Making laws is something we do. Homo juridicus, or something like that. Maybe homo legistoris?

Regardless, we won't stop making laws because they're "ontologically impossible." The law doesn't predict conduct, it assumes nothing. It's ascribed to, or it isn't. It's effective, or it's not.

The existence of a law is one thing, its merits or demerits is are another thing. Whether a law be, is one inquiry; whether it ought to be or whether it agree with a given or assumed test, is another and a distinct inquiry. The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. --John Austin

The Oxford Dictionary used to state that a mystic was 'one initiated into the [Greek] Mystery religions', although the definition has now been broadened. — Wayfarer

Much broader, in fact. Of course, if we define "mystic" as an initiate into the mysteries, there were one hell of a lot of mystics back then. There were a good number of mystery cults. But it means something more, now, which I think can't be associated with the Eleusinian mysteries.

Merriam Webster:

Mystic; noun
1: a follower of a mystical way of life
2: an advocate of a theory of mysticism

Mystical; adjective
1. a : having a spiritual meaning or reality that is neither apparent to the senses nor obvious to the intelligence
the mystical food of the sacrament
b: involving or having the nature of an individual's direct subjective communion with God or ultimate reality
the mystical experience of the Inner Light

Mysticism, noun
1: the experience of mystical union or direct communion with ultimate reality reported by mystics
2: the belief that direct knowledge of God, spiritual truth, or ultimate reality can be attained through subjective experience (such as intuition or insight)

Cambridge Dictionary

Mystic, noun:
someone who attempts to be united with God through prayer:

Mystic, adjective:
relating to magic or having magic powers, especially of a secret, dark, or mysterious kind:

I think we use the word differently, now. What distinguished the ancient mysteries was knowledge of a sort, which was arrived at through rituals which were secret, hence mysterious.

Cicero wrote of the Eleusinian mysteries in his On the Laws:

For it appears to me that among the many exceptional and divine things your Athens has produced and contributed to human life, nothing is better than those mysteries. For by means of them we have transformed from a rough and savage way of life to the state of humanity, and have been civilized. Just as they are called initiations, so in actual fact we have learned from them the fundamentals of life, and have grasped the basis not only for living with joy but also for dying with a better hope.”

A more ecstatic, magical mystery cult was that of Dionysus. From what we know of the mysteries of Eleusis, they were more refined. A kinder, gentler mystery cult. The revelation wasn't received in the mist of frenzy, or in a sudden burst of communion with God, but through contemplation and ritual, over a period of days.

Interesting fact: Plato was a mystic, as defined by textbooks: 'initiate of the Greek mystery religions' (probably one of the orphic cults). — Wayfarer

Those of Eleusis, by my understanding. Eleusis was quite handy to those in Athens; not far away at all, relatively speaking.

But being an initiate didn't make one a mystic, at least as we understand the word. Many were initiated, including Alcibiades who is infamous for mocking the mysteries in public. Augustus, Hadrian, Marcus Aurelius and even Commodus among the Roman Emperors were initiated to those mysteries; Julian as well, of course, being one of the last to be initiated. Cicero too. Aristotle also. I'm not sure any of them would have been called "mystics" as we use the word, with the exception of Julian.

I just felt that philosophy defined so generally or neutrally, and without the critical aspect (in the sense of social critique), was somewhat anemic. — Jamal

Dewey and other pragmatists (e.g. George Herbert Mead), proposed that philosophy should be applied to the resolution of social problems. I don't know if they engaged in "social critique" as you define it, though.

↪Ciceronianus That’s the spirit! — Jamal

Now that would be an "anemic" response, as in lacking substance. (Merriam Webster Online)

In fact, I almost used the word “anemic” in reply to Ciceronianus, the sensible no-nonsense pragmatist, but decided it was too rude. — Jamal

How thoughtful and kind of you to refrain from doing so!

But what an interesting, and revealing, word to choose. "Anemic" as in lacking force, vitality or spirit. Philosophy should be forceful, vital and spirited..powerful. Examples of proper philosophy would include Bergsonian proclamations of elan vital, then; or perhaps expositions of the Will to Power, or rhapsodies regarding the ubermensch. Something more manly, maybe, like Hemingway's "grace under pressure" or masculine and spirited or spiritual, like the English philosophy of "Muscular Christianity." I could go on and on, but don't wish to seem rude.

It's true we don't encounter such clamour (or glamour) in pragmatism or analytic philosophy. But we don't see it in ancient philosophy, either. In antiquity, such thinking would have seemed merely silly. It seems to have arisen in the 19th century. And perhaps that's what philosophy is, now. It strikes me that the appeal of such thinking is emotive, sometimes even mystic, sometimes even religious. For me, the expression of such ideas is best left to artists or the religiously inclined who are certainly better at it than those who call themselves philosophers.

Still, there’s something about it that makes me suspicious. The idea that philosophy is an independent ever-expanding toolbox, ready to apply to whatever exists—this is surely a fantasy. Philosophy is itself always historically situated, and part of what it does is to apply its tools to itself, even to its own tools, depending on the social conditions. — Jamal

Yes, but the pragmatist/quietist approach would certainly include among philosophy's purposes the application of its tools to itself. And if reason, critical analysis and the careful use of language are among those tools, pragmatists and quietists have been doing just that. Successfully, I think.

What's to be considered, I think, is whether we want such tools to be applied in and to philosophy. If they are, then philosophy probably wouldn't involve much in the way of proclamations regarding Truth, the Meaning of Life, Being (a la Heidegger and others), the Good, the Beautiful, Reality, God and other traditional philosophical concerns, because such proclamations require the creation and imposition of a system of ideas, and the application of the tools I refer to generally precludes the formation of a system that purports to resolve those traditional concerns.

When they're not applied, I think what results is mostly an expression of the wishes, intuitions, feelings and preferences of certain individuals, which may be inspiring and thought-provoking, which appeal to the wishes, intuitions, feelings and preferences of others. Perhaps that's what philosophy is, really.

I don’t have a specific question except: what do you think? — Jamal

The pragmatist in me thinks that philosophy should be devoted to the clarification of ideas and the application of critical intelligence to the resolution of problems of all kinds. The quietist in me thinks much the same, but would limit the problems to a particular type--those involving the pretensions of philosophy (those claiming special insight into Truth, Nature, Being, etc.) and their influence on thought and conduct in general. The stoic in me would say it also involves how to live a tranquil life.

What is faux about the doubt which he expressed? He doubted everything else (the entire external environment) and was left with himself, which he could not doubt, as "doubting" comes from something that doubts (self). No self = no doubt to be had. — Benj96

He "doubted" what he unquestioningly interacted with every moment of his life. Do you think he doubted the food he ate was food? Or that the paper he wrote on existed, or the pen (or whatever he used) did, as well, or doubted the chair he sat on? If so, it would be a very curious kind of doubt, one that was disregarded and that caused no uncertainty.

This serves to emphasize the wisdom of the greatest of sages, Popeye the Sailor Man. "I am what I am" he proclaimed, dispensing with "that" as a mere redundancy, expressive of nothing more than faux doubt of the kind Descartes indulged in. But he added "and that's all that I am." Thus, he not only affirmed his existence, but disdained to speculate regarding his nature, being and destiny. He is Popeye, singular and manifest!

I have a feeling you might interpret him more charitably when I tell you he really hated Heidegger, philosophy and all. — Jamal

A remarkably perceptive fellow, then, after all.

His primary targets in this area were instrumental reason, bureaucratic thinking, and science and technology that considers only means, not ends. This is a critique of modernity from within, in a spirit of self-critical enlightenment, rather than an instinctive conservatism or a reactionary attitude. — Jamal

That's a far more interesting perspective, I must say.

Maybe, but the German student movement at the time was more than just that, even if—as Adorno says somewhere—it was partly that. There was police violence and an attempted assassination from the state, terrorism from the students (the Red Army Faction came out of it). It had a specific character and happened for specific reasons, rather than just students doing their thing. — Jamal

I may be thinking too much of the American experience of the 1960s. Our student rebels of that time are probably all Republicans, now. Some are probably even lawyers, God help them.

Far too long ago to remember well, really. I recall that we were forced to read Plato's Republic and Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions when Freshmen. I don't know why. I suspect it was believed that if we were willing to read such books, we could be induced to read most anything and believe it to be rewarding in some undefined sense. And so we did.

What is particularly fascinating and at first glance puzzling about this is that he identifies the wild, empty, and irrational pseudo-activity of the students with the increasing “technocratization of the university”. What could he have meant? — Jamal

I'm unfamiliar with him, but I suspect this is another example of the technophobia we see in some philosophers. Just a guess, really. I also guess that academics sometimes think, mistakenly, that their students are more than privileged, self-important brats indulging themselves in various ways while they can do so in a more or less safe environment, one in which they're unaccountable for the most part. Just guessing, as I say.

Therefore, justice does not equate with a system of law. — Tobias

You would think this should be obvious, but it isn't, even to some lawyers. O.W. Holmes, Jr. famously noted that we have courts of law, not courts of justice. Some say he made this point to a young lawyer appearing in court: "This is a court of law, young man, not a court of justice." I like to think he did. It's one of my favorite quotes about the law, though I'm also very fond of this one by John Marshall: “The acme of judicial distinction means the ability to look a lawyer straight in the eyes for two hours and not hear a damned word he says.” I think most lawyers know there are judges who have this ability.

So, I think it follows that efforts to define justice as if it equates to the law are misguided. There is no "justice system." I'm inclined to the view of the Stoics that justice is, properly speaking, a virtue. It applies to how we act in our relations to others. Fairness to and respect for others are characteristic of just action. For the Stoics, justice is part of acting according to nature, so I suppose that they may be said to consider it as based on natural law, a theory which they had a part in creating.

I can't stop myself from asking if Chomskybot will participate. Sorry.

I mentioned it because it deals with Plato's friendship with Dion and the events in Syracuse.

Here is a good article on what he was doing there. — Fooloso4

Thanks for the reference. Sidebar, though relevant--ever read May Renault's The Mask of Apollo? I think her Alexander-worship is excessive, and she treat's Aristotle too harshly (in other works) but she's one of the best writers of historical fiction I've ever read.

Plato pointed to the attitude that philosophy is useless, but he did not attempt to make it useful. — Fooloso4

Whatever was he doing in Syracuse, then? Better to say he never succeeded in making it useful.

I've been grateful to Heidegger, nonetheless, since my earliest philosophical studies in the late '70s for his monumental oeuvre as a/the paragon of how NOT to philosophize - or think-live philosophically (as Arendt points out) - as manifest by the generations of heideggerian obscurant sophists (i.e. p0m0s e.g. Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard, Rorty et al) who've come and gone in and out of academic & litcrit fashion since the 1950s ...
— 180 Proof — 180 Proof

I like this. Well said.

As I've said, I'm listening to the book mentioned in the OP. There's a good deal left to listen to. I think its persuasively makes a case that there is a relation between H's political/social ideology and his philosophical works. The author professes to admire H for his efforts to provide the philosophical foundation for an alternative to nihilism and angst which, it appears, was rampant in European philosophy before Being in Time.

[Have patience with me here, if you will. I've never understood why angst and nihilism were supposedly prevalent in 19th and 20th century Europe, and elsewhere to a lesser extent, and am inclined to attribute it to an overreaction to the perceived failure of Christianity, which resulted in people being deprived of the solace of its busybody, "Big Daddy" God, giving meaning to life and setting rules. So, I'm not inclined to think there was some kind of need H tried to satisfy, if there was one. I may not be accurately describing the author's views, or H's for that matter in this respect]

Assuming the author accurately describes what H wrote, however, he wrote a great deal about Volk, Blut und Boden, Arbeit macht frei. The author thinks this wacky (to me) glorification of Germany, Germans, the German language and culture and corresponding denigration of all other people and nations (especially Jews) is consistent with the entirety of his work and that this would be clearer still if his philosophical works rendered into English, including portions of Being and Time, had not been modified by sympathetic translators.

I haven't read Being and Time; certainly not in its entirety. I've read some of his other, shorter works such as The Question Concerning Technology and it seems to me that it can be inferred from them that he was something of a mystic and romantic. Perhaps that in addition to his rampant Germanophilia accounts for his reference to the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism, even in the 1953 publication of An Introduction to Metaphysics.

I think this was located in Arbeit macht frei. — Tom Storm

This charming slogan, which also graced the gate into Auschwitz (part of what Heidi called the "self-annihilation of the Jews" when referring to the Holocaust), is mentioned in the book.

Apart from the political aspect, the question is, is there any evidence
that such readings get the philosophy right? — Joshs

Well, one must read or listen. It seems that the author believes that to be the case. Thus far, the focus has been on Heidi's weird obsession with Volk, Blut und Boden, which seems a peculiarity of German Romanticism, and his belief in the superiority of Germans and the inferior status of everyone else, but especially Jews. Those views are, from what I can gather, more pronounced in the Black Notebooks and his efforts at licking Hitler's boots while Rector at Freiburg, and in letters to various and sundry, but we shall see. The author thinks that Heidi himself believed such scribblings to be part of his oeuvre, and that his previously published work was "sanitized" in some cases by fans.

I'm listening to Heidegger in Ruins. It's interesting to learn that he's become something of a hero among far-right groups in Europe.

Who is to blame? Or are we all equally to blame for different or specific reasons in each individual case - as unique instruments in the chain that lead to the whole/total outcome? — Benj96

The law is the law, and nothing more (or less) than that. It imposes no moral obligations. B is under no moral (or legal, for that matter) obligation to bring legal action. There is no "causal chain."

I can't help but wonder what other subjects taught in institutions of higher education would be subject to similar criticisms. I suspect there are several.

How would living people on Earth see death and killing from this point on? — Captain Homicide

Well, it may cause a problem or two for antinatalists. Would it still be wrong to procreate in all cases if, ultimately, eternal bliss will result? You couldn't be eternally blissful unless you lived for a time in this veil of tears, this house of horrors. Perhaps there'd be a moral obligation to breed like rabbits, so more and more people would die!

I still maintain that this kind of gesture exists. 'I can take you with one hand tied behind my back.' Or I can ride a motorcycle at high speeds without a helmet. Or I can drink mountain man booze. Or I can go without vaccines, without flattery, without apologies, etc. — green flag

Perhaps the Native American practice of "counting coup" would work here.

"Some Celtic warriors entered battle naked - a group which Roman writers called gaestae - and exactly why this is has perplexed scholars. It may be they wished to demonstrate their supreme confidence in their prowess and the protection offered them by their gods." To me it's intuitive to think in terms of pursuit and flaunting of status, something like conspicuous destruction or potlatch. Who can 'afford' to stand most naked, to question most radically ? Is this toxic masculinity? Clearly I'm approaching this in terms of the adoption of a fundamental hero myth. — green flag

According to Polybius they fought naked, at least in part, because they didn't want their clothes to be caught in the brambles. So perhaps their concern was more sartorial than anything else. But I imagine the trousers barbarians wore could be a nuisance in battle, sometimes. It's said they were mercenaries, which suggests their motives weren't entirely heroic.

The idea that acceptance of death results in freedom or least is freeing is ancient. You see it in Lucretius, Epicurus, Seneca and others. But I think the Christian focus on death and its disdain of life as sinful transformed death, making it particularly fearsome; far more than it was for pagan philosophers, making the acceptance of death seem peculiarly liberating.

Thanks for the reference.

As for Heidi, I have only this to say, or rather say again:

Notorious Nazi Heidegger
(Whom Hitler had made all-a-quiver)
Tried hard to be hailed
Nazi-Plato, but failed
Then denied he had tried with great vigor.

Ah. So Christianity didn't become a religion until it was looked upon favorably and sanctioned by the Imperial government. It's certainly an interesting though peculiar perspective.

Not wrong or confused. You have to look at the time of Constantine, who made the formal acknowledgement of the Christian religion around 313 CE. The school of Stoic closed around the first century, I think. (I don't have my books anymore, sorry).

Before Constantine, it was a sect, not a religion. They were called the Nazarenes. — L'éléphant

You astonish me!

It's very odd, then, that centuries before Constantine, Pliny the Younger referred to "Christianis" and "Christiani" and "Christo" in his letter to Trajan, inquiring how they should be treated, and Tacitus wrote of "Chrestianos" who were followers of "Christus" who had been executed by Pontius Pilatus. I wonder who they were referring to, really.

I admire your blithe exclusiveness. Not only do you relegate the authors of the Gospels and Acts to non-Christian status, but also the revered Church Fathers Tertullian, Origen, Justin Martyr (called "martyr" because he was martyred, but apparently not for being a Christian), Clement of Alexandria and Ignatius of Antioch (the third bishop of that city, though it seems not a Christian one), all of whom lived and died long before Constantine.

Do you interpret this as an indication of the difference between politics and philosophy? In what way? — Fooloso4

In the way Cicero did. Cicero criticized Cato in his letters for being on occasion harmful to the Roman Republic because of his insistence on acting as a philosopher while acting as a Senator, and on his insistence that all other Senators do the same. If Cato had his way, the Republic would not function.
Plato himself failed miserably in his effort to have Syracuse's tyrant govern in accordance with philosophy.

That is to say, simply, that there's a difference between the politics as practical governance and the practice of philosophy.

No doubt philosophy may have political implications. But this doesn't make them the same in any significant sense.

↪Sumyung Gui Okay, first let's stop referring to Christianity when talking about Stoicism itself. Stoicism had gone out of practice way before Christianity was born.
Are you just confused as to the historical events? — L'éléphant

Really? Jesus supposedly lived in the early first century C.E. (A.D. if your prefer). Paul was born around 5 C.E. and lived until around 65 C.E. Paul, it seems, had something to do with Christianity. The Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus died in 95 C.E., 30 years after Paul. The Stoic philosopher Seneca was a contemporary of Paul's and was an advisor to Nero, who it was claimed burned Christians after Rome's great fire during his reign. The Stoic philosopher Epictetus died around 135 C.E. Marcus Aurelius was Emperor from 161 C.E. to 180 C.E They were Stoics, you see. Marcus Aurelius referred to Christians in his Meditations. So did the Emperor Trajan in his correspondence with Pliny (Trajan was Emperor from 98 C.E. to 117 C.E. ).

It seems you're wrong. Or just confused as to historical events.

This is, of course, from Plato's Republic. See the quote from Cicero above. — Fooloso4

Cicero knew quite well the difference between politics and philosophy. We see this in his criticism of Cato the Younger (though he admired Cato in some respects). Cato, said Cicero, "gives his opinion as if he were in Plato's Republic, not Romulus' cesspool."

No, there's not. And be honest - you meant to say that religious beliefs are preposterous. Now you're trying to get off the hook on a technicality. — T Clark

Can't let it go, eh?

Basta. As @Vera Mont would say, what we understand to be the case depends on meaning, context and significance. So yes, you're right. Understand that as you will, and I'll understand it based on its meaning, context and significance to me.

It all depends, doesn't it? No use debating about it.

There's a difference between saying certain religious beliefs are less preposterous than others and saying all religious beliefs are preposterous or saying all religion is preposterous. I personally think the belief in an immanent God, who doesn't demand or respond to prayers or worship, doesn't exist "outside the universe", is not jealous, doesn't interfere in human affairs, doesn't assist certain football teams but not others, doesn't miraculously save some people from disasters but lets many others die in them, (one could go on) is far less preposterous than other such beliefs. I would even call it a reasonable belief but for the fact I know its attraction (to me at least) is more the result of a feeling which, though based on my experience, can't be established by reason; can't be proven.

I'm not sure what else to say.

Such a touchy fellow. Your self-righteousness compels me to review what seems hardly worth reviewing but is apparently (and sadly, I think) of great concern to you.

Here's what I said:

I think that certain religious beliefs are less preposterous than others. But I doubt believers care whether they're more or less preposterous to others, and will be unimpressed by any argument that they're beliefs are unreasonable regardless of whether they're told there is no God or that particular beliefs about God are unsupportable. — Ciceronianus

Here's what you said:

I've never thought any religious belief sounded any more "preposterous" than quantum mechanics. If you're in the mood for some pointless argument, there are plenty of reasonable arguments against religion, but preposterousness is not one of them. — T Clark

Then I said:

Quantum mechanics certainly seems strange, but I think the analogy with religion doesn't work. I suspect that those studying QM approach things a bit differently than religious believers. It wouldn't surprise me, though, if it's taken up by religious apologists and claimed by them to support their religious beliefs. It seems that's been the case for a while now. — Ciceronianus

Then you said:

Of course they do, but that wasn't the question on the table. You weren't talking about the methods, mindset, approach, or beliefs of scientists studying quantum mechanics. You were talking about QM's preposterousness. Now you're trying to change the subject. — T Clark

Then I said:

In fact, I said nothing at all about QM being preposterous. I said it "certainly seems strange." You said QM is preposterous, and apparently feel it's as preposterous as religion, if not more preposterous than it is. If that's what you believe, so be it. I merely think QM and religion are not analogous. — Ciceronianus

Then you said:

No, that was me. I claimed that believing in God is no more preposterous than quantum mechanics. You have yet to address that argument. — T Clark

Again (and again, and again, and again) that is not the question on the table. You made a glib statement about religion being preposterous. I made a comment in response. You have yet to respond to my comment. — T Clark

Now, pause and perpend. I never said that religion is preposterous. I never said QM is preposterous.

I really don't care if you think they're both preposterous. Never having said either was preposterous, I don't feel inclined to debate whether or not or to what extent either may be preposterous. You may pontificate on those issues to your heart's content, though. But I was responding to the claim that atheism supports religion and the suggestion in the OP that the religious should be confronted with what seems problematic with their beliefs rather than merely the denial of God's existence. In doing so, I pointed out that I didn't think it mattered how preposterous religious beliefs may be to the believer.

Then you began harping on the preposterousness of both religion and QM. I said I didn't think they were analogous and you became apoplectic, demanding a response to your claim that they were both preposterous.

"Bad philosophy" forsooth. Read what you comment on, from time to time.

No, it doesn't depend on the myth. It depends on one's understanding of the myth, its meaning, context and significance.
Just as belief of* any particular scientific theory depends on one's understanding of it.
* of, not in — Vera Mont

Yes, yes. Giant muddy sea turtle, big bang...it all depends.

While the scientists operate by different rules and glean their information from different sources than the mystics, a creation myth doesn't sound more impossible than a big bang. — Vera Mont

Ok. I would think it might depend on the myth, though. But for all I know the world may have come about from the piling of mud on the back of a large sea turtle.