Women, they were once, how shall I put it?, support staff. — Agent Smith

If I were a woman, I think your dismissive statement about women's role in religion would bother me. Hey, wait a minute... I'm not a woman and it bothers me. Your comment is, how should I put it? ignorant.

Sarcasm? — Agent Smith

Well, Mary was meant to be... I guess ironic, but the other two were serious.

What if everyone were magically making enough income to be middle class.. all retail workers, factory workers, construction workers, agricultural workers, etc.. Everyone was making a decent enough salary to live in a house, buy some entertainment goods, a car, had all their daily living met.. — schopenhauer1

I don't care if you call it "middle class," or something else. No society can call itself good if it doesn't provide access to a decent way of life to everyone. A decent way of life includes enough to eat; a safe and clean place to live; health care; a decent, humane job; education; the opportunity to have and raise children; and basic human freedoms. If that's what you're talking about then, yes, that would satisfy me.

This is a touchy subject because it has reference to sexist ideology. But I'm trying to present a problem that, perhaps, could shed light on the difference between a masculine morality and feminine morality. — L'éléphant

I haven't seen any response to @Possibility's comment about the source of your information. I am skeptical of the characterizations you have made. I'm even more skeptical about the rationales you have provided for the differences between men a women. Since you say you know this thread deals with a touch subject, it's hard to accept you making claims with no justification.

No women have founded a religion — Agent Smith

Mary Baker Eddy, Ellen G. White, and, of course, the Virgin Mary.

We heard the guys' story. Now we should ask some women. — god must be atheist

You're assuming you haven't heard from any women.

This is a really good post. As I noted for Tim Wood's post above, it is reasonable, nuanced, and well-expressed. One objection - I think I did note a bit of the lack of respect for gun rights supporters that is the source of a lot of the political problems with this issue.

I think your post is very reasonable, nuanced, and well-expressed. I agree with what you've written.

Although I disagree with some of your post, I thought much of it was reasonable and nuanced. I appreciate that.

I generally support the position that what are called "gun rights," as described in the Second Amendment applied to private individuals are in fact protected by the U.S. Constitution. I have three primary reasons for this.

First, in historical context, the goals of the Second Amendment can and will not be achieved unless reasonable access to firearms is provided to private individuals. Those goals are clearly expressed in the U.S. Declaration of Independence:

We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness—-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

"...it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it..." means very little without that protection.

Second, like it or not, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Second Amendment should be interpreted in the manner.

Third, as you note "Public opinions have are suffering from bipolar disorder, either demanding guns be banned entirely or that all gun-control laws are a violation of constitutional rights." The controversy about this issue is incredibly politically divisive in a way I think may be more damaging to the country than gun violence itself. I'm a liberal Democrat. I think my party's rigid position on this issue makes consensus on other important, traditionally Democratic, issues; i.e. climate change and other environment, voting rights, health care, support for the working class, etc.; much more difficult. Support for onerous restrictions on gun rights also make it less likely that more limited controls will find enough support to be politically feasible.

For the record, I am, as I wrote, a liberal Democrat. I don't own guns, but did when I was younger, including a rifle and a shotgun. I come from a hunting family and I hunted myself. I support reasonable restrictions on gun ownership and use, as do many Americans who identify themselves as conservatives and who strongly support gun rights.

Here are some specific comments on your post.

An Ethical view of 2nd amendment rights — ernest

I think this title is misleading. Your post isn't really about gun rights or the Second Amendment, it's about killing for self-defense. Conflating those two issues increases the controversy unnecessarily. The Constitution says nothing about policies that allow that. I was pleased you recognized that access to and ownership of guns will continue and that the court ruling allows reasonable restrictions.

The post is also not really about ethics. It seems to be more about support gun control as a public health issue.

it appears to me the only rational justification for killing in self defense should be that one is too physically or mentally handicapped to use non-lethal self defense. — ernest

I'm 70 years old and reasonably heathy, although I have some of the usual infirmities of my age group. What methods of self-defense which are not potentially lethal are available to me? Of course I'll lock my doors and call the police. In some areas that's a very weak defense.

a campaign to change the attitude to the right might be the best action. This is because I observe the highly deceptive marketing for John Lott's 'more guns less crime' has taken over. — ernest

It's an appalling state of affairs and Im not even sure even a few million dollars on promoting a more cogent view would really make much difference. — ernest

Campaigns to change attitudes have been used, with little in the way of political success. A lot of the reason for this is the contempt supporters of gun control show for gun rights supporters.

"A few million dollars" would be a completely inadequate amount.

I now have the trilogy on my kindle. — Amity

I loved "Titus Groan" but have been afraid to read "Gorhemgest." Yes, I know that's ridiculous. I started it once, but was daunted even though I knew what to expect. Maybe now I'll be inspired. You have me thinking about listening to it instead, although I usually would rather read.

Agree that the creative aspect of philosophy could be explored more. Encouraging to see an increase in interest. T — Amity

I'm surprised by how much I've enjoyed it. I haven't paid attention to aesthetics as a serious philosophical subject before, but, if, as I believe, philosophy is about increasing self-awareness, understanding why we think things are beautiful is central to what makes us human.

I'll be interested in hearing what you have to say.

Never sat through any of Tyson's shows, they weren't very popular here in Aus. — Wayfarer

For me, Tyson represents what I call "Gee whiz!" science, which I dislike. Was my impression that the Shannon film was like that correct?

Brilliant ! — Amity

Thank you.

I have never learned the art of review. My read-a-long feedback to the stories is nowhere near a proper review. I felt uncomfortable with that description by some.
For me, it was just like being in a discussion. Relating and trying to understand the text. Asking questions of the author and self. Interacting with other readers. Viewing other perspectives.
Mostly, this led to greater understanding and appreciation of the writers' own process. — Amity

I really like writing reviews if it's a book that really moved or influenced me. I almost always write positive reviews. I wrote the one for "Titus Groan" because it's a hard book to stick with and I wanted to give it people as a gift. I thought if I gave them that review it might inspire them to read it. I also write reviews to examine my own experience of reading. Why did I like this book so much? Just like the writing I do here on the forum, it is a way to become more intellectually self-aware.

@Bitter Crank says he started this thread as a joke. He, and I, are surprised how interesting and enlightening it has turned out to be. There are a few people here who seem really interested in the philosophy of art; including literature, poetry, music, architecture, visual arts, sculpture. There have been a couple of good threads recently. I'd like to see more.

Haven't watched it yet but thought it might be of interest to others. — Wayfarer

The link goes to a trailer for a full-length feature. I didn't see any way to watch it. Perhaps I missed it. From what little it showed, it seemed a bit Neil DeGrasse Tysony.

No, there is no comparing The Magic Flute and rap. There's no comparing a Bergman film and a porno, — Bitter Crank

Just showing your old white guy prejudice.

Psychopathology turned into an artform. This artform affectively speaking only to … psychopaths. — javra

Philosopaths perhaps? I think there might be quite a few here on the forum.

So all fine art as product is there because it was deemed useful in this sense: it, as form, is supposed to be a vehicle for conveying that which the artist intents to communicate. — javra

I think I understand what you're saying, but I also think are using the term "useful" in a different sense than I am. I'm getting a bit overloaded with aesthetics, so let's leave it at that for now.

So I figure that any artifact, by shear virtue of so being a form that is resultant of some function, or intended use, carries as part of it this very meaning to anyone who discerns it to be an artifact: an artifact, of itself, in part means "some thing that was intended to be for some usage, hence purpose, and thereby is". — javra

I don't think art is intended to be for some usage or purpose. Or at least that's the position I am investigating.

And so artifacts are always meaningful in so being artifacts in this sense which is intrinsic to our very notion of what an artifact is. — javra

If I understand what you're saying, and it is very possible I don't, I disagree.

Footnote: as to meanings' meaning, — javra

Not a chance am I going over this waterfall right now.

As I noted before, I'm reading Collingwood's "Principles of Art" and I'm really enjoying it. Some of what he writes makes me think I am on the right track. Other things make me think I don't have a clue. One thing it does show is that I've done enough talking about this for a while and I've gotten a bit lost. I'm going to leave the discussion for now, finish the book, and think about other things for a while.

Well, I've rambled, I see. — Ciceronianus

You rambled very nicely and provided an interesting, well-thought-out, and well-written post.

I was reading the philosopher of aesthetics, Theodore Gracyk, on the functionalist understanding of art - eg - art functions to elicit an aesthetic experience. Under this category, enjoying African or Pre-Columbian art (for instance) is incorrect or ill judged, as these objects were not intended to be appreciated aesthetically but played a vital role in a culture in connecting to ancestors and spirits. Approaching them aesthetically and divorced from function could be seen as a form of disrespectful cultural appropriation and trivialization. — Tom Storm

I think this is related to our craft discussion. I guess the Africans and Pre-Columbians who created the objects you are talking about were doing just what the Greek craftsmen Collingwood discussed were. They were making useful things and; because those things were a powerful, intimate part of their daily lives; they made them with care. Their beauty is a reflection of that care.

I would rather have African and Oceanic sculpture in my home than a Rodin.... — Tom Storm

I guess that explains why you dumped "The Thinker" at that construction site.

Here Yossarian is of course totally right and what he does is exposing a weakness in the Kantian argument, (or maybe the argument of Kantians). — Tobias

I'm not familiar enough with Kant's arguments to say that Yossarian's position contradicts them. As was discussed previously, it might depend on which of the three formulations of the categorical imperative you choose to look at.

I don't mean to pester — javra

This has been one of the most enjoyable discussions I've participated in in a long time. I came in with ideas that I know need to be tested about something I think is important. If I can't explain them to you and others, how can I say I understand them myself. All of which means your questioning my statements is not pestering. I'm trying to work this out for myself.

How do you discern artificial from non-artificial in definition (1) if not by that which is artificial occurring (necessarily but not sufficiently) on account of a persons' (or cohort's commonly shared) intent that it occurs? In other words, if you can't discern whether it was intended to be by one or more persons, how can you discern it to be an artifact? — javra

All I mean by "artificial" is that it was made by human beings. I think that's consistent with what you are saying.

I ask because if intent is inherent to what artifacts are, then all artifacts would yet have a meaning in so being: they all signify being the outcome of some intent. And this again gets to the issue of how an artifact can be devoid of all meaning outside of the viewer's experience - if meaning of "being a creation" is innate to being an artifact.

In which case, some might not help but wonder why the creator(s) of the artifact bothered to create it - for it then is factual that it was the result of intentions - which again speaks to the intentions of those who produced it. — javra

I don't understand how the fact that something was made intentionally gives it meaning. I think we may be about to fall into the "What does 'meaning' mean" abyss."

I'm probably missing something, but I'm not getting what that is. ... You're of an engineering background, so I'm thinking of buildings, which are functional artifacts. Can you find it possible that an engineer could design a building in manners perfectly devoid of aesthetic properties? I'm here thinking of the proverbial notion that form follows function: when this occurs, the end result would be aesthetic in the sense of elegant (or something to that effect). — javra

I addressed my uncertainty about this issue in a recent post addressed to @Tom Storm. I don't know if you saw it.

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/642426

I've been pushing the definition of art as something without meaning beyond the viewer's experience.
— T Clark

Think back to what we were all discussing in terms of differentiating art from non-art - this irrespective of its aesthetic standing. In order to be art some being must have intended it to be art and, in so intending, that being must have meant it to so be - thereby imparting it with this meaning. Hence, even in this basic facet of it, for X to be art it must have the minimal meaning of having been intended to so be by someone - and this fully independent of any viewer's experience of it. — javra

I've been endorsing two meanings of the word "art." 1) Something artificial without meaning beyond the viewers experience and 2) Something offered for aesthetic judgement or, as you expressed it, intended by some being to be art. I think they both work and I don't think they contradict each other.

Otherwise:

How do I turn that personal, idiosyncratic standard into something a community can share?
— T Clark

Though taken a bit out of context here: That's the rub of it all, I think. Even in assuming that the prototypical artist intends to convey some affective state to other(s) - something I myself champion - the same question holds. — javra

Yes, this was the main point I was trying to make with my response to this comment of yours:

Going back a bit to what I was saying about commonly shared tastes in relation to food and the exception of some humans somewhere finding human shit to be a delicacy: if what is shit (in terms of art out there) to the vast majority of us is deemed a sublime delicacy by some select few, this doesn’t change the fact that it doesn’t serve the vast majority’s affective appetites any. — javra

I was agreeing with you and saying that it was a problem for my definitions.

Going back a bit to what I was saying about commonly shared tastes in relation to food and the exception of some humans somewhere finding human shit to be a delicacy: if what is shit (in terms of art out there) to the vast majority of us is deemed a sublime delicacy by some select few, this doesn’t change the fact that it doesn’t serve the vast majority’s affective appetites any. (I know. I'll try to fully stop my chastising of much of modern art with this last comment on it. :smile: ) But could we in any way address this and like issues outside of our intersubjective bubbles? — javra

I've been pushing the definition of art as something without meaning beyond the viewer's experience. That leads to the same contradiction you're talking about above. How do I turn that personal, idiosyncratic standard into something a community can share? So far, the only answer I've come up with is unsatisfying - Quality of art is a measure of the extent to which a specific community consistently has positive experiences. Yeah... I don't like that much.

Which thread were you meaning? — Tom Storm

You mentioned it on this thread previously. I also thought I remembered you writing about it in the thread we participated in on interpretation last week, but I couldn't find it.

The idea that art is that which expresses the emotion of the artist is something I need to sit with again. — Tom Storm

Yes, I'm just getting into "The Principles of Art." Collingwood seems to be headed toward defining art as an expression of the artists emotion. I'm not sure if I like that. We'll see as I get further in.

I have generally drawn a distinction between craft and art. Craft being useful items of daily living that often have a working class or tribal origin. And art as being non-useful objects, generally created for an aesthetic experience not use. — Tom Storm

One of the reasons Collingwood's explanation struck me is that I remember you making that distinction in previous posts.

I think this is one line of thought that I can support if i understand it properly. — Tom Storm

It is not clear that I understand it properly. That's what I'm working on here.

Why shouldn't I present them as dogmatic truth. I don't force anyone to follow my dogma. If people lay value in other dogmas it's up to them. You present your dogma as personal experience. — Raymond

It's not clear to me you understand what the word "dogma" means. The prevalence of inflexible, dogmatic assertions about disputed ideas is one of the reasons people find philosophy hard to take seriously.

In my immediately previous post, I identify the idea of useful arts as a challenge to the ways of defining art I have been endorsing. That set me thinking about another challenge to those ideas I keep coming back to. I've always been attracted to what is often called "outsider art." In particular I remember a TV report on the work of a man that wasn't discovered until after his death. He had taken his back yard and built I guess what you would call sculptures from castoff items, tin foil, and whatever else he could find. Not one, two, or ten sculptures, but dozens, hundreds. They filled up all the space in the yard.

Those sculptures were clearly meant to represent the man's understanding and experience of his relationship to the Christian God. The pieces by themselves were interesting and moving, but when considered together they were much more. They presented a coherent vision, created over years and decades, of this man's inner religious life. The work was rough and unsophisticated, but I found it beautiful and inspiring.

Clearly, the man created this work only for himself as an expression of his feelings for his God. I don't think he ever intended for it to be seen by others and I doubt he had any thoughts of aesthetics.

I've just started reading "The Principles of Art" by R.G. Collingwood. I came across some historical information that I found interesting and thought others would be interested too. I think it gives perspective on some of the issues we've discussed in this thread. — T Clark

@Tom Storm

I don't know if you looked at the post I put in on Collingwood's discussion of art vs. craft. If you did, I'd be interested in hearing your response. It opened my eyes a bit and forced me to back up and put our discussion in perspective, which I think was Collingwood's intent. I've often regurgitated my thoughts on the definitions of art I find useful. Maybe I need to add a new one - "Art," in the sense of fine art, is not a useful concept. I'll call this my "We don't need no stinking art" definition.

That way of seeing things actually helps deal with some issues that have bothered me. When I go to the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, they have a section called "Decorative Arts," which Collinwood calls the "useful arts." That section generally includes useful items like furniture, china and porcelain, silverware, glassware, etc. I guess you could add architecture to that list. These are items that challenge my characterization of art as something that doesn't mean anything. It also makes me ask if usefulness is a kind of meaning. On first look, I think it may be.

What I would be interested in knowing is what is the aim of the book - in a couple of sentences? And have you written a chapter breakdown and mapped the content in dot points so you know where it is going? — Tom Storm

I agree.

Nice work TC. These are the kinds of reviews I appreciate because there is something in it for me as a potential consumer, namely a clear line for assessment. And you have a light, humorous touch. As someone who has written for newspapers and magazines (a second job) for years, it still often surprises me how hard it can be to say something useful and say it clearly. — Tom Storm

Thank you.

Do the reviews provide any support for my position that the standard by which the quality of art should be judged is based on the experience of the audience members?

I don't want to take this thread off-topic, but I just want to say that this is a beautiful review of one of my favourite books, though I totally disagree with the oft-heard view that the plot doesn't matter. — jamalrob

Thank you.

My review of "Titus Groan" by Melvin Peake.

Wonderful, bleak, lovely, tedious, beautiful, unrelenting

Six stars. Eleven stars. 432 stars. Tedious and bleak and beautiful. Funny and moving. Wonderfully written and very, very, very slow. Then suddenly, disorientingly sensual. Gormenghast the castle – miles long; dank, moldy, full of hundreds or thousands of unused rooms packed with useless and peculiar things. A tower where the death owls live. A giant dead tree with painted roots growing out the side of the castle. Lives ruled by inflexible, all-encompassing, oppressive, and unrelenting tradition. Gormenghast the land – always raining, too hot or too cold. Gormenghast the mountain – the peak always hidden by clouds.

The people - Lord Sepulchrave, 76th Earl of Groan, Countess Gertrude, the wonderful, pitiful twins Ladies Cora and Clarice Groan, Mr. Flay, Dr. and Irma Prunesquallor, Swelter, Nannie Slagg, Sourdust, Barquentine, Keda, Rottcodd, Pentecost, The Poet. The Grey Scrubbers. The Mud Dwellers who live outside the castle and spend all their time making beautiful carvings, most of which will be burned. The best of which will be placed in a museum that no one visits. And stuborn, 15-year-old, clumsy, and maybe doomed Lady Fuchia, whom I love with all my heart. And nasty, scheming, capable, admirable, and maybe evil Steerpike. And 1 1/2 year old Titus – 77th Earl of Groan. Everyone; almost everyone; odd, eccentric, and unhappy.

The plot doesn’t matter – for what it's worth, there is Titus' birth, scheming, betrayal, murder, suicide, a deadly knife fight, bodies eaten by owls, endless ceremonies, drunken revelry, and a toddler standing alone on a raft in the middle of a lake in the rain. The writing, the place, and the people do matter. The words grabbed me by the neck and forced me through the slowest, hardest sections. It felt like the hood of my jacket had gotten caught in a subway door and I was being dragged down the platform. I love this book.

There is something more than personal opinion and public acclaim that makes good art. There's artistic vision, truth, technical mastery, surprise, emotional insight, playfulness, complexity, narrative, simplicity, clarity, idiosyncrasy, depth, history, humor, community.... and on and on. I don't know how to put all that together. — T Clark

I've set myself a task. I'm going to spend some time looking back over things I thought were good recently - a couple of books, something I ate, maybe "Casablanca", my favorite Christmas tree ornament, some silver plate forks and spoons I love. — T Clark

I'd really like to hear a few choice navigation points from a phenomenological approach to artistic value. — Tom Storm

I'd like to take a swing at this in a way I think may be a bit self-indulgent. In a thread still active here on the forum - "A different style of interpretation: Conceptual Reconstructionism" - we discussed the difference between interpreting and reviewing of a work of art. I sometimes write reviews in Amazon for books that I think are especially good. I try to focus on the types of issues I discussed above, although in an informal way. I'm going to post a couple of those reviews to see what people think of the approach. First, my review of "One Day All This Will Be Yours" by Adrian Tchaikovsky.

Clever, clever, clever, clever

This book is so good, I almost gave it five stars. Well, actually, I did give it five stars, but that's because people give five stars for crap and I didn't want to bring the average down. Five stars is for great, wonderful books. This is just a really good book. Well written. Funny. Did I mention clever? In a fair world I'd give it four stars.

I always said that David Gerrold's "The Man Who Folded Himself" was my favorite time travel book, but now this is a contender. I always wondered - if there really could be time travel, how would you keep timelines from getting all tangled up to the point that you couldn't keep them straight anymore. How could you keep time from becoming complete chaos? Answer - You wouldn't. You couldn't.

Tchaikovsky describes how everything falls apart when nations develop time machines and play the game of mutually assured destruction, not of the world, but of all time. Everyone agrees that no one will ever use time weapons, but then no one could resist taking a chance to win all wars at once for now and forever. Events, if they can even be called events anymore, proceed in a way that is plausible, if anything can even be called plausible anymore. I said to myself - Yeah, that's how it would happen.

And the protagonist, not hero, sits at the end of time trying to hold the last strands together by murdering anyone who tries to get past him into the future. Clever, clever, clever. Good book. Clever title too.

What I didn't make explicit in this review are the factors I considered in evaluating this as "a really good book." Rereading the review now, I think those factors included technical mastery; narrative; humor; surprise; and especially intellectual stimulation. The last was not on my original list, so I'll add it now. Actually, saying these are the factors I considered is misleading. I didn't self-consciously and explicitly identify the factors in the review or in my mind while writing.

I've just started reading "The Principles of Art" by R.G. Collingwood. I came across some historical information that I found interesting and thought others would be interested too. I think it gives perspective on some of the issues we've discussed in this thread.

History of the word ‘art’

In order to clear up the ambiguities attaching to the word ‘art’, we must look to its history. The aesthetic sense of the word, the sense which here concerns us, is very recent in origin. Ars in ancient Latin, like τέχνη [technē] in Greek, means something quite different. It means a craft or specialized form of skill, like carpentry carpentry or smithying or surgery. The Greeks and Romans had no conception of what we call art as something different from craft; what we call art they regarded merely as a group of crafts, such as the craft of poetry (ποιητικη τέχνη, ars poetica), which they conceived, sometimes no doubt with misgivings, as in principle just like carpentry and the rest, and differing from any one of these only in the sort of way in which any one of them differs from any other.

It is difficult for us to realize this fact, and still more so to realize its implications. If people have no word for a certain kind of thing, it is because they are not aware of it as a distinct kind. Admiring as we do the art of the ancient Greeks, we naturally suppose that they admired it in the same kind of spirit as ourselves. But we admire it as a kind of art, where the word ‘art’ carries with it all the subtle and elaborate implications of the modern European aesthetic consciousness. We can be perfectly certain that the Greeks did not admire it in any such way. They approached it from a different point of view. What this was, we can perhaps discover by reading what people like Plato wrote about it; but not without great pains, because the first thing every modern reader does, when he reads what Plato has to say about poetry, is to assume that Plato is describing an aesthetic experience similar to our own. The second thing he does is to lose his temper because Plato describes it so badly. With most readers there is no third stage.

Ars in medieval Latin, like ‘art’ in the early modern English which borrowed both word and sense, meant any special form of book-learning, such as grammar or logic, magic or astrology. That is still its meaning in the time of Shakespeare: ‘lie there, my art’, says Prospero, putting off his magic gown. But the Renaissance, first in Italy and then elsewhere, re-established the old meaning; and the Renaissance artists, like those of the ancient world, did actually think of themselves as craftsmen. It was not until the seventeenth century that the problems and conceptions conceptions of aesthetic began to be disentangled from those of technic or the philosophy of craft. In the late eighteenth century the disentanglement had gone so far as to establish a distinction between the fine arts and the useful arts; where ‘fine’ arts meant, not delicate or highly skilled arts, but ‘beautiful’ arts (les beaux arts, le belle arti, die schöne Kunst). In the nineteenth century this phrase, abbreviated by leaving out the epithet and generalized by substituting the singular for the distributive plural, became ‘art’.

What I'm trying to do is show the process that leads up to my final argument, because I'm going to claim to know the conclusion follows; and that others can know too. This starts with understanding some of Wittgenstein's thinking about the meaning of our concepts, and some of the misunderstandings involved in our thinking about how we acquire knowledge. However, I need to be able to explain Wittgenstein so that people can understand it (this is the challenge). Maybe I'm biting off more than I can chew, but I think it can be done. It will just take a lot of work.

My intention is to start with the argument, which is what people are interested in, then if they want more they can go deeper into the book. Next would be epistemology, and finally, linguistic analysis, which is the most difficult part. So, the book will be in reverse order, because if I start with linguistic analysis, they may read a page or two, then give up. I have the outline in my head, i.e., I know how I want to proceed. I should write it down though. — Sam26

If I'd had the information you've provided here while I was editing your text, I think there would have been fewer comments.

First paragraph

Before we get to the subject of epistemology, we will need some background on how meaning has been traditionally thought of in philosophy. Traditionally, the meaning of a word was thought to be connected with the object it refers to, that is, its referent, or the object it denotes (the object the word points to). The idea that meaning is directly connected to things or objects in reality can be traced back to Augustine (354 A.D. – 430 A.D.). Thinking of meaning in this context culminates in the twentieth century with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus-Logico Philosophicus (originally published in German, in 1921, then translated and published into English, in 1922). — Sam26

No comments.

Second paragraph

Again, just as our treatment of epistemology is just meant to be an overview, so is our look at Wittgenstein’s ideas only meant to be a glimpse at some of his ideas. This glimpse is mainly focused on his ideas about meaning; and to briefly contrast his ideas of meaning in terms of his early and later philosophy. — Sam26

This paragraph seems unnecessary and distracting to me. Not distracting, equivocating. It undercuts the authority of the first paragraph.

Third, forth, and fifth paragraphs

Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was born in Vienna, Austria, and he was the youngest of eight children. He came from a very cultured and very rich industrialist family, where the arts, especially music, played a central role. In fact, Johannes Brahms, who was considered a close friend, would come to the Wittgenstein home and play his music; and Brahms was also known to have given some family members piano lessons.

Ludwig was educated at home until the age of 14, when his parents decided to send the young Wittgenstein to Linz to prepare him in mathematics and the physical sciences. It seems that the young Wittgenstein wanted to study with the physicist Boltzmann, however Boltzmann died in 1906. After being educated in Linz for three years, he then went to Berlin to study mechanical engineering at the Technische Hochscule at Charlottenburg. After two years in Berlin, he went to England where he became a research student of engineering at the University of Manchester. During this time, he engaged in aeronautical research, and went from experimenting with kites, to the construction of a jet reaction propeller for aircraft. The design of the propeller was a mathematical endeavor, which eventually led the young Wittgenstein into pure mathematics, and then, to the foundation of mathematics.

Apparently, his interest in the foundation of mathematics led him to Russell and Whitehead's work, called, The Principles of Mathematics. The Principles of Mathematics greatly affected the young Wittgenstein, and this interest led him to the works of Frege, who was the founder of modern mathematical logic. So, it was through Russell, Whitehead, and Frege's works that Wittgenstein entered into the study of philosophy. — Sam26

I would pare these way down, only leaving in the bare bones of his path to linguistic analysis. This part is about mostly mathematics, so it seems important to know how the switch was made. Or maybe what's the connection.

Sixth and seventh paragraphs

Wittgenstein’s early work, the Tractatus, is a more traditional philosophical work. It is traditional in the sense of the kind of analysis he is doing. He digs into a proposition as if to find some essence that will logically connect it to the world. It is an a priori analysis of the proposition that shows how propositions picture (or mirror) the world of facts through a one-to-one correspondence between the proposition, and the fact it pictures (it is a picture theory of language). It is through this investigation that Wittgenstein hopes to find an exactness of meaning, or an exactness of expression. He accomplishes this by breaking down the proposition into what he believes are its essential parts, namely, elementary propositions, and even smaller parts, called names. So, according to Wittgenstein, “…propositions must bring us to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (T. 4.221).” Names, again, being the smallest constituent part of the proposition. And, since Wittgenstein held to the traditional view of language, namely, that the meaning of a word is the object it refers to, or the object it denotes (T. 3.203). He then links the proposition, via a name, with an object, the smallest constituent part of a fact. Facts being broken down into atomic facts, then into objects. There is a direct connection from the name (the smallest component of the proposition) to the object it represents (the smallest component of the fact). In this way we have a direct link between the proposition and the world of facts. This brings us back to the traditional view of meaning, that the meaning of a word is its referent.

Wittgenstein’s analysis is much more complicated than what is presented here. My only point is to show how meaning was thought of in the traditional sense, and how Wittgenstein’s Tractatus continued this historical line of thinking in a much more exacting way. This is probably why Russell mistakenly thought Wittgenstein was trying to construct an ideal language. Because if Wittgenstein was correct in the way he thought of propositions, then you would have more precision based on the nature of the proposition, and how it pictured the world of facts. — Sam26

You've gone from Wittgenstein's life history directly into the middle of his philosophy without showing how he got there. A big jump that breaks up the continuity. Where are you headed? Is it linguistic analysis you want to talk about? Is the stuff in these two paragraphs importantly connected to linguistic analysis? Do I need to understand these details to follow your story? If not, it really clutters things up. I think you're telling the story of how Wittgenstein got interested and involved with linguistic analysis. How much of this do you need in order to do that? Or if that's not what you're trying to do, what is?

The seventh paragraph seems really equivocal again. Sort of apologizing for the story you're telling. I don't think it's necessary.

Eighth paragraph

Wittgenstein’s later work, in some ways, is continuous, namely, he continues to think of many of the problems of philosophy as misunderstandings of the logic of our language. It would be a mistake to think that his later philosophy completely repudiates his early philosophy. He mainly repudiates his method of analysis. This contrast of methods into the nature of the proposition, is what separates his early philosophy from his later philosophy. If there is a gap between the two periods of his thinking, it is a gap of method. One could say that the difference between these two investigations, is like comparing the a priori (independent of experience) with the a posteriori (dependent on experience). — Sam26

I get no feel for how the work described here fits in with what was described in paragraphs six and seven, with Wittgenstein's philosophy generally, or with linguistic analysis.

Ninth paragraph

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy starts when he meets both Bertrand Russell (1911), and Gottlob Frege (1912); and his later philosophy starts roughly around 1929. His later philosophy is most famously expounded in the Philosophical Investigations; and culminates in his final notes on the subject of what it means to know, called On Certainty. His final entry occurs two days before his death in April 1951. — Sam26

Does this belong here? What does it have to do with linguistic analysis?

Tenth paragraph

It is important to understand the background of Wittgenstein's works in order to better understand his thinking. I am not going to be able to give those of you who are interested a complete background of what was going on in philosophy at the time, vis-a-vis Bertrand Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and Gottlob Frege. I will only give you bits and pieces in order to show the connection with Wittgenstein’s analysis of what it means to know, and the view of epistemology as presented in these musings. — Sam26

Again, I think this paragraph is apologetic and unnecessary.

General comment - It seems like this section ought to be a concise summary of Wittgenstein's philosophy and how it evolved towards linguistic analysis or a more detailed summary focusing specifically on linguistic analysis and leaving out other parts of his philosophy that aren't specifically relevant. As it is, it's neither and it seems a bit random. What is this section supposed to accomplish?

I think a lot of the problems I've discussed could be simplified with a good annotated outline laying out where you want your book to go and how you want to get there. Knowing where the text I've reviewed so far fits in to such an outline would help us figure out whether my comment are really relevant.

I've enjoyed this, but I've spent quite a bit of time on it. I'm not sure that what I've written will be useful for you.

So, basically, what you're saying is that the writing is mediocre — Sam26

I made a bunch of specific comments and recommendations. It's your job to decide which are useful and should be addressed and which don't need to be. I care about good writing and I take editing seriously. I've done it a lot and I think I'm good at it. I hope it's clear I'm trying to be helpful.

That's exactly what I'm looking for. — Sam26

Ok, then I'll continue. Editing is something I enjoy.

Second Paragraph

In the twentieth century there are two philosophers who stand out in terms of their work in linguistic analysis, namely, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who taught at Cambridge, and J. L. Austin, who taught at Oxford. Wittgenstein’s seminal work, called, The Philosophical Investigations, contain his notes, which were published posthumously in 1953; and secondly, J. L. Austin’s lecture notes, which were also published posthumously, specifically in Sense and Sensibilia in 1962. In these pages we will be concentrating mostly on Wittgenstein’s ideas as a guide. — Sam26

Why are you mentioning Austin when you're not going to use him? Why are you using Wittgenstein rather than Austin? Is there anything else interesting to write about linguistic analysis to provide context? Was it just these two guys or was there a larger group? Alternatively, get rid of the reference to Austin and just jump into Wittgenstein [hypothetical] Although there were a small group of philosophers interested in linguistic analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein was the most prominent and influential. For that reason, this evaluation will focus on Wittgenstein's work.[/hypothetical]

I think something is missing here:

Wittgenstein’s seminal work, called, The Philosophical Investigations, contain his notes, which were published posthumously in 1953; and secondly, J. L. Austin’s lecture notes, which were also published posthumously, specifically in Sense and Sensibilia in 1962.

Third paragraph:

In order not to cause confusion, an important difference between linguistic analysis and the philosophy of language must be distinguished. Linguistic analysis refers to a method or technique used for philosophical inquiry, and is used for solving or clarifying philosophical problems. However, the philosophy of language refers to a specific branch of philosophy. So, linguistic analysis would fall under the heading of, the philosophy of language; and much of what we will be doing as we investigate what it means to know, is a linguistic analysis of the concept. — Sam26

This paragraph seems unnecessary, especially since you haven't told us what linguistic analysis is.

Fourth paragraph:

Understanding the history of meaning, and some of the mistakes made about what meaning amounts to, is very important to having a correct understanding of how the meaning of a word is acquired. This is not an easy topic. One reason it is not easy has to do with the nature of the grammar involved, that is, statements that look similarly structured, seem to be doing the same work in our language. — Sam26

It seems like jumping the gun to talk about the history of meaning when you haven't even told us what meaning is in the context of your analysis. It also seems like jumping the gun to talk about mistakes made about "what meaning amounts to." What does meaning amount to? This seems like a follow-on from the first paragraph, but I'm lost. I don't see how they fit together or where this is headed.

Fifth and sixth paragraphs

For example, “I believe in consciousness,” which has the same structural grammar as “I hammered the nail,” that is, we think that the relationship between “belief and consciousness” is similar to the relationship between the “hammer and nail.” It is this this kind of analogy that misleads us, namely, we think, consciously or not, that because “hammer and nail” has an instance in reality, that “believe and consciousness” has a similar instance, or a similar existence or ontology. This misleads us into a false picture of how the word believe is used in relation to the thing believed. As if what is believed points to a psychical thing, or mental object, in this case, consciousness. We confuse the ontology of these two statements, when the ontology is of a different kind. Hopefully, some of this will be clear as we progress through this subject, but it is not easy to follow.

So, there is a conceptual confusion about how mental phenomena should be talked about. And, as has already been pointed out, this has to do with the different realities between the physical and the mental, their existence (their ontology) are worlds apart. This goes to the heart of consciousness, and the nature of the self. The conceptual confusions about how we talk about mental things can be seen in much of the talk about the nature of consciousness. This is especially seen in our talk of our subjective awareness. — Sam26

I don't see what you're trying to achieve or how these paragraphs relate to the forth paragraph. What is "structural grammar?" What is "consciousness?" The two examples you give don't seem similar. The relationship between believe and consciousness does not seem to me to be the same as that between hammer and nail. What is an "instance in reality?" I got confused when you talked first about "consciousness" as a certain type of word, then consciousness as a mental phenomenon. I'm lost.

Seventh paragraph

Another reason it is difficult to understand the nature of meaning, is that language, by its very nature, is not given to the kind of exactness some of us might be looking for, especially in philosophy and science. However, this does not mean that we cannot come to an understanding of what it means to have knowledge. It just means that it takes a lot of work. Our attempt, in these pages, at understanding knowledge, is just an overview, and it not meant to be an in-depth analysis of the subject of epistemology, which would take us far beyond the scope of these writings. — Sam26

My first inclination is to suggest getting rid of this paragraph. I'm not sure what it adds. You talk about the meaning of "meaning" and the meaning of "knowledge." Again, you're talking about "meaning" the word and meaning the property. Knowledge and meaning are connected in some unspecified way, but then you talk about what it means to have knowledge. I'm confused again.

Eighth paragraph:

As part of the goal of these writings, we will attempt to answer some of these questions based on our understanding of Wittgenstein. It would be the height of arrogance though, to think our interpretation is something Wittgenstein would approve of, or even agree with. However, it would also be an error to neglect Wittgenstein’s writings in our attempt to understand the concepts we are using; especially since Wittgenstein’s work sheds so much light on language use. — Sam26

Again, this paragraph doesn't really add anything. I recommend removing. Alternative - use it as a place to summarize what you've said in previous paragraphs.

After contemplating Aristotle's assertion that objects are divisible only "potentially", I now think I know how I would describe matter. — Gregory

Seems like you are taking a subject that is clearly about physics and trying to make it somehow about metaphysics, i.e. ontology. I think that's a futile undertaking.