Scientific explanations are grounded in empirical evidence, so it is nonsensical to demand of science an explanatory account of what empirical evidence is — sime

Agree with this.

which is what asking for a scientific explanation of consciousness amounts to. — sime

Don't agree with this.

So in the sciences for example, we are always breaking physical objects down into parts, analyzing, and using instruments like microscopes, Xray, CT-scans, MRI, and spectrometers, in an attempt to get a glimpse at the inside of physical objects. However, no matter how far we break down these objects in analysis, and whatever we do with these instruments we are always looking from the outside inward. That is unavoidable, as the nature of what is called scientific 'objective' observation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with this, but I don't see why it is a problem. Science is looking in from the outside. That's how it works. If we can look at every other phenomenon in the universe with science, why would we not be able to look at consciousness that way? Apples taste good, but we can learn most of what we need to know about apples without considering that.

Whenever our sciences leave us with an arbitrary starting point , this should be an impetus to start asking ‘why’ questions. Asking why a physical constant happens to be what it is is part of what led to the hypothesis that our universe with its constants may not be the only one — Joshs

I'm with @Isaac on this one. There doesn't have to be a why. The speed of light has to be something. Why does there have to be a reason? Sometimes "just because" is a good answer to a question.

As for the multiverse, well, let's not get started on that.

I don't think the question makes any sense at all. We don't ask why the speed of light is 299,792,458 metres per second, we don't ask why protein channels block certain molecules, we don't ask why water boils at 100C. Why would we expect an answer to the question of why these neurological functions result in consciousness. They just do.

We could give an evolutionary account, some natural advantage to consciousness. Random changes in neurological activity one time resulted in proto-consciousness which gave an evolutionary advantage to the creature and so it passed on that genetic mutation. There...is that satisfactory, and if not, why not? — Isaac

This makes a lot of sense to me, by which I mean I agree. This is why the hard problem may be hard, but it's not really a problem, just a question.

It is not a matter of just rearranging words. One has to argue. What is that Kantian distinction really about? Always one must go to the things that are given to see what there is that can provide justification. Kant had to talk about noumena; why? Either it is nonsense, or there is something in the witnessable, phenomenological (empirical) world that insists. This is where we have to look: what is it in the world we know that intimates noumena? What is there in the presence of things that is the threshold for metaphysics? How does one talk about such a threshold? One cannot say it, for it is an absence, and yet it is an absence that is in the presence of the world. — Constance

This lays out the question pretty well, although in different language than I would use. One thing I disagree with is equating the world of experience with the empirical world. As I noted in my previous post, I think it's possible to directly experience noumena, the Tao. It's just not possible to speak about it. When I start talking, then it becomes phenomena. Then I can measure it, name it, and conceptualize it.

This absence is intimated in the world, so it is part of the structure of our existence, and so, it is not outside of our identifiable existence as Kant would have it, but in it, saturating it, if you will, and it is staring you right in the face in everything you encounter. In the analysis of what it is to experience the world, it is clear that the language used to "say" what the world is is radically distinct from the existence that is being talked about. The cup is smooth to the touch, and warm, and resists being lifted, and so on, but all this language I use to describe the cup takes the actual givenness of sensation up IN a language setting. I call it a cup, but the calling does not, if you will, totalize what is there in the language possibilities because there is something that is not language in the "there" of it. It is an impossible other-than-language, and because language and propositional knowledge is what knowing is about, the understanding encounters in the familiar day to dayness of our lives something utterly transcendental. — Constance

This sounds as if you're agreeing with at least some of what I'm saying.

the hard problem of consciousness, phenomenology is not just an alternative view; it is necessary and inevitable. — Constance

You already know I disagree with this.

There is one fundamental premise that really should preside over the entire inquiry: all one has ever experienced, every can experience, and hence ever know, is phenomena. — Constance

This is something I've struggled with a bit. I know you can't talk about noumena. As Lao Tzu says, the Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. But I'm not sure you can't experience it.

It reminds me of an issue I came across regarding Freud and the unconscious: The unconscious was considered to be a metaphysical concept entirely, and I thought, no, for there is an evidential basis for it. But the response was quick, pointing out that it was not that the unconscious had never been directly experienced, but rather that it was impossible for it to every be experienced, encountered, and this is why it belonged to metaphysics. — Constance

This surprises me. Did Freud consider the unconscious to be a metaphysical concept? Seems unlikely. Not everything I am not aware of is metaphysical.

Here, anything that can ever be conceived, even in the most compelling argument imaginable, simply cannot be anything but a phenomenological event, for to conceive at all is inherently phenomenological. Nonsense to think otherwise. Consciousness is inherently phenomenological. — Constance

As I noted, I suspect this isn't true, but I'm not sure.

This, then, is not a matter for science as we know it. It lies with the "science" of phenomenology. Which leads me to reaffirm that philosophy is going to end up one place, and it is here, in phenomenology. There is quite literally no where else to go. — Constance

I've read a little about phenomenology and I don't get it. Wikipedia says

Phenomenology (from Greek φαινόμενον, phainómenon "that which appears" and λόγος, lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. — Wikipedia

But when I go to read about it, it is just a bunch of jargon and convoluted language. As if I need someone to tell me how to understand something I am intimately familiar with.

I think it might be because many of the issues are conceptual and not empirical. — bert1

I think it's because many of the issues are so personal. Our experiences are what is most who we are.

flogging dead horses is also not productive. — Wayfarer

I just worked 52 hours in the last four days due to the little triple pandemic of COVID, flu, and RSV knocking out our department. What's your excuse, Skippy? — frank

Oh, wait. I have a better one:

You have fallen prey to the Who gives a shit logical fallacy.

I just worked 52 hours in the last four days due to the little triple pandemic of COVID, flu, and RSV knocking out our department. What's your excuse, Skippy? — frank

You only need an excuse for being wrong.

Dennett gas a minority viewpoint. Don't sweat it. — frank

So we vote to determine the truth now? Majority wins?

Dennett's claims were so preposterous as to verge on the deranged. — Wayfarer

And people on the other side think the same about Chalmers. It's not an argument, it's name calling. I know you are, but what am I?

Well, thanks! (although one of the reasons I had stopped posting for six months was because of this debate, I am continually mystified as to why people can't see through Dennett.) — Wayfarer

I'm really glad you're back, but but I know you don't think things have changed in the past 6 months.

The argument is about the first-person nature of experience — Wayfarer

I do understand that. I even understand why it's hard to imagine that that experience could be explainable in terms of biology and neurology. It's just so immediate and intimate. I can feel that, but I just don't get why people think that is any different from how all the other phenomena whirling around us come to be.

Chalmers is one of the most influential philosophers of our time. — frank

Ok. He's popular so he must be right.

Providing a scientific explanation for the experience that accompanies function: that's the hard problem. — frank

I just don't see what the big deal is. I think it's just one more case, perhaps the only one left, where people can scratch and claw to hold onto the idea that people are somehow exceptional.

Phenomenal consciousness and metacognition constitute the hard problem. There is something it is like to be you (or me) what is this? (And no, I'm not looking for an answer.) — Tom Storm

I'm not sure how that is different from what I wrote. And no, I'm not looking for an answer either.

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell?
— T Clark

No. — frank

This from "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness."

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. that unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers

Has anyone considered that the ability to manipulate information (and information itself) and consciousness are one in the same. — Mark Nyquist

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell?

I don't know if I'm smarter, but I am more privy to actual reality...

...I have seen many things. Things "smart" people have never seen. — neonspectraltoast

I find your statements unconvincing.

But if you're really a good person, would you seek revenge on bad people for being bad? Or allow the judiciary system to do it for you either through monetary compensation or prison time etc. — Benj96

This from Wikipedia:

The principle is found in Babylonian Law.[6][7] If it is surmised that in societies not bound by the rule of law, if a person was hurt, then the injured person (or their relative) would take vengeful retribution on the person who caused the injury. The retribution might be worse than the crime, perhaps even death. Babylonian law put a limit on such actions, restricting the retribution to be no worse than the crime, as long as victim and offender occupied the same status in society. — Wikipedia

As this indicates, the eye for an eye standard was developed not as endorsement for revenge but as a limit to retribution. Punishment should be proportionate to the offense.

I think at this point in history there are a few key issues left to people who wish to find support for higher consciousness/idealism/theism worldviews - the nature of consciousness, and the mysteries of QM, being the most commonly referenced. — Tom Storm

I think there is a case to be made for a theistic worldview. I actually have an OP on the subject half-written. I'll finish it eventually.

I say that values can indeed be irrational. — hypericin

Yes, I understand that.

It assumes the separation of subject and object, and attempts to arrive at objective descriptions of measurable entities. And the mind is not among those entities. — Wayfarer

I don't want to get into a long discussion about how science has to proceed. I will say that there is no reason the mind would not be among entities amenable for study by science. You and @Constance are just waving your arms and promoting a ghost in the machine with no basis except that you can't imagine anything else.

From where I sit, there's no need to take this discussion any further. We clearly aren't going to get anywhere. I'll give you the last word if you want it.

I can't imagine. — Constance

"I can't imagine" is a pretty pitiful argument.

You seem certain of this. Is this an article of faith? Or do you have evidence for this? Is that evidence conclusive? — bert1

Not faith, confidence. Could I be wrong? Of course. But the fact that many people cannot conceive that consciousness might have a physical basis is not evidence that it doesn't.

it is precisely this relation that science cannot explain. — Constance

That science has not explained. I see no reason to believe it can't.

This is debatable. — hypericin

I suppose, but I stand by my judgement. Going beyond that is outside the bounds of this discussion.

By science I mean the instruments that detect physical matter....Not saying we can't go beyond that if we understand the problem. — Mark Nyquist

As far as I can see, there's no reason to think that consciousness can't be understood in terms of principles we already are aware of. I don't see any hard problem.

Our brains contain networks and catalogs and hierarchies of biologically contained non-physicals that will never be detected by any physical means, ever, regardless of the science. — Mark Nyquist

If it can't be known by science, how can it be known. How do you know it?... You don't.

Thanks! Got it just now on Kindle. I'll give it a good read — Constance

It still amazes me that almost anyone, almost anywhere can get almost any book, movie, or music just by pushing a couple of buttons.

To break with this requires an entirely different paradigm of knowledge relations; radically different. Can't imagine a neurological approach finding this. — Constance

I disagree with this. Scientists don't generally say that biology is nothing but chemistry. In the same way, mental processes, including consciousness, are not nothing but biology. But they are bound by biology in the same way that recorded music is bound by a CD or MP3 reader or radio. Music is not nothing but electronic equipment and electrical processes.

I would be fascinated to read about this. — Constance

Antonio Damasio is a neuroscientist who studies the biological foundations of mental processes, including consciousness. The book I have is "The Feeling of What Happens."

Doesn't that imply that you value truth in the expense of happiness? — TheMadMan

Not necessarily. I think it would vary from situation to situation.

This is facile and untrue. It shows a lack of understanding of how the universe works at a fundamental level.
— T Clark

Are you saying atheists are making facile and untrue statements? Well, go on then, edify us/them as to the true state of affairs. — Agent Smith

No, I'm saying that atheists in general would not say that because it's not true and shows a lack of understanding of how the universe works.

This leads me to a further question: what if there are types of fields other than electromagnetic? — Wayfarer

The idea of a field is not all that exotic - it just means there is a specific value of some property at all locations of space, at least within a given area. There are definitely fields other than electromagnetic ones. There are gravitational fields and quantum fields. If I understand correctly, and that's a fairly big if, a quantum field is the one you're talking about when you reference "atomic particles are conceived of as 'excitations of fields'.."

Consider the case of Frank Brown, a US scientist who situated oysters in an isolated environment in Evanston Illinois, in the middle of the continental US, and was amazed to find that they gradually synchronised their opening and closing times with the high tides adjusted for their location, even though they were completely isolated from external world. — Wayfarer

I'm not sure I understand. There are no tides in Evanston, Illinois. For an oyster in a location with tides, differences in hydrostatic pressure with different water depths could be one possible explanation for coordination of shell opening. Another might be sensitivity to the flow of water associated with tides.

I am definitely a skeptic about any ideas of exotic or hidden fields that have important effects which have not been identified.

Would you push the button? — TheMadMan

I wouldn't push the button, but that doesn't change my answer to the previous question.

Which value would you attribute to each choice? — TheMadMan

I'm not sure what I would do in a situation like that.

I think this issue makes me wonder a lot of questions because my failure is see the Pope as someone different from God but probably a Catholic sees him as the pure representation of the idea of God. — javi2541997

I think there are a lot of differences among Catholics about many issues of doctrine, especially here in the US. My wife is Catholic and I don't think she cares about papal infallibility at all.

I see it as you do. But this premise could end up in an argument where the Pope is above God. Catholics don't want to humanize the Pope but I understand that, at the same time, no one is divine as much as God.
So, they will always have this debate. Are the faculties of the Pope object of criticism? If we critize him, are we arguing against God's mercy? — javi2541997

The kinds of questions you are asking only make sense from within Catholic Christianity. From outside where we stand, the questions can only be sociological or anthropological.

To my mind "the hard problem of consciousness" is only "hard" for (Cartesian) philosophers because their aporia is actually still an underdetermined scientific problem. — 180 Proof

Your claim was not merely that it has not been, but that it could not be, explained (likened to trying to reach the earth from the moon by car). — Isaac