I happen to very much agree with that. Though I'm uncertain as to how this might relate to reasoning among lesser animals in your own view. — javra

I’ve already said, I don’t deny that the so-called higher animals (including some birds) are intelligent. But rationality in the sense h.sapiens possess it displays a kind or level of intelligence that they don’t, even if it is present in them in a rudimentary degree. This is based on abstract reasoning and language (see for instance Terrence Deacon The Symbolic Species). It has been suggested that because there is some continuity between h.sapiens and other species, then the difference is only one of degree rather than of kind. That is what I’m taking issue with. Maybe what I’m arguing for could be described as a question of philosophical anthropology, a philosophical view of what is significant about humankind. I know this is a very non-politically-correct argument, so a lot of what I’ve been trying to spell out in this thread, is what I see as the motivation for the currently popular view that we’re no different to animals.

Also in relation to AI, I’ve used ChatGPT since day one, I run a lot of ideas by it and use it for all kinds of things. It’s truly amazing. But are large language models beings? That’s another thing I question. I put it to ChatGPT which responded as follows:

The question of whether large language models or AI in general qualify as "beings" touches on deep philosophical and ethical issues. From a philosophical standpoint, it connects to topics like consciousness, personhood, and agency, all of which are traditionally considered key aspects of what makes a being.

In the case of large language models like me, while we're able to process language, respond meaningfully, and simulate conversation, we don't have consciousness, intentionality, or subjective experiences. So from a metaphysical or philosophical point of view, most would argue we're not "beings" in the traditional sense. However, this opens up debates about how we define terms like "being" and "intelligence."

It sounds like a lively thread—did the mention spark any follow-up questions or reactions?

I said I’d provide updates ;-)

I don't believe there is a black and white line between us chimps and bonobos, they are animals we are humans. I think we are on the same line of evolution and under the right conditions bonobos could have more complex communication than we want to admit — Athena

You should have a read of the story of Nim Chimpsky. He was born and raised like a human child with the hope that he could be taught to communicate like humans.

As chronicled in the 2011 documentary "Project Nim," [Columbia University psychology and psychiatry professor Herbert S.] Terrace decided to see if Chimpsky could learn human language by placing the infant monkey into the home of one of his former students, Stephanie LaFarge. The goal was to see if Chimpsky could acquire human-like language if he was raised like a real human being. Starting in late 1973, Nim Chimpsky began his life/experiment — but controversy soon arose. Despite being treated kindly, Nim Chimpsky showed unexpected aggression toward his human caretakers. His behavior was so sporadically violent that, after he attacked one of the people taking care of him in 1977, Terrace moved Nim Chimpsky back to a regular laboratory. At that point, Terrace called off the experiment.

Additionally, Terrace and his colleagues reached a disappointing conclusion: Although Chimpsky had appeared to learn language — he moved his hands and body in a manner consistent with American Sign Language, using over 120 combinations, in order to seemingly ask for things like food and affection — the evidence indicated that he was simply mimicking the behavior of the humans around him. It is possible that Chimpsky understood at least some of the "words" he was forming, but it is also very, very far from being proven.

"Nim learned to sign to obtain food, drink, hugs and other physical rewards," Terrace later explained to Columbia University. "Nim often got the signs right, but that was because his teachers inadvertently prompted him by making appropriate signs a fraction of a second before he did. Nim's signing wasn't spontaneous. He was unable to use words conversationally, let alone form sentences." — Salon

When the experiment failed, the poor little chimp was then packed off to a home for retired lab animals, where he was reported to seem very depressed. Ends up being a sad story.

why would the dog go mad — javra

I would say because of cognitive dissonance. I don't find it hard to see that many higher animals could experience that.

A couple of paragraphs:

According to Cudworth, Descartes’ mistake was that his conception of the soul was too narrow. Descartes thought that animals’ inability to speak or think reflectively like humans was explained by their not having souls and thus being purely physical machines, but Cudworth saw a problem with this: animals might not speak or reason, but they still do an awful lot. As Cudworth saw it, anyone who can look at the incredible variety and complexity of animal behaviour and decide that it is all merely physical mechanism “will never be able clearly to defend the incorporeity and immortality of human souls” (The True Intellectual System of the Universe, 1678, p.44). In other words, if animals feel and move and communicate as they do purely because of their physical makeup, then there’s no reason to introduce a special, immaterial soul to explain human behaviour. If Descartes is willing to explain the behaviour of all animals as resulting from nothing but ‘blood and brains’, why shouldn’t he draw the same conclusion about us?

For a seventeenth-century Platonist, that’s a surprisingly modern insight; in fact, it’s not unlike the sort of argument many materialists would use to refute Descartes’ dualism today. But Cudworth was not a modern man, and like Descartes, he accepted the orthodox assumption of his time that conscious minds are souls. As we have seen, he was also committed to bridging Descartes’ radical gap between human and animal life. And so, instead of showing that neither animals nor humans have souls, he tried to show that animals have souls too. And although Cudworth thought that animal souls were less perfect and less conscious than human souls, he believed that nevertheless, their existence gives us moral responsibilities towards animals that we do not have towards soulless, mindless objects. So for Cudworth, the specialness of human souls does not entail the worthlessness of animal ones: rather, animals are simply less complex, less developed examples of the same sort of thing that humans are.

Substitute 'soul' with 'mind' and I think Cudworth makes a valid point.

None of which vitiates the arguments I've been presenting on the matter.

Ralph Cudworth - right! He was one of the Cambridge Platonists. @Manuel has mentioned him several times. I'll read that with interest later.

Do you see how you keep making my point?

Is anyone in this thread "violently" rejecting human exceptionalism, or are people simply expressing various nuanced views? — wonderer1

And I see how you consistently fail to understand mine, probably due to lack of basic education in philosophy and cultural history.

The word 'violentily' doesn't imply actual violence, but rather a 'strongly held opinion' which has been expressed forcibly any number of times in this thread.

I once had an acquaintance who steadfastly denied that animals other than man had intelligence or any form of thought; he maintained that they are little more than automata that respond to stimuli without any understanding. — Vera Mont

I started a thread a while back on something I had read that Descartes used to flay dogs alive, assuring onlookers that their cries of agony were due only to mechanical reactions, not any genuine feeling of pain. During the course of the thread, I did more research, and discovered that this was not true, and that at one point, Descartes had a pet dog which he treated with affection. However, the anecdote was not entirely devoid of fact, because students at a Dutch university who were followers of Descartes' mechanical philosophy did, in fact, perform those dreadful 'experiments', and it is true that Descartes believed that animals were automata without souls, as he identified the soul with the ability to reason. I think he was mistaken in this respect, but understanding why he would think such a thing is an important point.

I'll make clear, I believe intentional action is fundamental to all forms of life from the very inception, and also that feeling and sensation are fundamental to sentient organisms, even very basic ones. (I'm currently reading Mind in Life, Evan Thompson, which explores these subjects in depth.) I recognise the continuity between human life and animal life in an organic sense. But I argue that with language, rationality, and also the capacity for transcendent insight, h.sapiens have crossed a threshhold which differentiates us from other animals, and that this difference is something we have to be responsible for, rather than denying.

Presenting an argument on the cultural background of philosophical attitudes has nothing to do with discussing 'the psychology of others'.

I'll recap the arguments I've presented in this thread.

Aristotle's distinction between the vegetative, sensitive and rational soul. He distinguishes h.sapiens as 'the rational animal' on the basis that humans can recognise universal concepts through the faculty of intellect or 'nous' (a seminal word in the Western philosophical tradition.) I acknowledge that Aristotle's is an ancient philosophy, but point out that some of his foundational concepts remain part of philosophy of biology to this day, and also to the foundational role of the 'ideas' in Plato's and later philosophy (1)

I then go on to argue that the human abilities of language, abstraction, tool use, and so on, also introduce an existential dimension to the question of human reason (2). The existential dimension arises with the sense of self and self-consciousness in paleolithic culture, as illustrated by the passages quoted from Norman Fischer (3). He links this with the arising of religion, which is posited as a means to ease or rationalise the sense of 'otherness' and alienation that is part of the self-conscious condition. I also remark that the Biblical myth of the Fall is an allegory for this condition.

Finally I argue that the modern insistence that 'we are no different from animals', is based on a subconsious longing for return to one-ness. We want to see ourselves as part of nature, and believe that evolutionary biology shows that we are. Hence any suggestion of human exceptionalism is violently rejected, as it calls this belief into question.

If you want to demonstrate that these arguments are based on my 'narcissism', knock yourself out. ;-)

This need to see yourself as particularly special isn't something I think you have made a free willed choice to have, and not something I see you as to blame for. In fact I appreciate your skill at keeping keeping your rage covert. And of course, we are all narcissistic to some extent. — wonderer1

Nonsense. I don’t see myself as ‘special’. I have presented a specific argument based on a number of sources in this thread. I understand the argument I’m pursuing is a difficult one to both articulate and understand, especially in the kind of fragmented format that forum conversations tend to assume. I don’t see any indication that you (and for that matter other participants) have understood the gist of the argument. It is not because I’m ‘special’, it has nothing whatever to do with it. Your statements here are ad hominem, how about you try and respond the actual specifics of what I’ve been arguing for, if you want to take issue with them.

Not knowing what scientific humanism is, I wouldn't want to comment on what it loses sight of. — Ludwig V

Scientific humanism is hardly a fringe movement. It is hugely influential in modern culture. One example is Julian Huxley, of the famous Huxley family, a direct descendent of "Darwin's Bulldog", Thomas Henry.

Julian Huxley said 'As a result of a thousand million years of evolution, the universe is becoming conscious of itself, able to understand something of its past history and its possible future. This cosmic self-‐awareness is being realized in one tiny fragment of the universe—in a few of us human beings' - a sentiment I endorse.

I prompted ChatGPT for other examples, which gave this list:

Carl Sagan – Sagan was not only an astrophysicist and science communicator but also a strong advocate for scientific skepticism, ethics, and the use of science for human betterment. His emphasis on a "cosmic perspective" incorporated a deeply humanistic vision, stressing both our smallness and responsibility in the vast universe.

Jacob Bronowski – A polymath known for his series The Ascent of Man, Bronowski combined a deep appreciation for the achievements of science with an equally strong concern for the ethical dimensions of human knowledge, particularly in the wake of the atrocities of World War II.

Albert Einstein – Though more widely known as a physicist, Einstein was also a humanist who believed in the moral and social responsibilities of scientists. He spoke frequently on issues like disarmament, civil rights, and the need for global cooperation.

Bertrand Russell – A philosopher and mathematician, Russell advocated for the application of reason and science to address social and ethical issues. His humanism was deeply intertwined with his pacifism, atheism, and commitment to improving society through rational inquiry.

E. O. Wilson – An evolutionary biologist and naturalist, Wilson emphasized the importance of biodiversity and advocated for what he called consilience, the unity of knowledge across the sciences and humanities. His work explored the ethical implications of our connection to nature and argued for environmental stewardship.

Richard Dawkins – Although known for his contributions to evolutionary biology, Dawkins is also a strong proponent of humanism and reason, criticizing dogmatic belief systems while advocating for a scientific worldview that promotes moral responsibility and societal progress.

Steven Pinker – A cognitive psychologist and linguist, Pinker’s work on human nature and his advocacy for reason and Enlightenment values places him in the tradition of scientific humanism. His book The Better Angels of Our Nature explores how science and rationality have contributed to moral progress throughout history.

Isaac Asimov – The celebrated science fiction writer and biochemist, Asimov not only wrote extensively on science but also on humanism and ethics, especially in relation to technology. His Three Laws of Robotics are a famous attempt to think through the ethical implications of technological advancement.

John Dewey – A philosopher and psychologist, Dewey promoted a form of pragmatism that saw science as the best method for achieving human progress. He argued that moral and ethical concerns should evolve in tandem with scientific knowledge, and his views strongly influenced 20th-century educational theory.

I'll go into bat for Russell. I still think his HWP is a good initial text for philosophy because of its historical perspective, and even despite many valid criticisms. I don't much care for his philosophical views, but he was a perceptive writer and good prose stylist on the subject of philosophy.

It sounds to me like you are projecting your own fears. In any case, you are demonstrating a lack of insight into the perspectives of others. — wonderer1

Thanks! and to you also.

Anyways, what are other people's most uninteresting philosopher/philosophy and why? — schopenhauer1

G E Moore's 'here is one hand' must come close. (Maybe if he could extemporise on the sound it makes, it might be more interesting.)

Just had a peculiar thought today regarding how ideas and concepts of God may have developed. — I like sushi

Firstly, 'God' is not a matter for conceptual thought at all. Of course, you or I might have our 'concepts of God' but what the name signifies or stands for is outside the scope of conceptual thought. As T Clark will no doubt recall, the well-known Taoist aphorism 'the Way that can be named is not the real Way'. Much the same can be said here. It is the reason that the name that became corrupted as 'Yahweh' was originally represented as four Hebrew consonants YHWH that literally could not be spoken, as for the profane to speak the name was to corrupt it (although that interpretation is contested.)

Second point - I'm sure pre-moderns, generally, had a completely different sense of their relationship with the world than do we. The world insofar as it was an expression of the sacred, God or the Gods, was not an 'it' but a 'you' to which we were related in an 'I-you' (or I-thou) sense that we nowadays mainly reserve only for our significant others. I think the sense of the whole cosmos as being personalist was intrinsic to the early religions, as was the sense of awe at the vastness and fruitfulness of nature. Thus is was natural to feel that the cosmos (whicn incidentally means 'an ordered whole') was animated or alive, in a way that is quite alien to us moderns, for whom the vast bulk of the universe comprises lifeless matter. Which is not entirely at odds with the way you have put it, although that lacks, shall we say, a certain gravitas.

Incidentally, those last two posts were also addressed to you ;-)

(continued from above)The sense of separateness from nature is, I think, at the heart of the Biblical Myth of the Fall. In that mythological account, 'the Garden of Eden' represents the primeval consciousness of animal existence.

The animal world is a world of pure being, a world of immediacy and immanence. The animal soul is like “water in water,” seamlessly connected to all that surrounds it, so that there is no sense of self or other, of time, of space, of being or not being. This utopian (to human sensibility, which has such alienating notions) Shangri-La or Eden actually isn’t that because it is characterized at all points by what we’d call violence. Animals, that is, eat and are eaten. For them killing and being killed is the norm; and there isn’t any meaning to such a thing, or anything that we would call fear; there’s no concept of killing or being killed. There’s only being, immediacy, “isness.” Animals don’t have any need for religion; they already are that, already transcend life and death, being and nonbeing, self and other, in their very living, which is utterly pure.

[In his book, A Theory of Religion] Georges Bataille sees human consciousness beginning with the making of the first tool, the first “thing” that isn’t a pure being, intrinsic in its value and inseparable from all of being. A tool is a separable, useful, intentionally made thing; it can be possessed, and it serves a purpose. It can be altered to suit that purpose. It is instrumental, defined by its use. The tool is the first instance of the “not-I,” and with its advent there is now the beginning of a world of objects, a “thing” world. Little by little out of this comes a way of thinking and acting within thingness (language), and then once this plane of thingness is established, more and more gets placed upon it—other objects, plants, animals, other people, one’s self, a world. Now there is self and other—and then, paradoxically, self becomes other to itself, alienated not only from the rest of the projected world of things, but from itself, which it must perceive as a thing, a possession. This constellation of an alienated self is a double-edged sword: seeing the self as a thing, the self can for the first time know itself and so find a closeness to itself; prior to this, there isn’t any self so there is nothing to be known or not known. But the creation of my 'me', though it gives me for the first time myself as a friend, also rips me out of the world and puts me out on a limb on my own. Interestingly, and quite logically, this development of human consciousness coincides with a deepening of the human relationship to the animal world, which opens up to the human mind now as a depth, a mystery. Humans are that depth, because humans are animals, know this and feel it to be so, and yet also not so; humans long for union with the animal world of immediacy, yet know they are separate from it. Also they are terrified of it, for to reenter that world would be a loss of the self; it would literally be the end of me as I know me.

In the midst of this essential human loneliness and perplexity, which is almost unbearable, religion appears. It intuits and imagines the ancient world of oneness, of which there is still a powerful primordial memory, and calls it The Sacred. This is the invisible world, world of spirit, world of the gods, or of God. It is inexorably opposed to, defined as the opposite of, the world of things, the profane world of the body, of instrumentality, a world of separation, the fallen world. Religion’s purpose then is to bring us back to the lost world of intimacy, and all its rites, rituals, and activities are created to this end. We want this, and need it, as sure as we need food and shelter; and yet it is also terrifying. All religions have known and been based squarely on this sense of terrible necessity. — The Violence of Oneness, Norman Fischer

I think this is the (unconscious) fear that we're seeking to ameliorate through a kind of scientific interpretation of 'one-ness with Nature', which is where belief in the projected meaning of evolutionary biology fits in. We seek to master nature through science, and also to transcend it, but now through ambitions to 'escape the surly bonds of earth' by way of space technology.

(The essay from which that passage was extracted was written about 9/11, by Norman Fischer, a Zen master and poet from California.)

There's no post delete function for users on this platform (although mods can delete posts. Incidentally I agree with the points you're putting forward here.)

Scientific American 2018 - What Made Us Unique — Ludwig V

Thanks for these links. From the above:

Most people on this planet blithely assume, largely without any valid scientific rationale, that humans are special creatures, distinct from other animals. Curiously, the scientists best qualified to evaluate this claim have often appeared reticent to acknowledge the uniqueness of Homo sapiens, perhaps for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines. Yet hard scientific data have been amassed across fields ranging from ecology to cognitive psychology affirming that humans truly are a remarkable species.

The density of human populations far exceeds what would be typical for an animal of our size. We live across an extraordinary geographical range and control unprecedented flows of energy and matter: our global impact is beyond question. When one also considers our intelligence, powers of communication, capacity for knowledge acquisition and sharing—along with magnificent works of art, architecture and music we create—humans genuinely do stand out as a very different kind of animal. Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.

I think the phrase 'for fear of reinforcing the idea of human exceptionalism put forward in religious doctrines' is actually a key driver for a lot of what is being argued in this thread, and I think I know why.

A secular age, defined by a naturalist outlook, has developed and is defined in opposition to the religious culture that preceded it. The watershed in European cultural history is generally regarded as the Renaissance and the subsequent 'scientific revolution' which ushered in sweeping changes to the understanding of man and nature. That is the subject of a vast literature and commentary spanning centuries, so it's futile to try and summarize it. I'm only mentioning it as the background to why I think there is such a sense of hostility towards 'human exceptionalism'.

I think the reasoning is existential and cultural.

The other key phrase in that passage is: 'Our culture seems to separate us from the rest of nature, and yet that culture, too, must be a product of evolution.'

'Must be the product of evolution'. And that is because evolutionary biology is believed to define us, both in terms of species, but also in terms of a grounding explanation of human nature, and nature herself. To that extent, and in that sense, it assumes the role of a religion - of course not the supernatural religions of yore, but in the sense of providing an apparently coherent and unified worldview within which we make sense of our identity, of who we are and how we originated. Furthermore, one fully validated by the authority of science - and what other kind is there?

I will add, I myself have never questioned the facts of evolutionary biology. I grew up on a digest of the excellent Time-Life books on biology and evolution and have a keen interest in paleoanthropology and the evolution of h.sapiens . I wasn't even much aware of the 'creation debates' until well into adulthood, as they're not a feature of life in Australia. (Ken Ham, the notorious young-earth creationist, started in Sydney but had to migrate to Kentucky to find an audience.)

But I'm also of the view that there's a lot read into evolutionary biology that isn't actually there. First and foremost by the so-called 'ultra-Darwinists' such as Richard Dawkins and the late Daniel Dennett, among many others, who see evolutionary theory and science as superseding and displacing religion. Of course they're kind of outliers in some ways, but their views are influential and quite consonant with the 'scientific worldview' they espouse.

So, getting back to 'our culture seems to separate us' and the assertion that 'it too must be the product of evolution'. What this does, is offers a resolution to the sense of separateness, of otherness, which is a pervasive undercurrent of our lives as self-conscious individual beings. Hence the fierce adherence to the belief that we're continuous with other species, that we're 'no different' - when on face value, we are obviously vastly different. Evolutionary biology makes us part of a cosmic story, in which evolution and/or nature is now endowed with the kind of creativity that used to be assigned to God.

(....to be continued.)

I think this is the heart of the debate. Exceptional or similar is, to a great extent, a difference of perspective, or emphasis. What matters is what difference the difference in emphasis makes. Why does it matter? It comes down to a question of values. Does our dominance over other species mean that we are entitled to treat them as machines or use them for sport? Or does it mean we need to be stewards rather than owners, including taking into account the interests of at least other animals, but maybe also fish, insects, plants, bacteria and microbes. — Ludwig V

Why does it matter? Because humans literally hold the power of life and death over the whole planet and separately, of many of its species, by what we do or don't do, or because of unintended consequences of our actions. We have awesome power, we alone have the means and the ability to literally destroy the Earth, leaving aside whether we will or should. No other species has anything like that power. The fact that this distinction is so easily denied never ceases to dismay as it is the denial of an obvious fact. What I mean by ‘taking responsibility for it’ is acknowledging it as a fact. There is no other species on earth like h.sapiens . Call it 'exceptionalism' if you like, but it just seems utterly implausible to deny it. (I have a theory as to why it is so frequently denied, but I won't go into that here.)

Consider this: there have been searches going on for decades, SETI, Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence, signs of life on other planets. Some other civilisation that emanates radio waves or some form of signal we could recognise. Signatures of non-natural compounds that can only be produced by artificial synthesis. So far, no luck, but it indicates a clear distinction between objects and forces found in nature, and those that are a result of artifice, things that could only be manufactured by a rational sentient being.

The earth is nowadays polluted by many thousands of chemicals that couldn’t even exist had we not made them. If some other species SETI found signs of those compounds, they would say 'Aha! Rational sentient life exists there!' But yet, ‘we’re just another species’? :yikes:

That's like saying that the explanation of a rainbow in the terms of physics undermines it, or reduces it, or even abolishes it. Which, I'm sure you will agree, is a serious misunderstanding. — Ludwig V

But a rainbow is a matter for physics and optics, in a way that living beings are not. Yours is the misunderstanding here.

The basic axioms of logic are certainly something that we are able to recognize and manipulate. Whether they are constructed or discovered is contested. That's what this is all about, isn't it? — Ludwig V

It’s very close. I’m very much in the ‘discovered’ camp, although once we have the intelligence to discover, with it comes the ability to construct, which muddies the water somewhat.

But, I do understand your puzzlement, and will try to explain the point I’ve been reaching for with respect to Aristotle. I’ll say again I’m no classics scholar and am not well read in the Greek texts. Many here are better educated in them than am I. But there’s a crucial point I think I’ve discerned in the Platonist-Aristotelian context. This is the reality of ideas. Not the kind of ideas we mean when we speak casually - ‘I’ve got an idea!’ - but formal ideas, like those of logical and arithmetical principles. Ideas in the platonic sense as formal principles or structures, eidos. I say these are real, but not material in nature. Not that they're 'immaterial things' - a horrible oxymoron - but they're only perceptible to a rational intellect. They are what traditional philosophy calls 'intelligible objects' (reference). And these are not explainable or reducible to the terms of particle physics or the principles of evolutionary biology. You can't account for syllogisms or the law of the excluded middle by appealing to the laws of physics.

Just as your passage states (and yes, it is highly germane to the topic at hand):

Where and what is this ideal construction? — J. Lukasiewicz, A Wittgenstein Workbook, quoted and trans. by P.Geach

Consider this passage from Bertrand Russell in his chapter, The World of Universals:

Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it. When we come to know that Edinburgh is north of London, we come to know something which has to do only with Edinburgh and London: we do not cause the truth of the proposition by coming to know it, on the contrary we merely apprehend a fact which was there before we knew it. The part of the earth's surface where Edinburgh stands would be north of the part where London stands, even if there were no human being to know about north and south, and even if there were no minds at all in the universe. ...We may therefore now assume it to be true that nothing mental is presupposed in the fact that Edinburgh is north of London. But this fact involves the relation 'north of', which is a universal; and it would be impossible for the whole fact to involve nothing mental if the relation 'north of', which is a constituent part of the fact, did involve anything mental. Hence we must admit that the relation, like the terms it relates, is not dependent upon thought, but belongs to the independent world which thought apprehends but does not create.

This conclusion, however, is met by the difficulty that the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. It does not exist in Edinburgh any more than in London, for it relates the two and is neutral as between them. Nor can we say that it exists at any particular time. Now everything that can be apprehended by the senses or by introspection exists at some particular time. Hence the relation 'north of' is radically different from such things. It is neither in space nor in time, neither material nor mental; yet it is something.

My bolds. So - this is something that Plato and Aristotle see, which, on the whole, naturalism and much of modern philosophy rejects. It's a deep issue, I agree. But the gist is, the ability to grasp universals just is the kind of 'divine spark' in the human intellect which differentiates humans as 'the rational animal'. I know it's a very non-politically-correct philosophy, but I can't help but believe there's something vitally important in it.

Point taken. I could have picked a better example.

But I steadfastly disagree with human exceptionalism. — Vera Mont

The distinction between h.sapiens and other creatures is something we have to take responsibility for, rather than denying the obvious.

I have to say that the emergence of science has not done much to change the basically animal nature of human beings, so for my money, the discontinuity is not particularly significant — Ludwig V

One of the ironies implicit in scientific humanism is that it looses sight of the very thing which enables us to pursue science.

My point is that to depict reason as a biological adaption is to undermine it. Reason is a faculty that differentiates h.sapiens from other animals, enabling the invention of science, among many other things. Reducing it to the status of a biological adaption fails to come to terms with it. God knows many other species have persisted for millions of years without it. I think we tend to assume that evolutionary theory provides an explanation for it when there are very many unanswered questions in that account.

So far as I know there is no doubt that faculty depends on the brain, at least in homo sapiens — Ludwig V

What does 'dependent upon' mean in this context? That reason can be understood in terms of neural anatomy? Certainly the brain is an evolved organ, indeed the rapid evolution of the homonid forebrain is one of the most astonishing episodes in the history of life on earth. But what has that development enabled us to see and to understand? Do you think, for example, that the basic axioms of logic, or the natural numbers, came into existence along with the hominid brain? Or are they something that brain now enables us to recognise and manipulate? See the distinction?

You seem to suggest that there is an unreal mainstream of Western philosophy. What does that consist of? — Ludwig V

Scientific materialism. It is parasitic on the classical tradition of Western philosophy, but fundamental elements of that classical tradition are making a comeback. See Aristotle's Revenge, Edward Feser.

Pastoral peoples were migratory or nomadic and didn't leave many records. Still, we know that they herded livestock - which is a huge step from respect for to control over and ownership of other species. It also reduced all other predators from a threat to be feared to rivals to be hated and exterminated. Settled agriculture did the same to land and vegetation, water and forest.
The Genesis story (which originates in an oral tradition before Judaism) already shows the drive to "subdue and fill the earth" as well as nostalgia for pre-agricultural life.

Every civilization has left records. Their beliefs and lifestyle are generally depicted in representations on walls and in tombs. The architecture itself speaks volumes about how people lived. There is also considerable literature from about 3000BCE onward. — Vera Mont

This is a sound approach to the question of understanding the evolution of reason and many other aspects of human culture. I've read quite a bit of paleo-anthropology and studies of the evolution of consciousness over many years, although it's a huge and multi-disciplinary field of study, encompassing anthropology, history of ideas, philosophy and comparative religion to mention a few. Could I draw your attention to a source I've been studying of late, Awakening from the Meaning Crisis, John Vervaeke, a professor of cognitive science at the University of Toronto. It's a long series, of which the first three or four address the pre-historic origins of distinctively human consciousness. YouTube playlist can be found here.

At some point - about 7000 years ago, but there were interim steps that took much longer - humankind turned against nature and began to treat it as Other/the enemy. We lost a good deal of our own nature and have been paying for it ever since in mental illness, discontent, strife and a sense of loss. — Vera Mont

I think you’re on the right track but needless to say it’s a vast topic.

A good deal of clarification of what you mean by "abstract and comprehensive" and "ideas and concepts" is needed, and you have the difficulty that philosophy doesn't have a consensus view about what those terms mean. — Ludwig V

I don't expect much *modern* philosophy will have any consensus about those questions, as they're deep questions, not the kind of minutae that analytic philosophy is preoccupied with. But the fact that you and I can have such a conversation as this, should indicate a key differentiator between us and other creatures, none of which could entertain such ideas, let alone devise the medium by which we're able to discuss them.

However, if evolution is correct, even in outline, humans have evolved from animals, so the expectation must be that human reason is a development of animal reason. So to understand human reason, we have to understand animal reason. Of course, it is possible that you don't accept the evolutionary approach to these questions. — Ludwig V

Of course I accept the facts of evolutionary biology, but its applicability to the problems of philosophy is another matter. For instance, the idea that evolutionary biology alone accounts for or explains the nature of reason or of the intellect is contentious. Evolutionary biology is not, after all, an epistemological theory, but a biological one, intended to explain the origin of species, not the origin of such faculties as reason. In fact I think one of the unintended consequences of Darwinism on culture is to believe that such evolutionary accounts are sufficient, when in fact they're barely applicable. The thread on Donald Hoffman is about a cognitive psychologist who argues that if our sensory faculties are explicable in terms of evolutionary fitness, we have no reason to believe they provide us with the truth. Of course that's a contentious argument, but I mention it to provide an indication of the scope of these issues.

Certainly there is a biological continuity between h.sapiens and other species, that is indisputable from the fossil record. But the ability to reason, speak, and to invent science, indicates a kind of ontological discontinuity from other animals in my view. Through the faculty of reason, we cross a kind of evolutionary threshold, which opens horizons that are imperceptible to animals.

Is he (Jacques Maritain) a platonist of some kind? — Ludwig V

He says he writes as an Aristotelian. I haven't read a great deal of him, but he was a major 20th century Catholic philosopher, but on the intellectual left, so to speak (as distinct from many more conservative Catholic philosophers.) But that passage I quoted, concerning the ability of reason to grasp universals, is really, in my opinion, part of the real mainstream of Western philosophy, which I do think is Platonist on the whole. Incidentally the essay from which the quote was taken can be found here.

When a human, or a dog, smells food, it is an automatic reflex (i.e. not the result of conscious control"). It is by way of a preparation for chewing and digesting food - a product of evolution. — Ludwig V

I was wanting to get at the meaning of reason, in particular, which is fundamental to the OP. I've read about the Caledonian crow studies and other studies indicating rudimentary reasoning ability in some animals and birds, but I don't see the relevance in terms of the philosophical question at issue, as to what differentiates the rational ability of h.sapiens, 'the rational animal', from other species.

The reason I mentioned Aristotle's philosophy of biology is not because I idolize the ancients, but because the distinction between vegetative, sensory and rational forms of life remains basically sound. In addition, in Aristotle's philosophy, the particular prerogrative of the rational intellect ('nous' - a word which lives on in vernacular English) is to grasp universal ideas and concepts. Unlike other animals, we can see meaning in an abstract and comprehensive way. And I think the case can be made that this ability - the ability to grasp ideas and concepts - is foundational to language, and so a key differentiator between h.sapiens and other species. I fully understand acceptance of universals and Platonic forms is generally considered, well, ancient history by most, but in my view, these are barely understood in today's culture.

There's an essay I often cite by neo-Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain on this point, in which he also addresses the point you raise about canine behaviour.

For the empiricist there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is 'sugar' or what is 'intruder'. He plays and lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; but he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in h.sapiens -- a potential infinity of knowledge.

Such are the basic facts which empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. ...In the Empiricist view, intelligence does not see in its ideative function -- there are not, drawn from the senses, through the activity of the intellect itself, supra-singular or supra-sensual, universal intelligible natures seen by the intellect in and through the concepts it engenders by illuminating images. Intelligence does not see in its function of judgment -- there are not intuitively grasped, universal intelligible principles (say, the principle of identity, or the principle of causality) in which the necessary connection between two concepts is immediately seen by the intellect. Intelligence does not see in its reasoning function -- there is in the reasoning no transfer of light or intuition, no essentially supra-sensual logical operation which causes the intellect to see the truth of the conclusion by virtue of what is seen in the premises. Everything boils down, in the operations, or rather in the passive mechanisms of intelligence, to a blind concatenation, sorting and refinement of the images, associated representations, habit-produced expectations which are at play in sense-knowledge, under the guidance of affective or practical values and interests. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

You might notice a resemblance between this description and eliminative philosophy of mind, which is not co-incidental.

@Leontiskos

Someone like Trump should, in a healthy democracy, be blocked from running as a representative, because people like him are clearly incompetent for the job. — Christoffer

I perfectly agree, and so, I’m sure, do millions of Americans. The whole saga has been so totally unlikely from the very beginning. In hindsight, the selection of Hillary Clinton was a disaster. I remember at the time, many of the US contributors on this forum were utterly scathing about her. I never had a strong sense of hostility toward her in particular, but I always thought the fact that she was part of a ruling dynasty and a representative of the Washington élite was a really bad idea. The FBI investigation didn’t help either. AND she won the popular vote. So Trump’s ascension was a fluke, in some ways, but I’m sure he’s never going to win another election.

The two most-quoted memes of the entire Trump-Vance campaign are now ‘childless cat ladies’ and ‘pet-eating immigrants’. And that’s really the best they can do.

If information is thought of as form (actuality, quiddity) then the idea of information as a "foundation" of sorts is very old indeed. In Aristotle, form (act) has primacy over matter (potency). — Count Timothy von Icarus

The computer chip industry understands hylomorphism very well. Why? Because there's the chip designers, and the chip fabricators, and nowadays they're usually different companies. This is called 'fabless manufacture' and is the standard model in current chip design. NVidia, for instance, deals entirely with design ('form'), while TSMC is one of the leading companies which fabricate the chips using fiendishly complex machines ('matter') - about which, see this mind-blowing documentary on ASML's EUV lithography machines.

often it seems that attempts to use information in a hylomorphic sense are hamstrung by being unable to jettison the modern conception of matter as having form — Count Timothy von Icarus

It is because of reification, the 'thingifying' tendency deeply embedded in modern thought, which believes that only things are real.

That in itself is a clear sign of how the current structure and system of government is a failure in every form other than playing with authoritarianism under a plutocracy. — Christoffer

That is part of Trump's reasoning, and I don't accept it. Believing that it's hopeless plays into his hands.

Anyhow, I'm still convinced that Trump/MAGA is heading for a historic defeat in November. Can't come soon enough.

The very early point which sailed right by, was Trump's apparent belief that if he puts tarriffs on China, that this costs China. He still seem not to understand that the importer pays the tarriff, that it is a form of sales tax. It was the very first item in the debate, and it went right by.

Yes, I’ve read about Caledonian crows.

I don't much like Discord. I tried to accept the invite but then it or me got confused because I have an already existing Discord account under a different email to the one I use for philosophyforum. I was hoping in case of a crash I could make contact via the PF Facebook page.

John M. Frame's "A History of Western Philosophy and Theology," is a fine example of such a view. Frame is "unapologetically Reformed," as positive reviews put it. And this shows in things like him dismissing the whole of the Christian mystical tradition and the idea of divine union or theosis as "unbiblical" a term he uses even for writers who quote Scripture virtually every line. Obviously, the idea isn't that folks like St. Bernard of Clairvaux don't use the Bible. It's that they lost the original (correct) understanding of the Bible under the influence of Platonism, Stoicism, etc. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That’s an interesting point. I’ve read a little of Father Andrew Louth’s ‘Christian Mysticism: An Introduction to the Tradition*. Father Louth addresses the tension between the Greek philosophical tradition ('Athens') and Hebrew scripture ('Jerusalem'). He discusses how this tension was historically expressed, particularly in how Greek philosophy influenced early Christian theological development, especially in medieval (and later) mysticism. He discusses how certain strands of Christianity, especially within the Reformed tradition, were more skeptical or even hostile towards mysticism, often because of its perceived connection to Platonic or Neoplatonic ideas, which were seen as too speculative or incompatible with a more scripture-centered faith. ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’, as Tertullian put it. He was a forerunner to the ‘sola scriptura’ polemics. Likewise I recall that Luther expressed antagonism towards aspects of Aquinas’ theology on account of the latter’s advocacy of Aristotle’s philosophy, which Luther saw as pagan.

Myself, I’ve always felt that, on the contrary, the mystical facets of Christianity were those most relevant in our (or any) day and age. Hence I feel much more drawn to some elements of Catholic and Orthodox faiths as far as their philosophy is concerned. And many of the more recent Christian philosophers I admire, such as David Bentley Hart, Evelyn Underhill, Dean Inge, et al, are nearer in spirit to the Greeks and the mystics than to the fire and brimstone Protestants.

is it all immigrants? — Fooloso4

Apparently, only Haitian immigrants, and only in Springfield Ohio. If you live elsewhere, you can breathe easy.

The debate was much as I expected. Trump a fire hydrant of mendacity, as always, and Harris lucid and controlled in comparison. But the irksome thing is, that even while most of the mainstream media acknowledge this, they are all obliged to add that it may not matter. He can spout lies, exaggerations and hyperbole for 90 minutes, and everyone can acknowledge that this is what he's done, but it may not matter. Me, I think it does matter, and I think in November the American electorate will have judged that it matters, but this is one real measure of the damage he's doing to democracy every time he opens his mouth: he's persuaded vast numbers of people, and a large number of very powerful politicians, that the facts are what he says they are, no matter how far from the truth.

The pre-socratics, if I remember correctly, believed there are universal truths. But they believed that not everyone could access the right path to the truths. Because to them, seeing things differently, not commonly, through the right mind, is the way to truth. — L'éléphant

:100: I think that was broadly characteristic of many of the Axial Age philosophies both East and West.

I had wanted to come back to this thread to make a critical observation that the point of rational thinking seems to have been lost in this discussion. I said in my first post here that the goal of rational thinking or reasoning is to arrive at a valid/sound conclusion. Animals do not use rational thinking, but instinctive behavior. — L'éléphant

I agree. I think there’s a difference between behaviours that can be accounted for in terms of stimulus and response, and behaviours that can be attributed to rational inference. The former, for instance, covers an enormous range of behaviours that animals and even plants exhibit. Venus fly traps, for instance, close around their prey, and numerous other plants will open flowers in sunlight and close them when it sets. Animal behaviours from insect life up to mammals routinely exhibit complex behaviours in response to stimuli. But the question is, do such behaviours qualify as rational? Human observers can obviously perceive the causal relationship between stimulus and response, but I don't think that implies conscious rational calculation ('If I do this, then that will happen') on the part of the animal (or plant).

It might be worth recalling the distinctions Aristotle makes between different organic forms. Plants, according to Aristotle, possess only the nutritive soul, responsible for growth, nutrition, and reproduction. Animals, in addition to the nutritive soul, have the sensitive soul, granting them the abilities of sensation, movement, and desire. Humans uniquely possess all these functions but also have the rational soul, which allows for inference, reflection, and the capacity for abstract thought. This rational capacity sets humans apart, as it involves deliberation and the ability to grasp universals, which Aristotle sees as the hallmark of true rationality. (Bear in mind 'soul' is used to translate the Greek term psuchē which refers broadly to the principle of life or the life force in living beings rather than the modern notion of an "immaterial soul." I've been reading a little of contemporary systems science and biology, and while it is true that Aristotle's schema has been updated somewhat in those disciplines, elements of his biology are still recognised. Terrence Deacon, in his Incomplete Nature, adapts Aristotelian concepts like teleology (goal-directedness) in describing emergent processes in nature, and Alice Juarrero, in her work on causality and complex systems, sees continuity with Aristotle’s notion of formal and final causes.)

One of the most enduring debates in philosophy is the one that pits relativism against objectivism. This debates has been fascinating me for years and it raises a fundamental question: is truth unique and universal (objectivism), or does it vary depending on perspectives and contexts (relativism)? — Cadet John Kervensley

I say that this is a something of a false dilemma, but one that we are very much bound to, due to the circumstances of culture and history. It arises from the modernist intuition of ourselves as intelligent subjects in a domain of objective forces. We divide the world into self and other, internal (mind, self, what I think) and external (matter, physical forces, society). It is the 'Cartesian division'

I've been absorbing a great deal of information from John Vervaeke's Awakening from the Meaning Crisis. A key idea which is relevant to your question is a term he introduced, 'transjective'. The 'transjective' refers to the dynamic, participatory relationship between the subject and the world, in which meaning arises through interaction rather than being either imposed by the subject ('in the mind') or existing outside ('in the world'). Vervaeke argues that the objective/subjective distinction presents a false dilemma because it overlooks how humans are always embedded in a web of relationships and processes within which meaning arises. The 'transjective' thus highlights the co-emergence of perception and reality, suggesting that meaning is neither purely personal nor purely external but is co-constituted through engagement with the world. And that applies to meaning in all the different senses of that word, from the utilitarian to the aesthetic, which arise along a continuum, from a spider spinning a web to a poet spinning a sonnet.

Vervaeke sees the 'transjective' process as both 'bottom-up' and 'top-down,', introducing a contemporary Neoplatonist framework into his account of meaning-making. From the 'bottom-up' perspective, the transjective emerges from embodied, sensory experiences and the mind's interaction with the environment, grounding meaning in concrete, lived reality (the 'lebenswelt' or 'umwelt' of phenomenology). From the 'top-down' perspective, higher-order cognitive processes, such as abstraction, reflection, and narrative-building, shape how individuals interpret and organize their experiences. This dual flow of meaning aligns with Neoplatonism, where reality is understood as structured through levels of participation, from the material to the transcendent, while avoiding reductionism ('everything dependent on the physical').

For further info see Transjectivity - A Short Commentary Andrew Sweeny

Awakening from the Meaning Crisis (playlist)

Cognitive science is a new interdisciplinary science. The fact that it has not yet developed a generally accepted theory hardly serves as evidence that it cannot or will not. — Fooloso4

It's a matter of principle. This is the point of the original 'facing up to the problem of consciousness' essay. Consciousness can be studied as a phenomenon, via cognitive studies, but consciousness as the first-person ground of experience is not an objective phenomenon nor among objective phenomenon. Neuroscientically-inclined types such as Wonderer will be exasperated, 'how do you know it is not solvable?' 'The hard problem' is not a problem in search of a solution, but a rhetorical argument which indicates the inherent limitations of objective science with respect to a philosophical question, which is the nature of being ('what it is like to be...').

What I'm getting at there, is the division that arises in early modern science ...
— Wayfarer

Some of us are quite familiar with this well rehearsed story, but it is not what is at issue in this thread. — Fooloso4

It has a considerable bearing on the issue.

the fact that you don't have much of a working hypothesis yourself, seems like something that you might want to correct. — wonderer1

You wouldn't read or recognise the point of the 'blind spot of science' article that I frequently reference in this context, would you. If by any chance you're interested, regardless, I'll provide the link to it.

The underlying point I'm trying to get it in all this is the nature and limits of objectivity, and of whether what can be objectively known and demonstrated exhausts what is really the case. And the reason that is relevant, is because of the frequent demand that the contents of NDE's be objectively demonstrable. It is assumed as a matter of course that if they're not objectively demonstrable, then they can only have a subjective reality. I'm working on fleshing out a philosophical framework which provides an alternative to this supposed dilemma.

Mind (or consciousness) is causal, a latent drive towards higher levels of intelligence and awareness which manifests as organic life.
— Wayfarer

This is an assertion not a theory is the sense in which you fault science for lacking. — Fooloso4

The way the issue is invariably framed is that matter is fundamental, and so consciousness can only be thought of as a product of (epiphenomenon, emergent feature) of matter. But it is precisely that causal connection between matter and consciousness which is a point at issue. I'm not providing a theory about that, only pointing out an alternative. No doubt there'll be someone working on it.

An argument for a distinction between historians and scientists is yet to be made in this thread — Johnnie

The OP presents an argument for the distinction of the sciences and the humanities. You may not think it's a good argument, but that is what the thread is about. And I think the assumption that scientific method generally assumes physicalist reductionism is a pretty safe, even if there are those who dissent from it or question it. The scientific status of psychology and the social sciences is often called into question because they are not so amenable to the kinds of certainty that characterise the so-called 'hard sciences'. Sure, quantum physics calls reductionism into question, I think that's been the case since 1927 (and that is an interesting SEP article, to be sure.)

Consciousness is dependent on the existence of organisms. — Fooloso4

However, in light of modern scientific understanding of the nature of brains, and the sort of information processing that can occur in neural networks, it's unparsimonious. I.e. "I have no need of that hypothesis." — wonderer1

But there is no theory of 'how brains generate consciousness', which actually is an implication of the 'hard problem of consciousness.' It is assumed that consciousness is a product of organic evolution, but what if the appearance of life just is the appearance of the very 'first-person' perspective which defies objective or third-person description? In other words, organisms are dependent on the activities of consciousness. Mind (or consciousness) is causal, a latent drive towards higher levels of intelligence and awareness which manifests as organic life. The reason this view is not materialistic is because it assigns a causal role to intelligence, albeit not necessarily concieved of as a 'divine architect' but more like:

God, according to (the Stoics), "did not make the world as an artisan does his work, but it is by wholly penetrating all matter that He is the demiurge of the universe" (Galen, "De qual. incorp." in "Fr. Stoic.", ed. von Arnim, II, 6); He penetrates the world "as honey does the honeycomb" (Tertullian, "Adv. Hermogenem", 44), this God so intimately mingled with the world is fire or ignited air; inasmuch as He is the principle controlling the universe, He is called Logos; and inasmuch as He is the germ from which all else develops, He is called the seminal Logos (logos spermatikos). This Logos is at the same time a force and a law, an irresistible force which bears along the entire world and all creatures to a common end, an inevitable and holy law from which nothing can withdraw itself, and which every reasonable man should follow willingly (Cleanthus, "Hymn to Zeus" in "Fr. Stoic." I, 527-cf. 537). — New Advent Enclyclopedia

If that sounds like vitalism, perhaps so, with the caveat that mind/consciousness is never something that can be known objectively. You can't know it, because it is what knows. So there is no such 'vital essence' in an objective sense.

All that said, I've never questioned the biological account of evolution, only what implications can be drawn from it. If you've never accepted the idea that the Biblical creation myth is literally true, then the fact that it's not literally true is not (contra Dawkins) that big of a deal.

The point, however, is that for Sam there is a distinct, enduring, imperishable "higher self". Perhaps I am wrong, but this does not seem to square with your understanding of the:

principle of no-self (anatta)
— Wayfarer — Fooloso4

It's true that Buddhism doesn't teach in terms of 'higher self' but they don't deny the reality of rebirth. Beings are understood as being caught up in an involuntary and endless cycle of rebirth. I mentioned before a book by Sam Bercholz, the proprietor of Shabhala Books, a major published of Buddhist titles, who's near-death experience after open-heart surgery revealed a vision of hell, which he published a book about, A Guided Tour of Hell. As to whether the Buddha exists after death, that is one of the 'unanswerable questions'.

the division between object and subject
— Wayfarer — Fooloso4

What I'm getting at there, is the division that arises in early modern science, with Galileo, Newton, Descartes et al. The division of the universe into the objective realm of primary qualities measurable by science, and the relegation of mind to the inner or subjective domain. And then the sense that the world is devoid of meaning and purpose because of that division. The 'Cartesian anxiety'. This becomes more than a theory, it becomes an existential state, and not necessarily a happy one.

And that means everything that wants to build itself up from that ground can't be clockwork determinism.

And there freedom lies.

Science and scientism are not the same. — Fooloso4

Ain't that the truth.

This is one book on the subject, The Lost Sutras of Jesus, Thomas More and Ray Riegert.

Sam's claim that:

... we survive death as individuals, but we return to our true nature, which is not human.
— Sam26

and:

Our identity is not in this avatar (so to speak) but is connected with our higher self
— Sam26

is that there is a self distinct from the body. Out of body experience is not the experience of a non-differentiated, generalized consciousness but the experience of an individual subject. — Fooloso4

That is only a re-statement of beliefs that have been pretty well universal at one time or another throughout history. Of course that is no guarantee of them bring true. But consider the historical context. As Hans Jonas says in the essay previously mentioned, for the ancients 'Soul (or 'life') flooded the whole of existence and encountered itself in all things. Bare matter, that is, truly inanimate, "dead" matter, was yet to be discovered - as indeed its concept, so familiar to us, is anything but obvious.' That watershed didn't arrive until the Renaissance and the ascendancy of materialism proper, the idea of a solely material universe acting in accordance with physical forces. Within that context, Jonas says, life becomes the anomaly and inert matter the norm. You see that writ large in this debate. Imagine if you were time-transported back to the 13th century to proclaim that the body is only physical and that there were no soul. You would be ridiculed and ignored (and quite possibly executed) in line with the dogma of the day. Now those so bold as to proclaim that the living soul is more than the body are ridiculed and ignored. Every educated person is presumed to know that there is no reality beyond the material. That's what I mean by 'dogma'. We've erected bulwarks against what we regard as the supernatural.

Sam mentions the idea of the body as a 'receiver' or 'transmitter' akin to a television. Why is that necessarily a daft idea? What if, from the very earliest stirrings of organic existence, organic life is the means by which consciousness painstakingly takes form? 'What is latent becomes patent', to quote a Hindu aphorism. Of course we don't think like that, we think the issue can only be viewed through the lens of the so-called objective sciences. We start with the presumption that life and mind can be explained in terms of physical and chemical forces, and then will only consider what is amenable to that approach.

To reject my argument, you have to reject that testimonial evidence is a valid form of knowing apart from science. — Sam26

Perhaps there are kinds of knowing which are only accessible in the first person, which can't be reproduced in third-person terms or subjected to that kind of arms-lengh analysis. I already mentioned Sean Carroll's fallacious ruminations on the nature of soul in an earlier post.