The person who says "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining" isn't being sincere. — Michael
All with have are two propositions... — Isaac
...If the truth of "It is raining" is determined by whether it's raining, not by whether I believe it's raining, then I can say it is truthfully raining, but I don't believe it is. — Isaac
The problem here is caused by the contradiction between a philosophical commitment to correspondence theory, and the actual psychological reality that the truth of a statement is always a judgment and always based on the belief of the person doing the judging.
Suppose you are sitting in a windowless room. It begins to rain outside. You have not heard a weather report, so you don’t know that it’s raining. So you don’t believe that it’s raining. Thus your friend McGillicuddy, who knows your situation, can say truly of you, “It’s raining, but MacIntosh doesn’t believe it is.” But if you, MacIntosh, were to say exactly the same thing to McGillicuddy—“It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”—your friend would rightly think you’d lost your mind. Why, then, is the second sentence absurd? As G.E. Moore put it, “Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?” — Wheatley
I'm discussing the belief statements, because that's how the self-contradiction and/or incoherency is found and understood. — creativesoul
There are two belief statements in question here. "It is raining outside" and "I do not believe it is raining outside". They cannot both be believed at the same time. — creativesoul
Even in that case, the speaker cannot believe both at the same time. — creativesoul
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A Justified True Belief is just a restatement of the condition where sufficient evidence to accept the statement as Truth has been achieved. To continue to refer to it as a belief expresses an unjustified resistance to accept the existent difference. — Edgy Roy
My distinction between the two is based only on the single fact that one has satisfied the required condition for acceptance and the other has not. — Edgy Roy
Moore was envisioning a situation where the speaker (MacInstosh) doesn't know nor does he have any reason to believe that it's raining outside. — Pierre-Normand
Only in philosophy would someone think that there is anything to be gained from imagining that someone would say something that nobody would say in a situation which would not take place. — Ciceronianus the White
Their purpose is to tease out hitherto unnoticed consequences of our assumptions. This peculiar tough experiment was especially fruitful since it heralded in some measure the movement away from metaphysical or purely descriptive accounts of knowledge and belief and towards more contextual and pragmatist accounts of belief and knowledge avowals and ascriptions. — Pierre-Normand
This peculiar tough experiment was especially fruitful since it heralded in some measure the movement away from metaphysical or purely descriptive accounts of knowledge and belief and towards more contextual and pragmatist accounts of belief and knowledge avowals and ascriptions. — Pierre-Normand
If you say so. But it seems to me not a particularly "tough" experiment; instead a silly one. For me, addressing the question "Why is it absurd for me to say something I would never say?" doesn't strike me as useful. — Ciceronianus the White
The sentence "I know it's raining (i.e., it's raining) but I don't think it's raining (i.e., but I think it's not raining)" isn't "true" as the thought experiment proposes. — Ciceronianus the White
You are making the assumption that the "sentences" (assertions?) "I know it's raining" and "It's raining" are equivalent. — Pierre-Normand
I'm assuming that nobody would say "It's raining" if they thought it wasn't raining, unless they wanted to lie for one reason or another — Ciceronianus the White
(I think Snakes Alive had a promising approach.) — Srap Tasmaner
Of course nobody would say it. The question is, why not? — Srap Tasmaner
Actually, if I'm assuming anything, I'm assuming that nobody would say "It's raining" if they thought it wasn't raining, unless they wanted to lie for one reason or another. In any case, there is no true statement being made. — Ciceronianus the White
If it's raining and he/she says it's raining, there is no lie. No false statement is made.If it's raining then the assertion "it's raining" is true even if the person saying it is lying. — Michael
If it's raining and he/she says it's raining, there is no lie. No false statement is made. — Ciceronianus the White
Why does he maintain a true statement has been made? — Ciceronianus the White
For whatever reason, Tom is asserting something he believes to be false, but his assertion is true. This is the situation that Moore is imagining. — Michael
Tom's assertion "It is raining but I don't believe it is raining" is Moore-paradoxical regardless of the truth of the component proposition "It is raining". — Pierre-Normand
In any case, there is no true statement being made. It's necessary that we pretend the statement is true for the paradox to exist. — Ciceronianus the White
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