are now still arguing that Wittgenstein's private language has two conditions: referring to one's immediate private sensations and that another person cannot understand the language. So I ask again:

1. Do you acknowledge that Wittgenstein's private language refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?
2. Furthermore, do you acknowledge that another person cannot understand Wittgenstein's private language because it refers to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations?

I don't think we should rush to discuss other sections until we have clarity on what Wittgenstein means by a private language.

Sure, but you are still neglecting the context. He is asking at 243, a question, could we imagine such a language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, but you are neglecting that you said you could not see the relevance of sensations in relation to Wittgenstein's private language, so let's get clear about that first.

You're misreading again Luke. The phrase "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking" ;means only the person speaking can know what the words refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your accusation that I’m misreading is supported by a fictional quote. He does not say “refer to what can only be known to the person speaking”. Get the quote right before you accuse me of misreading, otherwise you might be accused of misreading.

He is talking about knowing what the words refer to, not knowing the things themselves. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he is talking about “what only the speaker can know.” An actual quote carries a lot more weight than your constant misinterpretation and made up quotes.

One can make up a language with words that refer to external things, so that other people do not know what the words refer to, and therefore cannot understand the language. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s not about what other people do or do not know, but about what only the speaker can know. Re-read 243.

So, do you apprehend the two distinct conditions now? 1) the language talks about inner experiences (which we might do with our public language), and 2) another person cannot understand the language (which also could be the case with a language that refers to things other than inner experiences). — Metaphysician Undercover

No, and I’ve given you my argument. Your only counterargument is that a person could have a private language which refers to external things. That is not a valid response because Wittgenstein tells us that the language refers to “what only the speaker can know”, which implies that it refers to what other people cannot know. External things are not something that other people cannot know. He also says that “another person cannot understand the language”, not merely that they do not understand it.


EDIT: I note that the third edition has 243 as:

The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243 (3rd edition)

This is slightly different in the fourth edition that I am using, which has it as:

The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243 (4th edition)

Nonetheless, the point remains that he is talking about what only the speaker can know (and, therefore, what other people cannot know); he is not talking about what the speaker does know or what other people do not know. The point is that this language is private in principle; it cannot possibly come to be understood by others and it has no possibility of translation into another language.

One might make a language referring to external things, in which no one understands what the words refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

That wouldn’t work. The words of such a language would not refer to “what only the speaker can know.” Other people can know external things. Other people cannot know one’s immediate private sensations.

That these are two distinct parts is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein answers 1) with "Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?". Then he proceeds to the second condition "the individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking". — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously, we can and do talk about pain and other sensations using our public language. What Wittgenstein proceeds to show is that our public talk and its grammar are based on external behaviours, not on immediate private sensations. Hence, Wittgenstein’s beetle, where “the [sensation] object drops out of consideration as irrelevant”. See also PI 307. He introduces the private language only to reveal it as a common philosophical misconception about how language actually works.

You haven't been addressing anything I say, — Metaphysician Undercover

It has been addressed.

Clearly 256 indicates that referring to one's private sensations, and "only I can understand" are two distinct things. The issue is to determine whether there is a relationship of logical necessity between these two, as proposed at 243. Does "referring to private sensations" necessitate "only I can understand". — Metaphysician Undercover

These "two distinct things" are both described and/or entailed by: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know" (PI 243). Therefore, one "distinct thing" does not necessitate the other; instead, both "distinct things" are necessitated by "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know".

You have a lot of trouble accepting all of 243. You first ignored that the words of the private language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. Now you are ignoring that the words of the private language refer to what only the speaker can know.

The question at 243 is "can we imagine" such a language. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a different question from what Wittgenstein means by a private language, which is the question we were previously discussing. You initially thought that it did not matter what the words of the language referred to and all that mattered was "only I can understand". You have now tried to change the subject.

1. It refers to private sensations. 2. it uses words which no one else can understand. The second condition is necessary to distinguish the private language from a common or public language which refers to private sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "first condition" is not only that it "refers to private sensations". The "condition" - if you must call it that - is that "the words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", which is the speaker's immediate private sensations.

You are begging the question Luke. The question at 243 is "can we imagine" such a language. Is such a proposal a logical possibility. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not begging the question; I'm explaining to you what Wittgenstein means by a private language, because you said that you couldn't see how sensations were relevant to it:

I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant. The words of this proposed "private language" cannot be understood by another person. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is clear evidence that you do not understand Wittgenstein. And yet, despite this resounding misread, you admit no fault and continue to act as though your reading was correct all along.

Would having a language which refers only to one's private sensations cause that language to be only understandable to that person. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to the concept of a private language that Wittgenstein describes at 243, a language that refers to what only the speaker can know is a language that is understandable only to the speaker.

Wittgenstein does not mention internal/external or what "a person can talk about". He mentions "what only the speaker can know".
— Luke

You're just being tedious Luke. He does mention "inner".

"256. Now, what about the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand?" — Metaphysician Undercover

We were discussing 243, not 256. Remember? You said:

I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

I pointed out to you how very relevant the mention of "sensations" is, then you tried to distract from your egregious oversight by claiming to be "pointing out the insufficiency" with your two conditions - neither of which I had ignored, and one of which was that the words of the private language "refer to internal things" - the very thing you initially found irrelevant. Now you are trying to distract further by introducing 256.

Why do you refuse to recognize that a person might describe one's private sensations in words that another can understand? And so, "describing one's private sensations", and "describing one's private sensations in words which another person cannot understand", are two distinct things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein does not talk about "describing one's private sensations in words which another person can understand" at 243. If another person could understand the language, then the language could not "refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations."

To repeat: Another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations.

The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

That the proposed private language uses words to refer to internal things is one condition. — Metaphysician Undercover

At least you finally recognise the relevance of sensations at 243.

That these two conditions are not the same condition, as you seem to think, for some strange reason, is evident from the following. A person can talk about internal things in words which others can understand. And, a person can talk about external things with words that someone else cannot understand. Therefore the two conditions are not the same condition, nor are they equivalent. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know how many times you need to read 243 until it sinks in. Don't think, but look:

The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

Wittgenstein does not mention internal/external or what "a person can talk about". He mentions "what only the speaker can know". The words of the private language refer to what only the speaker can know; that is, to his immediate private sensations. "External things" are not things that only the speaker can know. One's sensations are private and the words of this language are supposed to refer only to these private sensations. Another person cannot understand the language because it refers to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations.

The separate condition I'm referring to is "another person cannot understand the language". That's why I said you are completely neglecting this phrase. — Metaphysician Undercover

How have I neglected this phrase? I haven't neglected anything. To say that your two conditions are inseparable is not to neglect either one of them. Let's not forget it was you who could not see the relevance of sensations.

That a person owns something as "private" does not necessitate that others cannot have access to it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nobody can access your immediate private sensations. Even if you wanted to, you cannot show them to anyone. And we are not necessarily talking about private property, only private.

It is allowed that the person with the private naming ("S"), shares the use of the name, through the means of the common understanding of "sensation". Therefore the condition "another person cannot understand the language" is violated, despite the fact that the naming itself is something private. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know how many times I need to repeat that the attempt to give an example of a private language fails, and Wittgenstein show us this to demonstrate that the idea is incoherent.

Do you understand this? The naming is something "private", it is a private language-game. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wrong again:

Naming is not yet a move in a language-game — any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. One may say: with the mere naming of a thing, nothing has yet been done. Nor has it a name except in a game. — PI 49

Do you understand misplaced condescension?

Luke, the private word is "S". The word of the common language is "sensation". The private word "S" is made public (integrated into common language) through the proposition "S is the sign of a sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean it's "made public"? "S" never had a private use before.

You still refuse to acknowledge the last line of 257 — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not going to get into other sections of the book when you have so much difficulty with just one or two.

If the words of a language which talks about inner feelings could not be known to another, we could not coherently talk about our inner feelings. Therefore, what makes the private language incomprehensible to others must be something other than that it refers to inner feelings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Explaining it again does not change the fact that you described the same condition twice.

You claimed that a private language had two conditions but you repeated the same condition of privacy twice. What's the other condition?

These two conditions are inseparable in Wittgenstein's description, and they are therefore not two separate conditions.
— Luke

You are neglecting the statement "So another person cannot understand the language." — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't neglected anything. I stated that the two separate conditions - privacy and the reference to sensations (assuming this was your second condition) - are actually inseparable. In contrast, you said that sensations are irrelevant.

Obviously we understand another person's language when they talk about their private sensations. Talking about our private sensations, and understanding each other is a common part of natural language. — Metaphysician Undercover

A common part of a public language, yes.

Therefore, "so another person cannot understand the language", is a condition other than referring to one's immediate private sensations. — Metaphysician Undercover

What's the other condition? Is it "referring to one's immediate private sensations"? You said earlier that sensations are irrelevant. On the other hand, I never said it was irrelevant that "another person cannot understand the language". Don't try and project your failed understanding on to me.

The demonstration is not meant to show that a private language is incoherent, it is meant to show that something very similar to private language, the integration of a private word into a common language, is a very real aspect of language, even though "private language" itself is incoherent. — Metaphysician Undercover

This word salad is very comical. Does the demonstration succeed in its attempt to show that the integration of a private word into a common language is "a very real aspect of language"? What private word is being integrated into a common language at 258?

Hint: 258 has nothing at all to do with integrating a private word into a common language. You are lost.

Here's a proposal. Let's look at the word "only" at 243. Let's assume that all the words of the proposed "private language" can only refer to private sensations, nothing else. Every word in this language can only refer to a private sensation, just like "S", and this might be the reason why the language cannot be understood by others. We can see why Wittgenstein would say that such a language would not be understandable to others, at 265, because he says justification requires reference to something independent. But the demonstration at 258 shows one private word, "S", in the context of common words, "recurrence" and "sensation", so it is clearly not an attempt to portray a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are aware that an attempt can fail, and that a failed attempt is still an attempt?

If I talk about my pains, can you know what I'm talking about? Of course you can. Then I am not using a private language, despite talking about my inner feelings. Therefore, the conditions for being a "private language" must be more than just a language about one's inner feelings. The second condition is that only the speaker can know what the words refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not described two conditions. You have described the same condition of privacy twice.

If there actually were two conditions the second one would be 'the reference to sensations': that the words of the language refer to the speaker's immediate private sensations. And, as I have pointed out several times, Wittgenstein is using the word "sensation" here in the singular sense of one's "inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on".

You have attempted to argue that the second condition of 'the reference to sensations' is irrelevant. If the condition of privacy is met, then you are right, because it won't matter what the words refer to, and so there is no need to meet the second condition of reference to sensations. However, this is not the private language that Wittgenstein describes. These two conditions are inseparable in Wittgenstein's description, and they are therefore not two separate conditions.

"The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations." (PI 243)

If you could manage to read a whole sentence, you might have noticed that. But you wanted to talk about your own version of the private language argument instead, in which the words do not necessarily refer to one's sensations. Unfortunately for you, we are discussing Wittgenstein's private language argument, not yours.

Describing S as a "sensation", "a word of our common language" (261), so that we can all know what "S" refers to, negates the possibility that the demonstration is intended as an example of a private language, as defined. — Metaphysician Undercover

How many times do you need to be told that he attempts to give the private language advocate what he wants but fails, because he is showing us the incoherency of the concept of a private language? THAT'S THE POINT. And yet you still complain that it isn't really a private language. Well, no shit.

I don't think that's misplaced when directed toward you. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't know enough to know any better.

I'm not ignoring it, I'm just pointing out the insufficiency to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

What insufficiency? You said in your previous post "I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant". Now you claim to be "pointing out the insufficiency"? Rubbish.

I spent days arguing that we cannot know exactly what "S" refers to because of ambiguity — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a lie. You spent days arguing that the meaning of "sensation" is ambiguous, not that "S" is ambiguous.

It's basic logic. If a definition stipulates two requirements, then fulfilling one of the requirements is insufficient for designating that the thing meets the conditions of the definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are not two conditions.

When he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know", the word "this" is indicative of the language he mentioned earlier, namely: "a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use".

Your attempt to recast your ignorance of the text as "basic logic" is a sham. You clearly don't accept Wittgenstein's description of a private language, however you refuse to provide your own.

If this is the case, then you must concur that we cannot understand the meaning of S, as indicated by the description, or definition of "private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did say that:

We don't know what "S" refers to, so how is it not private? — Luke

You responded:

It's not private because we have a public word which refers to the thing named "S", it is "sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't concur with yourself.



You are no longer talking about Wittgenstein's private language argument, and it is obvious now that you never were, because you don't understand it. All you have is misplaced condescension. I have wasted too much time already trying to help you understand it. Since you are not actually discussing Wittgenstein's PLA, there's little point in continuing. I'll leave the following quotes here for the sake of anyone else who might accidentally take you seriously. They're not aimed at your reading level, because you fail to notice even the relevance of the word "sensations" at 243.

Imagine that one wants to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. This is, after all, something one might well want to do, perhaps for the sake of recollection in tranquillity (MS 116, 136) or for medical purposes (MS 119, 132v). And it is certainly something we can do. But now suppose that we conceive of doing so in accordance with the model of the putative ‘private’ language. So we think that to do so, one must associate the sensation with a sign, say ‘S’, and then simply write ‘S’ down on a calendar whenever one has a sensation. To show the incoherence of this conception is the purpose of §§258 — Baker and Hacker exegesis of §258

On this latter reading, §§258 and 270, for example, are attempts to give the interlocutor [i.e. the private language advocate] what he says he wants, but which, in the end, amount to nothing (in the case of 258) ...

However, to investigate the possibility of the imagined diary case by exploring it from the inside (the only way, he thinks, really to expose the confusions involved) requires him to use certain words when it is just the right to use these words which is in question. Thus he is forced to mention in §258 examples like ostensive definition, concentrating the attention, speaking, writing, remembering, believing and so on, in the very process of suggesting that none of these can really occur in the situation under consideration (§261). — SEP article 'Private Language'

I don't see how the mention of "sensations" at 243 is relevant. The words of this proposed "private language" cannot be understood by another person. — Metaphysician Undercover

You cannot ignore these parts of 243:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? ,,,

The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. — PI 243

You are ignoring everything here except "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". How can you possibly think this gives you a better understanding of the text?

The mention of "sensations" is relevant because sensations are the basis of Wittgenstein's private language; immediate private sensations are what "the words of this language are to refer to".

The words of this proposed "private language" cannot be understood by another person. "Sensation" is not such a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you do know what "sensation" means now? It's no longer ambiguous and has no meaning?

But "S" at 258 is said to be the name of a sensation. Therefore 258 is not an example of a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. As I said, he tries and fails to provide an example of a private language according to the description he gives at 243 which includes the word "sensations".

The description, or definition, of "private language", is not itself a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is new. Who said that it was?

So "sensation" might be used in the definition of a private language, but since it is a publicly understood word, it cannot be part of a private language. This is very simple. Do you understand this? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

"S" is the new word with the private referent, and "sensation" is the public word. That the thing, if there even is a thing, which is named by "S", is consistent with the criteria of "sensation", must be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why is it only the word "sensation" that requires justification at 258? Why not all the other words too? What makes this word so special? Does the "sensation" at 243 also require justification? And what is this process of justification? How are these words justified? Please answer these questions to help support your argument.

Why would you say this, right after insisting that he is talking about a "sensation" at 258? When he talks about the private language at 243 he says "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know". — Metaphysician Undercover

Nice cherry picking. Are you blind? How many times do I need to quote the passage from 243 before you comprehend that it contains the word "sensation"? Look:

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

Are you trying to pretend that he does not talk about "sensations" at 243? Or do you have a reading difficulty?

Obviously "sensation" doesn't refer to something only he can know, and S is described as a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

No shit, Sherlock. But "sensation" is given as part of the description of a private language at 243 that you agreed to. Did you agree to that definition by mistake? Again, if you don't like it, then provide your own definition of a private language. But bear in mind that you will no longer be discussing Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Therefore there is no real attempt at exemplifying a private language here. — Metaphysician Undercover

No real attempt? You said that it was not possible to provide an example of a private language, so what sort of attempt do you expect? Wittgenstein's point is that it is not possible and this is what he is showing us. That's why he tries to provide an example of a private language and fails. If you think there's a way to successfully provide an example of a private language, then show us. Otherwise, stop complaining that it's not an example. I said from the outset that he attempts to provide an example, that he does not succeed, and that that's the point. If you think he is saying or showing something else, then spit it out.

Do you agree that "S" is supposed to signify, or be "the name of" whatever it is which is described as recurring? — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein clearly specifies it is the recurrence of a sensation. I don't see why you call it "whatever it is".

He is talking about establishing a direct relationship between a name and a sensation, and that's what's meant, and described at 258, establishing a direct relationship between a sensation, and its name "S", by giving that sensation a name, "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, I agree.

So, from the first person perspective which Wittgenstein provides us at 258, we have a recurring 'thing' (whether type or token is irrelevant here), we have "S" as the sign, or name of this thing, and we have the person referring to this thing as "the sensation", in telling us about the thing he has named "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, why call it a "thing"? It's a sensation.

Do we have agreement on this, or not? — Metaphysician Undercover

For the most part.

Accordingly, discussion of our second principal disagreement, whether this is meant to be an example of "a private language" or not, is pointless until we have agreement as to what has been given to us in the example. — Metaphysician Undercover

Compare 243 with 258. He is clearly talking about the same thing here:

...a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use...[where] The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

I first want to observe that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. — But all the same, I can give one to myself as a kind of ostensive definition! — How? Can I point to the sensation? — Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation — and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. — PI 258

Ask yourself why a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. The reason he performs this "ceremony", as he calls it, is in an attempt to have "S" refer to his immediate private sensation, just as he describes at 243, which you have agreed describes a private language.

This is not how Wittgenstein dictates the example. He associates "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S" and writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation.
— Luke

You are not grasping this correctly. — Metaphysician Undercover

What I wrote is almost verbatim from 258.

He does not associate "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S”... — PI 258

Seriously?

"The recurrence of a certain sensation" is a phrase of language. This is not what he marks with an "S" — Metaphysician Undercover

...and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. — PI 258

It's "a phrase of language" that you have much difficulty with.

According to the description, he writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation. The word "recurrence" implies that it's the same type of "certain sensation" each time. Otherwise, you need to provide an alternative account of the word "recurrence".

He is telling us (publicly) about this activity of marking in the diary, with that phrase, and is calling it (the thing signified by S) "the sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

You said in your previous sentence that the sensation is not what he marks with an "S".

Therefore this phrase, "the recurrence of a certain sensation" refers to the thing he is signifying by marking with an "S", as does "the sensation", not vise versa. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says that he associates the recurrence of a certain sensation with the sign "S". You are saying that he associates Something (or "the thing") with the signs "S", "sensation" and "recurrence of a certain sensation". Therefore, what you are saying is not what Wittgenstein is saying.

We don't know what "S" refers to, so how is it not private?
— Luke

It's not private because we have a public word which refers to the thing named "S", it is "sensation". But you can't seem to get the referencing right — Metaphysician Undercover

You've just told me that "S", "sensation" and "recurrence of a certain sensation" all refer to Something. Now you are saying that "sensation" refers to "S". Is that different again?

Also, I said that we don't know what "S" refers to, and you have responded to say that "sensation" refers to "S". Does that mean that "S" also refers to "sensation"? Are you saying that we do know what "S" refers to?

At 258, from the first person perspective, the use of "S" cannot be justified "there is no right here"; "I" can apply S to whatever I want.
— Metaphysician Undercover

If he applies it to whatever he wants, then he is not applying it only to his immediate private sensations, as per the description of a private language at 243.
— Luke

I know, it's not an example of a private language. How many times do I have to demonstrate this to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

You've missed the point. He must apply "S" only to his immediate private sensations per the definition of a private language given in 243. Therefore, YOUR claim that he "applies it to whatever he wants" is wrong. He cannot apply "S" to whatever he wants.

Why would the person with the supposed private language be restricted only to naming private sensations with that language? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because that's the definition of private language you have agreed to, as per 243. Otherwise, provide your own definition of a private language.

If "private language" made any sort of sense we couldn't say that this language would be restricted by any conceptions imposed by the confines of our public language. It couldn't be restricted at all. But then how could it be a language? — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. How could it be a language?

That is how Wittgenstein dictates the example. There is "a certain sensation" which is signified with "S". Then Wittgenstein refers to this sensation as "the sensation". So, in the demonstration "the sensation" refers to a particular sensation which has been named with "S". You can't change the way the demonstration has been written just because you don't like it, or it's "not how English works" in your opinion. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not how Wittgenstein dictates the example. He associates "the recurrence of a certain sensation" with the sign "S" and writes the sign "S" in a calendar for every day on which he has the sensation.

He does not "try his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario". He already knows that as impossible, so he is depicting something different. He is depicting a private game (though he doesn't call it a game) within the context of a public language. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's different, is it?

A true "private language" would require that the naming of the thing be private. — Metaphysician Undercover

What definition of a private language are you using? Earlier you said you agreed to Wittgenstein's description of a private language that he gives at 243:

...a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use...[where] The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

Wittgenstein does not keep the naming of thing private, he only keeps the thing private. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't know what "S" refers to, so how is it not private?

At 258, from the first person perspective, the use of "S" cannot be justified "there is no right here"; "I" can apply S to whatever I want. — Metaphysician Undercover

If he applies it to whatever he wants, then he is not applying it only to his immediate private sensations, as per the description of a private language at 243.

The first layer is naming something with "S". The second layer is the person claiming that the thing named as S is a sensation — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not merely "something" in the first place. This is why Wittgenstein intercepts this anticipated response from the private language advocate at 261:

And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S” he has Something — and that is all that can be said. — PI 261

Consider that the person could be using "S" completely privately without knowing that "S" refers to something which we would call a "sensation". The use of "S" could be completely private, yet from our perspective, "S" refers to a sensation. That is the difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

So you're saying that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something — and that is all that can be said?

Good, we finally have agreement, "the sensation", referring to the particular sensation named "S" is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not how language works, and not what you've been saying for several pages now.

It is "S" which supposedly refers to the sensation, not the sensation which refers to "S". And the argument you have been making this whole time is that "the sensation" is ambiguous, not that "S" is ambiguous. You are conveniently trying to conflate the two now, instead of admitting your error.

It's good to see you finally agree that "sensation" is not ambiguous.

Now we can ask whether this ambiguity is intentional or not. In any attempt to understand the meaning of an ambiguous passage of writing, it is necessary to determine whether the ambiguity is intentional or not. It seems obvious to me that in this case it is intentional, as it is meant to be this way for the purpose of the demonstration. Do you agree? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that Wittgenstein does not specify the type of "certain sensation" that he associates with "S". I suppose he could have said more about it, but describing it using more words from our common language would defeat the purpose. He tries his best at 258 to depict a private language scenario based on the assumptions of the private language advocate without it turning into a public language. He does not succeed, but that's the point.

What is being named with "S" is "a sensation", and "sensation" is a word of our common language. Therefore this is not an example of a private language — Metaphysician Undercover

What would be an example of a private language?

So the example at 258 is already set up within the bounds of common language, to talk about something which is being referred to through the use of common language as a certain sensation. Therefore it is impossible that this is an example of a private language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that's the point. Do you at least agree that Wittgenstein attempts to give an example of a private language at 258?

Wittgenstein never says "'S' cannot refer to a sensation", nor is this implied. — Metaphysician Undercover

You're right. What I implied was that "S" cannot refer to a sensation and still be a word/symbol of a private language, which is intelligible only to me. That is the point of 261. You still have not explained why Wittgenstein says "intelligible only to me" at 261.

I think you need to pay closer attention to the subtleties of the demonstration. Notice that at 258, the author, Wittgenstein, is providing the first person perspective: — Metaphysician Undercover

He actually begins 258 by saying: "Let's imagine the following case:" Expand the contraction and it becomes "Let us imagine the following case". Please pay closer attention to the subtleties.

Or did you think he was talking to himself at 258 and then to his audience at 261? I won't bother with the rest of your "perspective" argument.

We are no longer concerned with how the judgement is made whereby something is judged as fitting the name "S"... — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't the concern at 258.

...we are concerned with whether the thing which has been given the name "S" qualifies as a "sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

That isn't the concern at 261. You still have not stated what reason Wittgenstein might have for raising this "concern". How does this reading help to make sense of the text? Do you at least acknowledge that Wittgenstein is arguing against the possibility of a private language?

So the diarist has said at 258, 'I am naming something "S"', and naming this thing this way is his own little private language game. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you said that 258 is not an example of a private language.

However, since the diarist has said that the thing named is a "sensation", and "sensation" is a word from a public game, then from the perspective of the people in that game, 'us', or 'we', the diarist needs to justify the assertion that the thing called "S" is a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

He can't possibly justify it because "sensation" is a word of our common language. The fact that the diarist must rely on the word "sensation" implies that the language is not private.

From the first person perspective, 258, it is stipulated that the diarist is making a note of something. That is a premise of the example, so it cannot be otherwise, and we cannot ignore this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe he only thinks he's making a note of something but he really isn't. See 260 again: so far "S" has no function.

"Sensation" is our word, in our language game, and if we want to allow "S" into our game, — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't want to allow "S" into our (public) game. Then it would no longer be private! We are trying to determine whether a private language (or even a private word) is possible.

The key to understanding the demonstration, which you are not getting, is that when we switch to the perspective of the observers, 'we', it is not a question of whether his use of S is justified, it is a question of whether our use of "sensation", to refer to the thing which he has named S is justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is so confused. We are told at 258 that "S" refers to a sensation. We are also told at 258, and you have acknowledged, that "the use of "S" cannot be justified". But now at 261 you claim that we are supposed to justify our use of "sensation" to refer to what one person has? That's not how language, or how the word "sensation", works.

It wasn't the community of public language users who used the word to refer to what the person has [how would that work exactly?], so why would we need to justify it? Even if it were the community of public language users who used the word to refer to what the person has, to whom would we justify it? To the private language user?

Wittgenstein poo poos the idea that the private linguist could have something (if not a sensation). But, assuming you are correct, what do you view as Wittgenstein's supposed reason for stating that "something" cannot be justified as a sensation?
— Luke

If I claim that I am using "S" to refer to a certain sensation, and you ask me to justify this claim, that the thing I am calling S is a sensation, how is proving that there is something which S refers to, justification for the claim that the thing is a sensation? — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't answer my question. And you are not being asked to justify this claim.

No, the possibility of a private rule is denied by Wittgenstein — Metaphysician Undercover

The possibility of a private language is denied along with it.

So all these points you raise, are from Wittgenstein's perspective, unanswerable, and therefore ought not be asked in that way. — Metaphysician Undercover

I put them to you because you seem to think a private language is possible. Do you? If so, then Wittgenstein is not your defender.

So whatever means the diarist uses to judge the occurrence of a sensation as qualifying for the name "S", it cannot be a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

What possible (non-rule) means could there be?

We look for justification that S actually names a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You already said this was denied at 258. Your position at 261 is that we are looking to justify that "sensation" fits what the person has.

Perhaps "disallow" is not the right word, but Wittgenstein shows at 261 that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use.
— Luke

This is not true. What is shown is that the diarist's claim 'S refers to a sensation' remains unjustified (i.e. no such thing as correct or incorrect use) so long as the use of "S" remains private. The problem though is that the diarist already steps outside the bounds of a "private language", by using "sensation" to say what "S" refers to, because "sensation" is a word of public language. So the diarist has already gone beyond private use with this claim. — Metaphysician Undercover

How is what you said different to what I said? I said that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use. You just repeated it back after saying it's not true.

"Private use" and "private language" are two distinct things. — Metaphysician Undercover

What distinguishes the private use of "S" from a private language?

In other words, if we judge the ambiguity as intentional, then we conclude that the question of what the thing is which "the sensation called S" refers to, cannot be answered, as I explained to you already. Then to understand the meaning of the passage we need to determine what Wittgenstein intended to do with that ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Once again, "sensation" is not ambiguous given the context, as it clearly refers to an "inner experience" such as pain. It doesn't seem sensible for it to have any other meaning. Only "S" or the type of sensation denoted by "S" might be considered ambiguous or vague.

"C" in my example has the same use as "S" has in Wittgenstein's example. The fact that you claim to know what "S" refers to in Wittgenstein's example, as "a sensation" — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't claim to know what "S" refers to in Wittgenstein's example, except as a type of "certain sensation".

258. Let’s imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. — PI 258

Remember, as I explained to you, 258 is not an example of a "private language" as you define it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where have I defined it? I'm following Wittgenstein's description at 243:

...a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use...[where] The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — PI 243

What definition of a private language are you using?

What you propose, "so 'S' cannot name a sensation anyway", directly contradicts what Wittgenstein says in the example, that "S" is the sign for a sensation, therefore we must reject your proposal. The problem appears to be that you believe Wittgenstein is giving an example of a "private language", when he is not, because this is impossible, so you can only support your belief by contradicting what Wittgenstein actually wrote. Therefore your belief is incorrect. — Metaphysician Undercover

258 is a kind of reductio ad absurdum, where Wittgenstein attempts to play along with the private language advocate only to show that their assumptions lead to an impossible conclusion. It is not Wittgenstein contradicting himself, but the idea of a private language contradicting itself.

That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something.
— Luke

I believe you are misreading this. He is talking about justifying the use of the word "sensation" here. He is saying "it would not help", (in relation to the attempt to justify this use), to point out that when he writes "S" he has "something" which "S" refers to. This is simply due to the obvious, saying that it is "something" doesn't justify calling it a "sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

At 261 he starts out questioning the reasons for calling "S" the name of a sensation. Wittgenstein's description at 243 requires that a private language refers only to what the speaker can know so another person cannot understand the language. He notes at 261 that "sensation" cannot be a word of a private language because it is "a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me."

When he goes on to say: "And it would not help either to say it need not be a sensation; that when he writes "S" he has Something," he is talking about "Something" as being a lesser claim than a "sensation". The private linguist may accept that "S" cannot refer to a sensation, as Wittgenstein notes, however he may try to respond that "S" could still refer to "something" (not nothing), even if it is does not refer to a sensation. Wittgenstein is saying that it would not help to make the lesser claim that "S" refers to "something" instead of a "sensation", either. This is because ""has" and "something" also belong to our common language". Just like "sensation", "something" is also "a word of our common language which is not a language intelligible only to me."

Your account does not explain why Wittgenstein refers to "a language intelligible only to me" at 261.

What Wittgenstein claims, is that whatever criteria, or principles which the person applies in making the judgement of "S", they cannot be understood or described by words. This is the "private" part. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Wittgenstein make this claim?

It is simply the person's memory, and the application of "private" judgement which cannot be described in words, because we describe things in terms of rules, and this is not a matter of following rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it is supposed to be a private language. You cannot have a language without rules. For example, a definition is a rule for how a word is to be used. "A definition serves to lay down the meaning of a sign, doesn’t it?" (PI 258)

Therefore you need to respect the fact that he is asking a question at 260, when he asks did the man make a note of "nothing". He is not stating that "S" signifies nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says at 260:

Don’t consider it a matter of course that a person is making a note of something when he makes a mark a say in a calendar. For a note has a function, and this “S” so far has none. — PI 260

You appear to be considering it a matter of course that the person is making a note of something, despite what Wittgenstein says here.

The parameters of the example stipulate that "S" signifies something, so this would be contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's like a reductio.

According to my translation, this is incorrect. What I have is "—But justification consists in appealing to something independent." — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not incorrect. You're using an older edition.

Now, proceeding onward he is talking about justifying 'our' use of "sensation" to refer to what the diarist signifies with "S", not the diarist's use of "S". — Metaphysician Undercover

At 258 Wittgenstein asks us to imagine that he keeps a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation that he associates with the sign "S". He can only be talking about the diarist's use of "S" at 261. "What reason have we for calling "S" the sign for a sensation"… in the imagined scenario at 258?

It is well established at 258, that the use of "S" cannot be justified. — Metaphysician Undercover

Since "sensation" is a word of public language (261), we need to justify that the thing which "S" refers to is a token (to use your word) of the type, sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

If it is "well established at 258" that the use of "S" cannot be justified, then why would we need to justify the use of "S" at 261?

He is saying that use of these public words needs to be justified, he is not disallowing them. — Metaphysician Undercover

The use of all words of our common language need to be justified such that everyone understands them. This is independent of the supposedly private use of "S".

Obviously the claim that he has "something" does not justify the claim that "the something" is a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein poo poos the idea that the private linguist could have something (if not a sensation). But, assuming you are correct, what do you view as Wittgenstein's supposed reason for stating that "something" cannot be justified as a sensation?

Whatever method the person employs when attaching the name to the thing is completely private, as not being a matter of following a rule, and so it is unintelligible to us. — Metaphysician Undercover

Surely the private linguist has their own rule for the use of "S". Otherwise, how do they recognise the same thing as "S" again each time? How do they use "S" in the same manner each time? Surely the use of "S" is at least intelligible to the user of "S". If "S" denotes a different type of thing each time, what purpose could that possibly serve?

Anyway, according to Wittgenstein's original description of a private language at 243, the words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations."

Next, Wittgenstein wants us to justify "sensation", that what he has is a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

How and why would we justify whether what Wittgenstein has is a sensation?

For “sensation” is a word of our common language, which is not a language intelligible only to me. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. — PI 261

The use of this word, like all words of our common language, stands in need of a justification which everybody understands. We don't need to justify the use of "sensation"; it's already justified.

That there is a sensation implies that there is something sensed, and like the example of the chair, the something sensed is the "something independent", which serves to justify the use of "sensation". — Metaphysician Undercover

How does the source of the sensation justify the use of the word “sensation”?

You want to turn back on the premises of the demonstration, and deny the principle premise, saying that Wittgenstein disallows such a use. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps "disallow" is not the right word, but Wittgenstein shows at 261 that "S" cannot refer to a sensation if "S" is supposed to have only a private use.

The question is what does "the sensation" refers to in the context of 258. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why do you need this question to be answered in the context of 258?

Suppose I define "chair" as a seat for one person. Then I tell you that I have named a certain chair "C". And then I proceed to talk about "the chair" named C, without telling you any of its identifying features, only that it is a chair. How can you not see that there is ambiguity with respect to what "the chair named C" refers to. Suppose I asked you to bring me the chair named C, so I could sit on it, because it's my favourite chair. How would you know which chair is named C? — Metaphysician Undercover

Does "C" have only a private use? No one else but the diarist is supposed to know what "S" refers to.

However, I know what "chair" refers to, because you have defined it as "a seat for one person". And I know what "sensation" refers to in Wittgenstein's scenario because he talks about it in the context of "inner experiences" and "pain".

Now, out of these many things called sensations, I have taken one and named it "S". Then he leaves it completely ambiguous (a guessing game if you will), as to which sensation is the one which he has named S. — Metaphysician Undercover

The type of sensation that "S" refers to is irrelevant to Wittgenstein's point. "S" has a private use so you can imagine any type of sensation you like. It makes no difference. Moreover, Wittgenstein proceeds to establish that the diarist cannot rely on the public word "sensation", so "S" cannot name a sensation anyway.

The answer is at 270... — Metaphysician Undercover

270 is notoriously difficult. I'm not going to touch it until you can show better comprehension of the earlier passages. The section from 270 you quoted does not give you the "answer" you think it does. Suffice it to say that 270 is not a continuation of 258 and 261 but a totally different scenario.

At 258, Wittgenstein leaves it ambiguous as to whether "the sensation" as an internal experience, refers to the sensation itself, or the source of the sensation (what I called the thing sensed), as both are internal in sensations like pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The example you gave for the source of pain was an injury or wound. Wounds are not internal and injuries are not necessarily internal, so the source of pain is not necessarily internal.

You are saying that Wittgenstein might not use "the sensation" to refer to the sensation. You offer no textual support for this absurd claim.

What makes you think he uses "the sensation" to refer to anything else but the sensation, and in particular that he uses it to mean "the source of the sensation"? Wittgenstein says nothing about "the source".

At 261 he makes it clear, when he says all we can say is that he has something — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't say "all we can say is that he has something." He says: "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."

That is, according to Wittgenstein at 261, we cannot say that the diarist has Something.

Otherwise we could not say that he has something, because he might have nothing, and be naming nothing with "S", i.e. using S randomly. — Metaphysician Undercover

We cannot say that he has something. Wittgenstein shows us that the diarist fails to establish a use of "S" by inwardly associating it with a particular sensation.

So, as I explained in the other post, he makes a switch at 261, so that "S" refers to the object, the thing sensed, rather than the sensation itself, from this point onward. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is zero textual evidence to support this bizarre claim. What at 261 provides any indication that "S" now refers to the source of the sensation (i.e. "the thing sensed")?

This "switch", is what allows his use of "S" to be justified, as explained at 265. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is (further) explained at 265 is that the private use of "S" is not justified, since "justification consists in appealing to an independent authority."

Actually, he says "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."
— Luke

Right... So, it does not help, as a means of justification, to say that he must have "something". This is because we still do not know what it is which is referred to as "S", that was left ambiguous, and remains ambiguous. That it must be something does not justify that it is a sensation. And if it's nothing it's totally fictitious, and still not a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

He says: "And it would not help either to say that it need not be a sensation; that when he writes “S” he has Something."

Wittgenstein disallows the private use of "S" to name a sensation because "sensation" is "a word of our common language". But Wittgenstein also disallows "that when he writes "S" he has Something" for the same reason - because "has" and "something" are also words of our common (public) language.

You have misread if you think Wittgenstein allows the use of "S" to name Something, and you are wrong that what "S" refers to "must be something". The entire point is that a private language is not possible.

The private language argument argues that a language understandable by only a single individual is incoherent — Wikipedia article 'Private language argument'

What Wittgenstein had in mind is a language conceived as necessarily comprehensible only to its single originator because the things which define its vocabulary are necessarily inaccessible to others.

Immediately after introducing the idea, Wittgenstein goes on to argue that there cannot be such a language. — SEP article 'Private Language'

Uh-huh, just like I can identify a particular colour, as "a certain colour". It might be good for a guessing game, but not too good for philosophy — Metaphysician Undercover

If you think you have to guess what "sensation" means then you have missed the surrounding context.

If you think it's necessary to guess what type of sensation he means, then you don't understand the purpose of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language.

But he has to give it some identity as an internal experience, to be able to even lay out his example, so he just calls it a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you not know what "sensation" means unless you are told what type of sensation? Can you not know what "fruit" means unless you are told what type of fruit?

Saying that he identifies it as an internal experience shows that you know how he is using the word.

That's why he asks at 261, what reason do we have for calling this a sensation. And the answer, eventually, is that it's a sensation because that's what it's called. — Metaphysician Undercover

At 261 he questions calling "S" the sign for a sensation. There is no such “answer” given.

The "thing sensed" is the wound, injury, or whatever it is which is the source of the pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

It sounds much more natural to me to say that the "thing sensed" is the pain. It sounds very unnatural to me to say that the "thing sensed" is the wound or injury. Regardless, you haven't explained what this has to do with the private language argument.

Wittgenstein explicitly says, "He has something", and this is what he means, that there is something which is being referred to. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, he says "And it would not help either to say...that when he writes “S” he has Something."

Well, if he's talking about a particular item, or a particular type, referring to it as "the...", then this particular "something" ought to be identified. — Metaphysician Undercover

The particular something is identified, as "a certain sensation".

Of course the real ambiguity is as to whether he's talking about a particular object, or what you call a type, — Metaphysician Undercover

Is that the real ambiguity? You keep saying that the type-token distinction is irrelevant here, except where it suits you to say that the type-token distinction is the main problem here.

The diarist is supposedly naming a type of "certain sensation" with the use of "S". This means that "S" is the type and its tokens are also called "S", being instances of the type. The "objects" of inner experiences can only be tokens or instances of the type "S". The type "S" cannot be an object, token or instance itself because it is only a conceptual category.

My point has been that the diarist is not (supposedly) naming only a single token of "a certain sensation", but is (supposedly) naming a type of "a certain sensation".

And it is quite possible that Wittgenstein is talking about a particular (or a particular type), and hiding the thing he is talking about from us, for the purpose of making a philosophical point, but then we must conclude that the ambiguity is intentional. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is no hiding. The particular type "S" refers to "a certain sensation". All you need to know is how he is using the word "sensation", just as all you would need to know in my alternative example is how he is using the word "fruit". It is obvious in my example from my reference to an apple what the word "fruit" means, and it is obvious from Wittgenstein's scenario and the surrounding passages from his references to "inner experiences" and "pain" what the word "sensation" means. What type of sensation (or fruit) it might be is irrelevant to the scenario.

If you refuse to acknowledge a difference between the thing sensed, and the sensation, then we simply cannot go any further in this philosophical discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm reluctant to be dragged into this metaphysical argument unless you can explain its relevance to the current topic.

Do you apprehend a difference between the chair, as the thing sensed, and the sensation of the chair. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not necessarily. What sort of thing is "the sensation of the chair"? And why do you insist that this relationship must hold in every case? It seems that, in the case of pain, pain is both the thing sensed and the sensation.

Suppose we assign "pain" to the sensation itself. We still need a thing sensed, let's say the thing sensed is a wound, or an injury, what I'll call the source of the pain. — Metaphysician Undercover

The source or cause of the pain sensation is not the pain sensation.

Can we discuss Wittgenstein's so-called private language argument while maintaining this distinction, without conflating the two in ambiguity? — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't really follow the distinction or why it should be maintained.

Would you agree, that at 261, when he says "he has something", what the word "something" refers to here, is not the sensation, but the thing sensed, the source of the pain? — Metaphysician Undercover

I would not agree.

At PI 261 Wittgenstein tries to accommodate the private linguist by getting us to imagine that she names a sensation by/for herself. However, strictly speaking, in order to be a truly private language, she cannot make reference to a "sensation", "For sensation is a word of our common language". Although she cannot speak of a "sensation", Wittgenstein tries to accommodate the private linguist by allowing that she could instead have "Something" (that is possibly like a sensation, only different). However, strictly speaking, "has" and "something" are also words of our common language, so the private linguist can't rely on those, either. In the end, the private linguist can do nothing but emit an inarticulate sound, but even that doesn't help her.

"Something" doesn't refer to the source of the pain; it doesn't really refer to anything. It is just Wittgenstein's way of playing along with the idea that a private language is possible, in order to ultimately show that a private language isn't really possible after all.

Would you concur, that at 258 he is talking about the sensation itself, which we call "pain"... — Metaphysician Undercover

I would concur that at 258 he is talking about "a certain sensation", and, yes, the sensation itself. However, I would not agree that this sensation is "pain". Wittgenstein does not specify what type of sensation it is.

...but at 261 he switches and proceeds from this point onward to refer to the thing sensed (the source of the pain). — Metaphysician Undercover

I would not concur.

Luke, if he says "a certain type of fruit", then the type of fruit is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he says "a certain type of apple", then the type of apple is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. If he is saying "a certain type of sensation" then the type of sensation is left unidentified and this is ambiguous. — Metaphysician Undercover

How definite do you need him to be? What more information do you need and why do you need it?

How far does Wittgenstein need to go before you are satisfied that he is no longer being ambiguous, vague, unclear or indefinite?

I don't believe you can be so persistent in your ignorance of Wittgenstein's use of "the". — Metaphysician Undercover

At what level of detail does it stop being “indefinite” and become “definite”?

Sensations are not what is sensed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Is pain not a sensation? Or can we not sense pain? Or both? You said:

If there is no object called "the pain", which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you arguing against yourself? I still don't see the point of this.

Definite: clear and distinct, not vague..

If you don't see "a certain sensation" as indefinite and ambiguous, I don't think I can help you to understand ambiguity. You need some elementary level training. Which sensation is he talking about? He's talking about a certain sensation. How does that identify the particular type of sensation referred to, making clear and distinct that type of sensation? — Metaphysician Undercover

In terms of the type-token distinction, the type is “a certain sensation”.

How definite do you need him to be? What more information do you need and why do you need it?

Let’s assume that instead of “a certain sensation” Wittgenstein had said that the diarist has “a certain fruit”. Then you would complain that Wittgenstein was using the word “fruit” ambiguously because he does not tell us what type of fruit it is. And if he said it was an apple you would then complain that he doesn’t tell us what type of apple it is, etc. How far does Wittgenstein need to go before you are satisfied that he is no longer being ambiguous, vague, unclear or indefinite? There is nothing unclear in the first place about what he means by “fruit” or what he means by “sensation”. If there is, then you need to be more exact about what you mean by “definite” and tell us: At what level of detail does it stop being “indefinite” and become “definite”? Otherwise you face the same charge of “ambiguity” in your use of the word “definite”.

We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary — for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. No more than it took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable. And if you want to say “But still, before that it wasn’t an exact measure of length”, then I reply: all right, so it was an inexact one. — Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. — PI 69

And, as I've already explained to you it's nonsense to claim that there is such a thing as a token of a sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’ll need to remind me why you think this is nonsense.

If there is no object called "the pain", which was being sensed, existing independently of the act of sensation, then the sensation would be completely imaginary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, we sense sensations. What’s your point?

Let's suppose that Wittgenstein's use of "the sensation" is meant to single out a particular type, like in your examples, then unlike your examples he hasn't given anything to identify this particular type. — Metaphysician Undercover

The type is "a certain sensation".

So he is using "the sensation" to single out a particular type of sensation... — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly.

...which supposedly has been identified, and made definite as his use of the definite article "the" indicates, yet the particular type has not been identified and made definite. Hence the ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The particular type has been identified - as "a certain sensation". What's your definition of "definite"?

71. One can say that the concept of a game is a concept with blurred
edges. — “But is a blurred concept a concept at all?” — Is a photograph
that is not sharp a picture of a person at all? Is it even always an advantage
to replace a picture that is not sharp by one that is? Isn’t one that
isn’t sharp often just what we need? — LW

But talking about it, unless the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features, does not remove the ambiguity (obscurity) as to what T is the name of. — Metaphysician Undercover

So we can only ever talk about something if "the talk is aimed at discussing the identifiable features" of that something? The purpose of all discussion about something is always to better define it? Go back to PI 71 - sometimes a blurry (or more general) picture is just what we need.

And in Wittgenstein's case, he doesn't even go so far as to say that "S" represents a type of thing. that is simply your assumption. At 261, he explicitly says we cannot make such a judgement. It is only you who is claiming that "S" names a type, as an attempt to remove the inherent ambiguity, and make the passage intelligible to you. — Metaphysician Undercover

He doesn't even go so far as to say that "S" represents a token of thing either, but that has been your position for more than a month.

You're jumping to Wittgenstein's conclusion about the scenario at PI 261 here. I am (and we previously were) discussing the scenario at PI 258 itself.

You keep insisting that we cannot experience the same token twice — Metaphysician Undercover

I've said numerous times that a token of a chair is not your experience of the chair, but the chair itself. One chair is one token of a chair, no matter how many times you experience it. So, I have not insisted that you cannot experience the same token of a chair twice. If I've "insisted" anything, it's that you cannot experience the same token of a sensation (e.g. a pain) twice.

"Recurrence" signifies another occurrence of the very same thing, a sort of repeating. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you think "occurrence" means? It need not have anything to do with "experience". Your experience of a chair is not the chair's occurrence. The chair's occurrence is its existence. The chair has one existence or instance, and thus there is one token of the chair. You can experience the chair's existence many times. Or zero times. There is still one token of the chair.

But then if "He's in pain" is not nonsense, how can "He knows he's in pain" be nonsense? Do they have the same use or not? — Srap Tasmaner

"He knows he's in pain" is nonsense for the same reason that "I know I'm in pain" is nonsense - because one cannot surmise and verify that they are in pain, so one cannot (technically) know that they are in pain. Grammatically speaking, to know something requires that one can surmise and verify it (and doubt it). One does not surmise and then verify that they are in pain. That's not how pain works. This is why all that could possibly be meant by "I know I'm in pain" is "I'm in pain".

The argument seems to go like this: the trouble with "I know I'm in pain" is that you would only choose this expression over "I'm in pain" if you have a mistaken understanding of the privacy of our sensations. You may only end up saying (what amounts to) "I'm in pain", but you are trying (and failing) to say something else, and that something else is nonsense.

But that means it's something like your intention that makes "I know I'm in pain" nonsense. — Srap Tasmaner

It is not one's intention. but the misuse of the word "know" that makes it nonsense.

This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they surmise (guess, suppose, suspect) I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — Not Wittgenstein

Hopefully this is adequately answered by my first response in this post.

Everyone seems to take this as an anticipation of On Certainty and finds it completely convincing. — Srap Tasmaner

The difference between PI 246 and On Certainty is that PI 246 concerns knowledge of private sensations, whereas On Certainty extends the same idea to some public knowledge. Without the appropriate context, it is grammatically incorrect to say, e.g., "I know I have two hands". Whereas it could be argued that it is always grammatically incorrect to say "I know I'm in pain".

There's a language-game that relates knowing and guessing, isn't there? It's the one he rejects, the one that pictures our sensations as secrets we know and others can only guess. When I say I'm in pain, I'm not guessing, and that makes it, as he notes, natural to say I know I'm in pain. — Srap Tasmaner

You'll need to refresh my memory of this language-game.

"S" clearly refers to only one token, as is indicated by the definite article, "the" sensation. — Metaphysician Undercover

The definite article can be used for both the type and a token. For example:
"The blue whale is the largest mammal."
"The giraffe has a very long neck."
"The sensation is a tingling in the toes resulting from a lack of oxygen."

That's what "the" means, a particular member of the type signified by "sensation" is being talked about. — Metaphysician Undercover

The word "sensation" refers to the sensation in question, as does the symbol "S". If the word "sensation" signifies a type (as you say here), then the symbol "S" also signifies a type.

We can't say whether or not the diarist should mark "S" because of the ambiguity as to what "the sensation", or "S" is supposed to refer to. We have no criterion of identity. Whether It is, or is not what is called "the sensation", named "S", cannot be answered. There is no such thing as "what should be done" in this context. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said in the quote at the top of this post that "S" refers to a single token of the sensation. You have also argued previously that "a certain sensation" refers to a single token of the sensation. You are now arguing that neither the symbol "S" nor the word "sensation" can refer to the sensation. So which is it? Do "S" and/or "sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation or can they not refer to the sensation?

I would never refer to them both as "the sensation" in the same context of speaking. However, Wittgenstein is talking about "the sensation" when referring to both occurrences, the use of "the" indicating that one particular sensation is being referred to two different times. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is all you could possibly mean by saying that "S" and/or "the sensation" refer to a single token of the sensation. If there are two tokens, then you face the same contradiction that "one particular sensation is being referred to two different times". But let's assume for a moment that "the sensation" does not refer only to a single token of the sensation and that it instead refers to a type of sensation. This may help to explain why Wittgenstein says:

I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign “S” and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. — LW

To associate a "certain sensation" with a name/symbol is (supposedly in this scenario) to establish a type, not merely to name a single token. This has been my point. In the most basic terms, it is not logically possible to have the recurrence of a single token, which has only one instance, so Wittgenstein could only be referring to a type of sensation.

Both occurrences must be "a single token" — Metaphysician Undercover

So if you have a pain and it goes away for one year and then returns, it is still the same instance of the pain? You were just unaware of it for a whole year? Garbage.