underspecified — Pierre-Normand

While underdetermination is well known enough in the philosophy of science, could you give a central text which uses the term underspecified.

Yes. The ideal gal law is an empirical law, and so are quantum electrodynamics or quantum chromodynamics (both of the latter are effective field theories), for instance. Ethological accounts of animal behavior also are empirical. The number of examples from natural or social sciences is almost infinite. Theories that are fully reducible are the exception rather than the rule. — Pierre-Normand

So you consider all these autonomous high level theories. In the case of quantum electrodynamics, electroweak theory is not a reduction, "since those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class."

Or did you mean something else?

Then are these autonomous high level theories empirical theories?

No, it is not possible. That's because it is proven that the high level features shared by systems that belong to therelevant equivalence class fully explain the existence of the high level laws (since the latter can be causally/deductively derived from the former), on the one hand, and since those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class. — Pierre-Normand

A further point of clarification. You to refer to "relevant equivalence class" because a single high level theory may have instantiations with different low level features/substrates. Or to use a previous example, the same software can run on different kinds of computers.

Or did you mean something else.

We can also seek to explain how the software is being enabled to run effectively on a specific machine, and such enabling explanations are genuinely reductive. But they are answers to a different question, and not even indirectly relevant to the high-level question concerning the obtaining of the input/output structure that is fully explained by the software specification. — Pierre-Normand

Does Weinberg give similar caveats for his version what a fundamental theory is?

We can also seek to explain how the software is being enabled to run effectively on a specific machine, and such enabling explanations are genuinely reductive. But they are answers to a different question, and not even indirectly relevant to the high-level question concerning the obtaining of the input/output structure that is fully explained by the software specification. — Pierre-Normand

No, it is not possible. That's because it is proven that the high level features shared by systems that belong to the relevant equivalence class fully explain the existence of the high level laws (since the latter can be causally/deductively derived from the former), on the one hand, and since those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class. — Pierre-Normand

So attempting to synthesize your position: while "those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class", we can seek to explain how low level features enable the high level ones and such enabling explanations are genuinely reductive.

Sartre actually.

We can also seek to explain how the software is being enabled to run effectively on a specific machine, and such enabling explanations are genuinely reductive. But they are answers to a different question, and not even indirectly relevant to the high-level question concerning the obtaining of the input/output structure that is fully explained by the software specification. — Pierre-Normand

Does Weinberg give similar caveats for his version what a fundamental theory is?

Sure, but I also have a keen, personal, interest in people who argue in this way, because I've got a bit of that myself. It makes me want to stop and ask: alright, all the bullshit out the way, what are you really asking, what are you looking for? It's clearly not what you say you're looking for, you've demonstrated that, so what are you actually after?

I can't answer that for myself, at least for the part of me that's drawn to provocation for the sake of provocation (which, say what you want, is all this thread really amounts to.) So maybe I want to provoke you into giving an answer that'll help me. — csalisbury

Every existing thing is born without reason, prolongs itself out of weakness and dies by chance.

Nothing matters.

That would be a relevant example. We may say that the software laws govern how the computers behave, at the relevant functional level that gives meaning to significant input/output structures. The lower levels of hardware implementation enable rather than govern what the software does (as characterized at the relevant symbolic level). — Pierre-Normand

In that case, that's quite an anti-climax. Engineers create structures like this all the time. Engineers who make parts and components at one level are also at the same time creating abstractions for engineers at the next level.

The part of your difference with Weinberg where he does not consider
this autonomy to be fundamental - well I am on his side on this,

It is not a difference in the understanding of the facts. It is one of perspective.
I am sure you can debate perspective, but I would rather debate something else.

I suspect this autonomy is the autonomy that computer designs at the logical level have. It just happens that economics and technology has determined they be implemented using semiconductor technology. But the design does not depend on it.

Is this a correct paraphrase?

Isn't is simpler to ignore my posts and as you say "Find a hobby, meet some people, do something else."

No, it is not possible. That's because it is proven that the high level features shared by systems that belong to the relevant equivalence class fully explained by the existence of the high level laws (since the latter can be causally/deductively derived from the former), on the one hand, and since those higher-level laws are completely insensitive to any other low level features of material constitution that aren't merely deducible from the system's belonging to the relevant equivalence class. Hence, the availability of any bottom-up (and hence reductive) explanation is positively ruled out. — Pierre-Normand

Do the following have these non-reductive features

1) Protein production
2) Plant conversion of sunlight into starches
3) Macroscopic properties of gasses.

In that case, to attempt a reduction of the high level laws just is pointless. — Pierre-Normand

Pointless is not impossible.

Yes, there is. I just explained it in a long message moments ago. The autonomy is demonstrated through deriving it directly from high level structural features (and normal boundary conditions, etc.) of the systems belonging to an equivalence class that abstracts away from most determinate (thought irrelevant to the derivation of the high level laws) features of material constitution. In that case, to attempt a reduction of the high level laws just is pointless. It's akin to seeking your keys under the lamp post, just because there is more light there, and in spite of the fact that you know for a fact that you've lost your keys further down the street in the shadows! — Pierre-Normand

Using your way to describe autonomy, is it then still possible to also reduce the same explained phenomena into lower level structures?

Indeed, explanatory autonomy is the key. — Pierre-Normand

Before reduction is attempted, is there a way to tell if the theory was autonomous?

They produced insightful philosophical works and made genuine scientific discoveries irrespective of your stubborn denials. — Pierre-Normand

Philosophy is inconclusive, but some of it is insightful despite that.

They made genuine scientific discoveries. But they also speculate on the borderline of science.

I am not being stubborn. You are being careless.

That some of the features of the theory that are explanatory fruitful do not admit of further reduction isn't a claim of ignorance. It is a positive claim that can be demonstrated conclusively and without appeal to any sort of magic. What is shown is that this explanatory relevant feature of the system is common to several other systems with heterogeneous material constitutions owing simply to them belonging to an equivalence class: sharing formal/functional features that directly ground those laws. (This is what is being referred to as multiple realizability). That is, it is only from those high level formal/functional features (and also, in many cases, some contingent features of the history of the system and of its normal boundary conditions) that the high/level laws, norms, principles or regularities can be derived and explained.

George Ellis, in his recent books and many articles, provides countless examples of emergent laws in physics, biology, computer science and cognitive science. There also exist an abundant literature pertaining to emergence and top-down causation in chemistry. One paper that I read recently (authored by a professor of chemistry) provides an example of a class of chemical networks where the concentration of a reactant is fixed insensitively to the concentrations of the other reactants in the network provided only that the individual reactions satisfy a specific structural/topological relationship. And that it must be so derives from a mathematical theorem (recently proven) regarding the structure of such networks. I'll dig up the reference if you want. — Pierre-Normand

So the answer is no. In case you forgot the simple direct question I was asking here it is again:

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory todetermine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction? — Frederick KOH

I guess I can agree with you that Weinberg's arguments aren't any better when construed as scientific arguments than they are when construed as philosophical arguments. His lack of so much as a cursory acquaintance with the relevant literature on reduction and emergence, either in physics, specifically, or in science, generally (e.g. in chemistry, biology, social sciences and cognitive sciences) also puts him at a severe disadvantage compared with his numerous colleagues who both are well acquainted with this literature, and who also (some of them) actively contribute to it. — Pierre-Normand

But you are using the wrong measure in your estimation of him.

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory to determine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction?

Just because a philosopher has a good scientific understanding doesn't necessarily makes her produce "inconclusive philosophy". Also, just because a scientist is well acquainted with philosophy doesn't make her produce "borderline science". Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hillary Putnam, Werner Heisenberg, James Jerome Gibson, Ernst Mayr and George Ellis are cases in point. — Pierre-Normand

It's borderline and inconclusive irrespective of the people involved.

I guess I can agree with you that Weinberg's arguments aren't any better when construed as scientific arguments than they are when construed as philosophical arguments. His lack of so much as a cursory acquaintance with the relevant literature on reduction and emergence, either in physics, specifically, or in science, generally (e.g. in chemistry, biology, social sciences and cognitive sciences) also puts him at a severe disadvantage compared with his numerous colleagues who both are well acquainted with this literature, and who also (some of them) actively contribute to it. — Pierre-Normand

But at that level you either do borderline science or inconclusive philosophy.

Weinberg's denial of the autonomy of emergent domains of scientific explanation seems to rest on the belief that the affirmation of such an autonomy amounts to a denial that the laws and principles formulated at this higher-level can have any explanation. — Pierre-Normand

Notice that Weinberg again assumes that either the emergent laws must have reductive explanations in terms of deeper scientific principles that govern (in this case) the individual constituents of the high-level entities (i.e. the composite individuals picked up by the high-level "terms") or they must be believed by the strong emergentist to be governed by principles that are "fundamental" in the sense that they don't have any explanaton at all — Pierre-Normand

Suppose we have an empirically adequate theory at a certain level. Does an "emergentist" have any theory to determine whether that theory is autonomous or admits further reduction?

I am rather faulting you with failing to even acknowledge (let alone seriously address) my criticisms of Weinberg's positive arguments on the ridiculous ground that any flaws a philosophical position might present aren't necessary fatal to it and hence dont really undermine it. — Pierre-Normand

Because he isn't doing philosophy. I repeat here what I said in another comment:

In the case of Weinberg, he faces what I consider an insurmountable disadvantage. Even when he engages philosophers, he engages as a scientist. He makes claims that have no hope of being philosophically defended because they are empirical claims but of a different order. They are not properly scientific either because these are claims at a higher level of generality than a scientific theory.

This is a mere dogmatic denial. There are many such forms of naturalism on offer (both in the philosophical literature and within ordinary scientific practice). It is your burden to show that they entail some sort of unacknowledged belief in magic, or to show that all forms of genuine scientific explanation that don't involve magic (and that aren't either reliant on mysterious emergent laws that defy all explanation) must be reductionistic in Weinberg's sense. — Pierre-Normand

No I don't. Either there is such a naturalism and people opposed to naturalism in general are all incapable of reasoning or there is none. I am inclined to conclude the latter.

It's quite a jump to get from me saying

"How does one reject reductionism without making naturalism as vulnerable."

to

You are now arguing that the flaws in his pro-reductionism arguments must be ignored since, if they were acknowleged, then similar (albeit unspecified) flaws in pro-naturalism arguments could make some naturalists worried. — Pierre-Normand

Well, how else do you "erase" the alleged flaws of a position that you endorse other than through showing that the arguments mustered by your critics against it are themselves flawed or point missing? — Pierre-Normand

In the case of Weinberg, he faces what I consider an insurmountable disadvantage. Even when he engages philosophers, he engages as a scientist. He makes claims that have no hope of being philosophically defended because they are empirical claims but of a different order. They are not properly scientific either because these are claims at a higher level of generality than a scientific theory.

If this were a thread about naturalism, then I might take that burden. But I need no produce a detailed account of the naturalism that I would feel comfortable arguing for in order to point out that Weinberg's assimilation of anti-reductionism to a belief in magic, or in supernatural phenomena, is unwarranted. It suffices for me to sketch an account of the forms of non-reductive scientific explanations -- explanations that are commonly generated in ordinary scientific practice, including in physics -- the structure of which Weinberg completely overlooks, in order to show that his fear is unwarranted. — Pierre-Normand

Then how can any denial of super-naturalism be "mere"?

If we endorse naturalism then we thereby straddle ourselves with the burden of showing that anti-naturalism arguments are flawed. — Pierre-Normand

This does not erase the flaws of naturalism.

You position shifted rather more dramatically from an acknowledgement of the burden to defend Weinberg's pro-reductionism arguments against my criticism to a claim of indifference towards the flaws, small or large, that they may present. — Pierre-Normand

Accepting a position does not mean you are indifferent to its flaws. Similar flaws exist in other positions.

The tactic Weinberg used is particularly suitable for this situation where all alternatives are problematic. Soup or touch. We know what choice we would make first and think of the reasons later.

Since you assumed naturalism to be roughly equivalent to reductionism, you misconstrued what my acknowledgement of naturalism (which I defined as the mere denial of super-naturalism, or of mysterious emergent laws that defy all explanation) entailed. — Pierre-Normand

When you deny the "super" of something, how do you avoid talking about the something first?

a defensible naturalism that wouldn't share the flaws that afflict reductionism. — Pierre-Normand

There isn't one.

You are now arguing that the flaws in his pro-reductionism arguments must be ignored since, if they were acknowleged, then similar (albeit unspecified) flaws in pro-naturalism arguments could make some naturalists worried. — Pierre-Normand

No. Please give me exact quote.

You are now arguing, again, that it matters not at all if Weinberg's arguments in favor of reductionism are afflicted by little or large flaws. (And this after straddling me with the burden of criticizing his allegedly very strong arguments). — Pierre-Normand

The arguments against naturalism are respectable philosophical arguments. If we accept naturalism anyway, does it mean that it matters not at all that arguments against it are afflicted by little or large flaws?

You haven't offered any specific counter-argument. You merely complained that if they weren't assumed to be flawed in some way or other then some dogmatic "naturalists" might sh*t their pants. — Pierre-Normand

In a way, you argued with yourself. You were challenged on your naturalism and your position shifted noticeably. I even juxtaposed/quoted the change in some of my comments.

You haven't stated what the flaws in my argument were. — Pierre-Normand

"They" referred to naturalism and reductionism. How did my "they" turn into your "my"?

It is not a sound criticism of a sound argument that merely "similar" arguments can be made to support a false position. — Pierre-Normand

All non-trivial philosophical positions have respectable arguments against them. What does "false" mean?

If this is the case, then you had better attend to the difference, rather than the similarity, in order to properly diagnose the subtle flaw in the second argument. — Pierre-Normand

As I keep saying, they have the same flaws, subtle or not.

I have been explicitly arguing that naturalism and reductionism are not aligned positions. — Pierre-Normand

They don't have to be aligned and I am not saying they are. I am saying analogous arguments can be made against naturalism.

Laugh and ironise all you want; it is your own refusal to engage in arguments that may lead one to conclude that you don't care about them. — Pierre-Normand

I did. It's just that you find them in an inconvenient form. How does one reject reductionism without making naturalism as vulnerable.

Also, you seem to see the gaps that I have highlighted in Weinberg's pro-reductionism arguments to be minor defects akin to unfulfilled promissory notes. This could be said of the sort of "in principle" 'ontological reductionism' that often is claimed to be consistent with the falsity of merely 'epistemic reductionism'. Weinberg's true "final theory", for instance, could be claimed to lay, possibly, forever beyond the reach of human knowledge due merely to contingent limitations of human cognitive and/or computational powers. But those contingent explanatory "gaps" have nothing to do with the flaws I have highlighted in Weinberg's conception of reductionism. Those flaws rather have to do with his overly narrow conception of causal explanation, which leads him to ignore non-reductive causal determinations of emergent phenomena. Those gaps are actually wider than the argumentatively filled up space between then. They consist in Weinberg passing over, or downgrading (e.g. as mere reflection on historical accidents) large areas of fruitful and uncontentious scientific practice and understanding. — Pierre-Normand

If you say a similar argument can be made against naturalism, I am happy to concede.

intended for a jury of people who don't care about arguments at all — Pierre-Normand

Twice. You need new tricks. Laughing at solipsism does no imply one is doesn't care one bit about arguments.