Why would I be unable to deal with that? Yes most everyone assumed that Russia would easily prevail over Ukraine if it committed serious resources (at least initially). — Echarmion
If by "most everyone" you mean just common Westerners that believe what they're told on television, then yes they believed what the television told them.
However, actual military experts did not believe this 3 days scenario but that Ukraine had a sizeable military, could and would likely fight (as that's what soldiers are trained to do and usually do), and was also supported by US and NATO intelligence.
Then there was the size of the Russian regular forces which were and still are insufficient to simply conquer all of Ukraine.
In addition to military operations having fundamental logistical limitations.
Without even getting to the part of the West flooding in arms, such as shoulder launched anti-armour and anti-air missiles (which aren't sufficient to win the war but highly effective defensively).
But it turned out that Ukraine had more teeth than most anyone assumed. — Echarmion
Completely false.
What has occurred is what experts predicted was the maximum war aim Russia could reasonably accomplish with its initial force: securing the land bridge to Crimea.
Here's just one paper of actual experts analyzing things before the war occurred (published in December 2021).
Likely Ukrainian Initial Responses to Full-Scale Invasion
The Ukrainian military will almost certainly fight against such an invasion, for which it is now preparing. Whatever doubts and reservations military personnel might have about their leaders or their prospects, the appearance of enemy mechanized columns driving into one’s country tends to concentrate thought and galvanize initial resistance. It collapses complexities and creates binary choices. Military officers and personnel are conditioned to choose to fight in such circumstances, and usually do, at least at first. There is no reason to think the Ukrainian military will perform differently in this case. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
In the same paper they describe Putin's "most attractive option":
The operation to establish a land bridge from Rostov to Crimea is likely the most attractive to Putin in this respect. It solves a real problem for him by giving him control of the Dnepr-Crimea canal ,which he badly needs to get fresh water to occupied Crimea. It would do fearful damage to the Ukrainian economy by disrupting key transportation routes from eastern Ukraine to the west. He could halt operations upon obtaining an important gain, such as seizing the canal and the area around it or after taking the strategic city of Mariupol just beyond the boundary of occupied Donbas. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
The paper also explains exactly the problem Russia would have in actually conquering significant parts of Ukraine:
Russia does not adhere to American counter-insurgency doctrine, to be sure, but the counter-insurgency ratio identified in that doctrine was derived from the study of many insurgencies, not just those in which America was engaged. That ratio—of one counter-insurgent per 20 inhabitants—would suggest a counter-insurgency force requirement on the order of 325,000 personnel just for those cities. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
Hence why the authors identify the most "attractive option" as establishing the land bridge to Crimea which solves a "a real problem" after which he could "halt military operations" and "declare victory".
A significant part of the paper is devoted to analyzing the possibility of Russia conquering all of Ukraine, which the authors recognize Russia could do but that it would pose so many military and political problems that they describe such a move as irrational, even putting in bold:
Putin certainly could find ways to govern a conquered Ukraine, and he might well decide to pay the prices and take the risks considered above in return for completing this vital part of his legacy. But such decisions would be fundamental deviations from the patterns of thought, behavior, and action he has pursued for two decades. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
Followed immediately by:
They would be, in many respects, irrational, driven by an ideological need and psychic urge to take real risks and pay real prices for abstract benefits. People change, of course, especially toward the ends of their lives. But we should look for solid evidence that Putin’s thought process and calculations really have changed so fundamentally that he would either overlook these problems or accept these costs before accepting at face value the invasion plan he is ostensibly pursuing. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
The core thesis of the paper is:
We continue to assess for all these reasons that Putin does not, in fact, intend to invade unoccupied Ukraine this winter despite the continued build-up of Russian forces in preparation to do so. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
The terminology the authors use is "invade unoccupied Ukraine" refers to conquering all of Ukraine, and anything less being a limited operation which they predict is in fact likely:
A full-scale Russian invasion would consist of numerous discrete operations, almost every one of which could also be conducted independently of the others to achieve more limited objectives at lesser cost and risk. The most salient of those operations include, in order from most- to least-likely:
• Deploying Russian airborne and/or mechanized units to one or more locations in Belarus that would support a planned attack on Ukraine as well as pose other threats to NATO member states;
• Deploying Russian mechanized, tank, artillery, and support units overtly into occupied Donbas;
• Breaking out from occupied Donbas to establish a land bridge connecting Russian-occupiedCrimea with Russian territory near Rostov along the northern Sea of Azov littoral, as well as seizing the Kherson region north of Crimea and securing the Dnepr-Crimea canal;
• Conducting airborne and amphibious operations to seize Odesa and the western Ukrainian Black Sea coast; and
• Launching a mechanized drive to seize the strategic city of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine. — FORECAST SERIES: Putin’s Likely Course of Action in Ukraine, Understanding War
The authors also conclude that the "leaked plan" to conquer all of Ukraine is likely a ruse (by either Russian or Western intelligence) as well as the obvious fact the Russians could implement different operations as ultimately feints (either planned that way from the start or then pulled back if losses are too high).
Point being, experts definitely expected Ukraine to fight and that Russia conquering and occupying all of Ukraine to be so infeasibly militarily given Russias available forces as to be irrational, but that what does make sense is securing the land bridge to Crimea which is what ultimately happens.
All this has been discussed multiple times since the start of the war and in particular since the Russian withdrawal from North Ukraine.
That's a strawman. I asked you specifically how the US escalated in Ukraine. You never were able to answer those questions. — Echarmion
We can definitely get into the escalations in Ukraine itself, such as those 12 CIA bases and supplying more weapons including to Nazis if you really need it.
But this is the kind of kindergarten logic that I simply need to push back against. Escalating militarily with Russia in terms of being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO (what the RAND authors point out would likely solicit a Russian counter-escalation) and also withdrawing from INF, of which NATO intermediate range missiles being stationed in Ukraine is what Russia would be most concerned about in the scenario of Ukraine joining NATO, are both escalations in Ukraine.
This kindergarten logic that withdrawing from INF is not technically happening "in Ukraine" as it happens on paper in the abstract and so "shouldn't" involve Ukraine, is just stupid (at an adult level; if actual kindergarteners had these sorts of conceptual divisions that would be ok).
Whole reason Russia is so concerned about Ukraine joining NATO is the possibility of stationing intermediate range nuclear weapons now, and it was already essentially taken for granted even by Western talking heads that one reason to maintain a proxy war in the Donbas was to impede Ukraine joining NATO.
We can get into the funding passed in 2017 of military assistance to Ukraine if you want which would be the escalation in Ukraine, but as the authors of the RAND paper make pretty clear the Russians are particularly sensitive to the nuclear issue and potential for a decapitation strike and use pretty strong language to point out Russia would likely respond to both being more vocal about Ukraine joining NATO as well as withdrawing from INF.
Of course, you're just not going to do this very easy demonstration. Because you're lying. — Echarmion
What facts? Literally what the hell are you talking about?
Ok, well if you're going to call me a liar without even the cursory research into what you're talking about, the military assistance to Ukraine and the intelligence assistance (eventually revealed as 12 CIA forward operating bases) are not disputed facts except by you.
Here's an article from Politico from 2019 describing the situation:
For the 2019 fiscal year, lawmakers allocated $250 million in security aid to Ukraine, including money for weapons, training, equipment and intelligence support. Specifically, Congress set aside $50 million for weaponry. — Trump holds up Ukraine military aid meant to confront Russia, Politico
Which is what is called escalation in Ukraine, continuing year after year thus building up capacity and escalating further.
If you are unaware of such basic facts you are clearly not actually interested in the topic but just want to engage in denialism, which is just dumb.
Russia invaded. — Echarmion
That's what the purpose of provocation is.
The two biggest airforces on the planet, plus the European air forces? — Echarmion
Russia has a massively superior Air Force to Ukraine and yet it does not have uncontested air supremacy. After 2 years Russia has been able to degrade / attrit Ukrainian A2AD enough to be able to launch glide bombs from dozens of kilometres out.
The reason is that planes are incredibly vulnerable to surface to air missiles, and these systems can be highly mobile, hidden, dispersed and turned on only long enough to engage a target and then moved.
Not that this debate matters, but the idea NATO could destroy all Russian anti-air assets essentially overnight is ludicrous. Without nuclear weapons it would be an immense and long battle of attrition. NATO has a greater airforce but Russia would have a defending advantage of NATO needing to fly into Russian A2AD and not vice-versa.
You've got this backwards though. It is precisely because the US and the west are less committed to the conflict that no rational Russian government would ever use nuclear weapons in this conflict. — Echarmion
This makes literally no sense.
The more committed party is the party more likely to resort to more extreme force, the less committed party the party more likely to backoff and not escalate further.
Hence, it is because US and the West are less committed and Russia is super committed to winning the conflict that the US and the West knows if they actually did pour in enough weapons soon enough to actually threaten Russian forces, or then allow Ukraine to attack critical Russian infrastructure, that Russia is likely to resort to nuclear weapons which they have no response to being the less committed party.
You keep saying that the west is content to see Ukraine lose. And although you keep stretching the evidence far beyond what it actually supports, there is an element of truth in this. The west faces no existential risk over the outcome of the Ukraine war and so its determination to support Ukraine remains limited. — Echarmion
Limited support = content to see Ukraine lose.
That is literally the definition of limited support.
It honestly seems borderline miraculous that you have been able to realize essential fact of the conflict, which explains pretty much all the other facts.
If Russia were to use a nuclear weapon, especially if they were to use it directly against NATO, it would create an existential risk. At that point the West would be forced to strain every sinew to eliminate the government responsible for the attack.
It is a very, very bad idea. — Echarmion
Using a nuclear weapons against a NATO base in Europe supporting attacks on Russian critical infrastructure would not be an existential risk to NATO, and far less the US.
What would create an existential risk, in particular for the US, is to counter-attack Russia with a nuclear weapon or even more massive conventional attack.
If the process is Russia strikes a NATO base with a nuclear weapon and then the US does not respond in kind, then that is not an existential risk to the US and no US territory has even been damaged. Striking in kind on the other hand is an existential risk as that may lead to a further cycle of escalation towards a general nuclear exchange (where US cities would be hit) or then Russia may simply preempt that cycle of escalation by jumping right to general exchange (to have first strike advantage).
It of course makes zero sense for the US to risk actual existential risks to protect Ukrainian sovereignty either by directly intervening or then supplying Ukraine with weapons and intelligence that would put Russian critical interests at risk (in this case mostly prevailing in Ukraine as well as critical infrastructure within Russia).
Therefore, there being no way to mortally wound Russia without significant risk of Russian resorting to nuclear weapons to reestablish nuclear deterrence (which is of course already there, just in this scenario one side is choosing to ignore it for a period of time), the only rational move is to not cross a threshold of escalation that would lead to nuclear use.
Which is exactly what we see! NATO tanks, NATO planes, NATO missiles (and all the top shelf stuff not even what Ukraine eventually gets) could have been supplied to Ukraine day 1. The argument that it "wasn't useful" at the time is just gaslighting. Optimum military strategy would be to start transitioning to those systems starting day 1, which means fielding units with that equipment to start 1. gaining experience to workout optimal tactics to 2. more importantly to have a cadre of experienced Ukrainian troops on these equipments in order to train others when the day comes to scale up, to 3. even more importantly smoothly transition from old systems to new systems without a collapse in capacity and in fact increasing capacity. What NATO does instead is drip feed weapons systems into Ukraine, far from top shelf stuff, introducing each weapon system when previous capacity essentially collapses and then "calibrating", to use the RAND author terminology, the supply to not escalate to a "larger conflict" (i.e. one that risks nuclear weapons use).
But you run into the classic problem: both sides understand the logic of the situation. Both sides know that whoever stops the cycle of escalation loses. And whoever escalates into a general nuclear exchange also loses. The only winning move is not to play. — Echarmion
Well now you're getting it. The US is choosing not to play the nuclear escalation game by not supplying Ukraine in a way that risks critical Russian interests such as the bulk of their territorial gains in Ukraine or then critical infrastructure at home.
The US, understood as rational imperial interests (much less rational actual Americans interests), doesn't gain anything from doing this, it is a US policy setback and loss of prestige to lose the confrontation, but rather massive profits are made and natural gas is supplied to Europe and a new Cold War is started to ensure even more massive profits.
The kindergarten logic that you present here, just repeating Western talking heads propaganda, is the idea that because Russia is also deterred by Western nuclear weapons means that we can therefore do anything to Russia and they would not retaliate.
This is obviously not true. Attacking Russian critical interests, whether directly with NATO planes or then through supplying the Ukrainians with the right weapons and right permissions and intelligence to do so, is no longer a situation of mutual deterrence but one of simply attacking the Russians. If the attack approaches risk and losses comparable to a nuclear strike then this is simply starting the nuclear escalation cycle just using conventional weapons, on the basis that talking heads with kindergarten level logic can say things like "Russia is bluffing! We have nuclear weapons too!" or then "Ukraine has a right to attack Russian infrastructure! It's a war!"
However, what Western talking heads and their parrots on social media say doesn't constrain Russia. If we start a nuclear war it doesn't matter if Western talking heads feel the West was following some sort of rule book that allows it to attack Russian critical interests without the Russians retaliating. These kindergarten level logic developed by Western talking heads does not matter on the battlefield.
If the West, directly or through Ukraine, with conventional, nuclear or unconventional weapons, attacks Russian critical interests in which their only recourse is nuclear weapons or then risk collapse of the state, they will of course resort to nuclear weapons in order to stop the attack.
There's no "we have a right to attack you in a special way as outlined by our talking heads where you don't have a right to retaliate but just need to accept collapse of your entire economy and state".
What matters is not the methods but the end results. There's not "special way of murdering someone" where you get to get away with murder because "technically they pulled the trigger" and all you did was put them in a device that forced them to pull the trigger or then "all I did was leave some poisonous drink around and I didn't anyone to drink anything". These obviously stupid loopholes that obviously don't matter in the real world is the kindergarten level logic that Western talking heads keep repeating.
However, obviously Western policy makers, while happy to have these talking points repeated over and over so that the obvious problem with the policy of supporting Ukraine isn't scrutinized (that the West obviously is deterred by Russian nuclear weapons and therefore we are simply propping up Ukraine to receive harder punches), don't actually believe this kindergarten logic. When they tell us directly that this weapons system or that weapons system can't be supplied or these missiles can't be used to strike Russia, as to not "escalate", they are simply explicitly telling us that they are deterred in their choices by Russian nuclear weapons and therefore won't risk an nuclear escalation: how is that achieved? By not supplying Ukraine or permitting Ukraine to do anything that would actually risk Russian critical losses in personnel, material and infrastructure.
The point though is that Russia is already achieving that effect with just threats. No-one is even considering a large scale strike at russian critical infrastructure using western weapons. It is the strange logic of deterrence that using a weapon is less effective than threatening it's use. — Echarmion
Again, you follow literally zero events. You do zero reproach. You simply randomly deny things.
Which, if there was still interest in the conversation by others I'd just ignore you, but you are at least a useful foil in order to explain things I'm happy to explain anyways.
Striking Russian infrastructure with Western missiles is exactly what Ukraine has been asking! That's what Western talking heads keep repeating that Russia attacks Ukrainian infrastructure all the time and so the framework that Ukraine isn't allowed to do likewise to Russia isn't fair, Ukraine "has a right" blah blah blah.
No, Ukraine wants permission to attack specific military targets (airbases, air defences, supply dumps). — Echarmion
Again, you follow zero events, what Zelensky and others have been quite clearly stating is that Russia is only going to give up once the Russians in Moscow "feel" the war, which is achieved by attacking critical infrastructure, which obviously the Russians do in Ukraine all the time so obviously if you believe in "fairness" it's common sense that Ukraine would be allowed to retaliate in kind.
However, the West does not believe in fairness, but believes Russia would resort to nuclear weapons and so these permissions aren't given.
Since I know you'll just keep denying these obvious facts until I spoon-feed them to you.
The title of this BBC article is literally "Russia must feel war consequences, says Zelensky amid Ukrainian attack".
Which you may say "that's not specifically about missiles!"
Ok sure:
The Ukrainian leader previously called this the "one decision" that could prevent the Russian army from advancing further into Ukraine, adding, "If our partners lifted all restrictions on long-range capabilities, Ukraine would not need to physically enter the Kursk region to protect Ukrainian citizens in the border area and destroy Russia's potential for aggression." — US Maintains Stance on Strikes Inside Russia Despite Ukrainian Pleas
But even if you're right, that just demonstrates NATO is deterred by Russian nuclear weapons as I explain.