After thinking it through a bit, while it's true that if a definite description applies to something at one point it will apply forever, — fdrake

Yes, this really was my only point.

this does nothing to vouchsafe whether the definite description can actually be used to disambiguate a reference when required.

I agree with this, and with the rest of your post. Of course, one of Kripke's main objections to descriptivism is that it fails account for our evaluation of counterfactual conditional statements where the individual talked about fails to fall (or non uniquely falls) under its description in the counterfactual antecedent. And that's because, unlike proper names, definite descriptions aren't rigid designators. (They still can be used for purpose of initial "reference fixing", as Kripke would say, but then the issue of what it is that contextually, or informationally, is being relied on for purpose of disambiguation only is partially addressed by Kripke's "causal theory of reference").

Does our doing so successfully refer to to the thing? Surely. Can any of it be true? Surely not. Is that mode of reference somehow not existentially dependent upon any description whatsoever? As if we could do any of that without already having picked that thing out of this world by virtue of both description(s) and names?

I think not. — creativesoul

There is much for me to agree with in your long post, and a few issues that I could quibble with, but I am unsure how it connects with the previous line of inquiry. The issue of time came about when @fdrake suggested that a definite description could apply to an individual at a time and cease to apply to it later on. And therefore, as he had seemed to imply, for a definite description to single out a persisting individual it would need to apply to an unchanging individual. I pointed out that definite descriptions typically single out an individual through ascribing some property (or set of properties) that uniquely apply to it at a specified time. When the time is thus specified (either explicitly or implicitly) in the definite description, then, it becomes irrelevant that the item doesn't have the property ascribed to it at other times.

If my definite description of an apple is something like "The green apple that sits on my kitchen counter on December 14, 2018..." then, this description still will pick up the same apple in the future when it has turned red. Hence, if the sentence "The green apple that sits on my kitchen counter on December 14, 2018 has a stem on December 14, 2018" is true on December 14, 2018, it will remain true, about the very same apple, after the apple has turned red, has had its stem removed, or even has ceased to exist.

Well, I differ here wrt predictions being true at the time of utterance. Bt my lights, they are not able to be.

"Godel was born on April 28, 1906" is not a definite description though, is it? "Born on April 28, 1906..." is, right? If so, then this doesn't clear up what was in question to begin with. — creativesoul

"Born on April 28, 1906..." is a predicate. According to descriptivism, proper names have the same sense (meaning) as definite descriptions written as "The ...". Russell proposed to analyse them as incomplete symbols that introduce quantificational structure into sentences in which they occur (as Wikipedia puts it). For instance, the sentence "The King of France is bald" can be analysed as the conjunction of three quantified statements that assert (1) the existence of an x who is a King of France, that (2) any y who is a King of France is x, and that (3) x is bald.

Every true description of an entity at any time in the form at 'At that time the entity was X' is true at all times. — Janus

Yes, that's basically what I am saying.

I still haven't read more than the introduction to that book... — fdrake

Kripke or Evans?

I still haven't read more than the introduction to that book. I'll take this as a gentle reminder to read more of it. — fdrake

You might also want to check sections 10.5 (The Causal Theory of Reference) and 10.6 (The Social Character of Sense) in Luntley's Comtemporary Philosophy of Thought (which you had already begun).

Perhaps this is unsatisfying, but it looks to me that the necessary and sufficient condition for my use of Bob to refer successfully is that 'Bob' is used to refer to the entity. The sense of use I have in mind for 'use' in the previous sentence is that reference to that entity by 'Bob' is ensured by the use of the reference in an appropriate linguistic community. If my description failed to be definite and all the entities which satisfy the description happened to be called Bob, that would be quite unfortunate for telling which is which based on my description alone, but the person the sentences in my description refer to is the unique one I was referring to rather than all the ones which also satisfy the description. — fdrake

Yes, I agree with your general account. It's the main aim of Kripke's "causal theory of reference" to explain how language users institute and hook up to linguistic practices -- naming practices, specifically -- without any need, generally, for descriptions of any kind. Gareth Evans also offers an account, more fleshed out than Kripke's simple causal/baptism theory, but broadly consistent with it, in chapter 11 of The Varieties of Reference.

It looks to me like definite descriptions require a search of the properties of an object in order to give a singular extension, but such a search has a target. If we can target the search to the entity in order to find a definite description for it, we must not require a definite description beforehand to do the search.

Yes, indeed, and hence modes of reference other than definite descriptions (such as naming practices and demonstrative reference) ought to be more fundamental.

This still seems quite strange to me. Whether the description is definite or not isn't produced solely by my use of words, it's a feature of whether there's only one thing which satisfies my description or not. — fdrake

Singular reference is a function of the conjunction of both, actually. In order to secure reference, generally, you must think of the object properly (and/or with the use of a proper form of words) and you also may need the world to do you a favor.

So, granted, if I ask you to give me back the apple that I gave you, then I have failed to refer to a singular apple in the case where I would have given you more than one (and forgotten that). But also, if I ask you to give me an apple, and you have many, then I didn't thereby refer to the apple that you will choose to give me even though it will thereby fall under the indefinite description: "an apple". What is more, I will not have referred to it specifically even in the case where you only had one.

No matter the number of things which satisfy my description, it will still be about Bob and not about some Bob'. It would just be based on the information I have provided and only upon it, which candidate for the referent of 'Bob' is the subject of the sentence can't be decided... Despite that I'm referring to a specific Bob from the beginning. It's already decided which Bob I mean.

Possibly. But, in case where there are more than one individual satisfying the general description, what is it, in your view, that determines which one of them it is that you are referring to? Are you making use of the fact that this individual is is the only one among them who is named "Bob"? In that case, the description seems idle except as a way to help me anchor the reference of "Bob" for purpose of future use of this name by me.

So whether my description is definite or not looks entirely incidental to how I used the words. Why would something incidental to my use of 'Bob' be required to provide a semantics of how I used 'Bob'?

Refer back to my comment above regarding an apple (versus the apple), which I gave you.

"Falls under it"...

Does that mean that the description always applies to it, even when it is no longer true of the object? Time stamps take care of that.

Definite descriptions would have to be true of the object during it's entire existence(at all times)?

Time stamps cannot take care of that. — creativesoul

Yes, it is true at all times that Gödel was born on April 28, 1906, for instance. Of course, the sentence now being used to express this truth uses the past tense whereas a sentence used to express it prior to April 28, 1906 would use the future tense. But both sentences express the very same truth and there is no time when what it is that they express isn't true. (Put more simply: it doesn't make sense to ponder over when it will be that it might cease to be true that Gödel was born on April 28, 1906.)

Can you offer a definite description of Bob from that paragraph I wrote about him? — fdrake

In that paragraph, you offered a general description of Bob. To turn in into a definite description, you would have to rephrase it as: "The especially large baby, weighing 9 pounds the day he came out of his mother, etc. etc." This definite description then would successfully function as a singular referring expression just in case there would be one and only one individual who falls under it. (See Russell's analysis of "the ...")

I have to say though, it is surprising to me that one would be required seeing as it's extremely easy to recognise that all the sentences are about Bob, despite that such a description isn't being used to vouchsafe that reference. As a condition for the possibility of reference, maybe, partake in the act of designation? Doubt it.

Yes, I think it's common ground (between you, Kripke and I, at least) that neither explicit nor implicit definite descriptions are required to secure singular reference. The challenge is to provide an alternative theory of singular Fregean senses of proper names. Kripke was claiming not to be offering a theory, himself. But he did gesture towards an account with his so-called "causal theory of reference" (thus named by others, I think).

suppose what I'm trying to highlight is that designating an object doesn't seem to care about transformations in the designated object. And that the space of appropriate/possible definite descriptions changing with time is definitely a sensitivity to change rather than an insensitivity to it. — fdrake

Agreed about your first sentence. Regarding the second sentence: I don't think is makes sense to say that a definite description changes with time. Substances have (temporally) evolving states. But when a substance falls under a definite description at a time, then it falls under it at all times (including the times when it doesn't exist yet or anymore!) That's what makes it a definite description, rather than a general description. Hence the requirement that predication of states (such as being red) also be tensed in the case where there are two of more substances that would otherwise be in those states at different times.

Given the difficulty we have coming up with definite descriptions of objects with radical property transformations, it seems unlikely to me that the task of coming up with them formulaically and automatically is as easy as required to make them nascent. — fdrake

It seems to me like you are attempting to raise for descriptivist theories of proper names (or of their Fregean senses) an objection that isn't traditionally raised for them and that they can easily accommodate (unlike Kripke's own main objection). I alluded to this in an earlier post. Definite descriptions meant to pick up an individual for purpose of reference usually are tensed. They don't merely consist in predication of properties but rather in predication of properties at a time. Hence, "Bob", construed a shorthand of a definite description picking up a unique apple would specify just a couple properties Bob had, at a time, such as its general location and color, merely sufficient to distinguish it from other apples in the vicinity. It's then irrelevant to the reference of "Bob" that Bob moves and ripens (up to a point). That's because, "Bob" picks up whatever apple was green and on your kitchen counter on December 13, 2018, say.

@fdrake Let me try to put my main point as simply as possible. You might then tell me whether or not I myself missed your main point. Suppose you christen your (initially) green apple "Bob". You then let it ripe and rot for a few weeks or until such a time when what sits on the counter (where Bob initially was sitting) is a sorry and smelly mess barely recognizable as a rotten apple. Is that smelly mess still (numerically identical with) Bob? According to someone's metaphysical theory of fruits, it still is. According to someone else's, Bob has ceased to be. That is true (or false) whatever one's semantic theory of proper names (and of other sorts of singular referring expression) might be.

I'm not certain that I follow. It seems to me that if I began the paragraph by naming the apple 'Bob' and substituting all instances of 'it' with Bob and 'its' with 'Bob's', that would remove the anaphoric reference. If this seems illegitimate, a similar story could be written about a person's corpse, named with 'Bob's corpse' since it was Bob's.

Do you see this as undermining your objection? I believe it's likely that I've just failed to understand something crucial. — fdrake

In that case, for the sake of clarity, you might need to specify whether you intend "Bob" as shorthand for a definite description or rather as a genuine proper name: that is, as a rigid designator that picks up the unique individual that contingently happened to fit the initial description (at that time). In any case, the issue of the numerical identity of the apple with itself (that is, the issue of its persistence) as picked up at different times, and while its properties evolve, seems to me to be somewhat independent of semantic theories about singular referring expressions and rather a matter of the metaphysics of substances. But I must nevertheless concede that there are some interactions between the semantic theories and the metaphysics of substances; and those interactions are especially important when the semantic theories are externalistic -- as Kripke's and Putnam's indeed are -- since the referential practices of language users rely on some of the natural propensities (and their modes of persistence) of the substances (and 'natural kinds') whom they are referring to.

Kripke's whole point is based upon bullshit. Anyone who utters the sentence "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" is making a statement about Godel. — creativesoul

Well, I tend to agree with that. And Kripke would agree too, assuming only that we are correct that proper names function as rigid designators. But in the quoted passage, Kripke is examining what would be the case if, contrary to ordinary usage, and in accordance with some dubious semantic theories, a proper name such as "Gödel" would be used by someone with a meaning (or expressing a Fregean sense) that could be cashed out by means of a definite description. In that case, someone could use the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" to express a belief about someone who isn't Gödel. If that is indeed a BS claim (according to you), then it seems to be precisely the sort of semantic BS that Kripke is arguing against rather than something he is propounding. According to Kripke, proper names function as rigid designators, and so long as they are so used, then the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" is bound to express a belief about Gödel.

He points out that we have to be referring to Godel. — creativesoul

Of course, because otherwise (that is, if one isn't referring to Gödel with "Gödel"), saying that Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic isn't the same thing as saying "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". It is Kripke's whole point that in the case where "Gödel" would be used by someone as a definite description, and hence not as a rigid designator, then, unbeknownst to this person, her uttering the sentence "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" might not express a belief about Gödel at all.

If we sincerely say "Godel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic" then that is a statement of belief. We believe that that statement is true. When one speaks sincerely, s/he believes what they say. — creativesoul

Of course. And Kripke isn't denying that. What Kripke is discussing here is what it is that one professes to be believing when one sincerely utters the sentence: "Gödel proved the incompleteness of arithmetic". This would not be the expression of a belief about Gödel (as opposed to its being a belief about Schmidt, say) if the person uttering the sentence wasn't referring to Gödel. And she would indeed not necessarily be referring to Gödel if "Gödel" was used by her (unlike most of us) as shorthand for a definite description to refer to whoever proved the incompleteness of arithmetic.

Wht do they yse the word "saturate"? Is it borrowed from oil painting? — frank

In Frege's philosophy of language, predicates are unsaturated expressions since they have empty slots that require filling with singular terms in order to constitute propositions and express thoughts.

Hence, for instance, "... is red" is a predicate and an unsaturated expression.
"The apple is red" is saturated. But it is saturated in part because it is tensed. It expresses that the apple is red currently. On the other hand, the non-tensed expression "The apple being red" is unsaturated, because it fails to specify at what time the apple is claimed to be red.

The issue wouldn't arise if time was instantiated linguistically into the sentence. Would it? — Wallows

What issue? You may be thinking that definite descriptions of particular material substances at least implicitly assign times (or time periods) to the properties that are being ascribed to them within the description. I would agree. Within a Fregean logical framework, predicating a property of an individual without assigning a time constitutes an unsaturated thought (and an incomplete predication). A time must also be supplied in order that the 'thought' (Fregean proposition) be complete and truth evaluable. And likewise, in the case of definite description, a time must be supplied (either implicitly or explicitly) in order that the definite description could saturate the sentence it is a part of.

The "it" referring to the fresh apple and the "it" referring to the mouldy apple both refer to the same apple, it seems. The descriptions "fresh' and "mouldy" are not mutually exclusive but part of a greater description that helps to defines that particular apple (time, dates and location are also required). Its whole history is its completed identity. Of course logically. it's history could have been different; in which case its identity would have both been different, and yet the same. It seems there are different senses of 'identity'. The old 'Star Trek transporter accident scenario' where there ends up being two versions of you illustrates this paradox. Which one is you? — Janus

It seems to me that the issue concerning the reidentification of a material particular (or substance) as being numerically the same at two moments in time, in spite of qualitative change, is orthogonal to the issue of the rigidity (or lack thereof) of the referring expressions that are being used to denote it in particular instances. In @fdrake's example, the first part stipulates the existence of an individual (i.e. the apple) and assigns some properties to it. Thereafter, it seems to be assumed that this individual has conditions of persistence and individuation such that it can survive some qualitative changes while remaining numerically the same individual. The several occurrences of "it" all pick up the same individual just in virtue of them being used to refer anaphorically to whatever the first singular expression (i.e. the anaphoric antecedent "an apple...") was referring to. That would be true, it seems to me, regardless of the individuation conditions for apples, and regardless of the rigidity of the anaphoric antecedent.

The only thing I'm disagreeing with is that I'm not actually a determinist and I'm not a realist about laws--I believe there can be nondeterministic phenomena at (2) (and thus at (1)). — Terrapin Station

But I thought you were objecting to the possibility of there being nondeterministic phenomena at (2) (i.e. at the level of life, physiology and intentions) in case there wouldn't be any at (1) (i.e. at the level of the physical behavior of the inanimate material constituents). This is what a compatibilist who endorses some version of the principle of alternative possibilities would claim to be possible, and that it had seemed to me you were objecting to as being incoherent (although you didn't say why you deemed it to be incoherent, appart from asserting a lack of ontological distinction between the entities at both levels.)

Minus the fact that I don't actually agree that determinism is the case, yes, I think there is no need for such an argument, because there's no good reason to believe otherwise, no good argument for an alternate position.The fact that it's easier to talk about "functional" physiological and behavioral stuff from a different conceptual and linguistic perspective certainly isn't a good argument in support of their being some sort of ontological distinction. That would amount to very naively reifying language/the way we find it easiest to think about something. — Terrapin Station

What is it, exactly, that you are claiming not to be in need of an argument? Is it the inference that if something is made up of material parts (and/or events) that are being governed by deterministic laws, then, in that case, this something necessarily also is being governed by deterministic laws?

But I'm not attempting to insert it in a linear chain of nomological event-causation. That latter part is up to you. I'm just saying that it's there in a linear chain of spatio-temporal events, because anything else is incoherent. Whether those events are deterministic is up to you--that's what I'm asking you. — Terrapin Station

To clarify a bit, I think 'deterministic' is a predicate that is most suitably applied to systems rather than sets of events. That's because material systems governed by laws are defined with respect to sets of intrinsic properties of their constituents (such a physical predicates, like masses, positions and momenta) while other relational or systemic features of those constituents (and of the whole) are being abstracted away. Hence, looking at the behavior of a rabbit, say, construed purely as a physicochemical 'system'; its 'behavior' (viz. the set of the motions of its parts) may truthfully be said to be deterministic. But that's just because the 'events' that we are looking at are restricted to physical and chemical events, and those events indeed may be governed by deterministic laws (modulo quantum indeterminacies). But this abstract way of looking at the rabbit loses features of its biological organisation and is blind to those 'events' (viz. intentional behaviors and functional physiological processes) that physics and chemistry have nothing to say about.

Some philosophers such as Jeagwon Kim have mustered arguments, such as the causal exclusion argument, in order to infer determinism at the supervenient level of description (such as the description of the rabbit in functional physiological and/or behavioral terms) from the determinism of the system being supervened upon (the set of the rabbit's inanimate material parts). I think those arguments are flawed, but Kim at least acknowledges the need for such an argument whereas you seem to take its conclusion for granted or just believe the denial of this conclusion to be incoherent.

Maybe. I still don’t know. — Noah Te Stroete

Just to be clear, I never intended to suggest that your taking your medications constitutes a habit that you ought to kick. The opposite may very well be true. I am only arguing that habits in general (and other features of character) aren't things that we are powerlessly straddled with.

Well, I quit smoking by starting vaping. I understand that the second-hand vapor is harmless, but it would be best if I didn’t need nicotine at all. There are other attributes I would like to have, though. They seem more difficult. Vaping made giving up cigarettes easy. I can’t stand the smell of cigarette smoke now. Being more active is difficult being on antipsychotics, mood stabilizers, and antidepressants. — Noah Te Stroete

So, we can agree that someone may be smoking because (in a causal sense of 'because') of some feature of her character (viz. her smoking habit) and, nevertheless, this person isn't powerless to quit smoking. She may or may not quit, and will reasonably be held (and hold herself) responsible for the decision.

I have an ideal in mind, but I doubt it reflects many others’ ideals. — Noah Te Stroete

It's good that people don't all agree on what's best (or ideal). But there is some truth to the aphorism that the best is the enemy of the good. If someone feels stuck into a character that is bad in some respect (such as having a smoking habit) then it is usually clear enough to that person in which direction her character might be improved (in the direction of kicking out this particular habit, say). This is true even if not everyone agrees that smoking is bad.

How does one who wants a better character but who feels stuck in place go about getting one? — Noah Te Stroete

I think Aristotle's recommendation would be to try an emulate who appear to you to be wise people and take up good habits, which may be harder at first, but becomes easier over time as virtue (good character) and phronesis (practical wisdom) grow hand in hand.

So we are responsible for our character? What is character? I know the traditional sense, but what does it mean philosophically? — Noah Te Stroete

I am using the term in a sense that's intended to closely match the ordinary use, but I can make it a bit more explicit, or philosophical, thus: The (rational and/or moral) character of a person is the set of her dispositions, habits and intellectual skills, which account for her ability to make (rationally and/or morally) good practical choices. You are thus responsible for your own character inasmuch as it has been molded by your own past efforts and decisions, and it is also currently being maintained or reshaped by your present ongoing efforts and decisions.

I didn’t pay back my student loans, but that “choice” was fully determined by circumstances beyond my control. The stress of living in the ghetto where gunshots rang outside, drug deals in the parking lot outside my window, the paper-thin walls that made it impossible to differentiate outside voices from the voices inside my head; all contributed to my already fragile mind (I have schizoaffective disorder), fully determining my need to be proclaimed disabled and unable to work. In no possible universe given all of these factors as still holding true would I be able to work. So, I reject your view that “intelligible” actions are not fully determined. — Noah Te Stroete

For sure, there are many cases in which an agent acts badly and in which, because of the specificity of the circumstances, we hold her responsibility to be attenuated. This is why, for instance, the law provides for mitigating factors (or extenuating circumstances), which mitigate personal responsibility. The recognition of such circumstances constitutes an acknowledgement that the agent's action were, at least in part, determined by circumstances that were outside of her control.

But there also are cases where we hold that, although external circumstances account causally for the agent having made a bad choice, this influence on her action isn't best construed as a factor that severely diminished the agent's ability to do the right thing but rather is better construed as having provided an occasion for the agent to display a character flaw for which she remains responsible. Oftentimes, it is a matter of ethical (or legal) judgement whether the agent's responsibility for her irrational, unethical or illegal action is better construed as being mitigated, or not, by the specific circumstances (including features of her life history) that led her to make this wrong choice.

No one is denying the role of experience or of beliefs in the decision making process. Practically everyone knows, intellectually, that drunk driving involves grave risks. The question is not about acquired knowledge, but about how the agent weighs the incompatible factors that motivate driving drunk or not. There is no numerical trade-off between the relevant factors, so despite utilitarian objections, no algorithmic maximization can determine the decision. I think we can agree, further, that the decision is made in light of a subjective weighting process -- one that is neither algorithmic nor syllogistically conclusive.

Can't we also agree that how a person weighs such factors is not merely backward looking, not merely a matter of past experience and belief, but also forward looking -- a matter of what kind of person the agent wishes to be? And, if that is so, then the past is not fully determinative. We know, as a matter of experience, of cases of metanoia, of changes in past beliefs and life styles. While this does not disprove determination by the past, it makes it very questionable.

As for being "random," that depends on how you define the term. If you mean not predictable, not fully immanent in the prior state, free acts are random in that sense. But, if you take "random" to mean "mindless," no account of well-considered decisions can hold they are random in that sense. Personal beliefs, dispositions, and impulses all enter proairesis, but they alone cannot be determinative because they are intrinsically incommensurate. They are materials awaiting the impress of form. It is not what we consider, but the weight we give to what we are consider, that is determinative. And, we give that weight, not in view of the past alone, but in view of the kind of person we want to emerge in shaping our identity. — Dfpolis

This is a very nice account of practical reason, and a nice explanation of the sense in which past circumstances can't be held, even in conjunction with universal principles or laws, to uniquely determine the actions of rationally autonomous agents. It also seems broadly consistent with the account of practical reason that David Wiggins provides in his papers Towards a Reasonable Libertarianism and Deliberation and Practical Reason (both reprinted in Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed, OUP, 1998) and in his book Ethics: Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality, HUP, 2009.

That is a reasonable clarification of the PAP. But isn't this still consistent with compatibilism? How could the agent have made a counterfactual choice through his own powers of reasoning? What rational factor is indeterminate? — Relativist

It's true that the agent couldn't, counterfactually, have made a different choice if the antecedent material conditions had been the same. But that doesn't guarantee determinism if determinism is understood as the doctrine that everything that happens (and not merely what happens at the physical level of description) is uniquely determined by the antecedent conditions and by universal laws of nature. What it is that happens may be an intelligible action. If this action is being materially realized by specific bodily motions (and specific neurophysiological processes, etc.), then part of what happens is that those low level processes happen to realize (or materially constitute) an intelligible action form of a specific type (which may, on different occasions, be materially realized differently).

But even if there are laws of nature that uniquely determine what low level material events follow from given antecedent material conditions, it doesn't follow that there also must be deterministic laws that determine what (kinds of) intelligible action forms it is that the consequent material events are instantiating. In fact, there can't be any such laws, or so would I be prepared to argue. From the standpoint of the laws of nature (or from the 'physical stance', as Dennett would say), the fact that an agent is performing an intelligible action of type A (keeping a promise to pay back a loan, say) rather than an action of a different intelligible type isn't something that can be determined by laws of nature even if the intelligible event (i.e. the action) supervenes on its material constitution base (i.e. the specific bodily motions, etc.) What the deterministic laws of nature dont specify at all is what (low level) material processes constitute what (high level) intelligible actions. It is rather an agent's reasons for acting that specifies what her bodily motions are intelligible exemplifications of (from the 'intentional stance', as Dennett would say).

***edit** If a libertarian believes quantum indeterminacy is inadequate for LFW, despite it techincally meeting the terms of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), then please provide a re-worded PAP, or some other means of identifying LFW. — Relativist

Yes, this edit is an important addendum. Compatibilist philosophers who are impressed by so called Frankfurt cases hold that compatibilist freedom and responsibility are possible despite PAP being false. However, it's not only libertarian philosophers who endorse PAP, since not all compatibilist philosophers agree that Frankfurt cases show alternatives possibilities not to be a requirement for freedom. So, you are right that such compatibilist philosophers thereby have the burden of explaining in what sense there might be alternative possibilities open to free agents in the context of determinism. The most common way of discharging this burden (which is a step in the right direction albeit not entirely successful, in my view) is to develop a dispositional account of the "can" (or agential power) that is relevant to alternative possibilities.

The main idea is that, in the circumstances where an agent actually does A, although she could (counterfactually) have done B, the fact that the 'conditions' (where those 'conditions' include the agent's own mental states and dispositions) were such that she was determined to do A doesn't entail that she didn't have (at that time) the power to do B but merely that this power wasn't actualized. It is a tempting fallacy to infer from the fact that circumstances are such that an agent is determined to do A that, in those circumstances, the agent doesn't have the (unactualized) power to do something else. One good insight of compatibilism is the acknowledgement that some of the 'circumstances' (so called) that are 'internal' to the agent's own agential powers don't constitute constraints on her behavior at all but rather reflect (and enable) her own power of agency: that is, her power to choose which one among several options is, by her own lights (rational and moral) the right one to pursue. Hence we may say that the alternative possibilities that are genuinely open to the agent, at any given time, are the possibilities that are consistent with her general abilities, and her opportunities, such that it is only the agent's own power of practical reasoning that is responsible for one of them, in preference to another, being pursued.

I'm not saying anything about hard determinism (I buy free will--remember) or being compelled to believe something. It's not a coincidence because we're not talking about apparently "random," unconnected occurrences that have nothing to do with one another. None of that takes any of this outside of particular actions/events that have spatial and temporal locations.

So when we're talking about particular actions/events with spatial and temporal locations, (a) is either connected to (b) (and (b) (C)) in a causally deterministic way or it is not. They're all a series of actions/events with spatial and temporal locations. So it's a matter of whether ontological freedom is possible anywhere in the system or not. — Terrapin Station

It is the attempt to insert (b) in between (a) and (c) in a linear chain of nomological event-causation that I am objecting to. It rests on a category error since the (b)-items don't have the proper logical form to figure as causal relata in event-event chains of nomological causation. This insertion is an attempt to collapse (or reduce) formal causation into 'efficient' event-event causation. This amounts to an oversimplification of causal explanation. When complex systems such as living things, animals, and human beings, are functionally organized, then, many features of their behavior can be explained by appeal to their specific powers, which are emergent (and multiply realizable) formal features that they have in virtue of the way in which they are internally organized. Looking at the aggregate of 'events' that occurred in the past, prior to them intentionally acting (or behaving), loses the important distinction between (1) those features of their past that generate external constraints on their behavior and (2) those features that enable their functional capabilities to channel their circumstances and opportunities into autonomously generated (and/or rationally intended) outcomes.

It's not coincidental--coincidental means they're effectively "random" with respect to each other. That's not the case here. People interact, they influence reasoning, they influence expression, etc. — Terrapin Station

Yes. Hence, maybe, a hard determinist might argue that Pam and Sue are compelled to believe in the truth of the proposition owing to contingent cultural forces that they both are being passively subjected to (on the model of material nomological 'causal antecedents'). However, such an account, although popular in some circles, which stresses institution over constitution, seems to me to be blind to the existence of the autonomous abilities which rational individuals have to rationally criticize shared conventions and to convince their peers that they merit being overturned on the ground merely of the cogency of their criticisms. (And what makes it the case that a criticism of shared norms is cogent isn't something that is being nomologically determined by prior events).

It's a problem for comments like:
This fact isn't something that obtains in either Sam's or Pam's brains — Terrapin Station

Why it is a problem? Is there no possible explanation, on your view, why Sue and Pam are agreeing (non-accidentally) on the truth of the proposition? If the explanation of Sam's belief merely refers to contingent processes occurring in her brain, and likewise in the case of Pam, then since those processes are different, and no appeal can be made (on your view) to the shared rational principles that govern them both, it would appear that their agreement is merely coincidental.

The problem with that is that on my view, propositions, meaning and truth only are particular events in particular persons' brains (at particular times, etc.) — Terrapin Station

Why would that be a problem? What is it a problem for? It is a problem for the ascription of free will to rational agents? How?

When the agent is at (b), that's a series of events in the agent's brain, during a particular range of time. — Terrapin Station

Suppose I show the written statement of a mathematical theorem to two different mathematicians, Sue and Pam. Both of them convince themselves that the mathematical proposition indeed is a theorem on the basis of a simple proof that they easily come up with. The events that occur in their brains may be very different but the occurrence of those events, in both cases, enable (or implement, if you will) the valid inference of the truth of the proposition on the basis of agreed upon axioms. We may say, then, that the fact that the proposition follows from the axioms explains why Sue and Pam hold it to be true. This fact isn't something that obtains in either Sam's or Pam's brains although it's something that they both grasp thanks to whatever occurs in their brains being in good order (that is, thanks to its being such as to enable correct mathematical reasoning in accordance with commonly endorsed mathematical-logical standards).

You don't seem to be understanding that I don't agree that it's coherent to say that there is anything not located in particular places and times. That includes numbers and premises of arguments. — Terrapin Station

It may be inconsistent with some strong doctrine of nominalism (of spatiotemporal particulars), but is it incoherent? Where is the number five located, in your view, and when did it go there? In any case, I already granted you that, in a sense, an agent's reasons for acting have some sort of a relationship to time since they can weigh with that agent's process of practical reasoning at some time and not at other times. For all that, an agent's reason for acting (which may be the same as another agent's reason for acting on a different occasion) isn't identical to the process whereby the agent grasps it and acts on its ground. And hence, those two things fulfill different causal-explanatory purposes.

What I am relying on, in order to distinguish conceptually between your (a)-items and your (b)-items is the irreducibility of the latter to the former, and, in parallel to that, the irreducibility of (b*) rationalizing explanations of behavior to (a*) nomological-causal explanations of behavior in terms or 'psychological' laws (or neurophysiological laws). This irreducibility claim doesn't commit me to weird ontologies of abstract objects. It may even be rendered consistent with some reasonable form of nominalism, if you would insist on that.

?? On my view the idea of there being anything divorced from time (and space/location for that matter) is incoherent. — Terrapin Station

You need not entirely divorce rational considerations (or numbers, say) qua abstract objects from space and time in order to place them in a different metaphysical category than either concrete material substances or material events. Rational considerations clearly relate to time, in a sense, since they can be entertained and evaluated by agents at specific times and not others. But that doesn't make them suitable to being themselves located in particular places or times (any more than numbers or premises of arguments can be). That would be a category error.

So on my view it's incoherent to say that (b) isn't particular events in time, with a location in the world, and more specifically, that (b) isn't dynamic processes of material stuff (namely the agent's brain).

I am acknowledging the existence (and necessity) of some such dynamical processes as enabling conditions (and hence part of (a)) for an agent grasping (b).

It doesn't seem like you're talking about this, though. It sounds like on your view, the agent's rationality is some mysterious who-knows-what that's not part of the material world and that can somehow operate independently of it?

Rational abilities aren't mysterious who-knows-what. They are abilities to appreciate and be motivated by rational considerations. They are abilities that are being inculcated though normal education just like, say the ability to count, to answer to one's given name or to play chess. But they are distinguishable from the material processes that implement them since they are defined abstractly by reference to what it is that they are abilities for and, furthermore, they are multiply realizable.

(By the way, (b) is actually what I'm calling the "antecendent" and (c) is the consequent, but I'm guessing you know that and there's a reason you're inserting an extra step, which is fine) — Terrapin Station

Let me respond to this first, for the sake of clarity. When I'm speaking of "antecedent circumstances" I only mean to signify a temporal relationship between material states of affairs (or the so called 'state of the universe' at a time) and the agent's subsequent decision or action. The latter is being causally determined by the former, according to determinism.

Let's try it this way.

On your account, we have, in temporal order

(a) the antecedent conditions of the agent

(b) the agent's reasons for doing x

(c) the decision based on (b)

Now, was (c) determined by (b), or was freedom involved somehow between (b) and (c), and was (b) determined by (a), or was freedom involved somehow between (b) and (a)? — Terrapin Station

On my view both (a) and (b) can figure in the explanation of the agent's decision (or intentional action) albeit in different ways and for complementary explanatory purposes. (b) is, however, ineliminable as part of the explanation of the action as an intelligible occurrence in the life of a rational agent. It is also not something that can be construed as an event in time. It is rather a rational consideration that the agent can adduce in order to justify her action to herself or to others.

Now, regarding the locus of freedom: (b) is fully determinative of (c), as long as (c) is an intentional action (or the formation of an intention). But since this determination occurs as the actualization by the agent of her own powers of practical reasoning, it isn't being determined by (a). There nevertheless are causal relations between (a) and (c) but they aren't determinative. On my view, the causal relations between (a) and (c) are best construed as enabling conditions. Some of those causal antecedents account for the agent having acquired practical rational abilities (or a free rational will) in the first place. Other causal antecedents account for the various opportunities and powers that the agent has prior to the moment of decision. But what it is that determines what the agent does, in those circumstances, is the agent herself on the basis of rational considerations (b), which may be good or bad, and hence make the agent liable to be praised or blamed (or proud or ashamed, or happy or regretful) for her decision.