Willing, wanting, choosing, desiring don’t have to be thought of as volunteristic, as choosing in advance what we will. I would argue that we find ourselves choosing; we are compelled by the contextual circumstances we are thrown into to want and desire in specific directions prior to any reflection or consciousness. Self-conscious reflection occurs as a later and derivative mode of willing. This is the difference between unreflective mindful coping and abstract conceptual rationality. The latter is a derivative of the former, which is the fundamental way we engage with the world. — Joshs

I think you and I are getting wrapped up in a difference in our understanding of what "will" means. Or maybe not. What you call "compulsion by contextual circumstances" I would call acting in accordance with our intrinsic virtuosities, our nature. I would not call that "will" at all. I think it's more than a linguistic difference.

The determining factor is not an urge or a drive, driving and urging me from behind, but something standing before me, a task I am involved in, something I am charged with. This, in turn—this relation to something I am charged with—is possible only if I am "ahead" of myself. — Heidegger

I think what I mean by "will" is what Heidegger calls being ahead of myself. Not sure about that. It is possible to act without getting ahead of oneself.

That's a legal system, not a moral one. I doubt there are any societies left today in which the general population shares a belief system in which sins are perceived the same way by everyone, and the laws are made to prevent and/or rectify sins. Moral and legal are confused, sometimes deliberately. It's easy to impose rules if the populace shares the rulers' belief. — Vera Mont

As I see it, there is no fundamental difference between a legal system and a moral one.

What makes this "guidance of my intrinsic nature" moral? Suppose you are an antisocial psychopath: is acting "in accordance" with psychopathy also moral? — 180 Proof

Good point. Even if my actions according to Chuang Tzu's descriptions might be considered benign, they are not really moral, i.e. they don't deal with right and wrong. They apply as much to deciding whether to wash the dishes or clean the floor first as they do to robbing a bank.

As for antisocial psychopathy, I'll point you to the Emerson quote I just used in my previous response to fdrake.

Particularly in relationships, I've had the opportunity to be on both sides: the asshole and the wronged party. I know what the crime feels like from both sides. That's helpful for understanding the golden rule. — frank

I'm glad you brought up the golden rule. I've spent some time thinking about how it fits into my formulation. I'm not sure of the answer.

What can be concluded from Emerson and Thelema is that there's no distinction between a right life and one lived without worry. Thus successful rationalisation is the core moral principle. Forgetting the distinction between who you are and the lies you may make yourself believe.

Simply hope you are a good liar. And have others join in. — fdrake

Another quote from "Self-Reliance," one of my favorites.

I remember an answer which when quite young I was prompted to make to a valued adviser, who was wont to importune me with the dear old doctrines of the church. On my saying, What have I to do with the sacredness of traditions, if I live wholly from within? my friend suggested,--"But these impulses may be from below, not from above." I replied, "They do not seem to me to be such; but if I am the Devil's child, I will live then from the Devil." No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it. — Emerson - Self-Reliance

And so we fall into self-improvement, social improvement, and global improvement, as though through our internal conflict we can outthink that nature from which we spring. Yet one does not really have to go all the way to China; in our own Christian tradition, the individual conscience also reigns supreme. If you follow that internal voice, you cannot go wrong. (But on the other hand, you might well get crucified.) — unenlightened

I think you've said it very well.

I think it is more or less about feeling your around how other apply value to certain judgements in certain contexts compared to others. It is then about unpicking the rational claims laid out or, often enough, revealing that there are none whatsoever. — I like sushi

I think the approach I have been describing is not rational at all. It's not irrational, it's non-rational. In a sense, that's the point.

Of course, this is further complicated when those espousing certain moral themes are so entrenched in them (or opposed to moral views) that they are effectively no longer doing anything I would call 'philosophical'. We can still attempt to point this out and find out where they took the wrong path and/or whether there is simply a misunderstanding in the concepts laid out. — I like sushi

The point I'm trying to make is stronger than that. I think Chuang Tzu and Emerson endorse not applying moral themes at all, entrenched or not.

The terminology in this area is just as obtuse (if not more so) as every other field of philosophical inspection. — I like sushi

Agreed.

We are born with value imbedded into our experiences. From the beauty of a desolate environment in rain to the misery of a sharp electric pain in ones spine, these experiences we live through do not require any justification to estimate their moral value, but that value exists via our very perception of them. — Ourora Aureis

I agree, although I don't want to get into an argument about exactly where our intrinsic virtuosity comes from. Well, maybe I do, but I didn't include that in my OP.

Moral philosophers make the mistake of attempting to intellectualise the concept of value, when in reality they merely create rationalisations which justify their own value judgements of certain experiences. In such a way, these intellectual creations exist purely to coerce others into joining their judgements, using the common psychological need of humans to have the approval of others.

A reaction to this would be ethical egoism, the ethical framework I follow. It declares that we ought to act according to our values, not the value judgements of others. In this way it seems similar to the idea of personal morality you hold. I think the most important part of using it as a framework is its declaration that morality concerns an individuals action and nothing else. Social contempt is nothing more than the natural inclination towards disgust. The Emerson quote works quite well with this framework. — Ourora Aureis

I agree.

However, these social forces fail when someone who does not care for such judgements of others comes along. Nietzsche might refer to the idealised version of this type of person as the Ubermensch, someone who creates their own values. It is abnormal psychology which creates this person. — Ourora Aureis

Perhaps calling it "abnormal psychology" is going to far, but I am in sympathy with this comment.

this seems very different to the idea of value presented in the 2nd quote, which seems to suggests an uncaring attitude towards "great" and "small", which seems to just be a description of the average human who has little ambition. — Ourora Aureis

I'm not sure about this. You say "the average human who has little ambition." Perhaps Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu would say "sage." Maybe that's going too far.

Moral principles are part of the roots of each civilisation. From Orthodox or Christian moral values to Taoism. All of them have some pillars that guide people on how to behave properly in society. You understand them as 'coercive rules' but I personally believe it goes deeper than that. Moral principles are part of our culture. — javi2541997

I don't necessarily disagree but... This is what Chuang Tzu has to say. This from Ziporyn's translation of Chapter 8.

What I call good is not humankindness and responsible conduct, but just being good at what is done by your own intrinsic virtuosities. Goodness, as I understand it, certainly does not mean humankindness and responsible conduct! It is just fully allowing the uncontrived condition of the inborn nature and allotment of life to play itself out. What I call sharp hearing is not hearkening to others, but rather hearkening to oneself, nothing more. — Chuang Tzu

I believe one example of my argument is the 'sacred' standard of respect for family members. In general, children owe respect to their parents, and vice versa. When this essential moral principle is broken, members of this community experience despair, existentialism, and even nihilism, among other things, because one of these moral (Christian) principles (or 'codes', if you prefer) is no longer present. — javi2541997

I'll let Lao Tzu respond. This is from Stephen Mitchell's version of Verse 18 of the Tao Te Ching.

When the great Tao is forgotten,
goodness and piety appear.
When the body's intelligence declines,
cleverness and knowledge step forth.
When there is no peace in the family,
filial piety begins.
When the country falls into chaos,
patriotism is born. — Lao Tzu

The second quote is a more accurate description of what morality is, and holds in the majority of the contexts in which the term is used. Morality is "rules for the group, imposed by the group, for the benefit of the group". Let's explore this through an example, if I want to live in a clean society, simply practising what I preach will not suffice, I need a majority of peoples within my society to follow suit. To convince others to be clean, to dissuade others from littering or destroying/defacing property and to apply pressure to my local council to pay for cleaning and repairs. All my attempts to persuade, intimidate, coerce, compel, incentivise or punish to this end are part of morality. My local area may look unkindly at those who act dirty the area, demonising these acts and those who commit them to discourage the behaviour. Attempts to justify acts or conditions that run counter to these goals may be pounced on and criticised. This should all be familiar to you as the kinds of things that happen around all moral issues. This group aspect of morality is, to me, the defining feature. — Judaka

I agree with this.

The first quote doesn't clearly delineate morality from any other personal motivation, not even greed or jealousy, which also come from our "intrinsic nature". — Judaka

Yes, good point. I was thinking about that after I posted the OP. The idea of acting in accordance with our intrinsic virtuosity can apply to everything we do - from treating people with kindness to deciding what to have for lunch. It has struck me that the proper question for philosophy is not "what is truth," but rather "what do I do now." For me, that is the question Chuang Tzu is trying to answer.

Those aren't mutually exclusive, most laws that exist for the functioning of society will have a moral element to them. — Judaka

I don't disagree, but I am trying to make a stronger statement - what we call "moral" isn't about good and bad, right and wrong, it's about greasing the social skids.

I like the way you've put this. Have you read Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu?

I think what Emerson readily expresses, "Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this", Chuang Tzu was aware of. That all of the "things" ultimately constructing our morals, are just "things" arising from the evolution of difference. They are neither pre-existent nor absolute, but the contrary, constructed and projected to move our stories and project signifiers; things made-up and believed. — ENOAH

Agreed. This is from the Tao Te Ching, along with the Chuang Tzu the other foundational document of Taoism - Gia-Fu Feng's translation of Verse 2.

Under heaven all can see beauty as beauty only because there is ugliness.
All can know good as good only because there is evil.

Therefore having and not having arise together.
Difficult and easy complement each other.
Long and short contrast each other:
High and low rest upon each other;
Voice and sound harmonize each other;
Front and back follow one another.

Therefore the sage goes about doing nothing, teaching no-talking.
The ten thousand things rise and fall without cease,
Creating, yet not possessing.
Working, yet not taking credit.
Work is done, then forgotten.
Therefore it lasts forever. — Tao Te Ching

As for following your heart, if there's an iota of thought, let alone reasoning, harsh as it seems to say (for one, because it seems impossible to avoid), I think you are not following the Way that Chuang tzu presumably did. That Way would be to follow your organic feelings or drives (we, in the human world of make and believe only construct feelings and drives as being ravenous and aggressive; in nature, eons of evolutionhave ensured that they work appropriately). — ENOAH

There is truth in what you say, but Chuang Tzu is very easygoing when it comes to any kind of imperative. I can imagine him responding to your comment with a shrug and "Hey, just do the best you can."

As for the constructions and projections, I think Chuang would suggest, go along for the ride without any prejudice. Do that, and to the world, you might seem dimwitted and indifferent, even reckless in your lack of concern. But in your heart, you are always doing as your body naturally responds, so you are always doing right. While in the projected world, there is no right besides what has been constructed and projected from time to time. — ENOAH

I agree with this.

Perhaps T Clark’s point is that the reliance on moral principles may keep cultures from becoming more civilized, by fostering reliance on the violence of authoritarianism, punishment and social repression. — Joshs

Although I think what you say is true, it's not exactly the point I was trying to make. I wasn't even arguing against what I called "social control." I think that's necessary in all but the smallest human groups and certainly kinder, gentler controls are better than coercion. Although that may be necessary, it's not morality. Rules against homosexuality are no more about morality than rules against reckless driving.

The will to nirvana, to nothingness, to surrender is still a willing. — Joshs

I'm not talking about nirvana or nothingness. Application of will is not the only way to act in the world. Looking at my own behavior, I can see that much of what I do I do without any kind of self-consciousness or intention. Taoism has a term, "wu wei." It means, roughly, acting without acting. Acting from our deepest nature. If you don't like that, you can just say conscience, although that's not exactly the same thing.

It has always struck me that what we call morality grows out of our deepest human nature. We are social animals. We like each other... usually. We want to be around each other. We want to protect and take care of those we are close with - our family, friends, community.

formal systems of morality are social, not personal. — Vera Mont

I was trying to say something stronger than that. "Formal systems of morality," what I called social control, are not really morality at all. They rules for the functioning of society. Rules against sinning, however that is defined, are no different than rules against parking derelict cars in your driveway or playing loud music at 2 am.

I think that, by referring to usefulness and interest, you have touched an important point. I think that an essential reason why philosophy today is in a crisis is because it seems not useful nor interesting. I think this is a result of becoming more and more technical, professional, scientific, precise, this way becoming so abstract that even professional philosophers can't clarify what this clarity is supposed to be used for, once it is (hypothetically) reached. Today's philosophy has become less and less human, less and less related to life, to the human experience of existence. I think that attention to experienced subjectivity, even at the cost of renouncing to some control, power, clarity, precision, has an ability to recover philosophy to life. We would just need to work on it, especially to make it in a dialog with the precision of analysis. — Angelo Cannata

I agree with all of this.

In other words, science cannot say that what it cannot study does not exist. It would be easy to object to this: how do you know that something does not exist, since you acknowledge that you cannot study it? In this situation the conclusion is that no dialogue is possible. — Angelo Cannata

You say science, but science is just a formalization of how people go about knowing the world - I guess one would say "reason." It is a common understanding, although clearly not universal, that proposed phenomena for which there is no evidence do not exist. No, it's not that they don't exist, it's that there is nothing useful to say about them.

Backing up a bit, I think you've changed the terms of the argument. Just because there are non-scientific, non-rational ways of knowing things, e.g. consciousness, that doesn't mean that scientific, rational, study of those same things is not interesting and valuable. We've never disagreed about the fact that the scientific study of consciousness is not the same as conscious experience itself.

What then is an uninteresting phenomena? — jkop

Good point. I guess "phenomenon" is just another word for "thing," which makes the argument circular. Let's try this - a thing is an aspect of the world that draws the attention of and holds interest for people. Now you ask "What then is an aspect of the world that doesn't draw the attention of or hold interest for people?"

A feeling, a country, and a state of mind. Clarky, I assume those exist by common convention, but I'm not sure how 'real' they are. Yes, the United States has a specified territory, but isn't this acknowledged as convention rather than reality? — javi2541997

I guess it comes down to that - if we name it, which is a matter of convention, it is real and it is a thing.

I think that oranges are different from consciousness, with reference to this discussion. I think that oranges are not very subjective. — Angelo Cannata

I disagree. Consciousness can be studied just as much as oranges can. And oranges can be experienced subjectively.

About consciousness, science is even unable to determine if it exists and what it is exactly. — Angelo Cannata

I don't agree. There are often problems getting people to define what they mean when they say "consciousness," but once you get that tied down, there's no problem. Of course it exists. I've experienced it myself and observed it's results in others.

In this situation, wanting to objectify subjectivity, to be able to study it, is like wanting to put a kiss or a hug in a slide to be able to observe it with a microscope. — Angelo Cannata

How to hug, according to science — Science

I didn't mean that real things are different from the study of them. Of course everyone knows that studying an orange is not an orange. What I meant is that they think that they are studying subjectivity, they think that subjectivity, or consciousness is what they are making their research about. Against this thought, I oppose that they do not study subjectivity, they do not study consciousness. — Angelo Cannata

Sorry, you lost me. You recognize the objective study of something is not the same as the thing itself. So, why can't I objectively study consciousness or human experience?

Taoists say "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal Name." But that's not just true about consciousness, it's true of everything, including oranges.

So since there's no people holding interest in my examples, you seem to agree with my views? There is no 'thing' outside of intent/convention. — noAxioms

Yes, we do agree. I have a strong interest in Taoist philosophy as expressed in the Tao Te Ching and Chuang Tzu. This is from Stephen Mitchell's translation of Verse 1 of the Tao Te Ching.

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.

The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things. — Lao Tzu

And this from Verse 40.

Return is the movement of the Tao.
Yielding is the way of the Tao.

All things are born of being.
Being is born of non-being. — Lao Tzu

In Taoism, being is associated with the everyday world we live in. Non-being, or the Tao, is the unformed, unconceptualized state before things are brought into being by naming them.

almost 100% of discussions, both philosophical and scientific, about consciousness, subjectivity, qualia, “being like to be a bat”, quantum theories about consciousness, are completely wrong, completely groundless: they don’t realize that what they talk about, what they do research about, is not actual subjectivity, but an objectified, petrified idea of it, that is exactly the opposite of it, the opposite of what they want to talk about. — Angelo Cannata

You seem to be arguing with someone who doesn't exist. I don't know of anyone who believes that studying human consciousness and experience using psychology, neurology, cognitive science, anatomy, biology, sociology, or any other method is the same thing as the experience itself. That doesn't mean that kind of study isn't interesting and important in its own right.

A forest is a recognizable object that consists of trees. Neither is a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk from which we construct recognizable objects. — jkop

Humans can name, make an object or thing out of, anything. There is no such thing as a random swarm of unrecognizable gunk if it holds any interest for us. There's a good definition - a thing is a phenomenon that holds interest for people.

Is love real? The United States of America? One of my dreams? Is anything that's real an object?

other objects are physical and exist regardless of conventions. — jkop

So, perhaps a tree is an object. Is a forest?

Dinosaurs have intent. Predator and prey both need to recognize each other as distinct objects/threats/kin etc. Their convention is sufficiently pragmatic for their needs. — noAxioms

How about a microorganism that recognizes it's prey by chemical signals, then moves in that direction and engulfs it. Does it have intent? Does it recognize it's prey?

I would argue that there are no real objects in the world. It is just a matter of how our brains carve things up, some of this determined by our evolutionary history, some by cultural practices. — petrichor

You say no "real" objects, but for most of us, reality is also just how our brains carve things up too. The idea of objective reality is a much a human construct as everything else.

Yes.

Prefering rock music and prefering no murder are fundamentally the same process in terms of how they affect action, — Ourora Aureis

I disagree, but I don't think I can make a good argument for my position right now. I'll have to think about it some more. Thanks for the provocation.

It doesn't make sense to ask whether grammar is "true or false" any more than it does to ask this of metaphysics. I think (Western) metaphysics consists in what is necessarily presupposed (e.g. ontology) in order for epistemological statements (e.g. physics (i.e. cosmology)) and axiological statements (e.g. ethics, aesthetics) to make sense as domain-specific criteria for truth and falsity. In other words, physics models computable aspects of nature (just as ethics maps eusocial aspects of human nature) whereas metaphysics indefeasibly describes physics' model-making (& ethics' map-making). — 180 Proof

As I'm sure you know by now, metaphysics is important to me. Of all the people here on the forum, I think your way of seeing it is closest to mine, but you generally have a bit different take and way of describing the subject. I find that helpful.

This could be a major cause of our suffering and the consequent increase in psychiatric medication consumption. — merloz

Here are some possible alternative or supplemental explanations.

• Christopher Lasch was a social critic who died in 1994. In 1978, he wrote an influential book called "The Culture of Narcissism." In it he described a social process he called the "psychologization" of society to create a "therapeutic culture." I like his work, but it's been a long time and I need to go back and reread it so I can't remember the details.
  
• Related to that, the government has stepped in to take a larger role in people's personal lives - social security, Medicare, Obamacare, welfare, civil rights. Add to that social movements including civil, women's, and gay rights.
  
• More people have health insurance and more health insurance includes mental health benefits.

I don't think this list is anywhere near exhaustive.

T Clark: Are you saying a metaphysical position isn’t true or false? (Why? Because such positions go beyond the evidence and therefore their truth/falsity cannot be determined?) — Art48

R.G. Collingwood wrote, and I agree, that metaphysics is the study of the (conscious or unconscious) underlying assumptions, what he calls absolute presuppositions, of our understanding of the world. Let's take materialism, since that's what this thread is about. What are some absolute presuppositions of materialism. Let's try these:

[1] The universe is uniform, i.e. the rules that apply to the behavior of matter and energy are the same anywhere in the universe and at all times.

[2] Every event has a cause.

Now tell me, how would you set out to test these assumptions empirically? My answer - can't be done.

I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong. It gives the right answer to a certain number of decimal places but if you go far enough (10th decimal, 100th decimal), it gives an answer that disagrees with Relativity and with reality. — Art48

So, let's take the laws of conservation of energy and conservation of matter. I guess they were true until 1905 when Einstein showed that matter and energy are equivalent. Or maybe it was when scientists worked out how to go about actually creating energy from matter in nuclear fission. Now we have the law of conservation of matter and energy. Does that mean the law of conservation of energy is wrong? But scientists and engineers still use it all the time. It works fine except in situations where there are nuclear reactions. My answer - no, of course it's not wrong, it's just limited.

Or how about superconductivity. Superconductivity has so-far been observed only at very low temperatures. That's because at normal temperatures thermal movement of particles overwhelms the physical processes that manifest as superconductivity. Modern theories of superconductivity do not include consideration of physical processes that show up at temperatures we normally see in nature. So, are those theories wrong? Again, no they're just limited to the specific range of size and energy for which they were developed.

So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose? — substantivalism

Hmmm. Is that what I mean? Maybe I would say that metaphysics is conceptual simplicity for a particular role/purpose.

I admit it can get rather tiring making explicit what senses and brain states lead to such an' such a mathematical/abstract realization so the majority of such thinkers use certain vernacular as wide/generalized shorthand. Course, then all that philosophical seriousness about the choice between these shorthand languages is beaten into meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism. — substantivalism

I'm not sure I understand what you're trying to say. I don't see the value in talking about senses and brain states, at least not in this context. As for "meaninglessness, pointlessness, or pragmatism," I resemble that remark. I have been called a pragmatist and have accepted that label.

The notion that what's true is different qualitatively from what is established by our day-to-day interaction with the rest of the world minimizes the significance of our lives as part of the world, and separates us from what is significant, what is "true." — Ciceronianus

I really like the way you've put this.

I do not think psychology or social factors are irrelevent to ethics but that for the purpose of my specific argument I think construing it as a model is more relevent. I am assuming here that we have values as just a product of our being, regardless of the particulars of how they arise, which is where I believe those factors would be more relevent. — Ourora Aureis

You're right. I just wanted to clarify that values do not come from any kind of moral code or principle. They come, as you note, as products of our being.

To express the paragraph you quoted with some more context: I think that there is no such things as "values" outside of the experience we value. When we say "I prefer the taste of orange juice to apple juice", I think that can be translated to "I prefer an experience involving the taste of organge juice to apple juice". — Ourora Aureis

I don't think your analogy between my feelings for orange juice and my concern for other people is a good one. The desire to help people and not to hurt them is not a preference, it's an imperative, a drive.

There are infinite hypothetical experiences and we arrange these into hierrachies, aka we value them in relation to eachother. To state again, this isnt a psychological statement about how people view morality but a way of construing a basic idea that we have preferences for different experiences. — Ourora Aureis

Again, I think calling conscience a preference is not right, at least not for me.

I propose the easiest way for the West to defeat Putin and Xi. — Linkey

The only thing wrong with your plan is that it will never work. Oh, wait, another thing - opening up the possibility of a limited nuclear war makes it much more likely. Seems to me that any nuclear war between the US and Russia will inevitably lead to an all-out exchange of warheads. The only way to win is not to play.

Yes, materialism is a philosophical perspective. Newtonian mechanics , like all scientific theories, also rests on a philosophical perspective. As a theory, its predictions are ‘good’ and ‘accurate’ according to a particular metaphysical way of thinking about things. — Joshs

This is a good way of putting it and I agree.

The predictions of quantum physics are also good and accurate, but in relation to a changed metaphysical perspective. Both the old and the new physics use terms like mass and energy, but their qualitative meaning has shifted in subtle ways that, as you and Collinwood say, can’t be subsumed under the categories of true and false. The new physics isn’t simply ‘more true’ than the old, it is qualitatively different in its concepts, but in subtle ways that are easy to miss. — Joshs

This is something I've thought about a lot, which is made harder because I often struggle with quantum mechanical concepts. You say "the qualitative meaning has shifted." I don't know about that. There are a lot of arguments about different interpretations of QM. They have always seemed pointless to me if different ways of looking at it don't lead to questions that can be answered empirically. I think it's still an open question whether or not that's possible. From my reading, it seems like much of the dissatisfaction with the Copenhagen interpretation is that it doesn't provide new ontology. That has always seemed like an pointless criticism to me. Science isn't required to provide we mortals with ontology.

Maybe that's the new metaphysics of QM - no ontology. I'm comfortable with that.

Morality must be fundamentally concerned with experience, not principle. — Ourora Aureis

To start, I agree that a legitimate morality is not concerned with principle. For me it's more personal, human than that. As for the rest of your position, I'm not sure I understand it or agree with it. I'll make some comments on specific things you wrote.

Individuals value experience and arrange differing instances of experience into hierrachies, denoting their value in relation to each other. This is a neccesary condition for the concept of value to have meaning. To value is to prefer over another (this doesnt mean you cannot have equivalent value). — Ourora Aureis

As I noted, I don't understand what this means. As I understand it, value comes from inside us. It gets there by dint of our human nature and, later, from what we learn socially. I don't think this is what you mean when you talk about morality being concerned with experience, but I'm not sure. As I see it, moral values are founded in the fact we are social animals and we, more or less, like each other.

This expresses my understanding of the source of morality well.

No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it. A man is to carry himself in the presence of all opposition, as if every thing were titular and ephemeral but he. — Emerson - Self-Reliance

to avoid more semantic confusion, this isn't a psychological analysis but a model of morality. — Ourora Aureis

I don't think there is any legitimate discussion of morality without an understanding of psychological and social factors.