I’m a bit confused about what exactly you’re pursuing in this thread. The original post was a link to a physics professor’s thoughts about the relationship of physics and maths, which is what I tried to address in my comment about the quantification of phenomena. Philosophy of mathematics is an interesting albeit difficult subject that is often discussed here.

But then you linked to a completely different essay which mentions mathematics but in a very different context. That second essay is much wider-ranging, starting with reflections on the nature of knowledge, and saying:

When we recognize that mathematics is just one form of the many semiotic cognitive expression and reception tools that humans can use to navigate our terrain, this one by means of measurement, it is very important that we keep reminding ourselves that our perception of the terrain is only the human perspective.

Which I take to be a rather deflationary account, in that it deflates the notion that mathematics enables us to know any kind of universal truth, and basically ‘relativises’ the whole field (i.e. declares it is of human origin, presumably as a consequence of evolutionary necessity). This then segues into a wide-ranging survey into the shortcomings of human symbolic languages, including maths, and an excursion into ‘history of ideas’ and nominalism as the root of all modern evils. But there’s a wide range of ideas in that essay across a very broad sweep of history. It is impossible to tell which tack to take, so to speak ;-)

I too recognise the ‘evils of nominalism’ although I’m inclined to narrow the scope of the problem considerably, to the decline of scholastic realism and the influence of Ockham (which you acknowledge). In some ways, my own approach (and speaking very much as self-taught and without formal training in classical texts) is more traditionalist. I admire the Platonist attitude, that the ability to grasp numbers, and other exercises of reason, enables us to know something beyond the ‘treachery of sense’. It is that capacity which has enabled h.sapiens to reach into the domain of possibility and extract such astonishing inventions. As I said, I see mathematical knowledge as a power.

But I also agree on the shortcomings of ‘scientism’ and the evils of what has been described as the ‘reign of quantity’. (I sometimes wonder if from the Renaissance forwards, the West has taken all those elements of Platonic and Aristotelian thought useful for engineering and science, while abandoning the ethical dimension which went along with it, in their eyes.) I am a long-time and persistent critic of scientific materialism and many aspects of what is taught as philosophy in the modern academy. So I’m very much in your overall corner, at least as far as I can understand it, but that may not be very far!

I just think talk "beyond the conceptual" says too much. — Astrophel

And saying that the Buddha’s enlightenment is a ‘language phenomenon’ doesn’t?

if Kant thought the I think accompanied all thoughts (or even representations), he would have said so! — Leontiskos

I’m saying it’s an arguable implication of Kant’s intent, and that you’re making a polemical mountain out of an interpretive molehill.

They say in Tibet there is a dialog among masters of concepts those on the outside cannot even imagine — Astrophel

There is also an understanding of non-conceptual wisdom. In yogic terminology concepts are ‘vikalpa’, mental constructions. They are not necessarily erroneous, but there are domains of understanding, or so it is said, beyond the conceptual. In the same way that other skilled pursuits like acrobats or skiing might be, neither of which rely on or can be conveyed by concept.

I dare say within the Tibetan context, these types of non-discursive understandings can be shared amongst those who are similarly skilled in that sense.

In your case, would it not be fair to say that a skepticism about the mainstream and its platitudes drew you towards a countercultural orientation and by extension into traditions of higher consciousness? — Tom Storm

I guess you could say that. As I’ve often related, I’m pretty typical of the boomer generation, in whom some such convictions were planted by the popular culture of the day. When I went to University in pursuit of understanding, I had (and still have) the distinct impression that a great deal of what is taught in philosophy is conditioned by what ought not to be said, what ought not to be believed. There are these culturally-reinforced guidelines, or barriers, which grew out of a reaction against previous history. What is acceptable and or ‘politically correct’ to say, in various domains of discourse. That is where most of what is being discussed in the OP originates.

When Kant writes, "The I think must be able to accompany all my representations," he underscores that this "I think" is the unifying activity of consciousness, presupposed in every act of thought. Rödl is arguably drawing out this implication rather than making an unsupported claim. Kant’s texts are notoriously dense and subject to varying interpretations. Rödl is working within the tradition of Kantian scholarship that sees self-consciousness as central to Kant’s project. Like others, he will build on or extrapolate from the texts to make broader arguments, but that does not amount to lying.

Rödl’s interpretation may emphasize aspects of Kant that others downplay or read differently, but this is part of philosophical engagement, not dishonesty. I see it as a plausible and defensible reading of Kant’s argument.

To claim that Rödl is "lying" presupposes not just a disagreement but an intentional misrepresentation, which is a serious charge requiring compelling evidence. I don't think it's justified on the basis of the discussion.

our resident Kantian, Mww — Leontiskos

also said

Anyway….not that big a deal. — Mww

I think, possibly, what this thread about, is not skepticism so much as unbelief. The intention to blow away the cobwebs of inherited beliefs and start afresh with what is really there.

Anyway, it's provided the impetus for me to acquire a book I've often read about but never read in full, Pyrrhonism: How the Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, by Adrian Kuzminski. It is a study of Pyrrhonism - usually regarded as an original form of skeptical philosophy - and its relation with Madhyamaka, a philosophical sect of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which Pyrrho encountered in journeys east under the auspices of Alexander the Great's armies. (At the time, Greco-Bactrian culture was in full swing, with many exchanges of goods and ideas between the then-cultural centre of Gandhara and the Greek-speaking world. It is from this epoch that the well-known Greco-Buddhist statuary hails.)

Kuzminski disputes that Pyrrhonism *is* skepticism, per se, pointing out that the latter is a form of dogmatic belief (or dogmatic unbelief, more to the point.) Kuzminksi points out the the Greek 'skeptikos' meant originally an 'enquirer' or 'seeker', which is very different from what negative or dogmatic skepticism developed into. Pyrrho advanced no skeptic doctrine in that sense, but was aiming at reaching a state of ataraxia, or tranquility, in part by abstaining from judgements about what is not evident. Ataraxia is compared to the Buddhist 'nirodha' or cessation of attachment.

Non-Pyrrhonian sceptics, Pyrrhonists maintain, go too far in making doubt absolute and indiscriminate, in making the denial of everything inevitable. Confident of not allowing any positive assertions to be made, they draw the negative conclusion that no positive assertions can ever be made, and that even what is apparent must somehow be an illusion rather than something anomalous, something unusual and challenging. This kind of scepticism is a nihilistic negative dogmatism that claims we can know nothing at all. The point of positive dogmatic belief is to transcend the uncertainties and vicissitudes of life, of the space-time, flesh-and-blood world of appearances of which we are conscious, by appeal to something nonevident. The point of negative dogmatic belief, what is now called “scepticism,” is that there is no way to transcend life in this way. The point of Pyrrhonism, by contrast to both these, is to leave the question open..

For Pyrrhonists, like Buddhists and other nondogmatic soteriological schools, attachment is a symptom of a problem, not a solution. But ataraxia, free of any link to a view or attachment, escapes this burden; it is quite a different response to the claims of beliefs, and...it is for this reason that ataraxia was introduced by the Pyrrhonists in place of euthymia and other similar terms, such as eudaimonia. Ataraxia is not the elation of finding the hidden “truth” underlying experience, nor the security offered by a belief in such a truth, but is instead a liberation from the urge to seek such “truths” or beliefs at all. Insofar as ataraxia follows only upon such a suspension of belief, and not upon the adoption of any belief, it could not have been experienced by dogmatists like Epicureans, Stoics, Aristotelians, Platonists, Academic Sceptics, etc. — Greek Buddhism

I too like magpies, as I live here, and there's a large clan in my neighbourhood, but am puzzled by the bearing it has on the question at hand. If the point is that crows and other birds can demonstrate rudimentary reasoning skills, I'm tempted to ask, 'so what?'

I am saying that Rodl lies about what Kant says — Leontiskos

And I for one am not persuaded by your claim. I spelled out the exact passage in which you said he does this, and compared it to the passage in Kant, and could discern no difference between them, nor have you explained how they differ.

I'd also question the depiction of mathematics as a tool. It's more than a tool: it's a power. It is not coincidental that arithmetic and geometry came into existence with the advent of agriculture, the generation of surplus wealth, and the beginnings of architecture. All of these activities require calculation, measurement and accounting. Some of the oldest written records, cuniform scripts on Mesopotanian pottery shards, often recorded transactions of wheat and cattle. 'Other living forms' have no need of such powers, as they don't engage in the same kinds of activities. True, ants cultivate aphids so as to harvest their excretions for sugar, but they have no need of calculation in such activities (which is also true of many other symbiotic relations in the natural world.) Mathematical prediction enables degrees of control and invention which couldn't be found by any other means, so far as we know.

This is one of the reasons I began the article 'There is no I without the Not I' — Mapping the Medium

Something Fichte was very fond of saying, I believe. I've also been exploring similar themes through the perspective of phenomenology of biology, Evan Thompson and Hans Jonas. Quite a different topic to the essay in the OP however.

I see mathematics as a tool of logic that assists humanity in understanding its domain of existential experience, but other living forms have other means and tools to benefit their survival, and if faced with a dilemma that might fall outside of our domain of existence, mathematics might not be the best way to approach it. — Mapping the Medium

No contest there, but it's rather tangential to the article in the OP, isn't it? The article linked in the OP is about why mathematics is so powerful in the sciences, and the relationship of physics and mathematics. I think they're very interesting questions, irrespective of whether one should then elevate mathematical and physical knowledge to the exclusion of other 'domains of existence'. That is the specific point I was seeking to address in bringing up the quantifiable attributes of phenomena.

It is a language phenomenon, but this does not at all diminish the nature of the discovery. It does elevate the nature of language. — Astrophel

I don't see that. I think Gautama's discovery overflowed the bounds of what can be spoken. Hence the famous 'Flower Sermon' which is the apocryphal origin of Ch'an and Zen Buddhism. In the story, the Buddha gives a wordless sermon to the sangha by silently holding up a white flower. No one in the audience responds bar Mahākāśyapa, who's smile indicates his comprehension. It is said to embody the ineffable nature of tathātā, the direct transmission of wisdom without words. The Buddha affirms this by uttering:

I possess the true Dharma eye, the marvelous mind of Nirvāṇa, the true form of the formless, the subtle dharma gate that does not rest on words or letters but is a special transmission outside of the scriptures. This I entrust to Mahākāśyapa.

(Although it has to be acknowledged that Ch'an/Zen Buddhism, regardless, has an enormous compendium of 'words and letters' housed in extensive monastic libraries a part of its teaching repertoire, and indeed the various Buddhist canons exceed in volume by orders of magnitude the collected Biblical writings. But there is always a kind of awareness in Buddhism that the finger that points to the moon ought not to be mistaken for the moon.)

The matter of duality is not dissolved but framed in way outside of contending dependencies — Paine

Could you explain that a little further? A passage that I highlighted, adjacent to the one you quoted, is:

The aim of this essay, as an introduction to absolute idealism, is to make plain that it is impossible to think judgment through this opposition: mind here, world there, two things in relation or not. To dismantle this opposition is not to propose that the world is mind dependent. Nor is it to propose that the mind is world-dependent. These ways of speaking solidify the opposition; they are an impediment to comprehension. — p16

That seems to at least suggest the non-duality of mind and world, saying that construal of 'two things' is an 'impediment to comprehension'.

Note on sources:


Notes on Self Consciousness in Rödl.

Rödl's uses 'self-consciousness' in a way completely different to normal usage ('I felt very self-conscious entering the room with all of those famous people.')

For Rödl, self-consciousness is the implicit awareness that accompanies any act of thought or judgment. When you think <p>, you are not just aware of <p> as an object but also of yourself as the thinker of <p>. Thought is self-conscious because it contains within it a reflexive awareness of its own activity (which is what Rödl means by it being 'internal to thought'.) This inseparability of thought and self-awareness is what Rödl highlights as essential to understanding judgment.

Self-consciousness involves the first-person perspective, which is irreducible to a third-person description. This perspective is not simply a way of referring to oneself (e.g., with the pronoun "I") bu foundational to thinking —it is the form in which all thought occurs. This is where he criticizes Frege, as summarised in an earlier post:

Frege’s contention is that the content of thought (<p>) can be entirely objective and independent of any subject. Frege’s emphasis is on the idea that thoughts exist as abstract, objective entities in a “third realm,” independent of whether anyone thinks them. According to Frege, thoughts are, in principle, accessible to any rational being, and their validity does not depend on any individual subject’s act of thinking. Frege lays this out in a famous essay called ‘The Thought: A Logical Investigation’.

Summary of main points of Frege "The Thought":



Rödl’s self-consciousness aligns with Kant’s transcendental apperception: the 'I think' that must be able to accompany all representations. It is not a contingent property of individuals but a universal structure that makes thought and knowledge possible.

Comparison from CPR:

To say that Kant says something that one knows he does not say is lying, and this is what Rodl does. He demonstrates that in the endnote. — Leontiskos

But I can't see how he does that. Rödl says:

More precisely, he (Kant) says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. — Rödl, Endnote

Which I checked against the Norman Kemp Smith translation of the Critique:

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.

So, again, how is it a lie? I just can't see it.

Still reckon The Tao of Physics is alright. Capra interviewed Heisenberg extensively while preparing the draft. @Arcane Sandwich - you know that book?

I'm still at a loss as to why RFK Jr was picked as head of Health. — jorndoe

Trump doesn’t want to govern, but rule. He basically hates the government, unless and until he can make it conform to his will.

Another straightforward point I would make is to ask, how much of science is dependent upon the identification of the quantifiable attributes of phenomena? Which enables the application of mathematical logic to physical causation. It seems obvious to me but I don’t see much commentary on it. including in the article. He says ‘mathematics has nothing to do with physical reality’ but doesn’t the success of rocket science say he’s wrong?

I think skepticism started out very differently to what it has become. It started as 'withholding judgement regarding that which is not evident', rather than the kind of armchair skeptic claim which challenges any claim to knowledge. As such, it's aim was propaedeutic in some sense, not a global claim about who knows what and how.

There's a thematic connection between Pyrrho's skepticism, the Buddhist 'suspension of judgement', and the phenomenological epochē, which has been explored in various books and papers. I'll come back to that in a later post.

Have a glance at a recent long thread on a similar topic, Mathematical Platonism.

And after an excessive amount of digging we learned that Rodl contradicts himself in the endnote, which to me constitutes a lie — Leontiskos

The paragraph preceeding the endnote is as follows:

As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the I think is thought in every act of thinking: an act of thinking is the first person thought of itself. As being conscious of thinking that things are so is not a diferent act from thinking this, the act of the mind expressed by So it is is the same as the one expressed by I think it is so. As the act of thinking is one, so is what it thinks; as the I think is thought in every act of thinking, the I think is contained in every thing thought. This cannot be put by saying that, in every act of thinking, two things are thought: p and I think p. On the contrary. Since thinking p is thinking oneself to think it, there is no such thing as thinking, in addition to thinking p, that one thinks this. If our notation confuses us, suggesting as it does that I think is added to a p that is free from it, we may devise one that makes I think internal to p: we may form the letter p by writing, in the shape of a p, the words I think.

This bears repeating: there is no meaning in saying that, in an act of thinking, two things are thought, p and I think p. Kant said: the I think accompanies all my thoughts.³ — SCAO, P3

^3. Critique of Pure Reason, B 131. More precisely, he says that the I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for all my representations must be capable of being thought. This presupposes (what is the starting point of Kant’s philosophy and not the kind of thing for which he would undertake to give an argument) that the I think accompanies all my thoughts. — Footnote

Norman Kemp Smith translation of the Critique of Pure Reason p153:

The Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception

It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.

(I take it that Rödl's comment that this is 'not the kind of thing for which he would give an argument' is tantamount to 'it goes without saying' or 'it is assumed'.)

So - what about this constitutes a lie or a contradiction?

//

A little further along in the same section from the CPR, further argument which lends weight to Rödl's interpretation

The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all belong to me is therefore precisely the same as the thought that I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all mine. For other wise I should have as many-coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious to myself. Synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as generated a priori, is thus the ground of the identity of apperception itself, which precedes a priori all my determinate thought. Combination does not, however, lie in the objects, and cannot be borrowed from them, and so, through perception, first taken up into the understanding. On the contrary, it is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. The principle of apperception is the highest principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge. — Critique of Pure Reason, Sythetic Unity of Apperception

//

Yes, and there are those fortunate few who aren't sure! — J

Looks like I'm not done yet, after all ;-)

I have two apples. But I want to eat three. — Arcane Sandwich

Presumably, they will have seeds. All you need, is patience.

I haven't spent time like you have in meditation — Astrophel

There is something I want to add, which I think you will understand. It is that 'spending time' and 'making an effort' in meditation counts for nothing. There is nothing that can be accrued or gained through the conscious effort to practice meditation and any feeling that one has gotten better or gained something through such efforts is mere egotism. That is all.

It's kind of down to the least worst option. As it so often is.

That’s OK! I appreciate your courtesy.

Blistering critique of Albo in today’s SMH which I’m afraid is pretty on-target.

is it too much of a stretch of the imagination to relate the lyrics of this song, to the first part of Chapter 25 of the Tao Te Ching? — Arcane Sandwich

I don’t really go in for such comparisons. I will sometimes post graphics or videos to make a point, but rarely, and usually when their direct.

I don’t remember Aristotle’s argument for God (as the Unmoved Mover) talking in terms of created vs. uncreated things… — Bob Ross

Perhaps not but it seems natural that Aquinas would see the ‘unmoved mover’ as at least an analogy for the Divine Intellect?

I suggest that before you contact Priest, you could develop the idea a bit more by running it through ChatGPT. It will give you feedback on whether it judges the idea valid. It might also be able to code an actual model (although I don’t know.) Worth a shot, at least.

I’ll only add, because of the title, a lot of people will read it to find fault with it, while others (like myself) will read it to find support for their view

And that ain’t philosophy - that’s human nature :wink:

(Note you've posted an incorrect URL above, it's thephilosophyforum.com)

I think a lot of this conversation is rather lost in the weeds of Rödl's terminological minutiae. It might benefit from standing back and calling out what the book is about at a high level (gleaned from various sources).

I don’t think Rödl’s Self-Consciousness and Objectivity is a direct argument for absolute idealism, despite the title. Rödl meticulously analyses foundational questions about self-consciousness, judgment, and objectivity in ways that challenge implicit assumptions within analytic philosophy. His goal is not to advocate idealism but to build a case that shows how idealist principles resolve issues that other frameworks cannot. In doing this, Rödl reframes concepts like the nature of judgment and the role of self-consciousness, implicitly demonstrating how idealism underpins intelligibility, rationality, and objectivity.

It is very much written for the philosophical professoriate, particularly those trained in analytic methods, who dominate the discourse in the modern academy. Its style and structure reflect this intent, and as such it operates at a high level of abstraction. By embedding idealist principles in dense, systematic arguments, Rödl avoids presenting idealism as a speculative doctrine. His strategy is to show how it emerges necessarily from a deeper analysis of thought and reality.

Myself, I don't think I'm going to persist with it. I'm not well-equipped for this kind of technical philosophy and it really doesn't interest me that much. I'm already a convinced philosophical idealist, which I'll continue to explore and advocate for through other means. What with the abundance of information available in the Information Economy and the availability of time, I'm going to take leave of this topic and concentrate efforts elsewhere.

In fact, I challenge you to find a quote by Rodl in his book An Introduction to Absolute Idealism where he says that a mind-independent world does not exist. …Hegel is not an Idealist in the sense of Berkeley, for whom the world does not exist outside the mind. — RussellA

Berkeley denies the existence of matter as an independently real substance, but he does not deny the reality of the external world. For him, the world consists of ideas that exist either in finite minds (like ours) or in the infinite mind of God. Berkeley’s famous dictum, esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”), means that objects exist as ideas in minds. However, he maintains that the continuity and stability of the world are underwritten by God’s beholding of the Universe. He was not a solipsist; he does not claim that the world exists only in your or my mind or that it would come into existence only with humans. Instead, he holds that the world exists as a shared reality, grounded in God’s infinite perception.

The statement that “the world does not exist outside the mind” conflates Berkeley’s denial of material substance with a denial of external reality altogether. For Berkeley, the world is real, but its reality is mental or spiritual, not material. It exists as a collection of ideas dependent on being perceived by finite minds or God. It is the nature of the world that is at issue, not the contention that it is ‘merely a phantasm of the mind’.

Hegel was idealist, but his philosophy was focused on the dialectical development of Geist (spirit) and the unfolding of reason in history. For Hegel, reality is the expression of rational structures, not reducible to subjective or finite minds.

It’s not so much coincidence as parallel development. Have a browse of the Wikipedia entry on it https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axial_Age

the self-consciousness of the "I" is separate to not only to any thought but also to what is being thought about. — RussellA

Separate in what sense? You would at least have to agree that they are both held by the one mind.

Rodl is an Indirect Realist — RussellA

His book is titled ‘an introduction to absolute idealism.’ If he was an indirect realist perhaps he wouldn’t have used that description.

Our modern age thinks of organisms as machines, with upbuilding parts. For Aristotle an organism is very different than a machine, having a substantial form. — Leontiskos

But I get the impression the more holistic Aristotelian view is making something of a comeback, precisely because of his anticipation of self-organization.

If China Invades Taiwan, It Would Cost World Economy $10 Trillion

A China-Taiwan War Would Start an Economic Crisis.

My interpretation is that it is pointing to the inadequacy of spoken language to convey the depth of meaning that is inherent in 'the Way'. Arguments about it, 'it means this', 'no it doesn't, it means that', and so forth, have already missed the mark. The true way or eternal Tao is not a verbal expression or description or anything that can be said. Like I said every time you asked me: there is something you find in Eastern philosophies, 'the Unconditioned'. It's not God, or not like a 'sky-father' figure. But then as soon as we ask 'well what is it then?' then we've missed the mark again.

:pray:

There’s an article on SEP about ‘divine illumination’ which links back to Augustine. It is said to have been an idea that more or less died out in medieval times, but I think Augustine was right on the mark.

The original text probably would have had ‘created’ where this text has ‘composed’, would it not? I think it reads more authentically:

1. Created beings are made up of parts.
2. A created being exists contingently upon its parts in their specific arrangement.
3. A part of a created being is either created or uncreated.
4. A part that is a created being does not, in turn, exist in-itself but, rather, exists contingently upon its parts and their specific arrangement.

Etc.

Ancient and medieval philosophy recognised the ‘creator-created’ distinction which is fundamental to this form of argument. But the metaphysical background is very different to today’s. It is set against the background of the Scala Naturae, the ‘great chain of being’, which recognises the distinction between creator and created, and various levels of created being, such as mineral, plant, animal, human, and angel (in ascending order). It also, and not coincidentally, was implemented in the hierarchical ecclesiastical and political order of medieval culture.

As naturalism rejects the created-creator distinction as a matter of principle, this style of argument is incommensurable with their basic premisses; there’s really nothing in the naturalist lexicon that maps against it notwithstanding the attempts to find equivalences between quantum fields and the divine intelligence.

In other words, It’s the kind of argument that will appeal to those with a predilection for it, and not at all to those who don’t.

As we see ;-)