I won't take your bet, — unenlightened

Too late, you already took the bet. The question is was your decision rational? If you say no, it’s kind of hard to take your argument seriously.

imagine a world where the future is not always like the past. — unenlightened

I don’t have to imagine it, I live in the world where the future is not always like The past.

In other words, if the future fails to be connected to the past and related to it, it fails to be the future. The future is necessarily similar to the past, otherwise it is not the future. The timeline has to hold together, or else it is broken, and a broken timeline is not a timeline at all. — unenlightened

Sorry, I really don’t understand this argument

The problem is that it is not rational, in the sense that no amount of past evidence can constrain the future in any way, logically. And you just saying it seems rational does not make it so either. It goes something like this: — unenlightened

So let’s say you and I are sitting out on my front porch drinking whiskey sours. I live on a pretty busy road so cars are going by often. Let’s say every 30 seconds. We sit there for 10 minutes or so watching cars go by and keeping track. During that time 20 cars go by. Fifteen of them have Massachusetts plates, two have Rhode Island plates, and three have New Hampshire plates.

Then I say “I’ll bet you $50 the next car will have Rhode Island plates?“ You say “sure.” I’d say your decision to take that bet was rational.

But because my memory is sometimes unreliable does not mean that I can or should never rely on it, because even the interpretation of immediate sense data relies on memory, and thus there is nothing at all without it. — unenlightened

It seems to me the reliance on memory you are talking about is rational. So, what’s the problem?

ordinary usage intervenes. — bert1

I’m a big fan of ordinary usage, but it comes into conflict with philosopher’s desire to make up new definitions and new words.

I've been been considering whether the distinction between intentional cause and non intentional is sustainable. I think it may be, but the non intentional would be derived from the intentional. The only causes we actually know about are intentional. Other causes are often attributed to laws, which are descriptive and don't need the notion of cause to work, perhaps. Not sure. — bert1

Off the top of my head, this makes sense to me, but I haven’t spent a lot of time thinking about intentional cause. I specifically left it out of this thread because I didn’t want to complicate things.

You don't see the value of the distinction between rational and irrational? — unenlightened

Hume’s idea of legitimate belief is not irrational. If anything it’s non-rational. Very few of our beliefs are rational. Even fewer are irrational. The large majority are non-rational. Rational belief comes into play when a monkey wrench gets thrown in the machinery.

Or memory and imagination? — unenlightened

I don’t understand how this is relevant.

This is supposedly in line with what working class and lower middle class people do prefer, in comparison with the suggestions of OP, which is more in line with the ideas of progressive people of more prosperous beginnings. — Ansiktsburk

Good post. As a registered Democrat here in the US, what you’ve written is in line with my criticism of the party. We’ve lost contact with our purpose.

I hadn’t heard of Bourdieu. Sounds interesting. Any particular recommendation?

My initial interest was in how the idea of cause applies to historical events (which is terribly fraught, slightly different and more nebulous to the matters you have raised). — Tom Storm

Yes, the whole distinction between events that are intentional versus those that are not seems to complicate all of the discussions I’ve looked at. As I noted earlier, that’s why I avoided the whole subject of human causation. That doesn’t mean none of the issues discussed in this thread is relevant.

Quoting Freud is ironically more a disproof of your claim than anything else. He didn't recognize two different types, he guessed. Thankfully no one really buys that anymore. — Darkneos

None of this is true

Now how on Earth could anyone discover that, other than just guessing in a manner of which seems to offer no room for any argument to the contrary? — Outlander

It didn't say Freud discovered it. It said he recognized it. I also recognize it based on my own experience. I wouldn't have put it in my post otherwise.

But a philosopher pauses and asks about rational truth. Pausing seems like a suspension of everyday action and pragmatism, the things to be done. There is a relationship between the philosopher's contemplation (pausing) and not following inductive everyday life, if one can say such a thing. — JuanZu

I don't see the value in this kind of distinction. How do you see it?

But then, I find the same can be said of "what's responsible for what": what is responsible for my sink being clogged; what's responsible for my window not opening; and so forth. — javra

Again, I didn't say the idea of causality is never useful, only that it's usefulness is limited. I tried to give examples of what I was talking about in the OP.

However they may be thought to do it, non-human animals too operate by discernment of the same, both in terms of who and what as being responsible for what. We humans just term this issue one of causation. — javra

Causality is a human concept. Animals, at least the great majority of them, don't recognize causes. They just act in accordance with their nature given the conditions they encounter.

The invitation in your OP was to consider how we use the word"cause", and you showed that causal chains and inferring probabilistic causes are quite different ways of speaking. — Banno

That's what I was trying to do. I don't think I've been very successful.

Unfortunately, what you are talking about may be clear in your own mind, but it's not clear to my simple mind. — Gnomon

Did you read all my posts? I'm guessing you didn't.

This is a great summary of the "blooming, buzzing confusion." Better than the one I've presented in the OP and my subsequent posts in this thread.

You feel the notion of causality is too simple to deal with the complexities of reality. Applying its simple rules quickly becomes defeated by the fact that reality is just too much to be boiled down into chains of cause and effect. Everything is too networked, too interdependent, too full of feedback and strange loops. Stuff emerges. Things are transformed. Growth and development leave linear tales of cause and effect fast behind. — apokrisis

Yes.

Which is all true. But that is only to say that Nature is not a machine. A machine is designed to have a mechanical logic, a cause and effect linearity. It can be described in terms of a blueprint and a system of differential equations. But Nature is irreducibly complex. Or at least that is the conclusion of the systems science tradition that has sought a better model of natural causality - the causality of a cosmos - since philosophy first started cranking up. — apokrisis

Maybe this is where our differences start. From what I've observed, most people don't recognize the irreducibly complex reality you describe. For them, causality means simple systems--billiard balls. That's the curse of reductionism. That's what I'm talking about. Your complex and nuanced understanding of causality is not how most people understand it. We civil engineers don't work with machinery, we go out into nature and treat it as machinery. We're not the only ones.

Massively large calculations could hope to do a reasonable approximation of the intricate patterns of connection that make up any natural system. One could simulate the weather, the internals of a proton, the boom and bust of fishing stocks or stock markets. Networks of feedback arranged into hierarchies of such networks over logarithmic scale. Throw in phase transition behaviour too. It’s all become standard causal modelling. — apokrisis

I was going to mention numerical monitoring in my OP, but I didn't think I could do it justice. I'm not a modeler, but I have worked with them. We used groundwater and river flow models often in my work. I was going to use modeling as an example of the kinds of efforts required to overcome a knee-jerk dependence on causal processes. In a model you break up reality into little cells and apply simple causal processes within and between those cells. That just brings us back to my original question. When you're dealing with such a complex system, why do you need the idea of causality? Of course reality can be described using the language of cause, but why do it?

Well the history of humanity seems to suggest no. The problem is more the lag between the partial reductionst models and the later arrival of the more holistic models. We are already running at one level of inquiry before having learnt to walk at the next. — apokrisis

This makes sense to me.

Nope, not how it works. — Darkneos

Yup, that’s how it works. From the web.

Freud recognized two different types of processes, the preconscious, which contains thoughts that can easily become conscious, and the unconscious proper, which holds repressed material that cannot be directly accessed.

In Hume, legitimate beliefs exist. They occur in a process of recurrent association. A belief is legitimate when it is associated with a vivid impression. For example, the belief that one object will move after another is based on past experience of their constant conjunction. Hume concluded that fundamental beliefs, such as the existence of an external world or the existence of the self, are not rationally justifiable but are legitimate because they are the result of experience and custom. — JuanZu

So, you can’t trust induction, so just act as if you can. After all, what else are you going to do? Seems kind of a cheat. It’s not rational, but it’s legitimate. What other use is there for rationality other than to help us figure out what to do?

How can you, or anyone else, uphold responsibility sans “the whole idea of causality”? — javra

I posted this earlier in this thread.

there are everyday, common sense situations where the chain of causality is simple--as you called them "brute force causes." I would have no problem with saying I hit the ball in the pocket. I caused the ball to go in the pocket. At human scale that kind of judgment is necessarily so I can be held accountable for my actions. — T Clark

That’s why I don’t claim the idea of causality is useless in all situations.

As with many, if not most, disagreements on this forum, the controversy hinges on the definition of key terms. — Gnomon

In the OP and subsequent posts, I think I’ve made it reasonably clear what I’m talking about when I say “causality.”

But scientists & philosophers tend to assume Universal Causation as an axiom, despite the rare exceptions. — Gnomon

This is not true. Many do not.

But I’ve come to prefer a version of the so-called Transference theory of causation, where causation ought to be reduced to the transference of physical conserved quantities, like “momentum” or “energy”, from one object to another. Though I’m not sure I believe in “physical conserved quantities”, it is at least intuitive and empirical to say that one object hitting another caused the other to move. — NOS4A2

I’ve come to the same sort of conclusion you have— looking at cause, efficient cause, is a question of the transfer of energy. That doesn’t change the primary question in this thread, i.e. is the whole idea of causality useful in most situations? My answer is “no” or at least “maybe not”

That the reed hitting the black on the billiard table, causing it to move, is a different sort of explanation to that you went to the fridge because you wanted a beer, and different again to vaccinations causing the number of measles cases to decline. — Banno

I intentionally left out instances where a human motivation was involved because I wanted to avoid the complications associated with that. I think the difference between the billiard balls and the inoculations is the difference between a very simple instance where efficient cause probably does make sense and a more complicated one where it might not.

it's more a way of offering an explanation than some underlying universal mechanism. — Banno

I understand this, but I think it’s not a useful way of looking at things.

Don't be insulted. — apokrisis

I’m not insulted at all. I was just making an observation. I think this post confirms my observation is correct.

Well we can't really be aware of our internal mental processes since much of it happens unconsciously. — Darkneos

Sure we can. You’re right that you don’t have access to everything. But then again, the kinds of subjects that philosophy covers tend to be associated with conscious attention and intention. It’s also true that the more aware you become, the more of your unconscious mental activity becomes conscious.

Not sure if we even live on the same planet. — apokrisis

Even I'm not sure the US is on the same planet as everyone else these days.

There is indeed a reason for confusion. You have glimpses of fragments and they all seem to come from different puzzles. — apokrisis

It's clear from this thread I'm working on pulling my thoughts on this subject together. I don't think that's the same thing as glimpsing fragments from different puzzles.

This could take a while.... — apokrisis

Yes, I knew I was in trouble when you brought Peircian triads into the discussion.

And there will be those who just love such an answer.

But there is a reason why pragmatism describes it as the natural state of the newborn helpless babe when thrust kicking and screaming into the strange new world.

We start with the simple things so as to move on to the complicated things. Or in your case, its a shrug of the shoulders? Once you seem to be getting by, why should other folk still be working hard to get ahead? — apokrisis

A bit condescending.

I'm saying the reason the 8 ball moved is the physical impact of the cue ball, and the reason the cue moved is your decision to move it. Those seem very different to me. — Patterner

I see what you mean, but I tried to keep human intention out of the question. I can see I kind of slipped some in.

Wouldn't one response be, T Clark, that identifying a dichotomy also depends on were you look? That what constitutes a dichotomy is also a matter of convention, at least as much as a matter of fact? — Banno

To tell the truth, I'm not really sure what @apokrisis means by "dichotomy" in this context.

Nice OP! — hypericin

Thank you.

I feel you have demonstrated less that cause is not a useful concept, but that the concept needs a lot of refinement to generalize beyond toy cases. The problem is that people want to take the toy concept and apply it to everything. — hypericin

Do you consider the description of the salt marsh I discussed as a "toy case?" If so, I disagree.

In a family tree there is a orderly relationship between causes and effects, where every effect has two immediate causes, four nearest proximate causes, 8 second nearest, and so on. In reality there is no such order. any event may have any number of causes, arising from anywhere on the graph. Effects of a cause may even simultaneously serve as a cause of the cause, in the case of feedback loops. — hypericin

The question I've been asking is--if it is such a complex system of events, why bring the idea of causality into it at all. Why not just describe the system? To be clear, I acknowledge it is possible to express just about any situation in the language of causality, it's just that in many, most, cases it doesn't add anything to the discussion.

Peirce had his model of tychism or the probability of propensities. Popper recapitulated it. So the idea has been taken seriously. — apokrisis

I looked up "propensity probability" on Wikipedia and it said this:

Propensities are not relative frequencies, but purported causes of the observed stable relative frequencies. Propensities are invoked to explain why repeating a certain kind of experiment will generate a given outcome type at a persistent rate. Stable long-run frequencies are a manifestation of invariant single-case probabilities. — Wikipedia

That seems like a patch to me. A patch to cover the hole in the idea of causality related to what I called as probabilistic causality.

Something that interests me greatly is the singularity of the effect that cannot be reduced. — JuanZu

I'm not sure what you mean in this context. Previously I suggested just describing the conditions rather than attributing causality. Is that the same thing you are talking about.

But that is the metaphysical architecture that sets up the dynamic interplay over time. It is boiling causality down into the logical account rather than describing it in terms of the blooming, buzzing confusion one might appear to experience. — apokrisis

This is the point I'm trying to make. What does it add to the discussion to talk about causality instead of just describing the "blooming, buzzing confusion?" My answer--not much, and it misleads people into thinking there is a simple chain of events when, in reality, there is a complex system of interactions. That misunderstanding has significant consequences when you try to go about figuring out what buttons to push and levers to pull.

OK, how would you describe "changes in energy", while avoiding the notion of Causation? — Gnomon

In the OP I've given specific examples of situations where changes take place but it is not useful to use the term "causality." Many people here have disagreed with my characterization.

I’m curious as to how it resonates with your reading of Collingwood. — Joshs

I was using Collingwood's definition of metaphysics, not specifically causality. My claim is that causality is a metaphysical principle. It can't be verified or falsified empirically. He does talk about causality in "An Essay on Metaphysics" and I interpret his understanding of cause as being similar to what I call efficient cause. Here is what he has to say:

(a) ’In Newtonian physics it is presupposed that some events (in the physical world; a qualification which hereinafter the reader will please understand when required) have causes and others not. "Events not due to the operation of causes are supposed to be due to the operation of laws. Thus if a body moves freely along a straight line pi, p^, pz, A • • • its passing the point at a certain time, calculable in advance from previous observation of its velocity, is an event which is not according to Newton the effect of any cause whatever. It is an event which takes place not owing to a cause, but according to a law. But if it had changed its direction at p^, having collided there with another body, that change of direction would have been an event taking place owing to the action of a cause (see Note on p. 57).

{b) -In the nineteenth century we find a different presupposition being made by the general body of scientists: namely that all events have causes. About the history and interpretation of this I shall have more to say in the concluding chapters. Here I will anticipate only so far as to say that I do not know any explicit statement of it earlier than Kant ; and accordingly I shall refer to the physics based upon it as the Kantian physics. * The peculiarity of Kantian physics is that it uses the notion of cause and the notion of law, one might almost say, interchangeably : it regards all laws of nature as laws according to which causes in nature operate, and all causes in nature as operating according to law.

(c) In modem physics the notion of cause has disappeared. * Nothing happens owing to causes; everything happens according to laws. Cases of impact, for example, are no longer regarded as cases in which the Laws of Motion are rendered inoperative by interference with one body on the part of another; they are regarded as cases of ‘free’ motion (that is, motion not interfered with) under peculiar geometrical conditions, a line of some other kind being substituted for the straight line of Newton’s First Law. — R.W. Collingwood

I find Collingwood difficult sometimes, so I'm not really sure if what he calls action without cause--type (c) in his classification, is the same thing I am talking about.

It isn’t a fixed logical schema but a dynamic interplay that unfolds over time. Organisms live causality as an ongoing, enactive process, not as a formal reciprocal equation. — Joshs

Aren't you talking about what I've called "probabilistic causality" or "complex systems?" As I noted in the OP, I see those as evidence that the idea of cause is not a useful one.

I was just saying that the links in the chain of events you listed represent two very different types of cause. — Patterner

What are the two types of causes? I was trying to limit my discussion to efficient cause. Did I fail?

Mechanical forces are quite a particular subset of physics. They depend on the simplistic ontology of atoms in a void. Particles that have mass, shape and motion. They can stick together or recoil at the instant they happen to come into physical contact. They can compound or scatter as a second order topological fact.

So yes. This is a very restricted, if very useful, model of causality. — apokrisis

I'm lost. Confused. Is what we are calling mechanistic cause the same as efficient cause. That was what I intended. It's Newtonian cause. f = ma; F = G(m₁m₂)/r²; and then updated by general relativity and quantum mechanics. Me pushing a shopping cart, throwing a ball. Also included are all the things that happen with no people around--a billion light years from here.

I think you and I speak a different language.

It is exactly what you want if you are in the business of turning nature into a system of machinery. — apokrisis

As you wrote--pushing buttons and pulling levers.

So the natural world has a rich causality. — apokrisis

By this do you mean rich efficient causality? Please describe to me how that works. How it's different from f = ma.

I have come to see that philosophy is a practice like meditation, exercise, learning musical instruments, tai chi, martial arts, and similar enterprises. As with all such practices, the goal is self-awareness. Philosophy is a practice that focuses on becoming more aware of our internal mental processes. This is certainly how it is for me.

@apokrisis @Count Timothy von Icarus @Patterner @Janus @JuanZu @bert1

I often complain that people don't put enough effort into providing definitions of the words they're using in arguments. Now I'm wondering if I've fallen into that same trap. I'm not sure I mean the same thing when I say "causality" as the rest of you do. I thought it was something simple and clear, but maybe I was wrong. As I wrote back in the OP, I'm looking at causality as it is expressed in the principle of sufficient reason--everything must have a reason or a cause. I have always understood that to mean efficient cause and perhaps, as apokrisis noted, material cause. Patterner called it brute force cause. Thinking of it mechanistically, I'm talking about causality that includes the transfer of energy from one system, the cause, to another, the effect.

That's the argument I have been trying to make--the idea of cause, efficient cause, is not useful in many cases and can be misleading. Perhaps you all and I have been arguing from different starting points. Certainly that's true of me and apokrisis, but as I was working to respond to all the responses, it started to seem like it may be true of others also.

I was trying to distinguish between different types of causes. Cue hitting cue ball, cue ball hitting 8 ball, and 8 ball falling in the pocket are all one type. I don't know what anybody else might call them, but I would probably just call them brute force causes? Thing 1 bangs into Thing 2, and Thing 2 moves. — Patterner

I do understand the point you were trying to make. As I said previously, there are everyday, common sense situations where the chain of causality is simple--as you called them "brute force causes." I would have no problem with saying I hit the ball in the pocket. I caused the ball to go in the pocket. At human scale that kind of judgment is necessarily so I can be held accountable for my actions. The point I was trying to make is that particular choice is arbitrary. It's a matter of convention. As I noted in the OP, there are lots of other places along the chain of causality I could have identified as the cause. Which raises the question--why did you pick those particular places to make the breaks?

But all you keep doing is collapsing causality to the notion of efficient cause and then talking about the other thing of "context". — apokrisis

I've been going back and forth trying to figure out how to respond to this for awhile. I haven't given up. I'll be back later.

I don't think the asteroid and Hitler were constraints. The asteroid prevented the continued evolution of dinosaurs by wiping them out. Or, iirc, it wiped out land animals above a certain size. — Patterner

I guess that’s my understanding of what a constraint is— something that prevents something else from happening. It reduces the number of possible futures.