The alternative moral and political framework to complaining about rights, is focusing on decision making.

The key word in this alternative perspective is "policy" which simply represents some political decision.

What is our policy vis-a-vis Ukraine? I.e. what decisions are available and what is the best decision?

Ukraine's rights don't matter if we don't have a policy to enforce those rights; it's just pointless babbling.

Indeed, by complaining about a right Ukraine has and not enforcing it, we are disrespecting Ukraine's rights just as much as the Russians.

Note I got you to backtrack your implication that Russia has an implicit right to invade Ukraine, to: nobody really respects sovereignty. — frank

@Benkei is simply trying to explain the obvious, which is that rights and decision making aren't the same thing.

It doesn't matter what Russia's and Ukraine's rights are ... if we can't enforce them.

The confusion between rights as a legal framework enforced by the state, and a moral concept applicable in all circumstances to focus on condemnation rather than decision making (and a framework of thinking that takes the state not only for granted but is the origination and precondition of "goodness" if "rights" are good and cannot exist without the state), is essentially the bane of liberalism.

Simply having a right to do something doesn't make it a good decision, nor good for society.

A right existing in some legal apparatus does not make it by definition moral.

Complaining about rights as a substitute to good decisions, is by definition a bad decision.

The harms caused by enforcing any given right may outweigh the benefits.

Oh and here of course is a useful idiot echoing the generals' line with his trenchant "analysis": — SophistiCat

How is it "echoing" if I said the same trenchant "analysis" weeks before.

Of note (4 weeks and a day ago) "Kremlin can stop anytime and just consolidate the land grabs they've made so far, say 'enough war' we have achieved our security objectives and to demonstrate our 'peaceful intentions' are ending the war here, and declare victory" and "The parallels with Iraq and Afghanistan don't really make any sense as Russia isn't trying to "nation build" in an entirely different and hostile culture."

Also 29 days ago:

And again, Russia has already achieved key strategic objectives and can declare a magnanimous new peace now at anytime and declare victory. — boethius

Likewise 29 days ago:

This is definitely a risky move by the Kremlin, so could indeed fail; but with at least some strategic gains in Ukraine (that Russia has already solidified) I wouldn't say there's actual chance now for military failure (Kremlin can stop anytime and just consolidate the land grabs they've made so far, say "enough war" we have achieved our security objectives and to demonstrate our "peaceful intentions" are ending the war here, and declare victory).

The large size of Ukraine makes total occupation difficult / impossible, but, the large size of Ukraine makes a lot of land grabbing easy. For the same reason Russia can't easily occupy all of Ukraine, Ukraine cannot easily defend all of Ukraine.

Definitely full scale rebellion in Russia would be a failure or then failing to re-orient their economy towards China integration. I'm definitely not saying these aren't risky things, just presenting the arguments and, indeed, potential facts in which success is possible.

In particular, the Western media is basically just in a circle of saying Putin is failing because the Western media doesn't like Putin like "a lot" now ... but that was already the case from Putin's perspective.

Putin's not some youtube influencer living in fear of being cancelled by Western media corporations. — boethius

and,

Preparing in advance for "total sanctions" is not necessarily a sign they are unexpected. They are also not yet total; only some banks are shutoff from SWIFT and Western corporation "abandoning" Russia ... only matters if there's no replacement in Russia or China. — boethius

and,

The Russian army is shelling cities to the ground and already achieved a key strategic goal of linking Crimera to Russian territory. Russia may pay a price for these land grabs, but all military analyst agree whatever Russia takes it will keep. There was no insurgency in Crimea, citizens were in the least ambivalent about Russian control; hence, Russia simply keeping such territory and leaving insurgent territory and so having conventional fronts is a perfectly acceptable endgame. The parallels with Iraq and Afghanistan don't really make any sense as Russia isn't trying to "nation build" in an entirely different and hostile culture. — boethius

and

Western media takes it as a foregone conclusion that this was a "miscalculation" by Putin ... because it's played so poorly in the Western press and Western nations have flocked to offer moral support and a bit of hardware and economic sanctions.

However, the Kremlin has been preparing itself for this exact threat by the West since 2014, building redundancies for all critical systems and scaling up economic ties with China. — boethius

All analysis stated 29 days ago.

Now, certainly Russia would have achieved more militarily if it could and accepted Ukrainians complete capitulation if they did, but already 4 weeks ago they had achieved enough military objectives to simply say they achieved what they set out to achieve (and, consolidating those gains, in particular conquering Mariupol, in 4 weeks is a reasonable military time frame).

If Russia now accomplishes effective encirclement of the Eastern front ... which may be somewhat functionally being achieved now through air strikes on supply lines (it is 1000km trip from Poland to the Eastern front), then that would be the last strategic objective I pointed out Russians clearly trying to accomplish.

So, withdrawing from Kiev could be due to "weakness" and "losing" or it could be due to achieving the core objectives and exposing troops to harassment around Kiev no longer serves a purpose so they are being withdrawn to reduce losses (i.e. if they now calculate they can complete their remaining goals in the East with less losses even if Kiev troops are freed-up to redeploy to the East--such as due to degrading military infrastructure and capacity in the East--then there's no further reason to have troops near Kiev in exposed salients).

Likewise, withdrawing around Kiev is maybe the first steps to a peace agreement.

28 Days ago:

Yes, obviously discussing the stated reason for something is relevant. You can argue is purely propaganda if you want, but it's obviously relevant to the situation.

"I just don't get your position here.. I guess my question to you is do you agree with Putin's use of force to takeover a country? — schopenhauer1"

I'm presenting the counter argument to the Western media narrative, understand the counter-party perspective, which is the basis of negotiation; which I think is preferable to more bloodshed. — boethius

26 Days ago:

Everyone is saying "urban combat, urban combat" ... but if Russian forces just avoid urban combat and cut the country in half it is effectively laying siege to not only Kiev but the entire East of the country.

Combat in the East after that point is simply a matter of time before ammo runs out, and mayors and commanders can only ask people to starve only so long.

In the West, assaulting a conventional battle line would require heavy artillery and tanks, anti-tank weapons would be relatively meaningless.

Notably, the only city the Russian's have so far actually done urban combat and occupied is the only city required to carry out the above plan: Kherson. Every other city the Russian's are simply laying siege at minimal risk to themselves.

The armor dashes at the start of the war make sense to simply take as much territory as possible as Ukraine didn't preemptively mobilize, also make sense in terms of public relations of starting "the soft way", and also gave the chance to Ukraine to get a "taste" of war and maybe accept the offered peace terms.

Ukrainian leadership decided that calling Russia's bluff of doing things the hard way was a better idea, and so started handing out small arms to civilians to make clear the cost of urban combat in a social media campaign the likes the world has never seen.

... Which is what Western media keeps on going on about, how it's a "second Russian Afghanistan etc." but, other than the only city Russia has taken with experienced Urban combat units, I don't see any need for Russia to do any urban combat at all.

Russia has never stated it wants to occupy and passiffy Ukraine, everyone agrees it's impossible to do with their committed troop numbers and would be a costly disaster if they did commit the troops to try to do it ... so maybe that's just not their plan, but what they can do is cut the country North-South and just wait out the Ukrainian will to fight.

Easy to be brave when your heroic and defiant statements immediately get a thousand likes on facebook. It's far harder hungry, tired, cut off from communications, running out of ammunition, and no viable pathway to victory in the face of continuous shelling. — boethius

25 days ago:

Their strategy is pretty simple:

1. Keep pressure on all fronts.
2. Advance each day on weakest fronts
3. Avoid urban combat unless necessary
4. Cutoff all supply lines and wait things out
5. Build out their logistics methodically — boethius

Ah. Concrete evidence... yeah, that's a problem during a war, it is hard to know what's going on. Once this passes, we'll have the facts. — Manuel

We're in agreement here. If people were making strong claims that this was all somehow "genius 4 D chess" by the Russians, I'd point out the flaws in that argument as well.

Clearly it's a big mess, and there's losses and victories and significantly so on both sides, but I think also clearly that Russians have thought things through pretty carefully (at least top level Kremlin point of view ... not the conscript who knows nothing point of view).

Not to say "they got it right" or will succeed, but I think there's enough preparatory action to conclude they certainly have thought about things. From the Kremlins point of view, losses are certainly regrettable (no general wants to see burnt out equipment and dead soldiers) ... however, we really don't know what they feel are acceptable losses to achieve what they set out to achieve.

Since the war there's this narrative of Russia blundering into a fiasco. However, before the war there was a narrative of Putin wanting to "leave his mark on history" ... one way or another, he clearly has now. There are clearly massive risks being taken on in basically every sphere of Russian society, government and international relations. However, there are massive gains to be had from a strategic point of view as well.

What you say about proximity and people talking to each other and all the rest, yes, this makes the whole situation even more strange. — Manuel

Military, especially involving conscripts, in peace time is very, very, information leaky thing. Once a total war starts, then it's possible to impose strict communications, organise D day and even trick the Nazi's into thinking something totally different.

But then there are reports of many Russian soldiers entering Ukraine simply not knowing what they were doing there, approaching civilians and asking for directions and the like. — Manuel

This would be the downside of the surprise invasion. Organising a smooth invasion involving over a hundred thousand people is a super complicated thing, lot's of moving parts, and takes a lot of time. However, if the enemy knows your plan, you aren't necessarily gaining anything by doing your homework in this kind of situation.

But, if you just sort of gather people together, even your own troops think it's all just for show and a bullshit exercise (which is a default assumption about nearly everything in the military), and then suddenly invade. The whole chain of command needs to create orders in literally a few days for everyone. And the invasion was on 4 fronts.

It's also totally normal that the lower rank you are the less you know. During my time as a conscript it was made pretty clear the less we conscripts know the better. Everyone's on a need to know basis, and for sure conscript needs to know basically zero. Indeed, if everything the conscript believes about the operation is actually false, that's even better as then it just confuses the enemy when they get captured.

Of course, some units won't encounter any resistance at all so they'll just keep going until they have no gas and are lost.

What was clear is that the basic idea of the initial invasion is mostly just "go" until resistance is encountered. The only planned major urban battles is for Kershon and Mariupol which both have obvious strategic advantages to take. In the case of Kershon, military analysts concluded it was clearly overrun by experienced urban combat soldiers in a well planned operation.

Otherwise, Russians just take towns and cities that offer no resistance and go around cities that do offer resistance.

The "battle" for Karkiev is going since day one, but there's never been any real attempt to enter the city, they just go back and forth on the outskirts, apply pressure, Ukrainians defend, Russians shell, repeat.

Even knowing the Russians don't really plan to enter other major cities doesn't really help, since if you move out too many troops to elsewhere then Russians will seize that opportunity.

Russians don't believe in GPS based warfare since their plan is to blow up the GPS satellites. Indeed, in a real WWIII scenario that stays conventional for some reason, likely the first thing Russia will do is deny space by blowing up enough satellites to cause the cascading exponential destruction of all satellites and also make even venturing out into space nearly impossible for decades.

And only certain people are given maps, and even then you can still get lost with a map.

Point is, low-rank soldiers having little information, even given explanations, is pretty normal. And clearly the war is super chaotic so there's going to be big mistakes made by local commanders.

My problem is that a nation knowingly going to war with these kind of sanctions, does not fit into the "rational agent" idea, as in I don't think Putin would've been that irrational. After all, NATO now has a reason to exist, whereas it was struggling before. — Manuel

Agreed, "bringing NATO together" is a negative consequence of the War. However, the war has also brought Russia and China closer together.

Russia doesn't really care about much about NATO unity as such, that's what the nuclear weapons are for.

Rather, in a rational interpretation of Russias actions, at least, Russia cares about the USA attacks on Russian interests.

Putin has basically talked about this non-stop for 2 decades. The West response was "yeah, well, what are you going to do."

Putin would then explain (diplomatically) it would eventually get violent, that's what he's going to do. And that's what he's done. Putin's concerns were dismissed before because Russia had few strategic options ... so Putin works on solving those strategic concerns and then does exactly what he's said he's going to do if the West keeps treating Russia as the enemy.

The sanctions hurt Russia, but they also hurt the West and make the existing inflation problem even worse: pressing into an open wound.

Even if the Ukrainians "fight well" and even if it's concluded they get some concessions for fighting well and good for them and the Russians had serious losses: Russia will rapidly recover and improve it's military capability and most other countries in its sphere of influence would rather avoid a war than fight the kind of war Ukrainians have fought and are fighting.

And, consider the consequences on Ukrainian society.

Millions of refugees may not return to Ukraine, and the longer the war drags on the less Ukrainians will go back. The West's sudden concern for Ukraine may suddenly "need to be realistic" when it comes to rebuilding Ukraine and fixing its war financing. True, the entire country is not Mariopul, but there's still a lot of rebuilding to do, lives to put back together.

I'm not saying Russian elites were completely clueless or had no idea, but, I do think they very much over-estimated how easy this would be by a lot. — Manuel

It's certainly possible, I just don't see any concrete evidence. There's often focus on single lines of speeches or then that things were a surprise to junior officers who knew basically day before.

However, it's not like invading Iraq or Afghanistan who have literally zero intelligence capability in terms of spying on US planning, and things can be worked out in exhaustive detail and everyone know "their roll".

Ukraine has US backing and intelligence backing, that's a pretty massive asset. Indeed, over confidence would be planning it for months, not giving a shit who knows about it, and then just rolling in.

For, soldiers in peace time talk with their friends, who will be constantly asking "you think there will be a war" etc. and in the electronic age that's super easy to spy on. If you want the invasion to be a secret you can't have the rank and file telling their friends and family "something is going down", you want them to continue to be like "just normal bullshit". So your choices are to shut all that down and "get serious" in which to plan in secret but it's obviously not a secret, or then do what the Russians did and slowly build up so their own soldiers are none-the-wiser and then plan all the details in literally a handful of days, except maybe a few key things (like moving out of Crimea and taking Kershon).

So, the initial plan could be over confidence ... or could be extreme caution about US intelligence capabilities. A good plan is not so great if your opponent knows about it and is able to plan an even better plan. And, if the intelligence "environment" is such that the movement of 200 000 troops can literally be tracked on publicly available sat info, maybe the surprise shit show invasion and then learn by doing, is a good strategy.

Yes, there's losses, but there could have been more losses making a more detailed plan at every level that the CIA knows about and makes an even better counter plan with the Ukrainians. Worse, had the Ukrainians pinned down Russian forces in Crimea, maybe there's just as much losses but nothing to show for it; that's the nightmare scenario that generals would be worried about.

Another example would be Putin's essay on Ukrainian "artificialness".

If Russia managed to takeover all of Ukraine uncontested, that essay is a basis to just annex all of Ukraine, or then half of it.

But if that doesn't happen, it can be interpreted as just the historical reasons leading to this sort of civil and regional crisis, that arbitrary line drawings (such as just "giving" Crimea to Ukraine) and Dombas being massively ethnic Russians, is just a why the tensions occurred and why Crimea should be Russian and Dombas should be independent.

At the same time, it also provides legal cover for "defending" what is in effect Russian soil, in addition to the purely propaganda value.

Point of these strategic and reasoning ambiguities that can be reinterpreted to fit whatever happens after the war, is that it's difficult to assume it's an accident, just being stupid and not hedging all sorts of risks that were clearly very real and have revealed themselves to be very real.

And the other point, is that delusional tyrannies don't talk and plan in this way, but rather make delusional regional, if not world, conquering speeches.

Now, that's not arguing it's a "good plan" just pointing out things clearly were at least thought out and there was and is a plan. But if people deny there's any plan, claim Putin is irrational, everything is an unmitigated disaster etc. and pointing out potential reasons for any decisions can be dismissed off hand, then the discussion can scarcely progress to the point of considering what plans Russia may have had or has and the chances of success.

Which is just lunacy, even if you consider Russia "the enemy" and "evil", indeed even more so, the idea evaluating your evil enemy's goals and chances of success is somehow helping the enemy rather than inviting defeat, is truly remarkable framework of reasoning.

Of course, so stating only begs the question, of how weak does a political system need to be that the mere acknowledgement of the enemy as even potentially rational pursuing some objective in a thought out way, is the name that cannot be named and risks being some sort of self fulfilling prophecy to even consider one's enemy has some coherent plan to attack you.

The other things mentioned, like alternatives to Swift, nationalizing foreign companies, etc., look to me to be more of a reaction than pre-planned. It's not as if they have many alternatives, they couldn't well not do anything. — Manuel

There simply did not exist any alternatives to SWIFT at all before Russia and China made 2 after 2014 and the first round of sanctions and American analysts and official continuously hyping up the SWIFT as the "nuclear option" when it came to sanctions.

Now, I'm not saying their plan is succeeding, just pointing out that if you take mitigatory action about a risk beforehand, it's not a surprise (even if you thought it was low probability).

It seems clear to me they've thought through the fundamental military, intelligence, economic and diplomatic issues. Not to say having a plan guarantees success, or that achieving their military goals was at a reasonable cost and so on.

However, the idea that people who state goals, achieve those goals, didn't even have a plan to do so, makes no sense. Anyone who's ever been involved in institutional planning has literally zero stories of things being achieved despite zero planning, and even counter productive bad planning, to do so.

As to the probability the Russians assigned to Ukraine simply capitulating, we simply don't know. But they clearly had a plan in place in the event that didn't happen.

And, critically, as there's these chaotic manoeuvres in the North, the Russian military simply rolls out of Crimea uncontested, and rolls through Sough Ukraine though Kershon achieving a strategically critical bridge head East of the Dnieper river and rolls all the way to Dombas and connects their land bridge.

If those were the objectives (which "land bridge" to Crimea was more-or-less a consensus, before the war, of analysts as the "maximum ambition" Russia may try to achieve militarily) focus on the North clearly helped achieve that.

Then weeks of artillery to break down the dug-in Dombas line, missile strikes on key targets, committing to one single large urban combat operation that is strategically and symbolically critical, observing the Ukrainian supply system under a false sense of security to then plan an efficient bombing campaign, is simply not a bad plan.

Likewise, offering minimal conditions (just making the status quo de jure) and then the Ukrainians rejecting that, makes it a far easier sell to the home audience.

Which is I think the major point of that policy, that the minimum conditions the Kremlin has specifically asked in public are genuinely supported by ordinary Russians (keeping Crimea, recognising Dombas independence, and neutrality). Now, certainly the Kremlin will take more if they can, but their main political objective is "support the troops" remains a strong sentiment.

Certainly they would have just taken Kiev if they could, I'm not saying they predicted this current situation in advance, only that they clearly hedged their bets and made sure to be able to explain the operations in the North as simply undertaken to support the core objectives in the South that ordinary Russians agree with (Crimea should have water, and Dombas independence).

However, being able to set the bar of achievement to whatever was accomplished post festum ... that's just startup 101.

The issue not being surprised vs. not being surprised at the sanctions, it's being surprised by the extent of them, which is a different issue. — Manuel

But again, they took preparatory action such as make an alternative to Swift, isolate all sorts of industries, build a fleet of nuclear ice breakers to export gas out the Arctic, and most importantly make a "strong friendship" with China before invading.

Maybe Putin and the Kremlin did not predict the West would push sanctions and escalate arms shipments to the point of the EU locking itself into more expensive gas contracts and also put themselves in danger of an energy crisis that would cause an immediate recession (allowing US and China to take market share) ... because it's self-harm for a dubiously established ideological cause of which there's no guarantee home populations will care much of "it was the Russians!" as a reason for all domestic woes.

However, they clearly had a plan to deal with severe sanctions or they would not have created alternatives (such as banking) and secured essential supplies and trading relationships (such as China, India and Taiwan).

As for "the humanity" of Instagram existing Russia ... maybe the Kremlin doesn't actually like a large part of their population using an IT system controlled by a hostile power and is happy to see it go, which the shock and disruption of a war is the context to cut Russians cold turkey from these foreign controlled intelligence gathering systems ... which, we were just told today could be "weaponised".

And, likewise for the sanctions.

The idea the Kremlin has been taken completely by surprise by the sanctions and economy is in free fall, would make sense if the Kremlin took no steps to protect itself from sanctions.

If you want to argue someone is completely surprised by a risk occurring, it sort of goes with that argument pointing out they took no preparatory action.

It's like it starts to rain, and I take out my umbrella, and you accuse me of not having a plan in case it rains because I'd prefer it to be sunny.

Everything indicates it was the plan. You do not need to defend the strategic blunders if the Kremlin. — Olivier5

How'd they close the land bridge to Crimea within a few days and encircle Mariupol (the whole of their primary ideological opponent) ... without a plan?

If the plan was just to just assume total capitulation of Ukrainian forces faced with confused conscripts wandering around, and unexpected resistance created an unmitigated disaster ... how did the Russians accomplish anything?

Now, not to say Russian's plan was "the best" or the costs-benefit is positive, but they clearly had a plan in the event Ukraine made serious resistance.

If, in the first days and weeks of the war, when we were told Ukrainian resistance was a total surprise to the Russians and they're all confused, and morale terrible, and they're falling apart, it then happened; ok, that would be one thing. But the predicted disaster due to low morale and no plan etc. simply hasn't happened.

So it echoes @Isaac's comment about the idea the US goal and activity in the pursuit of that goal to collapse the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the Soviet Unions collapse.

If Russia had no plan and it's a total disaster, how has anything been accomplished at all?

And it's not convoluted to point out the goals people explicitly state ahead of time, point out to those goals being achieved, and then fit the steps taken to achieve those goals into some coherent plan.

It's much more convoluted to say people had goals, but not what they state (which sure, people can be lying, but that's a more convoluted theory ... especially ...), and no plan but they somehow achieved their stated goals as some sort of consolation prize offered or taken in an improvised way.

Yeah I don't know what's up with their website. — jamalrob

Web is also fragmenting, I can't access rt.com ... even though it's apparently not legally banned here, but I'm still not allowed to see it.

Of course, internet was already seriously fragmented with the great firewall technology, and seems that approach will be exported to a lot of the world now.

Exactly, and that plan failed disastrously. — Olivier5

That's not a plan, it's just a priori wish of pretty much any engagement.

Ukrainians would have preferred the Russians to just immediately capitulate as soon as they encountered brave resistance ... yet you're not saying Ukraines plan went disastrously because.

Preferring your opponent to just give up is not really a "plan", it's certainly not a warfare plan.

Now, had the Russians didn't amass the troops needed to accomplish the goals they stated, then, ok, they had delusional wishful thinking and sent in some random troops without a plan under the assumption Ukraine would just capitulate without a fight. But that's not the scenario.

Indeed, the only reason that Russia has "a lot" of losses to discuss ... is because they committed a lot of forces to the fight and kept fighting.

That is truly an absurd statement. — Olivier5

By conquer I mean through urban warfare.

Of course, if Zelenskyy simply capitulated or then Ukrainian forces just surrendered, that would have been preferred.

Almost no one actually prefers an adversary to fight rather than just give up.

However, considering Russia amassed the troops necessary to achieve their stated core objectives (which did not include conquering Kiev in Urban combat) then maybe they had a plan to win the fight (what they wanted to win in a fight) if Ukraine chose to fight.

As for the encirclement of Kiev.

It could be Russians did not want to cut off all access to Kiev or it could be that they would have liked to but advancing became too costly. However, if they achieve their land bridge, and take the rest of Dombas, and destroy Azov in Mariupol, and blowup all the Ukrainian critical logistical network and military infrastructure (by forcing resupply on 4 fronts), then encircling Kiev may have been deemed unnecessary.

In other words, if there is no objective to take Kiev in Urban combat, then encircling Kiev entirely is not really necessary if the general purpose is to just tie-up lots of troops to defend Kiev and force a lot of supplies to go to Kiev.

Likewise, Ukraine will fight fiercely to prevent total encirclement of the capital, so if it's not a core objective then it makes sense a stalemate does arise, as the whole purpose of a pin-down operation is to lower overall losses of your forces.

Again, I would agree that the Russian military would have encircled all of Kiev if they were simply allowed, but there's no reason to assume it was a core objective.

Now, you may say the very low list of objective announced at the start of the war, and essentially hasn't changed, is that the Kremlin were hedging their bets and intended to get more but failed.

Maybe true ... but the very fact someone hedges their bets is that they know ahead of time they may not get everything they want.

Likewise, it's been repeated many, many times that the Russians have tried but failed to kill Zelenskyy.

However, some analysists have pointed out that the Soviets killing the president of Afghanistan was a big mistake when they invaded and one of the contributing factors to a prolonged insurgency.

Hence, maybe the Russians learned from that and it's better to not kill the leader of the country you're invading so that there's possibility of legitimate peace terms. If you kill the recognised legitimate leader, you have have no one to negotiate with that both internal and external actors will largely recognise as legitimate.

They haven't achieved anything of note around Kyiv. — Olivier5

There's no reason to assume Kremlin ever planned to conquer Kiev a la Mariopul (whether the motivation is high to destroy Azov and symbolism is high and it's in the middle of the land bridge they want).

Of course, if they were allowed to just parade down the streets, they would have done so.

But, there's is no actual reason to assume Kremlin has ever wanted to actually conquer Kiev.

The capital is almost intact. — Olivier5

If they wanted to destroy render the capital "not intact" ... they could have easily done so from afar.

No need to invent bizarre convoluted explanations if there is a perfectly simple and good one at hand, fitting everything we know including what the Russian side itself has said and done. — Olivier5

What convoluted explanation? ... it's a pretty usual military tactic to have some manoeuvres (even most) for the purposes of occupying as much of the opposing force as possible in order to then achieve your core objectives.

Yeah, Russians didn't take Kiev, while they secured a land bridge to Crimea, their core security interest.

Their other stated goals?

No Ukraine in NATO. Check.

"Demilitarise" which the President of Finland asked Putin what that meant, which he explained it was currently ongoing; i.e. degrade Ukrainian military capacity, which blowing up bases and equipment and so on accomplishes. Russia can far easier rebuild what it has lost (and still has plenty in reserve anyways) than Ukraine can. It's also been reported, seems by Ukrainian defence ministry, that basically their entire military industry has been blown up.

"De-nazify" basically means Azov battalion, which is in Mariupol anyways, which they need for their land bridge.

"Liberation of the Dombas," is advancing daily.

These are the stated military goals as stated and explained by both Putin and Russian generals.

These were also the core goals as explained by many Western experts before the war started, what Russia may have mobilized for.

It's not "convoluted" to point out they achieved those core goals ... which manoeuvres elsewhere in the country, in particular pressure on the capital, help achieve by spreading forces and supply lines thin (and making it easier to map and blowup said supply lines).

A some 1300 km front has disadvantages to Russia, but so too Ukraine.

Since Russia can easily resupply and reinforce every part of the front by just going in and out and around within Russia, whereas Ukrainians must resupply from Poland and travel up to a 1000 km at risk of bombardment at each step of the supply line, it could be that this strategy was chosen as it has overwhelming advantage to Russia in accomplishing the core objectives.

Of course, the disadvantage of a 4 front war is there's going to be a lot of mad chaos and Ukrainians can easily penetrate lines and ambush and concentrate forces or small victories here and there, and ATGM's and Manpads definitely make life difficult. However, it's still better to have armor than not have armor, and once Russia achieves it's objectives through relentless shelling instead of armor offensives, then it can just dig in and shoulder launch missiles are of little use against a dug-in front (a waste of resources to fire a ATGM or Manpad at a trench or machine-gun nest ... and without mobility you can't really exploit punching through a line anyways).

Because they are now pulling back, objectively. — Olivier5

Sure, but pulling back because it's a debacle?

Or pulling back because they achieved their core goals through force?

Yes, at a cost, but also many goals achieved and the entire war fighting infrastructure of Ukraine has been severely degraded. It can't be rebuilt overnight.

(Not to mention the CIA was telling us yesterday the "pulling back" was a stunt and a lie and Russian ain't pulling back shit ... despite also losing and about to be routed ... any day now)

You do if you don't want to turn crazy. — Olivier5

Crazy according to whom?

There are people who have lived by themselves in the woods, sometimes for many decades.

We call them crazy, but maybe they call us crazy.

No issue with the rest of your post. — Olivier5

Glad we agree on some basics. And for sure a lot of the issues that have been discussed we don't "know". Maybe violent revolution in Russia will break out tomorrow, regardless of whether we on this forum think that's good or bad.

However, a lot of the "information war", which I don't keep mentioning is the "CIA" because I suspect the CIA, but because the literal director of the CIA goes on live television to explain the CIA's information war--which no one disputes Russia is also waging--is completely self-referential.

Why should we trust "our" information war?

Because "we're" winning the information war! And "winning" information-wars, means truth now all of a sudden.

Why is the Russian plan a debacle?

Because "our" information war tells us it is!

How do we know this information is all good?

Because spooks are intentionally leaking it to us?!? And we know "they're good" (despite several failed wars on false pretence) because they called Russian invasion, built up over a year, involving some 200 000 troops ... by a few days?

Invasion was chaotic and improvised precisely so CIA could only call it by a few days leaving Ukraine no time to just go and setup a line around the Crimea "border stop" and shell it to shit. Every plan has pros and cons: surprise invasion has the con of some conscripts that are there as part of normal run-of-the-mill training get lost in Ukraine (no one tells conscripts anything, I can promise you that).

Ok, doesn't resolve any of the questions of substance under discussion, but, as far as I can tell, this self-referential collapse of Western media is "our" fall of the Berlin wall moment.

Whether Russia be good or bad, that doesn't stop us from hurting ourselves either way.

BTW, this implies that it is absolutely not obvious to you that one has to trust some secondary sources. — Olivier5

You don't "have" to trust anyone.

And, of the people and sources you do trust, to the degree you decide to trust them, you may insist they earn it ... and likewise face the consequences of squandering that trust they earned when you find them to be lying to you, such as the consequence, in the least, that you personally trust them less.

Before the CNN article, I thought the following took the take for nonsense:

The heat, Ukraine crisis

Host: What’s behind president Zalenskyy’s move to ban 11 political parties in the country and shut down some TV stations.

Propagandist: Uh, there’s currently a war, there’s over 100 000 Russian troops, and, uh, 64 medical facilities have been bombed.

So, ah, in terms of banning things that are in the line of, ah, Russian influence. Uh, those are standard operating procedures during a war.

At this point we don’t even know how long broadcast television will remain in Ukraine, so long as those facilities are being bombed.

Host: So bottom line is you abandon democracy when you’re at war.

Propagandist: I don’t see, any pretence for that. We know that Ukraine has maintained elections throughout this 8 year war against it. Ah, and those, uh, and those elections have all been declared as, uh, as ah, fully recognised, ah, uh, by other, uh, countries. — The Heat: Ukraine Crisis

The very last minute of the clip there's this exchange.

Notice how proof that Ukraine's actions to ban political parties and press freedom is legitimate because of elections in 8 years of war ... in which it would be likewise legitimate to suppress any "Russian influence" without due process of any kind, in and around those elections ... indeed, would be just standard operating procedure to fix the vote to fix Russia fixing the vote to prevail against Russian influence.

And wouldn't anyone wanting to end the 8 year war and make peace with Russia to avoid a larger escalation of the 8 year war that just started last month, or anything the government doesn't like for that matter, be likewise presenting "Russian influence" and standard operating procedure would be to suppress or murder them? During these 8 years of so called war?

... Of course, there is some sort of internal consistency in the sense that the CIA, and other western intelligence agencies, discovery that intelligence can be used against an adversary is such a new concept to them that they simply couldn't keep this information secret as part of some covert operational doctrine ("covert" maybe a few concepts away once you've discovered "intelligence") ... so, they just had to come and tell us the god honest truth, as is their habit.

Institutions don't just suddenly change overnight! You can't ask spies to suddenly lie to us, learn Putin's wretched ways. It's unseemly.

[but for readers confused] If that harmonisation of the CNN article doesn't convince you, then the alternative is that the propaganda has become so obvious that they need "and that's why it's a good thing" article to directly instruct people to view propaganda as just "sticking it to Putin" and something that's needed, and to just categorise everything they say as true and everything Russia says as false even if they know both sides are waging an information war ... literally starting the article explaining Western spy agencies are using information as a weapon.

The problem is how do we actually conclude "Russia is bad" and "Ukraine is good" and "Western arms shipments to Ukraine even better" if we knowingly accept we're being fed propaganda and must spread it around ourselves, simultaneously believe it and also know it may not stand up to scrutiny so may not warrant belief to be active in shutting down all scrutiny in all contexts, to "help Ukraine and fight Putin" ... if we also know propaganda is by nature deceptive. If we agree to be deceived ... how do we know anything at all.

"We're playing Putin at his own game (but everything we say to the global media is, of course, absolutely true). Shh! Don't tell Putin - you're all spies now..." — Isaac

We better all keep it on the down low.

Our protectors just discovered a few weeks ago "intelligence" could be "weaponised".

What will they think of next!

It would be impossible to makeup the following article as satire.

Western spy agencies weaponize intelligence in attempt to undermine Putin

Western intelligence agencies are waging a psychological war over Ukraine directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin, an expert at the genre, who is now effectively taking a dose of his own medicine.

The United States and its allies are painting a picture of a bogged down, demoralized and dysfunctional Russian military taking disastrous losses on the battlefield, and are simultaneously conjuring a vision of growing political tension inside the Kremlin. They claim the Russian leader is isolated, poorly advised and lacking real intelligence on just how badly the war is going. [...]

The willingness of Western governments to be so open about what they are seeing inside Ukraine and Moscow has surprised even some veteran spies.

"It makes intelligence professionals, even former ones like me, nervous, because, of course, it's so ingrained in us to protect sources and methods," Steve Hall, former chief of Russia operations for the CIA, told CNN's Ana Cabrera Thursday. [...]

So what exactly are Western governments trying to do with this novel use of declassified intelligence assessments? Especially given that in many previous geopolitical crises, intelligence was kept secret by routine? [...]

Intelligence, by definition, is a murky business. The information about the Russian operations in Ukraine and the apparent isolation of Putin in Moscow only tell the outside world what the Western intelligence services want to release. There is, therefore, no way for outsiders to know whether these snapshots give the full picture or a more selective one. — CNN

But my favourite is the whole basis for the "Ministry of Truth" and that we should take everything said by the CIA at face value as "totally not an information war" and just honest truth telling is:

Then hours before the invasion actually happened, the US issued a warning that the incursion was imminent -- and was proven correct. — CNN

... Calling an "imminent invasion" (that had zero impact in terms of helping Ukraine, as too late for full mobilisation) with all the satellites and resources the CIA has, is now not only master spy craft" ... but also somehow makes all further intelligence assessment basically infallible ... but also war's a murky business? And the CIA is giving Putin a taste of his own medicine ... which, according to the CIA, Putin's medicine is lying about everything?

We've gone next level.

Well that's convenient, and you certainly have the advantage over me in that regard.

Indeed, I'll have to keep on my guard in that respect.

Which, to be honest, is often the case in discussing philosophy.

I have no idea what you are talking about. — Olivier5

You gotta read the book.

You mean, you were smart once? — Olivier5

The game is played now, the score is tallied in 300 to 1000 years.

It's not really so much about being smart, although that certainly helps, it's about the right ideas for the right moment.

And I didn't make the rules, it just so happens foundational concepts get reviewed and added to seldomly. Why? is a good foundational question to ask.

Sure thing, as long as they don't pin it on me. — Olivier5

Look, I'm just "a guy" who found at around 12—after reading all the popular physics books I could find, the complete history of WWII and Hitch Hikers Guide to the Galaxy—Isaiah Berlin's "The Power of Ideas" .... and thought to myself, "I can play this game, nothing they can do I can't do better." Just as the motivational posters instructed me to do, you know "reach for the stars" and "follow your dreams" or whatever.

And you and I are part of that 'very short list', you think? Or are you rather saying that we are part of some universal idea exchange fair? — Olivier5

Who knows these things.

In any event, it's a handful of Chinese sages centuries from now who get to decide.

Advising people is a business. Amateurs don't advise professionals. We are all amateurs here, are we not? — Olivier5

@Benkei is a lawyer, @Isaac is a shrink of some sort, and I'm a board director of corporations.

You can of course write down the words: 'I advise Biden to do X'. That you can do. But chances are your 'advice' ain't going to get to him. Because he receives a lot of advice, from other people than you. He pays dear money and far more attention to their advice than to yours and mine. As good as it may be... — Olivier5

You underestimate the infectiousness of ideas, the complexity of the world's social network, and humanity's response to new information.

Just because it's easier today ... doesn't somehow mean there's less impact of anonymous pamphleteers than there was in the enlightenment.

Look around you: everything you see, every tool used to build it, every plan to put it in motion and connect it with other things, every unfathomably long list of goals everything you see represents, and every political and ethical framework in which anything happens in society at all, was once an idea in one person's head.

Furthermore, if you trace all these ideas that you see to their real root, the "original" and not just a variation or implementation of some pre-existing vision, the real preconditions of human
thought and activity, what will you find? That all these truly foundational ideas originated in a handful of philosophers and mathematicians.

Why are we even talking about nuclear weapons? The damned mathematicians that brought us here, and not just the prerequisite theory for the Manhattan project: But all the way back to Babylon. A relatively short list of truly revolutionary mathematical minds.

If you dig below the surface, you'll find we live in the heads of a tiny group of people, their dreams and their madness.

I have not given advice to anyone. NATO, the EU, none of the actors you mentioned is reading TPFand they have not asked for our advice. — Olivier5

Ok ... so if I understand correctly you are in favour of certain actions but are not advising those actions you're in favour of be carried out?

To be clear, I have zero problem saying I am in favour of diplomatic resolution and I do indeed advise all parties to try to reach a diplomatic resolution as soon as possible and the foundations of an enduring peace.

I advise this here, I also advised this (well, avoid war in Eastern Europe in the first place) to my government in a letter I wrote the prime minister 2 years ago. Some hapless bureaucrat wrote back.

They didn't take my advice ... but who knows, maybe they will next time. Luckily, since I live in a democratic society (at least the aristocratic population of a larger "democracy" Athenians would actually recognise) where I can affect policy, I'm able, indeed, to advise politicians and bureaucrats directly and perhaps affect their thinking for the better. What's relevant in such political action are the policies of my country, indeed sometimes with respect to the policies of other countries, but what's less relevant is internal matters of other countries that have no real external policy response to change ... except maybe nuking them.

We could still discover new sides of him, but yes, there might be some truth there. However, nobody is eternal, and no regime is eternal either. — Olivier5

This is the usual route to democratisation. Someone concentrates all or a lot of power and, what goes along with that, is that no one in the second echelon has despotic ambitions.

And, Putin as a "dictator" is a caricature; Putin still needs to work within a political system with lots of actors and even democratic process. Certainly has concentrated power, but Putin's power within Russia is simply not comparable to Kim's power with North Korea or Xi's power within China.

Also of note, Putin only started really concentrating power, and doing things like changing the constitution, when the CIA took Medvedev (a moderate) as a sign of weakness and first, to Putin's surprise, declared Georgia and Ukraine would "join NATO one day" (still waiting on that), "interpreted" a "no fly zone" (which used to mean what it sounds like: you can't fly there, but can, like, walk as that's not flying) and then set their sights on Tartus.

Medvedev negotiated the new START treaty for example ... not an escalatory action.

Also of note, following the Georgian war and escalation of tensions with the US and West in general, Putin consolidated power and replaced the second echelon with non-moderates; nevertheless, he still appointed the moderates to important positions (at least nominally), such as Medvedev to the chairman of the security council ... which is more a re-balancing of policy priorities, that still includes moderate voices, than some sort of purge. Certainly not the typical actions of a "despot", such as Sadam Hussein who had his generals executed for retreating from a unwinnable suicidal battle.

I.e. concentrating and consolidating power was a response (whether we see it as a good decision or bad) to a real external threat, which the US isn't coy about calling Russia the enemy and the "near peer competitor" that they can't leave alone and so on.

Previous to the Libya, Syria, Crimea plays (in addition to all sorts of cloak and dagger spy shit we can only guess about) ... Russia, and Putin, was literally minding their own business. Ok, maybe things can be improved there but like ... seems the same everywhere and that there are a lot worse governments, that behead people in public and shit.

In any-case, democratisation usually happens after the death or retirement of a strong man, because he surrounded himself with competent or then incompetent bureaucratic types that don't have the ambition to replace him ... so don't bother when the opportunity arises, and so they then get together and decide elections is the way they all don't die in some sequence of violent coups. And, it was mostly about having sex with women, and being killed in a coup seems contrary to that purpose.

Of course, there are exceptions like North Korea, but this has been accomplished by essentially creating a functionally king ideology, idiosyncratic to Korean culture.

Now that IS interesting. The current leadership has been saying again and again recently, in various official statements, that a desintegration of Russia or a threat on its regime could trigger a nuclear holocaust. And now you seem to be arguing the exact same talking point. — Olivier5

It's not "arguing" a "talking point".

It's an undisputed fact that people who can launch nuclear weapons ... can launch nuclear weapons.

That "it could trigger a nuclear holocaust" is not up for debate.

One can only argue they're bluffing and advocate calling their bluff.

However, even if they are bluffing, they may not be in charge anyways for long during the events you hope for, and the people that do become in charge of the the nukes turn out not to be bluffing, even if the previous custodians were.

... indeed, maybe they would be "the previous custodians" precisely because they were bluffing, and, therefore, that "mistake" shouldn't be repeated.

If I understand correctly, the idea is NOT that they could use nukes in Ukraine if things go south there, as CNN wrongly (IMO) concluded. — Olivier5

Obviously they could.

However, it's extremely unlikely for things to "go south" in the current situation.

This scenario was more in the event of direct NATO air power intervention, which most analysts agreed would be met with a nuclear escalation of some sort (from limited strike or then EMP reaching all the way to Norway). Escalate to deescalate as @ssu mentioned is Russian policy.

What I am hearing in all these recent pronouncements, including in yours, is a different message which says: If this particular regime goes down, e g. by a revolution, then the whole world might go down with it through a nuclear holocaust. — Olivier5

Yes, because it's obviously possible, and even the likely bet, because chaotic revolution and regimes collapsing rarely actually results in a smooth peaceful transition to democracy, but instead triggers a series of more and more violent coups shaking out the most extreme, most violent, most ruthless and most couiest commander to the top.

Putin, who did not gain power by a coup but rather working the Russian political system as it exists, is, in such a scenario, the devil you know and should trust to not himself cause nuclear holocaust, as if he wanted to he would have done so already.

In a violent revolution it will not be Putin in charge. The Kremlin maybe signalling not a threat, just the likely outcome of themselves no longer being in charge, which is what regime change means! For fuck sakes. Crikey.

It's not "what would you do in the event of regime change?" it's "what would the most violent and ruthless commander you know do in the event you guys are no longer in charge to stop him?"

These are obviously scenarios that should weigh on any responsible person's mind.

I suspect the real reason is more prosaic. If it is not for him to give them advice, it might be that the opposite is the case: they give him 'advice'. — Olivier5

You want a violent revolution in Russia with blood pouring in the streets?

If this then, in itself triggers WWIII and nuclear exchange, or then hundreds of nuclear warheads go missing on the black market in a chaotic unraveling of the Russian state, finding their way into the hands of every radical group and despot that can get their hands on one, are you really owning those consequences? Is it really what you want?

Or then transforms into a civil war within Russia and, guess what, the commander willing to not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons prevails ... and continues with that philosophy to solve whatever other regional conflict emerges ... or is concurrently happening in Ukraine and just daring NATO to launch a strategic nuclear strike in an irrational response to tactical nuclear weapons dropped on non-NATO countries? You rather that outcome? You ready to own that possibility?

Or does it just sound tough to say on the internet and you zero have affect on the situation anyways, zero choices that would actually demonstrate your moral toughness, and zero personal risk "advising" your Russian friends to "revolt"?

The only reason people are so cavalier, as one poster put it, with World War III is that either they simply don't consider that possible outcome at all and have no idea what the fuck they're talking about, or they know actual adults elsewhere will avoid things escalating to that point, based on the realist philosophies expounded here, and so there's no risk in saber rattling and demonstrating your war horny credentials on the internet meanwhile. To say later to internet friends that "you were there, ready to drop nukes on Russia to save Ukraine ... but the softies had their way."

It could be counterproductive for Putin to pressure Lukashenko to join the war even more. — ssu

Yes, we're in agreement. If anything, I think it would be more Lukashenko wanting "to jump in" and demonstrate what he can do, and Putin calming him down, seeing the wider context ... and Belarus in the fight not changing much anyways.

You are not afraid of giving them advice, and also to the Americans or the French, but you are afraid of advising the Russians. Strange that... :-) — Olivier5

This has simply not been a topic of discussion.

You have been morally condemning the Russians and advising the Ukrainians to fight the Russians, and advising NATO and EU to keep sending more arms.

You just claimed a few comments ago Russia is irrational ... so what's the point of advising an irrational party?

You literally post a letter a few comments ago, literally some 3000 comments into this discussion, that, as far as I'm aware, is the first content advising the Russians to do anything ... which is not even your writing and it directly contradicts your "opinions" repeated, but not supported, over dozens of comments.

I have zero fear advising the Russians ... I just don't see any here or around me to advise.

Bring me "The Russians" and you will see a fearless viceroy at work.

One possible way the conflict could become larger is if the fighting would have Belarus involved. — ssu

This seems unlikely for the simple fact that Belarus is not so stable internally and they add little firepower anyways compared to Russia (i.e. the risk of revolution within Belarus sparked by soldiers dying who aren't "volunteers" ... and then Russia needing to commit resources to deal with that, likely far exceeds the military benefits).

Ukraine can also far easier strike/invade Belarus than Russia, so there would be that purely military risk in an official declaration of war.

However, militaries are always searching for "experience" so likely these "volunteers" are a way to get best of both worlds for soldiers that are itching for the fight and their whole social circle concludes they got what was coming to them if they die, rather than the entire state needs to be over thrown.

There's also the fact of Belarus bordering Poland, so an official declaration of war could mean Ukraine invade Belarus on the Polish border, baiting NATO into the conflict and also severe escalation of tensions.

For the exact same list of reasons, but just the answer being the reverse, it makes more sense to bring Syria into it, which apparently has happened to some degree.

Well then, you can't really comment on Littell's letter, because it's not about what non-Russians can do. — Olivier5

I can comment, I just can't say if what he suggests to do is actually the best course of action.

Or then, if by "revolt" against authoritarianism could mean just anything effective, ok, I agree, but what's actually effective is the key question, and the general advice is the mere tautology that "Russians should do good things" ... as we all.

What I can say with more certainty is that "we in the West" haven't figured it out.

We have "democracy" ... but not over the entire political and economic system as a whole that our states effectively "rule", in our name and with our "consent": We have democracy over here and get our products and resources from tyrannies over there.

Seems more like geographically segregated aristocracy.

When you say 'we' you mean pro-Putin guys like you, or some other group? — Olivier5

We non-Russians.

Stick to what Russians themselves can do, as this is the subject of the letter. — Olivier5

I spend a lot more time thinking about what I can do, and I have spent very little time on what Russians should do.

However, history teaches us there is no straightforward path to peace and prosperity.

If radical revolutionaries were always correct in revolting ... I'm pretty sure history would teach us the revolution has already happened and everything is great now.

Hmm, indeed, maybe Russia's own history demonstrates the danger of that idea.

The reason I call myself an anarchist, and not a communist, is that I do not believe in the revolutionary moment tradition. Things seem to me far more complicated. Predictable, but complicated.

I also do not believe in capturing the state to "make people better". People are far too avid and corrupt for that.

How to make life better in Russia is not a simple question, I know little of the culture and what affect any given action may actually have, and what is actually productive and what is in fact counter productive and a mere quaint gesture for one's own emotional satisfaction (the cowards way out).

However, how to make life in Ukraine better is far easier question to answer: negotiate an end to the war.

And, negotiation is something I know far more about than how to provoke regime change in Russia via revolt in a way that results in more democracy and not something even worse.

If you want to talk about that letter, do address what is actually said in the letter, rather than other stuff that has nothing to see with it. — Olivier5

I've made it pretty clear that I don't like authoritatianism ... but, precisely due to the nature of authoritarianism that I don't like, we have very little influence over the Kremlin and Putin.

Not only do we have far more influence in more democratic countries, but, on top of that practical fact, I, personally, feel morally responsible to contribute to the policies of my own country and my country's own political organisations like the EU, than personally morally responsible for what Russians and Putin does.

If I thought life in Russia was great, I'd move there.

The West could let Ukraine into the EU tonight.

NATO could let Ukraine into NATO tonight.

These options have been ruled out, and so the choice is between diplomacy and ... maybe just letting Russia win through force if nothing short of boots on the ground and planes in the sky actually makes a difference to the outcome.

If diplomacy is the better choice, then diplomacy starts with understanding the counter-parties point of view and not just ignoring their grievances and calling them names and exaggerating their power and threat to us, while simultaneously exaggerating their mistakes and short comings.

As I've mentioned repeatedly in my exchange with @ssu, maybe the Russian lines and state will collapse tomorrow, and, if the Western media and everyone on the forum was just predicting Russia's inevitable victory, then I'd be here arguing that (even though I can't see it based on my own military experience) that "maybe" Ukraine has some military surprise and maybe things just fall apart militarily and domestically for the Russians.

We don't know. Therefore, different points of view are more useful, from my point of view, than the point of view that other points of view should be excluded because they maybe correct and pointing that out makes that view point even more likely than it already is.

We do not know the facts on the grounds, but if we want some diplomatic process then we need a sober analysis of what information we do have and what it may represent and how other people may see the same information, in particular the people we wish to negotiate with.

A month ago we were essentially promised the collapse of the Russian military, due to morale problems, and revolution in the streets of Moscow. So why negotiate with a state that will be gone tomorrow? Unless, you know, that was bullshit to egg Ukraine on into total war.

Negotiation requires risk evaluation. The Western media simply bad mouthing Russia for a month and continuously lambasting Russia for failure as they take territory ... is not, in my view, a good risk-analysis framework, and likewise essentially excluding all other points of views but just parading yes-men retired generals (who have no more facts than us!) is not a basis for critical scrutiny to assess the likelihood of what they predict.

Additionally, negotiation requires some rational model of the counter-parties decision making, otherwise it's impossible to make offers and counter offers that are likely to arrive at an agreement.

Modest reasons for optimism. Russian minister of offence has promised to decrease military activity as a gesture of good faith resulting from the discussions in Istanbul today. Let's hope they keep their word and peace talks are indeed constructive. — Benkei

Agreed.

This may also be a sign of calling out the West and Zelenskyy on the referendum idea.

If there is a referendum on Russia's demands ... and wins ... that does indeed settle the issue for basically ever.

Likewise, how does that jive with the "Russia is anti-democratic" narrative if they call for and "respect" a referendum result?

If they pull back from Kiev, and fronts stabilise, then they are now in the position of making their offer and just publicly demanding Zelenskyy hold a referendum as he said he would. Cue fireworks.

The destruction of Azov in Mariupol may also embolden anti-Azov sections of Ukrainian society.

It should also be noted that although Zelenskyy down plays Azov, it's not the case that they're best friends. There's a bunch of stories / rumours of Zelenskyy trying to reason with the Azov guys to stop the 8 year war in the East. So, not actually liking Azov is maybe some common ground between Zelenskyy's personal beliefs and the Russians, and if a lot of the Azov guys are dead, that may bring some stability to the situation as well.

But, I hope for any resolution of the destruction, however it is achieved.

Conditions do seem being put in place for a resolution, but of course it's never possible to know who is being genuine or if events (accidental or not) set escalation off again.