Your use of "everyday human life" is interesting. Is that what Sider has in mind when he counterposes it to a bizarre interpretation? — J

Yes, I think that's right. As I noted in my last post, I understand what he means and agree with the general sentiment--after all, two electrons and a cow makes kind of a bizarre grouping. But the claim this represents some sort of "actual ontological structure" rather than a reflection of our common humanity raises my hackles.

The pivotal question, as so often, is whether this extension beyond the everyday can ever take us completely out of ourselves, into some sort of "view from nowhere" that is deeply fundamental, so to speak. — J

My answer is "No."

"Ontological realism [is the view that] ontological questions are 'deep', 'about the world rather than language'." — J

Well, no... I mean yes... I guess we can call them "deep" if you want, but they are not just about the world. They are about us and the world as a single entity. And yes, they are also about language.

This leave open the possibility that "the world" doesn't have to be construed as something apart from how we experience it. I — J

I don't know how open you are to Taoist thought. Lao Tzu wrote "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." We might say "The world as expressed in words is not the same as your experience of the world.” I think that's a good response to Sider, although I'm not sure he would disagree with me.

So we have to ask, Is identicalness a property for us because it is a fundamental property of ontology? Does being identical ground the other ways we can understand similarity or communality of properties? — J

This seems a bit odd. I guess two examples of a particular subatomic particle really are identical, but few other pairs in the world are. Two apples from the same tree are not identical physically, only conceptually. Then again, I can make the case that an electron and a cow are conceptually identical. As a matter of fact I already did in a previous post when I pointed out they are both consist of matter rather than radiation.

But suppose we both agreed that there is a reference magnet in the vicinity which is joint-carving. You want to say that "metaphysics" is the best word to apply to one division of the resulting conceptual carving -- the division which includes Collingwood's "absolute presuppositions [that] have been made by this or that person or group of persons." Other divisions might, on your terms, be "derivative assumptions" and "meaningless non-human-world statements about an inaccessible 'fundamentality'," or words to that effect, yes? — J

My problem is that the way I use the idea of "metaphysics" is fundamental to how I understand how the world works--or more accurately, how I can talk and think about how the world works. There's no way around it. I need bricks shaped like "metaphysics" to help build the wall. If I use another shape, the wall will be less stable. I guess I can call the bricks something else, but 1) there are already smart, qualified, experienced people out there using the word the same way I do and 2) making up new words almost never makes things better.

For my part, I'm not as clear about the right terms, but let's say I held a different set of labels, but was willing to bracket them while acknowledging that what you mean by "metaphysics" is indeed a reference magnet, and an important one. Might we not be able to continue the discussion on that basis? — J

This kind of question is what lead to think about the different approach to the question I mentioned in my last post when I wrote "Maybe I'll start a thread with lists of statements I consider metaphysical by my standard and ask people to describe how they fit into their own understanding of the term."

Too bad. I liked Bob in spite of our serious differences. I’m not surprised by this and I’m certain he wasn't either.

whether 'reality' and 'existence' and be differentiated, — Wayfarer

They certainly feel different. "Reality" feels more objective, concrete, philosophical, external. "Existence" feels more abstract, subjective, personal, internal. The Tao Te Ching uses "existence" and "being" as more or less interchangeable depending on the verse and translator. This is the kind of thing I meant when I talked about connotation.

I'm trying to think of two synonymous words that have different moods, tones or implications associated with them. — Janus

After I wrote that post, I was doing the same thing— trying to think of a good example. I figured someone would ask. An obvious example is the different ways of describing sexual activity.

• Sexual intercourse
• Having sex
• Making love
• Marital relations
• Fucking
• Mating
• Fornication
• Copulation

On a level more appropriate for this particular discussion, I think you’re example of reality and existence is a good one. Here are some more that might be relevant.

• Being
• Existence
• Reality
• Everything
• The universe
• The world
• The Tao
• The ground of being
• Ontology
• Ontological structure

I have used all of these terms at various times to describe everything that is, although I admit, I’d never use the last one until this discussion.

What do you think "thickness" or "depth" of meaning are, if not either polysemy or ambiguity? — Janus

What about connotation? Two different words might be accurately called synonyms, but still have a different mood, tone, or implication associated with them.

To start, I'd like to put a frame on the discussion up to this point. All the issues we've put on the table so far--your existence, being, reality, causation, freedom, the good, truth, the ground of being--my metaphysics--are themselves metaphysical concepts. I recognize we are in danger of slipping down the slope and off the cliff we are currently discussing, but this idea is central to my understanding and my argument. R.G. Collingwood is my guru in these matters. He wrote:

Metaphysics is the attempt to find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking. — R.G. Collingwood - An Essay on Metaphysics

The important aspect of this quote in the context of this discussion is that metaphysical, i.e. ontological, points of view don't, or at least don't have to, apply universally to all situations at all times. I can be a realist in the morning and an idealist in the afternoon. Digging a bit deeper, it is fundamental to my understanding that ontological perspectives are not inherent in the world out there--they are human cognitive artifacts.

If we could adopt the ultra-objective "view from nowhere/anywhere," would the same reference magnets exert their influence? Is that what we require in order to talk about "reality's fundamental structure"? Sider declares himself to be an ontological realist; he thinks the answer is Yes. — J

What I like about your phrasing here is the use of the word "adapt." In this context it refers to a choice by a philosopher. Something obviously human. If I really believe that, does it make any sense to talk about "reality's fundamental structure?" How can something be fundamental if it only applies from a certain specific viewpoint?

In Sider's favor: There is surely such a thing as a non-bizarre interpretation, in which the two electrons do "go together"; he isn't making that up. Your suggestion is that bizarre vs. ordinary is a referendum on human uses and contexts. And that too seems plausible. — J

Again--calling something "bizarre" is a human judgment. God or reality or the Tao don't think putting a cow in with electrons is bizarre. To be fair, I certainly know what Sider is talking about. I have made the case that it only really makes sense to talk about real or reality in the context of, or at least with a connection to, everyday human life. That's probably a good example of a "non-bizarre interpretation," or "right sort of basis."

The question, I think, is whether we can argue that our human uses are themselves not arbitrary, but reflect actual ontological structure of some kind. — J

My first response is "No!!! Of course there is no 'actual ontological structure' of some kind!!!" But now I'm just going in circles. I think this is a good example of a situation where our argument becomes pointless unless you are willing to accept my ideas about metaphysics or I am willing to abandon them.

Suppose . . . that there exist, in the fundamental sense, nothing but sub-atomic particles. Given such a sparse ontology, the most plausible view about natural language quantifiers might be that they do not carve at the joints. The best metaphysical semantics of an ordinary sentence like 'There is a table' might be . . . a tolerant semantics, which interprets it as making the true claim that there exist sub-atomic particles appropriately arranged. The English 'there is', according to such a semantics, would not express fundamental quantification. . . So even if there is a joint-carving sort of quantification, the quantifiers of ordinary language might not carve at the joints. — Sider, 171-72.

I deal with this metaphysical knot by applying the metaphysical sword I mentioned just above--In most cases, it makes no sense (to me) to talk about existence, reality, unless there is a connection to the human world. Hypothesizing reality without tables is silly. Where the joints are located depends on the specific point of view. In this particular situation, it depends on scale. The fact that I want to make joints around subatomic particles doesn't keep me from also making joints around tables made up of subatomic particles, or, to carry it further, to make joints around furniture in general including tables.

Let's move to a less austere term: "happiness". Philosopher A maintains that happiness refers to a state that's measured in terms of pleasures and pains. Thus, it's possible, though unusual, for a person to fail to seek their own happiness, due to some defect of the psyche. Philosopher B maintains that happiness is best understood as that state which all people do in fact seek, since we are egoistic hedonists, and cannot fail to act in our own behalf. — J

I think "happiness" is a different, simpler, case than the other concepts we've been discussing. It's a human emotion, a psychological entity, not abstract at all. Not interesting ontologically any more than an apple is.

I sympathize, and I think Sider has this sort of thing in mind. Is there a way to bracket your use of "metaphysics," so to speak, and instead specify the (joint-carving) way in which you use that term? It could be set out not as a definition of 'metaphysics', but as an interesting conceptual or structural category you've noticed. I dunno . . . people might still want to argue terms. — J

I've been thinking about something like this. Maybe I'll start a thread with lists of statements I consider metaphysical by my standard and ask people to describe how they fit into their own understanding of the term.

I wondered if beauty should be confined to visual images only. — Corvus

No, of course not. It’s not that other things can’t be beautiful, it’s just that wasn’t the purpose of this thread at the beginning. It was intended to focus on visual beauty. My preference would be to keep it that way.

A visual image itself cannot be beautiful, until you have perceived it, and came to a true judgement that it is beautiful. Hence the true judgement i.e.truth is, what you are finding as beauty. — Corvus

You talk about this in a way that doesn’t come naturally for me. Although you’re welcome to use this thread to have a discussion on this, I’m going to stick to my visual beauty only standard. If you start another thread on aesthetic philosophy, I will probably participate.

Isn't beauty in the eyes of beholder? An old cliche, but an undeniable truth.
Isn't truth more beautiful than some visual images? What eyes see might be just illusion in most cases. — Corvus

I started this thread a long time ago, at least on a forum scale. At that time, it was specifically intended as a showcase for visual beauty. The OP is specific about that. @javi2541997 has single-handedly kept the discussion alive by posting to it every now and then. It’s a thread I love and I think Javi feels the same way.

Now, after all these years, people can use it in whatever manner they want. That being said, no, I don’t think truth is beautiful, no matter what Keats said.

That is why students of kinds such as Goodman, George Lakoff or John Dupre say or imply that there are no natural kinds, — Pierre-Normand

I think there are natural kinds, but they are natural human kinds. They are manifestations of our human nature and, beyond that of our own specific personal natures.

But that’s kind of a pragmatic approach to the subject, which works well for me since I like to call myself a pragmatist. I don’t think the universe has a structure independent of us that allows it to be separated at the joints as @J discussed. I’ll bring a little Lao Tzu into the discussion. This is from the first verse of Steven Mitchell’s translation of the Tao Te Ching.

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.

The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things.

Naming is the process that divides, categorizes, the universe, the Tao, into the multiplicity that we experience. Naming is something humans do.

Let's say you and I had quite different construals of how "exist" ought to be used. I'm sure that, being reasonable people, we could stipulate a meaning to employ in examining some given question. And we might learn quite a bit about this term -- call it E^. But neither of us really believes it means "exist"! We're clinging to the idea that there is some right way to use "exist", even as we agree to stipulate E^ for this discussion. — J

The problem with that for me is, again sticking with metaphysics as the example, I need the idea as formulated in my understanding of philosophy. The way I’ve dealt with that in discussions that I started is to specify in the OP exactly the definition of metaphysics I want to use for the purposes of that particular thread. As I noted, it’s often a struggle to keep other posters on that path.

But as we know, a lot of philosophy consists of people insisting that Great Philosopher X was right about Big Term A, and they're sure they can come up with the persuasive argument somehow. That said, I enjoy talking with people who tone this down a bit, and want to show me how a particular philosopher's construal can be helpful, insightful, creative, et al., without necessarily settling the question for all time. — J

I enjoy those kinds of discussions to. As I mentioned, I’m happy to participate, but, as I see it, that limits how substantive the discussion can be. You never get any further than what the term does or doesn’t mean

in Ontologese, quantifiers are stipulated to carve at the joints. In other words, they are attracted by the correct, eligible reference magnets. — J

Can you give an example of this?

An obvious obstacle would be to get some agreement about whether there are such things as joint-carving or ontologically privileged concepts. Some versions of post-modernism, for instance, would stop right here and ask for an account of this that makes sense in their tradition. Can we give one? Food for thought. — J

As I understand it, at the most fundamental levels, joints are established based on biological and neurological characteristics. Visually, the world gets broken up initially in the eye before it ever gets to the central nervous system. Some animals are most sensitive to motion while others are to shadows. Some see color and some don’t. Some have much better visual resolution than others. Tactually, it would make sense if there were a joint between things that caused pain and things that didn’t.

How those various very primitive conceptualizations, if they can even be called that, lead to the complex conceptual reality humans live with every day is a question to be answered by biology, neurology, psychology, and cognitive science.

The way one overcomes disagreements is first by understanding what the other person is saying. If there is a term that is being used differently between two interlocutors, then it can be helpful to disambiguate that equivocation for the sake of clarity and mutual understanding, but there is no magic bullet where one overcomes metaphysical impasse by coining new words. — Leontiskos

This is right, but what it leads to is that every discussion about a difficult or obscure concept ends up as an argument about the meaning of words, and we never get around to a substantive discussion of consequences.

This is a great OP--clear, well written, and, even more important, something I'm really interested about.

Certain big philosophical terms seem fundamental, yet cause big problems. Existence, being, real, cause, freedom, good, and true are a few examples. These terms have acquired meanings, and then more meanings, and then yet more meanings, resulting in camps of philosophy who seem to say opposite things using the same words.

Are these disputes non-substantive? True, they often revolve around terminological disagreements, but they are not about terms, or at any rate we don’t want them to be. We want them to be about the things to which they refer: about existence, reality, causation, the good, and what grounds what. The disagreements begin to look terminological when the debaters realize that they are talking past each other, using those fundamental terms in different ways. — J

Yes, this happens a lot. I have made the case many times that it's important to agree on the definition of a term at the beginning of the thread unless the discussion's specific purpose is to figure out what it means. I get lots of pushback on that position. In my particular case, the most troublesome concept is "metaphysics." That idea is right at the heart of my interest in and understanding of philosophy. I have my own understanding of what it means. If you've paid attention to my posts, you've heard me spout out about it numerous times.

The problem for me is that, sometimes, I don't want to talk about what metaphysics is, I want to talk about what the implications and consequences of my specific understanding are. I've had knock down drag out fights trying to keep my own discussions on subject. The moderators are often unsympathetic and unwilling to intervene. In my experience, every discussion of metaphysics turns into an argument about what the term really means. It never goes any deeper than that. I think the same thing is sometimes true of terms you identified--existence, being, real, cause, freedom, good, and true--and others.

One of the key concepts Sider has endorsed is “reference magnetism.” (He attributes the term to a 1984 paper by Harold Hodes, but it’s usually associated with David Lewis.) According to reference magnetism, we don’t simply assign words to things or concepts in such a way that our statements about them come out true. Truth on an interpretation isn’t enough. We also want the references of our words to have certain characteristics, certain external constraints on meaning. Here Sider’s preferred term is “joint-carving,” borrowed from Plato, by which he means “corresponding to actual ontological structure.” (I find the term disgusting, but it’s too central to Sider’s thought to be simply dropped.) — J

This is really interesting. For the record, I love the term "joint-carving." I think it gets right to the heart of the issue, although I'm not sure the idea there is some "actual ontological structure" makes any sense. This use of the term makes me think of a passage from Brook Ziporyn's translation of the Chuang Tzu. I'm going to hide it so it doesn't distract from the flow of my argument.

An example of joint-carving that Sider offers: Imagine two electrons, alike in every respect, plus a cow. We could find ways of grouping one of the electrons with the cow, forming the mereological item “electron-plus-cow,”and go on to say true things about it, and the remaining lone electron. Sider’s contention is that to do this is to carve reality very badly; it’s a “bizarre interpretation.” “The three objects should be divided into two groups, one containing the electrons, the other containing the cow. The electrons go together, and neither goes with the cow.” — J

The only reason electron-plus-cow seems like a bad way of carving reality is context--not any absolute ontological structure. I can think of not too goofy situations where two electrons and a cow belong together. An example--let's say I have one group containing two electrons and another containing sunlight, gravity, and gamma radiation. Which group does the cow belong in? To me, it's clear it belongs with the electrons--they're examples of matter while the other group includes only radiation. The so-called ontological structure in Sider's example is based on a narrow understanding of the context of human experience and thought. And that may be fine in a particular situation as long as it is recognized. It is not any kind of universal truth.

Sider is saying that the conceptual field has natural structural divisions, so when we try to match words with concepts we can be more or less perspicuous. A word like “exist” can be pulled toward one or more of these “reference magnets,” and made to refer to them. How does this happen? Through historical usage, primarily, which may evolve into ordinary language as well...

...The problem is, the “big” words are so encrusted with centuries of varying uses at the hands of varying philosophies, that they now get drawn to many different reference magnets. — J

I think you're exactly right. Usage of the big words leads to situations where Sider's scheme doesn't work because we don't seem to be able to agree on an appropriate ontological structure.

Sider (and I) would say that trying to argue for a single meaning for a word like “good” is a non-substantive debate. It really is a wrangle over terminology. But . . . the possible “magnets” are not themselves words, and the issue is not merely linguistic. It is as substantive as can be: ontology, what the world is like. Our problem is that we can’t settle on which of our big terms ought to be coupled with which magnet. — J

Again--exactly right. When every discussion ends up an argument about definitions, we never get anywhere with any substance.

That is, the ordinary, natural language question, phrased in terms of the ordinary, natural language expression E, would be non-substantive. But we could discard E and enter the metaphysics room, so to speak. We could replace the ordinary expression E with an improved expression E* that we stipulate is to stand for the joint-carving meaning in the vicinity. The question we ask in the metaphysics room, cast in terms of E* rather than E, is substantive. Indeed, it is superior to the original question, for it concerns reality’s fundamental structure, rather than its merely conventional or projected aspects. This is plan B. — Sider, 74.

How is this different from just agreeing on the definition of the word in question at the beginning of the discussion? There's already vastly to many "improved expressions E*" out there.

Now I want to depart from Sider on one point. (And I should emphasize that much of the above is my own interpretation of Sider.) I’m not convinced that “reality’s fundamental structure” is the best way to talk about what Sider wants to talk about. I don’t know how fundamental the various reference magnets may be, or whether it’s necessary to drag in “reality” (one of those very terms whose ambiguity causes so much trouble). This is a version of the same question raised about “natural” groupings. I certainly don’t know whether “naturalness” or “fundamentality” are properties we can treat the same way we treat things like “yellow” or “square”. I’d rather say that words map imperfectly onto concepts, and that the structure of concepts – their relations, groundings, logics – is something we can discern regardless of the words we use. Plan B is an attempt to help everyone concerned to find a way to stop disagreeing about words and get on with doing metaphysics. — J

I agree with this.

But we could enter the metaphysics room, and coin a new term, ‛cause*’, for the joint-carving relation in the vicinity of causation. ‛Cause*’ will stand for C – fundamental causation, we might call it – and our new debate about causation* will be substantive.
— Sider, 75-76.

In some ways, this approach is familiar, even truistic: Define your terms!...

Yes.

But there’s no need to enter your metaphysics room and come up with fancy terminology. Instead, I’ll keep working to convince you that my use of ‛exist’ has indeed trumped all the other reference magnets in the vicinity, just as ‛leopard’ did.” And so the terminological/historical bickering goes on . . . — J

Rather than trying to convince me, perhaps it makes more sense for you to say "You and I just see things too differently for this to be a fruitful discussion." Then you go find someone else to talk with. I end up doing that a lot. I just learned the meaning of the word "incommensurable" recently and I find myself using it often.

Another type of philosopher might respond, “I’m wary about this division between word and concept – between a term and its ‛reference magnet’. Are we really able to perceive structure (‛joint-carving’ or not) apart from the words we use to describe it? Does this depend on a special sort of intuition, and/or a multiplication of entities? Surely our challenge, if we’re going to do metaphysics at all, is to use the words we have in order to create the most plausible, parsimonious, and complete account we can. The words are the structure.” — J

I like this, even though I'm not sure I know what it means. I'll have to think about it more.

“using the words we have” does work well in some areas of philosophy, but we all appreciate the power of logical languages that can remove vagueness and allow us to clearly see what we’re talking about. — J

This is true. I believe we can express most of what we want to say without having to use highfalutin philosophical language. At the same time, I think some technical terms, for example "metaphysics," are important and refer to things that aren't easy to express in everyday language.

bizarre semantic values — Sider, 29.

If no definitive ontological structure exists, perhaps no bizarre semantic values do either. Or at least they're not likely to show up in a normal discussion.

I’m also interested in knowing whether the idea of reference magnetism sheds any light on what happens when “big” terms are employed in philosophy. — J

I think using the term might be trying too hard. Of course words take on multiple meanings, sometimes only differing in subtle ways. Of course this is confusing and distracts from substantive discussion. Of course it makes sense to recognize this and try to avoid it. Having discussions about the meaning or meanings of important terms can be useful and interesting, but there comes a time when you have to put your money down if you want to get anywhere. By which I mean--agree on the meaning of the concepts you're going to discuss.

Again--good OP.

The irony is that people like Philosophim don't come across to me as even necessarily right-wing on LGBTQ+ and yet people like @T Clark bash them anyways out of paranoia. — Bob Ross

Geez, now my feelings are hurt.

You know I can read this, right? — Questioner

I think he likes you better than he likes me.

What a disappointment that one of my favorite posters isn't any better than some fresh face single digit poster.
— Philosophim

If you mean me:

I have 168 posts (169 with this one) and my face is not as fresh as it used to be.

If you don't mean me, sorry for the misunderstanding.
— Questioner

No, not at all. I'm talking to T Clark. — Philosophim

I’m surprised you’re disappointed—we’ve been through all this before. I’m not disappointed, I’ve heard these arguments from you before.

Because you aren't even clearly reading my responses to you. See below. I am not trying to be purposefully rude - this is just extremely hard to be polite about. You are ignoring the key aspects of arguments against you (including sources), while presenting none of your own and riding coattails (in this specific thread, only). It doesn't really call for civility. It calls for ignoring you, for the most part. I'm trying to do neither. — AmadeusD

So, I’m at fault for not taking into account— searching for—arguments you made in a different thread. Is that right. And since I didn’t, I’m arguing in bad faith.

Anyway, we’re not getting anywhere. Let’s leave it there. Or at least until the next time.

You seem to have ignored (again, and along with with Questioner) have obviously, and unfortunately obviously on purpose, ignore the several sources (and quotes there from, along with explanations of how they link with the context we're talking in) I have provided. I sent you to them. You have not bothered to look. — AmadeusD

I went back and looked at all the posts you and Philosophim made in this thread. I have no idea what you’re talking about when you refer to quotes and sources and explanations.

So swallow the personal attack accusations and actually give a coherent argument that addresses the OP instead of basic trolling and passive aggressive sniping. — Philosophim

I went back and looked through all my comments on this thread. They were all civil. The only comment I found that was not philosophically appropriate was what I said about your obsession with transgender issues.

This is a controversial and provocative issue. If you’re going to mess around with it, you need to come up with better arguments. Something with substance. That’s what infuriates me about this, not your opinions, but the low quality of your arguments.

Thank you for agreeing with me then. Glad you accept the premise of the OP. — Philosophim

That’s not what I said, and you know it. More importantly, you didn’t respond to my primary point which was:

taking gender into account is not the same thing as “placing gender over sex.” — T Clark

Your bias against me has nothing to do with philosophy or anything intellectual in the slightest. — Philosophim

I think your ideas on transgenderism are poorly argued and supported and I think it’s important that the weakness of your argument be demonstrated. Whether or not I’m doing a good job, that’s what I’m trying to do.

Then you clearly did not read the OP. Oh wait, you already said you didn't. — Philosophim

I did read the OP.

I just replied to his post. — Philosophim

It’s true, I wrote my post before I read your response to @Questioner’s post. Now I’ve read your post and the article Questioner linked to. The results presented in that article were fairly clear, if certainly not without qualifications. Sexual identity, or gender identity, or whatever you want to call it—and even brain structure—can be affected by genetic and hormonal effects both before and after birth. You ignored that.

Suffice to say that you making this claim doesn't make it so. — AmadeusD

He didn’t just make a claim. Unlike you and @Philosophim, he provided references to evidence. If you want to question his evidence, that would make sense, but all you do is wave your arms.

This is one of a few topis that seems to have people A. telling you not to talk about it (or shaming you for it - which is utterly ridiculous) and B. straight-up not engaging in good faith discourse. Some of our best posters such as yourself and Banno do this. Its bizarre. Just absolute non engagement with what's presented. — AmadeusD

Well, I certainly have never told you not to talk about this. I think it’s fine. And I don’t understand why you would say I’m not arguing in good faith.

But I then don't know what it would have to do with. Gender appears to be stereotypes. — AmadeusD

Have you read @Questioner’s post above? Here’s one of the things he had to say:

Perhaps it is simplistic to say a male transgender person has a male brain, or a female transgender brain has a female brain – but the evidence that transgender brain structure and function are different from their biological (physical) sex is there if you care to investigate it. — Questioner

The information included in his post puts the lie to just about everything you and @Philosophim have to say on this subject. Maybe you guys will just lay off on your transgender obsession. Probably not.

Or maybe I’ll just plagiarize what you’ve written in future discussions.

Boy, this is a great post. Really interesting. I’m going to follow up on some of the reading you linked.

To be clear, gender is purely a social expectation that has nothing to do with natural biology. — Philosophim

This is clearly not true. For 99.7% of people, biological sex and gender match each other.

I’ll quote the great Flight of the Conchords:

All the money that we're making is going to the man
(What man?
Which man?
Who's the man?
When's a man a man?
What makes a man a man?
Am I a man?
Yes, technically I am)

I would probably agree that there is a degree of sexism in such a statement, were someone to make it, but it isn't a realistic depiction of gender dysphoria. — Mijin

Nicely put.

Because gender is subjective and subject to the whims of an individual or group, and placing gender over sex in matters of importance matches the definition of sexism, — Philosophim

I’ll bypass most of your OP and just say taking gender into account is not the same thing as “placing gender over sex.”

There’s more to say about your obsession with transgender issues, but I guess that wouldn’t be philosophy.

I think the gospel of Jesus was embraced because it was the first egalitarian philosophy to reach the ears of the oppressed. Jesus was the first egalitarian, elevating the poor to an equal status with the upper levels. The promises were great, as can be seen by the 5th century poem, St. Patrick's Breastplate: — Questioner

I think of Saint Francis, who also preached the value and dignity of the poor, although about 1000 years after Saint Patrick. I always got the impression that his beliefs were considered very close to heresy.

You express your opinions as solid facts. Is that true? Do you have extensive knowledge that backs it up or is it just your surmise?

William Goldman — Tom Storm

He wrote “the Princess Bride,” both the movie and the book. I like both very much. He also wrote a lot of other famous screenplays. the movie is wonderful, but it’s so is the book.

You’re not paying any attention to what I said. We’ve taken this far enough. I am all done.

I see your point, but haven't heard a reason why a range around the mean is superior to the mode. Especially in cases of a bimodal distribution. — LuckyR

In a normal distribution, the mode, mean, and the median are all the same. For characteristics with a non-normal distribution, it probably doesn’t make sense to talk about normality at all. That certainly is true of a bimodal distribution.

I’ll say it again, my definition is a reasonable one, but it’s not the only reasonable one.

Actually, as I think about it, my definition would work for your situation also. The arithmetic mean of the number of fingers on a human hand would be very close to 10, so that my identification of normal as within one standard deviation of the mean would still be reasonable.

I disagree. If the question is: having how many fingers is normal? The average or mean (less than 10) isn't "normal", neither is the median, nor your range. The correct answer is the mode, that is: 10. — LuckyR

In the post I just submitted, I was talking about human body temperature, not number of fingers. Number of fingers is not normally distributed, although most characteristics, including body temperature, are.

So, what’s the normal human body temperature. 98.6°F. What does that mean? I assume that’s the arithmetic mean of values measured in many humans. If you plot a graph of specific temperature ranges versus frequency of occurrence in the sample population, it’s likely the graph will show a bell shaped curve, i.e. a normal distribution. As I understand it, for body temperature the amount of variability around that mean will be small.

Temperatures significantly above or below that value are dangerous to health. It’s reasonable for me to say a temperature of 104° or 93° is abnormal.

:point: :point:
It’s within one standard deviation of the mean
— T Clark — NotAristotle

Keeping in mind this is a definition, not the definition.

that's natural. — Copernicus

It’s called a normal distribution.

Can you define normal? — Copernicus

Sure. It’s within one standard deviation of the mean.