But they don’t. How interactions between physical objects and forces is observed and understood is completely different to what makes a valid syllogism. The nature of the methods used in science is not itself a scientific but a philosophical. Historians and philosophers are not scientists, and none the worse for not being so. — Wayfarer

Where did I say that the mind is a result of physical objects interacting? I said it has parts, modules with different functions. Not all reduction to first principles is physicalistic. Historians do share a methodology with other scientists. They just look for particular causes of particular events instead of natural causes of common phenomena. An argument for a distinction between historians and scientists is yet to be made in this thread. You tend to assume that scientific method equals physicalistic reductionism. First of all scientists don't have a criterion of physicalty second biology, psychology, sociology, even chemistry aren't explicitly reductive. You could make an argument for physicalism from chemistry maybe, but it's not explicit in the behavior of ethanol as put out by organic chemistry that it's a quantum-mechanical standard model system. It's not even explicit that a ethanol molecule is a straight-forward sum of parts. Because quantum-mechanical molecules aren't, their behavior is not a product of the wave-functions of individual particles: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physics-holism/.

An argument for a distinction between historians and scientists is yet to be made in this thread — Johnnie

The OP presents an argument for the distinction of the sciences and the humanities. You may not think it's a good argument, but that is what the thread is about. And I think the assumption that scientific method generally assumes physicalist reductionism is a pretty safe, even if there are those who dissent from it or question it. The scientific status of psychology and the social sciences is often called into question because they are not so amenable to the kinds of certainty that characterise the so-called 'hard sciences'. Sure, quantum physics calls reductionism into question, I think that's been the case since 1927 (and that is an interesting SEP article, to be sure.)

An argument for a distinction between historians and scientists is yet to be made in this thread. — Johnnie

The difference can be found in the justification report for the claim they are making. A historian will supply a collection of scrutinized and corroborated witness depositions while the scientist will provide an experimental test report.

The scientist must be able to control the observations recorded while that is pretty much impossible for the historian. He cannot just go to the lab and repeat the Battle of Hastings all over again.

The scientific status of psychology and the social sciences is often called into question because they are not so amenable to the kinds of certainty that characterise the so-called 'hard sciences'. — Wayfarer

Probabilistic claims are actually fine. Claims do not need to be fully deterministic.

The problem is rather that it is sheer impossible to experimentally test human behavior.

For an experimental test report to be meaningful, it should be reasonably possible for someone else to reproduce it.

Pavlov's dog experiment, for example, is considered eminently scientific. Some claims in psychology are indeed experimentally testable with the tests being reproducible.

Freud's psychoanalytic theory, on the other hand, is considered to be untestable.

The central question is therefore: Can the claim actually be experimentally and reproducibly tested?

By the way, claims in physics or chemistry that cannot be tested, are not scientific either.

The problem is rather that it is sheer impossible to experimentally test human behavior. — Tarskian

Why do you think that?

Why do you think that? — wonderer1

Experiments with human behavior is considered really hard:

https://www.nu.edu/blog/ask-an-expert-can-human-behavior-be-studied-scientifically/

Ask an Expert: Can Human Behavior Be Studied Scientifically?

But even if the answer to our initial question, “Can human behavior be studied scientifically,” is yes, that doesn’t imply it can be studied easily.

With human behavior experiments being so difficult to design, Jenkins cautions that the quest for measurability can risk steering research efforts down paths that are less than rigorous.

Experiments with human behavior have the same problem as experiments with computers, only worse:

Even more challenging to the test designer, Jenkins adds, is to remember that taking a test is itself a behavior. This means that tests need to try to take into account the attitudes of test takers while they are taking the test.

This means some people may answer questions based on how they want to be perceived, rather than how they truly are.

One of the most difficult hurdles for researchers observing human behavior is how to deal with the reality that human test subjects are always aware they are being studied and can modify their behavior—purposely or unconsciously—in response.

The issues that occur in Turing's halting problem and Rice theorem with computers, are even worse with humans.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rice%27s_theorem

In computability theory, Rice's theorem states that all non-trivial semantic properties of programs are undecidable. A semantic property is one about the program's behavior (for instance, "does the program terminate for all inputs?"), unlike a syntactic property (for instance, "does the program contain an if-then-else statement?").

It implies that it is impossible, for example, to implement a tool that checks whether a given program is correct, or even executes without error.

Testing human behavior amounts to testing a program without having access to its source code. Even with access to its source code, according to Rice theorem, the program's runtime behavior is fundamentally unpredictable. In fact, testing human behavior is even more difficult than that because a human brain is not a deterministic computer.

It may be possible to achieve this in especially designed cases only.

And I think the assumption that scientific method generally assumes physicalist reductionism is a pretty safe, even if there are those who dissent from it or question it. The scientific status of psychology and the social sciences is often called into question — Wayfarer

It is not safe since it causes you to arbitrarily reject psychology (because it doesn't even claim not to be reducible to physics, it leaves the issue unspecified) and physics itself is not making a claim of being able to reduce other sciences.

The difference can be found in the justification report for the claim they are making. A historian will supply a collection of scrutinized and corroborated witness depositions while the scientist will provide an experimental test report.

The scientist must be able to control the observations recorded while that is pretty much impossible for the historian. He cannot just go to the lab and repeat the Battle of Hastings all over again. — Tarskian

A historian can go into ground and look for artifacts, his claims are falsifiable. Doesn't a scientist aim to explain the observations he already did by coming up with a causal mechanism? And once he has a theory, he looks to disprove it. The same a historian, he comes up with a causal mechanism and looks to disprove it which is much harder because the event was singular in the past. But he still has some tools of falsifying his claims in principle. Also it's not like falsification is such an easy thing to do in hard sciences. We have the Duhem-Quine thesis.

But even if the answer to our initial question, “Can human behavior be studied scientifically,” is yes, that doesn’t imply it can be studied easily.

So you have gone from it being sheerly impossible to experimentally test human behavior to not easy.

FWIW, I just experimentally tested your behavior, and found that you were capable of going from making a ridiculously hyperbolic claim, to something more reasonable. It seemed like a pretty easy experiment to conduct to me.

A historian can go into ground and look for artifacts, his claims are falsifiable. — Johnnie

Archaeologist. That is a science.

It's not even explicit that a ethanol molecule is a straight-forward sum of parts. — Johnnie

And it really is not. H2O is not two hydrogen atoms together with an oxygen atom, like two boxes is one box together with another, but the resulting structure of the complex process of oxidation of hydrogen gas, the principle behind hydrogen fuel. Its representation as H2O is meaningful, but just symbolic. The same applies for any molecule.

It is possible that the prediction of the behaviour of organic molecules using hard physics is not computable, just like the behaviour of a human stomach can't be predicted using hard physics, even if we accept that we live in a purely physicalistic universe that regularly obeys the fundamental laws of physics at every level.

Fields other than physics are then justified, even if they all reduce to physics. Me riding a bike does reduce to dynamics, but I can't ride a bike by using dynamics, I need other cognitive methods.

The same a historian, he comes up with a causal mechanism and looks to disprove it which is much harder because the event was singular in the past. But he still has some tools of falsifying his claims in principle. — Johnnie

Falsifiability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for science. It must also be possible to experimentally test the falsifiable hypothesis.

Archaeologist. That is a science. — I like sushi

I have always thought of it as much more complicated than that. Something along the following lines:-

Archaeology is the study of human activity through the recovery and analysis of material culture. ... Archaeology can be considered both a social science and a branch of the humanities. It is usually considered an independent academic discipline, but may also be classified as part of anthropology, history or geography.

(That is actually a quotation, which I give because it saves me time and effort. I haven't given the source because authority is irrelevant, so it would be a distraction from what matters here.)

he comes up with a causal mechanism and looks to disprove it which is much harder because the event was singular in the past — Johnnie

This is not wrong, of course. But the use of the phrase "causal mechanism" here is an example of what happens when we get hypnotized by physics. Either questions about human behaviour are being pressed into the mould of what is appropriate for answering the questions of physics. Or the idea of a causal mechanism is being stretched to cover kinds of explanation that physics is designed to exclude. Either way, it is not helpful.

I'm sure that trotting round the argument about physicalism is great fun, but it seems like a well-known dance rather than a collaborative search for truth. I don't think it is helpful. Why don't we look at specific idea which is an interaction between a science and the humanities? That focus might allow us to see their differences more clearly.

The focus I suggest is the idea that the sciences are, in the end, social/cultural practices, as indeed the humanities are. To put it another way, the foundation of science is scientists in their social and cultural context. To put the point yet another way, physics is indeed everything, so is politics and so is economics, so is mathematics and so are art and ethics. The difference between all these approaches is not just in their subject-matter or their method; it is in what is important to them - the kinds of questions they ask and the kinds of answer they seek. Their objects of study may differ, and they may even work with different ontologies, but those differences are far from the only consideration and certainly not the predominating consideration. Understanding those differences may not answer all the questions, but I think it might enable us to ask questions more intelligently.

“Can human behavior be studied scientifically,"

It depends what you mean by "scientifically". If your paradigm of science is physics, then the answer will be that you can, provided you give the kind of answer that physics requires. But that kind of answer is not available in mathematics, so the paradigm is a bit embarrassing. You need to broaden your scope to allow different ways of studying things, without worrying so much about physics or even, perhaps, what is to count as scientific.

Once you have allowed that, it becomes possible to consider what ways of studying human behaviour are appropriate, and recognize that what we accept as an explanation of human behaviour is different from both physics and mathematics; one might characterize it as the search for the reasons for behaviour, for a rationale. (Causal explanations are also sometimes appropriate here, but not necessarily of the kind that physics recognizes.)

This opens up a more interesting question than the original one, because it identifies explanation as simply the search for understanding and explores what provides understanding of each question, rather than trying to press all questions into the mould of some paradigm - or even a small number of paradigms - in favour of pursuing our real needs.

Falsifiability is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for science. It must also be possible to experimentally test the falsifiable hypothesis. — Tarskian

Astronomy seems to be a purely observational discipline, though tests are indeed possible by means of prediction. It's just that experimental tests are not possible.
Ethology seems like another candidate in which experiments are not to be expected. This is partly for methodological reasons, because the behaviour to be studied needs to focus on animal behaviour in the context of animal lives, rather than a cage in a laboratory. Again, testing by prediction is possible. Ethology does not restrict itself to explanations of the kind required by physics, but often develops what I would call rationales, rather than causes. Perhaps you don't consider it to be a science. There are studies of animal behaviour that are based on experiments, but I think you'll find they are classified under the heading of psychology.

I have always thought of it as much more complicated than that. — Ludwig V

It is primarily dedicated to objectively recording the data of sites and artifacts in meticulous detail. The conjure comes later, as with practically every other scientific endeavor.

Historians deal with the written word. I was pointing out this clear distinction as whoever posted what they need seemed to think historians were archaeologists. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they operate on completely different levels of investigation and data collection.

It is true that the work on-site is the most visible and possibly most exciting phase of the archaeologist's work. The stuff back home is less visible and possibly less exciting; but it is where the objects begin to tell their story, so it is where the finds have value. So I prefer to include both phases under the heading of archaeology. There is no other source for pre-history, so once the narratives begin to appear, history and archaeology overlap, in my view. But it's really not worth arguing about.

Historians deal with the written word. I was pointing out this clear distinction as whoever posted what they need seemed to think historians were archaeologists. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they operate on completely different levels of investigation and data collection. — I like sushi

That's true. The complication is this. For periods and places where there are no contemporary text sources, there is no other source than archaeology. Where both archaeology and texts are available, the two overlap, collaborate, and supplement each other. So I would want to say that where both are available, it is not important to distinguish between them, except in respect of the objects of study - differences in method are just the consequence of that. Both aim to tell a story of what happened.

It is possible that the prediction of the behaviour of organic molecules using hard physics is not computable, just like the behaviour of a human stomach can't be predicted using hard physics, even if we accept that we live in a purely physicalistic universe that regularly obeys the fundamental laws of physics at every level. — Lionino

:up:

Even more challenging to the test designer, Jenkins adds, is to remember that taking a test is itself a behavior. This means that tests need to try to take into account the attitudes of test takers while they are taking the test.

This means some people may answer questions based on how they want to be perceived, rather than how they truly are.

One of the most difficult hurdles for researchers observing human behavior is how to deal with the reality that human test subjects are always aware they are being studied and can modify their behavior—purposely or unconsciously—in response. — "Tarskian

Dr. Paul Jenkins

Dr. Jenkins' distinction here shines light on the distinction between science discovery and humanities discovery that I'm trying to distill and generalize.

Discovery of "what" is rooted in the predication of the fact of existing things.

Can Human Behavior Be Studied Scientifically? As claimed above, it's hard to study human behavior because, according to my premise, the researcher has to negotiate a path between the dominant modes of two distinct disciplines of discovery. However, the distinction is not a simple binary, b&w polarization, and so the two modes can sometimes be made to work side-by-side.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. This adverbial modification elaborates both the effect and the affect of the fact of existing things. To the main point, "how" drags [personal] consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery.[/quote]

It think it's beneficial for both disciplines to make use of the scientific approach: public, measurable, repeatable. I think it's beneficial for both disciplines to make use of the humanities approach: What's it like to travel through (and be changed by) the natural world on a journey with a beginning, middle and end?

Here's an earlier dialogue that speaks to the mesh of science/humanities:

There are fields that are an tightly meshed combination of both, such as architecture. A good number of architectural rules have been experimentally tested for safety. Still, subjective aesthetics have always been a major consideration in the construction of new buildings. The same can be said about the design of cars or any consumer product. — Tarskian

That's right.

For millennia, humans have understood that buildings should be practical, beautiful, and sustainable, because if any of these qualities are omitted or prioritized the buildings become practical but not beautiful, or beautiful but unsustainable, or sustainable but regardless of how. — jkop

There's no causal relation between the aesthetics and the sustainability and the practical reason for solar panels.
— jkop

Does such a causal relation exist? — ucarr

Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities. — jkop

So, one possible summit of a science-art mesh would be a building that's useful, ecological and beautiful. — ucarr

Yeah, those three (or closely related varieties of each) are the essential components of all successful structural designs. Also known as the Vitruvian Triad.

When the sciences divorced the humanities, many intellectuals (e.g. Schopenhauer) became reluctant to see architecture as an art. It just seemed too pragmatic, concerned with functions etc. — jkop

Maybe a lesson here is that reductionism can be a good tactical maneuver while the researcher is in the thick of the hunt for discovery -- simplicity in theory and practice can be conditionally good -- but as a value, it should be approached with much skepticism $\Rightarrow$ necessary and sufficient.

However, the distinction is not a simple binary, b&w polarization, and so the two modes can sometimes be made to work side-by-side. — ucarr

I agree. I was trying to outline an idea and left that point out for simplicity. Once you start looking, there are a good many disciplines that need to combine and mesh rationales and causal accounts. Indeed, the two are both useful in the ordinary, "common sense" explanations of actions. Though, admittedly, we appeal to causal explanations most often, I think, when something has gone wrong. Some actions are habits, which tremble on the brink of addictions. But addictions are not purely causal, since an addict is perfectly capable of rational action; it's just that the values that are prioritized are incomprehensible to us - no, that's the wrong word.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. — ucarr

Yes, you've said that before. But I don't really understand what you mean. Are you getting at what I would call levels of description? So, for example, a person is a human being (animal), a body (biology), a corpse (physics). Another example would be walking down a street as exercising or getting in the beer or starting a journey of 1000 miles. To me, adverbial modification means walking purposefully, or ambling or wandering or limping. But you might mean that interpretation is much more important in humanities disciplines than in the sciences. (Actually, I wouldn't take it for granted that physics means the same thing by "interpreting the evidence" as a historian does.)

To the main point, "how" drags [personal] consciousness into the frame of the lens of discovery. — ucarr

That's true, but it's not all always about what's conscious. Tacit knowledge is one example. The sub- or un-conscious seems to be a real thing. And there's all the process of data from the senses, which clearly enables consciousness, though it isn't available to consciousness.

There are fields that are an tightly meshed combination of both, — Tarskian

That's true, and we might learn a lot by seeing how such fields cope. Sometimes, I get the impression that they simply ignore the distinction, which sounds impossible, and yet, perhaps, it may be.

Yes, in the sense that architecture causally emerges from the building's practical, aesthetical, and sustainable qualities — jkop

I don't quite understand "causally" here. Surely, any building "consists" of practical, sustainable, aesthetic qualities among others; architecture is the art of combining them to meet various criteria. There needs to be a discussion about aesthetics that gets over the crude observation that aesthetics is "subjective" meaning that there can be no meaningful way of understanding aesthetic qualities. There are mathematical techniques for turning subjective opinions into data, but they are only a beginning. The traditional ideas that there are certain proportions of buildings that make them beautiful are another approach.

Maybe a lesson here is that reductionism can be a good tactical maneuver while the researcher is in the thick of the hunt for discovery - — ucarr

That may be true. I would hope it was more a matter of focus, of attending only to the context that is relevant to the task at hand.

Discovery of "how" is rooted in the adverbial modification of the predication of the fact of existing things. — ucarr

...I don't really understand what you mean. — Ludwig V

To me, adverbial modification means walking purposefully, or ambling or wandering or limping. But you might mean that interpretation is... — Ludwig V

You express in your own words what I'm trying to communicate with my fancy language: the adverb reveals how an action is performed by an individual person with his/her unique Point Of View being the adverbial force that determines the "how" of the doing of an action: "the arrogant boy strutted boldly down the lane, scowling fiercely at anyone making eye contact. The shy maiden, seeing the lad's effrontery, blushed profusely."

The "how" of the boy's actions (strutting boldly, scowling fiercely) convey how he sees himself, i.e., his POV of himself; the "how" of the maiden's action (blushing profusely) conveys how she feels emotion in response to his personality, i.e., her POV of his character.

It's the personal POV that communicates what it's like experiencing the fact of the existence of the things of this world in an individualized way unique to one POV with one personal history that distinguishes humanities from sciences. Sure, scientists have personal experiences of discovering the fact of existing things, but it's unusual for science to be about the personal experience of those existing things. The personal account of experiencing existing things is what humanities does.

How we esteem the great scientist: for seeing the fact of what we never imagined.

How we esteem the great artist: for experiencing illumination from the conventional

I don't quite understand "causally" here. — Ludwig V

Architecture consists of its components, but there are causal relations between them and the composition.

As in cooking. A cook selects specific ingredients based on their looks/taste, nutrition, structure etc. and prepares them in ways that cause the ingredients to interplay with eachother. From their interplay emerges a meal that has a specific taste, utility, and sustainability.

The traditional ideas that there are certain proportions of buildings that make them beautiful are another approach. — Ludwig V

Yes, good looking proportions are rare in times prioritizing maximum exploitation per square unit.

The three qualities: utility, beauty, and sustainability can be balanced or distributed, but in some cases they seem to coalesce, such as in roman arches, catenary arches.

If you go down that road then everything relates to everything. Colin Renfrew is a pioneer in Cognitive Archaeology, for example.

My point was that an historian is an historian and an archaeologist is an archaeologist. Obviously they are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but they are distinct fields of investigation following different methodologies.

Science is what you study to get a high salary job. The Humanities (and the Arts) is what you spend your high salary on.

Science is what you study to get a high salary job. The Humanities (and the Arts) is what you spend your high salary on. — LuckyR

Neat, but wrong. If you want to get a high salary, Technology and Engineering or Business is what you need to study. But if you want to make real money, don't worry about studying, just get your hands on as much capital as you can, by any means possible. Science, Humanities and Arts are what make life worth living.

If you go down that road then everything relates to everything. Colin Renfrew is a pioneer in Cognitive Archaeology, for example. — I like sushi

But, in the end, everything is related to everything. The test of Cognitive Archaeology is what it produces. There's no true or false here, only pragmatics (where the criterion is not the useful, or even the true, but only the interesting or profitable.) The issue I skated over is that subject divisions are not only about subject-matter and methodology, but also about practicalities and administrative convenience.
Then there is the issue that any subject needs to make its bread and butter. That means that ideas about education and research are essential to survival. The origin of the idea of the Humanities is the idea that there are some things that one needs to know in order to be a human being (a decent citizen of a civilized society). So their educational role was fundamental to everything else. What has changed is that nowadays, one needs to know about science in order to be a decent citizen of a civilized society.
(I'm not pretending that the concept of a

Architecture consists of its components, but there are causal relations between them and the composition. — jkop

"utility, beauty, and sustainability", I would say are not components of the building, but aspects (properties) of the whole. So I agree with your sentiment, but am inclined to think that "causal relations" - which implies that they are distinct parts (components) of the whole - is not quite the right way to articulate the point.

the adverb reveals how an action is performed by an individual person with his/her unique Point Of View being the adverbial force that determines the "how" of the doing of an action — ucarr

Suddenly, I understand what you are saying. :grin:
I was interpreting "how" as asking a different question. How you got home, or How a computer works or How to make glass.
I see your point. I'm not sure what I think about it yet.

"Point of view" is an interesting concept. I think it's paradigm use is as in movies, when one talks about the camera's (audience's) point of view. The first use, of course, was in the context of (realistic) pictures and the theory of perspective, which has its place in geometry. It also occurs, I understand, in the Theory of Relativity, which proves its universal theses by proving that they are true of all possible points of view (sometimes they talk about observers). None of these uses is about actual people.
A point of view is an abstract of possible observers and ideal observers; it isn't about actual human beings. History, literature, and some approaches to language are about actual human beings, not abstract concepts. Linguistics is another interesting case that straddles the divide. (Is philosophy included here? Depends on what you mean by philosophy. Much philosophy presupposes an abstract observer, but Wittgenstein, of course, challenged that.)

A point of view is an abstract of possible observers and ideal observers; it isn't about actual human beings. History, literature, and some approaches to language are about actual human beings, not abstract concepts. Linguistics is another interesting case that straddles the divide. (Is philosophy included here? Depends on what you mean by philosophy. Much philosophy presupposes an abstract observer, but Wittgenstein, of course, challenged that.) — Ludwig V

Don’t forget Nietzsche here.

“Physicists believe in a “true world” in their own fashion…. But they are in error. The atom they posit is inferred according to the logic of the perspectivism of consciousness—and it is therefore itself a subjective fiction. … And in any case they left something out of the constellation without knowing it: precisely this necessary perspectivism by virtue of which every center of force—and not only man—construes all the rest of the world from its own viewpoint, i.e., measures, feels, forms, according to its own force— They forgot to include this perspective-setting force in “true being”—in school language: the subject.”(The Will to Power)

…and Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche:

“The essence of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value means that upon which the eye is fixed. Value means that which is in view for a seeing that aims at something or that, as we say, reckons upon something and therewith must reckon with something else. Value stands in intimate relation to a so-much, to quantity and number. Hence values are related to a "numerical and mensural scale" (Will to Power, Aph. 710, 1888)

“Through the characterization of value as a point-of-view there results the one consideration that is for Nietzsche's concept of value essential : as a point-of-view, value is posited at any given time by a seeing and for a seeing. This seeing is of such a kind that it sees inasmuch as it has seen, and that it has seen inasmuch as it has set before itself and thus posited what is sighted, as a particular something. It is only through this positing which is a representing that the point that is necessary for directing the gaze toward something, and that in this way guides the path of sight, becomes the aim in view-i.e., becomes that which matters in all seeing and in all action guided by sight…All being whatever is a putting forward or setting forth.

What has changed is that nowadays, one needs to know about science in order to be a decent citizen of a civilized society. — Ludwig V

I can generally agree with this. I think there has always been a disparity between those with knowhow and those not, but the information age has caused something of a hiccup I feel.

Don’t forget Nietzsche here.…and Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche: — Joshs

As if.... !
I did think about them. But, given that I wasn't citing anybody else, I couldn't be confident that I could summarize them with reasonable accuracy. I reckoned that my argument was inclusive enough to include them. If it was, then well and good. If it wasn't, then I couldn't be confident about whether they would support what I was trying to say. I'm quite happy that you seem to support at least the drift of my argument.
But, in both those quotations, I don't find my human beings, and I miss them. :smile:
More seriously, I think "actual human beings" are important because this is about the humanities, which are about actual human beings, as opposed to the abstract ones that Nietzsche and Heidegger seem to be talking about.
I'm not saying that they are wrong, because I don't even say that I properly comprehend what they are saying.

I can generally agree with this. I think there has always been a disparity between those with knowhow and those not, but the information age has caused something of a hiccup I feel. — I like sushi

I'm sure there has, but that it is more a question of degree than have/havenot distinction. In the context of education policy, there are three questions:-
1. What is required to function at a minimal level?
2. What is needed to function well and effectively?
3. How much can we instil into children before they become adults?

It's pretty clear to me that what happened in WW2 blew apart the conventional argument that the humanities have a civilizing or moral force, even if we include science in the list. My suspicion is that a practical (as opposed to theoretical) understanding of civilization and morality is not gained in any classroom or theoretical study, but only by living in such a society with civilized and moral people - and even that is not a guarantee.

This opens up a huge debate. Bringing up good citizens (let's suppose that this society is at least on some winding pathway towards civilization.) is a complicated and messy business. Formal education, as we understand it, is an important part of that. Don't think that I'm trying to disparage it. But play-time and parenting are important parts as well. Beyond that, I'm very confused.

This opens up a huge debate. Bringing up good citizens (let's suppose that this society is at least on some winding pathway towards civilization.) is a complicated and messy business. Formal education, as we understand it, is an important part of that. Don't think that I'm trying to disparage it. But play-time and parenting are important parts as well. Beyond that, I'm very confused. — Ludwig V

I just want to say, that I appreciate your thoughtfulness.

I just want to say, that I appreciate your thoughtfulness. — wonderer1

It's very kind of you to say so. The fact is that most of the time I feel as if I'm wading through mud. A lot of struggle for rather meagre progress.

History, literature, and some approaches to language are about actual human beings, not abstract concepts — Ludwig V

Is philosophy included here? Depends on what you mean by philosophy. Much philosophy presupposes an abstract observer, but Wittgenstein, of course, challenged that. — Ludwig V

This question directs some light onto what makes Tarskian's definition of philosophy interesting:

A statement about a fact is not philosophical. For example:

It is raining today.

A statement is philosophical, if it is a statement about another statement. For example:

It is irrelevant that it is raining today.

This explains in simple words what the true meaning is of Godel's incompleteness theorem.

A theory is incomplete if it can express statements about its own statements. In other words, a theory is incomplete if it is capable of philosophy.

Self-referential statements are just a special case of the general case, which is the philosophical statement. If a statement can talk about other statements, then it can also talk about itself. — Tarskian

Tarskian helps illuminate some possible essentials of consciousness via his application of Gödel to his definition of philosophy. We're looking at a spectrum of incompleteness: a) axiomatic: Russell, Gödel; b) existential: Bohr, Schrödinger, Heisenberg; c) cognitive: Tarskian.

If philosophy is an essential part of human nature, then human nature joins the list of incompleteness detailed above.