I want to ask, from what I understand the forebrain was developed by our need for the use of tools in its earliest stages. I do want to know that how could something so simple as the need to use and create tools could have led to so much of what defines human beings. What are your thoughts on the matter? — Shawn

That the Darwinist account tends to invariably be reductionist, because it looks at the question solely solely in terms of the benefit it has for reproduction. That because of the role of Darwinian biology in our culture, as a kind of secular creation myth, it has no conceptual space for the kinds of questions that our highly-developed forebrain allows us to ask. And that this is one of the root causes of what John Vervaeke describes as 'the meaning crisis' - even while the evolutionary account may be perfectly sound in its own terms. (Now there's a can'o'worms for you ;-) )

I agree, but, is conceptualization something that can be specified any further? — Shawn

Looking at it, again, from a kind of biological anthropology - the evolution of the h.sapiens forebrain was one of the most (if not THE most) spectacular and unparalleled events known to evolutionary science. I read an interesting account, in a book by a medical science writer, James Le Fanu (ref), on what was involved in the transition from simian to hominid anatomy, because the hominid cranium is far larger than that of its simian forebears, and this also had to be accomodated with the shift to bipedalism. This mean the birth canal of hominids had to be smaller, while the head of the infant was much larger - the reason that human babies are born with soft skulls, the fontanelle, which hardens during the first months of life. All in support of this fantastically elaborated brain anatomy, which enabled language, conceptualisation, tool-making, story-telling and many of the other essentially human characteristics of our species. (Le Fanu also notes that the payoff for these developments had to take a very long view, as it results in far higher instances of birth trauma and maternal mortality than among simian species, while for many hundreds of thousands of years, the rewards of that larger brain capacity may not have been abundantly obvious.)

... but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves.
— Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

What is the model that this is a likeness of? If for us this life is one of renunciate spirituality, is it that for the gods as well? Do the gods too have desires that they must overcome? Can we become a being of a different kind? — Fooloso4

They're foundational questions in this context. 'The gods' are, of course, those of the Greek pantheon, but from comparative religion, we learn that have much in common with the other Indo-European cultures, so there are parallels with the Indian pantheon. But in this case, they represent 'the divine' - a word is from the Indo-european root 'deva'. Notice that Parmenides' prose-poem is said to have been 'given' to him by the Goddess. The knowledge of which he speaks is rooted in revealed truth, not dialectical reasoning, although he then deploys reasoning in support of it. (I think in modern terminology, it would be described as 'trans-rational'.) But I notice references to the divine ('the devas') in many of the excepts being discussed in the thread in ancient philosophy. It is part of the assumed background of their world, and I personally think it's mistaken to regard it as a simple figment or archaic superstition, even if that is the consensus of today's disenchanted world.

Renunciate spirituality seeks to sever ties with or go beyond the sensory domain, 'the world' - the world of mundane attachments, pains and pleasures, so as to seek what Alan Watts' described as 'the supreme identity' in his book of that name. It means realising an identity with the One (or Brahman or the Godhead). Plotinus was said by Porphyry to have twice entered a state of supreme ecstasy corresponding to that awareness. It is said that his last words were 'to restore the divine (or: the god) in us (or: in you) back to the divine in the All'.

As to whether this is a realisable aim - the IEP entry on Pierre Hadot says

For all of Hadot’s evident enthusiasm for Plotinus’ philosophy...Plotinus: the Simplicity of Vision concludes with an assessment of the modern world’s inescapable distance from Plotinus’ thought and experience. Hadot distances himself from Plotinus’ negative assessment of bodily existence, and he also displays a caution in his support for mysticism, citing the skeptical claims of Marxism and psychoanalysis about professed mysticism, considering it a lived mystification or obfuscation of truth (PSV 112-113). Hadot would later recall that, after writing the book in a month and returning to ordinary life, he had his own uncanny experience: “. . . seeing the ordinary folks all around me in the bakery, I . . . had the impression of having lived a month in another world, completely foreign to our world, and worse than this—totally unreal and even unlivable.”

But I think this can be acknowledged, without thereby vitiating the mystical element in Plotinus' (and indeed Plato's) spirituality, which is a vital interpretive key in my view. Interpreted through that perspective, the meaning of the passage we're discussing sprang out at me, without any need to reference the political element of The Republic.

Is the fact that human beings are sentient that, we (human beings), are the only kind that contemplates the concept…. — Shawn

that contemplates any ‘concept’. Conceptualisation relies on abstraction, the ability to represent and to imagine. Is there evidence that any species other than h.sapiens possesses those abilities? (I know that Caledonian crows and some other species can display rudimentary reasoning abilities, but doesn’t qualify as truly conceptual ratiocination in my view.)

I think the question you’re asking can otherwise most profitably be viewed through the lens of anthropology and palaeontology. For instance Agustin Fuentes’ Why We Believe (although there are many others on the theme.) But it’s not hard to imagine early hominids witnessing the birth and death of their kin and prey animals, the cycles of the seasons and the bounty of nature and attributing it to or imbuing it with agency. And it’s also well-documented that humans have had a sense of the sacred since paleolithic times, evidenced by statuary, art and ritual burial practices. Of course the ancient origins are ‘lost in the mists of time’ as the saying has it, but it goes back well beyond the beginning of recorded history.

From my point of view non-duality means monism — JuanZu

I studied non-dualism (actually Advaita) as a unit in comparative religion, and one of the first things we were taught is that non-dualism is *not* monism. I’m now vague on exactly what was said, but it was along the lines that, in order for there to be ‘one’, there has to be another in order to be aware of it. Non-dualism means, rather, ‘not-divided’ or ‘not-two’ - actually the meaning of Advaita is literally that, as ‘a-‘ is the negative particle in Sanskrit (equivalent to ‘un-‘ in English) and ‘dvai’ is ‘dual’ or ‘divided’. So the meaning of Advaita is really ‘undivided’ or ‘not two’, and what it really means, is overcoming or dissolving the sense of ‘otherness’ that normally pervades all of mundane existence. As such it’s dangerous to make a theory or hypothesis out of it, as it is not a matter of propositional knowledge, but a state of being (designated sat-chit-ananda, ‘being-knowing-bliss’.)

I understand the idea of Atman being, shall we say, shards of Brahman, limiting itself in order to experience things in different ways. But that, itself, is speculation — Patterner

According to the Advaita, as I understand it, it is only a matter of speculation for the ignorant (in which I include myself of course). As for whether the material world is of a ‘different nature’ to mind, that assumes you can make an object out of mind and then compare it to the world. I see the point as being, rather, that even the experience of cold, hard reality - falling on concrete for instance - is still something that occurs within experience. It’s not as if there’s the material on one side and the experience on another, the reality is the experience of falling, the sensation of hardness, the pain of impact. Within which the objective and subjective elements are poles of experience, neither of which can be experienced in the absence of the other.

So you'd know the name Senator James Lankford, and why he made news a couple of months back.
— Wayfarer

Had to look that one up, perhaps I missed your point. — fishfry

Senator James Lankford is a strict conservative GOP member who was on a bipartisan committee tasked with addressing border issues. He drove a very hard bargain and got many more concessions out of the Democrats than anyone had expected, getting them to agree to what many of them thought were overly harsh measures that the GOP had been demanding for years. But then before it went to a vote, Trump got wind of it and said he didn’t want it to go ahead. Why? Because it would take away his talking points about the country being flooded with Mexican rapists. So Lankford was then pressured to vote against his own hard-fought legislation, rather than bring it to the floor - because it might have been a solution. Trump would rather keep his talking points than actually solve the problem. For his trouble, Lankford was then censured by the Oklahoma Republican Party, for the mortal sin of working with Democrats.

Trump was arguably less authoritarian than any of them, simply because he knew so little about how the government works that he got rolled by the bureaucrats and betrayed by the people who worked for him. — fishfry

That probably also explains why 24 previous aides and allies went on the record saying he was unfit for office and a danger to democracy.

Apologies to all if my above contributions have been off the mark.

But the good man may not be able to live the life of the gods, nor might he want to.

What does that life look like? This:

renunciate spirituality
— Wayfarer
?

Surely there is more to the life of a god. — Fooloso4

We discussed the various examples of what I'm referring to in an earlier thread on esoteric philosophies. I seem to recall I gave the examples of Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism, to which you replied something like 'you have to be prepared to believe in such things'.

There are numerous references to 'the gods' and 'the divine' scattered through the ancient texts. What does that signify to you? Remnants of archaic beliefs now superseded?

I think one of the characteristics of Eastern philosophical religions, like Advaita and Tibetan Buddhism, is that for various historical reasons they seem to have been able to maintain a closer relationship with their ancient roots. Which is why for instance a Swami of the Vedanta Order still appears in monastic robes (in his many youtube videos!) Likewise for many Tibetan Rinpoches.

Plotinus goes far beyond Plato — Metaphysician Undercover

Nevertheless, didn't he himself insist that he was simply explicating what was implicit in Plato?

I thought this was one for the collection :-)

If I knew what that meant, perhaps I would feel insulted. — T Clark

Hey this is in Pollitico today, about weed drinks (i.e. beverages infused with THC.) Gotta say, if THC Iced Tea were available near where I live, I'd be all in. (It's probably better that they're not :yikes: )

I have followed southern border politics for decades — fishfry

So you'd know the name Senator James Lankford, and why he made news a couple of months back.

Bunch of unarmed people are invited in by the Capitol cops — fishfry

So you think Mike Pence should have hung?

Trump will, of course, not change, but with his king makers behind him, those who want authoritarian rule will rejoice — Fooloso4

I'm convinced that most of Trump's backers are not in because they like Trump or think that he's any good but because they can use him to pursue their own nefarious ends. And the only way that works is by sucking up to him and telling him how great he is. That's how Putin and Kim Jong Un have played him like a fiddle. Works every time, but only if he thinks you're someone who's opinion counts.

being disembodied means you are dead. — Paine

However, the Gerson paper you linked to 'The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle' (and thank you for it) says right at the beginning 'This (i.e. 'agent') intellect is, in Aristotle's view, all the things he repeatedly says it is, including immortal.' (However, I will continue with that paper.)

I understand the passage as demonstrating the vast difference between Plato and Plotinus when they speak of the philosopher's return to the cave. — Paine

Here is that passage again:

For instance, he will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life of the good man which civic virtue requires. He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like. — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

Doesn't this plainly disparage the notion of 'civic virtue' and 'living the life of the good man' in favour of 'leaving that behind' and 'choosing another' - the 'life of the Gods' - and that we are to strive to be 'like them' and not simply 'good citizens'? The meaning seems very clear to me, without any external references. As mentioned, there are direct parallels to other schools of renunciate spirituality that characterised the ancient world, Eastern and Western.

And are there 'vast differences' between Plotinus and Plato? I readily grant at every juncture that your knowledge of the texts greatly exceeds my own, but I had thought it well-established that Plotinus saw himself as no more than a faithful exegete of Plato.

I don't see the value of the broad generalities offered by Gerson, Perl, Fraser, and the like. — Paine

I agree that we're talking past one another. That's why I've tried to explain my perspective on the topic. I'm not reading it as a classicist, comparing and contrasting various interpretations of ancient philosophy in which you're plainly better versed than am I (and I am learning a lot from it!) But I see Perl, Gerson, and Feser, as being concerned with retrieving what was and remains vital about classical philosophy as a living truth, not as museum pieces to be compared and contrasted. Many here among us will simply take it for granted that we're physical beings, no different in essence to other species, although considerably more dangerous due to our numbers and technology. But what if the truth were that we are 'immortal souls housed in corporeal bodies'?

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver, Ideas have Consequences, Pp2-3

I sense I have worn out my welcome. — Paine

Not at all. The fact that we keep coming back to contesting Gerson's interpretations indicates that this thread has stayed on-topic.

there is actually quite a strong relationship between traditional philosophy and modern culture.
— Wayfarer

Interesting. Where do you mostly find this connection? How different would you expect them to be? Doesn't it depend on what is meant by the terms? — Amity

Actually I went back and re-wrote that passage, it was the opposite of what I had meant to say. I meant to say there's a strong tension between traditional philosophy and modern culture (hence I added the word 'suspicion'.)

It seems that there is indeed a rewinding of time and progress. Or is this all of an eternal cycle and we should expect it? Is this something we can fight against...? — Amity

It's a very tricky issue. I went to University with a convinced proponent of 'the traditionalists' who introduced me to them, including René Guenon and Frithjof Schuon. Guenon was a Frenchman who migrated to Egypt and wrote on esoteric and Eastern philosophy, his Wiki entry was here. I was quite favourably disposed towards him, but when I heard that Steve Bannon was quoting him I was appalled, as I despise his form of 'conservatism' (if indeed that is what it is). I've done some more reading and changed my view a little - there's a good scholarly book on 'the perennialists' called Against the Modern World, Mark Sedgewick. It makes their antagonism towards modernity and liberalism pretty clear. Nevertheless I think they're worth knowing about - I heard Bernardo Kastrup railing against them recently, that they're a cult movement with no scholarly integrity, but I don't agree with that, either.

In any case, they're hardly the only ones who are 'against modernity'. There are many critiques of post-Enlightenment philosophy, including some from the New Left (see the Critique of Instrumental Reason). Although I'm an advocate for science, economic progress and political liberalism, I also think it has a dark side which needs to be called out, as we're so deeply embedded in it that we're not aware of it. That's why, even despite that misogyny and autocratic tendencies in Plato, his criticisms remain significant.

I knew there was a good reason I didn't live in Sydney! — tim wood

Don't worry! You could live your whole life in Sydney, as I have, but never cross paths with a migrating eel. I only know about it because I read of it in the Sydney Morning Herald. (Although I have observed them stealing pieces of bread that the visitors feed to the ducks when I've visited Centennial Park.)

My only point was to argue that the view we have that 'purpose' is solely the prerogative of conscious agents is a very narrow one.

And on a similar note, there is actually quite a strong relationship between traditional philosophy and suspicion of modern culture. Traditional philosophy is, well, traditionalist, and much of it does tend to be conservative. I noticed when I studied the so-called ‘traditionalist movement’ in European philosophy, that some of it - Julius Evola being an example - was quite close to fascist in its orientation. I myself am not drawn to anything of the kind but then I can also see why some taken-for-granted elements of modern liberalism would be impossible to reconcile with tradition.

Those were the times. Initially, that is one of the reasons I didn't 'take' to Plato and those that followed his tradition. Exclusive and elitist. — Amity

Indeed but much can be lost by judging the past by today’s standards. I was never much moved by the complaints about the cultural hegemony of dead white males.

If that is not your objection, then what is? — Janus

So you would agree with the statement ‘all design is artificial’?

Doesn’t address my question. Is everything designed of human origin?

Honestly I still don't see the obsession people have with Michelle Obama, — Mr Bee

Nostalgia for Barrack.

Trump was already president for four years. He didn't put people in camps — fishfry

His policy of splitting migrant families resulted with many children being interred away from their families.

Trump is Trump, I get you don't like the guy — fishfry

My liking him or not is irrelevant. His danger to democracy is not a matter of opinion. He’s not only a terrible person, he’s a dreadful leader, his only policy is retribution. His speeches are horrific and contain nothing about policy as such, only threats and fear-mongering. How you can fall for his schtick beats me.

Biden is not ‘a husk’. He’s been an effective senator and president, but he needs to pass the torch.

//

I note today that Gavin Newsom is acting as party whip for Biden. I believe he’s totally sincere in so doing, but also that he’s ideally positioned to step up if the torch is passed.

Good and cogent post in my opinion. At risk of some crossover from Tim Wood’s post on the nature of purpose, which seems to have some convergence with this one, I would add the following question.

I’ve noted in Richard Dawkins’ polemics the distinction between ‘real’ and ‘apparent’ design. This is crucial to him, of course, because purposelessness is central to his books such as Unweaving the Rainbow and The Blind Watchmaker. According to this view, what appears to us as marvellously designed in nature, really is due to the accretion of many incremental changes that occur over immense time-scales giving rise to what he calls ‘the appearance of design’. I wonder if that is also analogous to the discussion here about the nature of purpose, and whether there is any real purpose sans an intentional agent to enact it, as the same considerations will apply here also.

Now the question I have for Dawkins (and feel free to answer on his behalf if so inclined) is that, does his view entail that the only real designs are those created by humans, as humans are, to our knowledge, the only ‘intentional designers’ that we know of? That does appear a consequence of his view.

Given that Dawkins is a committed naturalist, it seems there might be a fundamental discontinuity in positing that human intentionality, a product of natural evolution, creates 'real' design, while natural processes can only produce 'apparent' design. How do we reconcile this distinction with a naturalistic view that sees humans and their capabilities as entirely natural phenomena, while at the same time denying that nature herself displays or generates designs as such?

It might be argued that human intentionality and the ability to design are emergent properties of complex natural systems. In this sense, human design is an advanced form of the same natural processes that create the appearance of design in nature. But in that case, it is contradictory to declare that design in nature is only apparent, as it is the basis of the human ability to design, which is made manifest in us, but is at least real as a potential in many natural forms.

This is why I keep going back to the question - does the assertion of the existence of purpose (or design or intention) in nature, necessarily imply that there must be a purposeful agency other than human agency? Because it seems the inevitable entailment of such a claim. Likewise, the requirement that Dawkins has to deny the intentionality of design in nature stems from his atheist philosophy.

we also learned that some animal behaviour is "hard-wired," instinctual - I do not know if that is still a valid viewpoint - and if so, then it seems fair to ask at such times what exactly is doing the intending or what it even means. — tim wood

I agree that it’s a very murky question, but I think there’s something fishy about it too. Sorry about the mixed metaphor, but speaking of murky and fishy, but a story that’s fascinated me is the account of the long-finned eels in Sydney’s Centennial Park. They live in murky ponds in the middle of said park, which is quite a few kilometres from the ocean. But every so often, at night and when it’s very wet, they’ll begin a migratory trek through a route that takes them across open parkland into some ponds connected to Sydney’s Botany Bay (hence their preference for wet evenings). And then they’ll make their way to a deep ocean trench near New Caledonia, which is about 1,800 km from Sydney, to breed. Their larval offspring then drift around for a few years, becoming elvers, and then when reaching their adult form, will make their way back to Sydney’s Centennial Park - even though they, as individuals, have never been there. But they know. Instinct, I guess.

There are many examples of migrating animals doing things like this - Pacific Salmon (or is it Atlantic? Whatever), who make their way back to their home stream from across thousands of miles of ocean. Birds who fly from the Arctic to Tasmania to breed. Obviously they don’t consciously calculate anything in the way a human would, but it makes me wonder whether how well we really understand what ‘instinct’ is, and how much of nature depends on these ‘instinctive’ processes. They’re not intentional processes, in the sense that human agents understand it, So in some sense they’re ‘intentional’ but also unconscious. (Schopenhauer devotes a section of WWI to this.)

But to try and tie this back to some of the points I brought up earlier, I’m wondering if it suggests a sense in which intentionality (or ‘will’ in Schopenhauer’s sense) is manifested at the most basic level of organic life. I don’t want to say that it is, but I think it’s an interesting question, and that it relates to questions of purpose and intentionality on a larger scale than the intentional actions of conscious agents.

He was from another epoch with a vastly different ‘weltanschauung’. But there are elements of Plotinus’ philosophy that remain vital in my view

To return to Gerson and the passage I quoted above: what do you think he means by the remark ‘you could not think if materialism was true’? Do you see how he appeals to Aristotle’s De Anima in support of that argument? Do you think it’s a valid point?

Quite so. I understand that Aristotle's 'hyle' was originally 'lumber' or 'timber', signifying the kind of generic material substance from which any particular might be formed. Interesting etymological point: 'matter' is derived from the same Indo-european root as 'mother', signifying the passive/receptive, 'that which is acted upon'. Form, then, is what 'actualises' the potential of matter to exist, because insofar as matter is formless, it can't be said to exist. (There's actually an ancient provenance to that idea, wherein Zeus is the 'creative principle' and earth the 'mother' - something I learned from Mircea Eliade's writings. This is reflected in the religious imagery of 'God the father'.)

In any case, the outlines of the general idea, and how matter came to be accorded primacy in Western culture, is what is of interest to me.

I'll check back in later. — javra

Sorry about that, wrongly transcribed, here it is again https://www.gornahoor.net/library/ThinkingBeing.pdf

I am mainly interested in the chapter on Plato. He shows where the predominant interpretation of the nature of the ideas or forms goes wrong.

I apologize for the dismissive manner I dealt with this upthread. — Paine

No problems at all.

I think I understand what that passage is saying - again it has parallels in Eastern philosophy, for instance in the contrast between the 'upright man' represented by Confucius and civic virtue, and the 'true man of the Way' represented by the taoist sage who 'returns to the source' and often appears as a vagabond or vagrant. It is a passage about the essential and total 'otherness' of the One, beyond all conditioned distinctions and human notions of virtue. It is a recognisable principle in various forms of the perennial philosophy.

But that is quite different to the point I was trying to make, which is the immaterial nature of reason. This is a thread that I picked up first from reading Edward Feser, but then also other neo-thomists that I then read (even if only in snippets and excerpts, as there is a lot of literature.) This is the principle that only the rational human intellect (nous) is able to grasp universals (kinds, types or species) which are the basis of rational thought. And that the rejection of transcendentals is one of the underlying factors behind the ascendancy of materialism.

Feser lays it out thus:

As Aristotelians and Thomists use the term, intellect is that faculty by which we grasp abstract concepts (like the concepts man and mortal), put them together into judgments (like the judgment that all men are mortal), and reason logically from one judgment to another (as when we reason from all men are mortal and Socrates is a man to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal). It is to be distinguished from imagination, the faculty by which we form mental images (such as a visual mental image etc...); and from sensation, the faculty by which we perceive the goings on in the external material world and the internal world of the body (such as a visual experience of the computer in front of you, the auditory experience of the cars passing by on the street outside your window, the awareness you have of the position of your legs, etc.).

That intellectual activity -- thought in the strictest sense of the term -- is irreducible to sensation and imagination is a thesis that unites Platonists, Aristotelians, and rationalists of either the ancient Parmenidean sort or the modern Cartesian sort. — Edward Feser

You can see the precedent for this general train of thought in e.g. The Argument from Equals in Phaedo. But it is central to the whole Platonist tradition.

Why is it significant? Because it goes to the point of the immaterial nature of mind (thought, reason) and that it can't be reduced to sensation or imagination. I'm not wishing to argue for Cartesian dualism, but then again, neither does Aristotelian philosophy (as described in another of Feser's blog posts). But I think this is the vital point at issue in the 'debate between Platonism and naturalism' that Gerson is describing.

In that sense of the physics already being self-organising, we are half-way there with the physical potentials that a modelling organism then harnesses for it ends. — apokrisis

Yes, I suppose I can see that.

I was after clear signs of just plain intelligence — tim wood

Birds and other animals surely exhibit intentional behaviour. What they don’t exhibit is the rational, abstract and meta-cognitive awareness of h. sapiens. But the excerpt shows how intentional, purposeful acts don't necesssarily require the latter and that intentionality has a much broader scope than what we think of as conscious intentionality.

The steadfast global purpose to the evolution of life is that of life’s optimal conformity to that which is actual and, hence, real. — javra

:100: I've been reading about the ideal of the mind's conformity with actuality and the distinction between 'conforms with' and 'corresponds to'. Compare with the Platonic principle 'to be, is to be intelligible.' See Eric D Perl Thinking Being.

I was talking to Baars back in the 90s at the same time I was talking to Friston — apokrisis

Interview with Friston on Curt Jaimungul's Theories of Everything.

I'm sure most pet owners can tell many like stories, clear examples of intelligence and even a sense of humor. — tim wood

The following extended passage about the chaffinch (a small finch) comes from a 1927 description by the British ornithologist Edward Max Nicholson (quoted in E.S. Russell’s 1934 book The Behaviour of Animals):

Here the male must leave the flock, if he has belonged to one, and establish himself in a territory which may at the time be incapable of sustaining him alone, but must later in the season supply a satisfactory food-supply for himself, his mate and family, and against as many birds of other species as overlap his sphere of influence. He must then sing loudly and incessantly for several months, since, however soon he secures a mate, trespassers must be warned off the territory, or, if they ignore his warning, driven out. His mate must help with the defence of the territory when she is needed; pairing must be accomplished; a suitable site must be found for the nest; materials must be collected and put together securely enough to hold five bulky young birds; eggs must be laid in the nest and continuously brooded for a fortnight till they hatch, often in very adverse weather; the young are at first so delicate that they have to be brooded and encouraged to sleep a great part of the time, yet they must have their own weight of food in a day, and in proportion as the need of brooding them decreases their appetites grow, until in the end the parents are feeding four or five helpless birds equal to themselves in size and appetite but incapable of digesting nearly such a wide diet. Enemies must be watched for and the nest defended and kept clean. When the young scatter, often before they can fly properly, they need even greater vigilance, but within a few days of the fledging of the first brood a second nest will (in many cases) be ready and the process in full swing over again. All this has to be done in face of great practical difficulties by two creatures, with little strength and not much intelligence, both of whom may have been hatched only the season before.

Here, too, organized behavior reflects the interests and needs, the perception, and the future requirements, of agents carrying out highly effective, end-directed activity. To be sure, the bird is not consciously reflecting upon its situation. But...we make sense of what happens by interpreting it as a series of reasonable responses to the bird’s ever-changing life context — all in the light of its own ends. While we cannot view the bird as inferring, deducing, and deciding, it is nevertheless recognizing and responding to elements of significance in its environment. There is a continual and skillful adjustment to a perceived surround that is never twice the same surround. — Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Purposes of Life

And let’s not forget the Congressional Oversight Committee which spent, or rather wasted, several years trying to dig dirt on Joe Biden, only to see all their witnesses turn on them on the stand or being charged for lying to the FBI. Nothing, nada, zilch.

Then review The Whitehouse For Sale report which found Trump made $6 million in emoluments from Chinese and Arabian interests while in office.

I ask you to introspect about your sentiments regarding Biden — fishfry

I only made the remark about medical factors causing Biden to retire, because I think he ought to retire. Like a lot of people, I think the public perception of him being 'too old' is a factor which might cause him to loose. If I were an American elector, and Biden was the candidate, I'd vote for him. I'm just concerned that many others won't, and as I've already said, I believe the re-election of Donald Trump would be an unqualified disaster for the United States and the rest of the world. Nobody's been 'covering anything up' about Biden. He's never been an orator, he often had verbal stumbles and gaffes throughout his career. So what? The Washington Post kept a daily tally of Trump's lies in his first term which topped out at some number around 38,000 (correction, 30,583) so don't talk about 'deception'. Anyway Im not going to discuss it with you, if you can't see Trump's obvious malfeasance then there's obviously no point.

enabling the Democrats' fraud — fishfry

:lol:

"I just need 11,686 votes".....

You and all the other Dems who are shocked, shocked that Biden's suffering the age-related cognitive impairment that was apparent in 2019. — fishfry

And I don’t believe that for a minute. Biden was quite capable of executing his first term, and did so with distinction.

What side are YOU on? — fishfry

Whatever side represents the rule of law and upholds the constitution. The side which didn’t attempt the overthrow of the Government and the subversion of the election.

I believe Biden has lost the confidence of many in the electorate and that the Democratic party ought to have selected a younger candidate. That said, though, I’ve never believed that Trump ought to have been allowed to run, considering his obvious malfeasance.

I think the answer will be: many abstentations, and that this will favour Trump, as his voters are enthusiastic.

It seems clear that Biden can't be forced out of the race - unlike in a parliamentary democracy such as Australia's or Great Britian's, there's no provision for the 'vote of no confidence' of the kind which brought down Boris Johnson. The only two things that can change that is that he changes his mind, or is declared unfit on medical grounds (which seems not altogether impossible.)

Trump is unanimously designated 'the worst US President' by a board of academic historians. If Biden runs and looses, he will be relegated to the place just behind him on that ladder, for having paved the way for the MAGA overthrow of the constitutional order (even despite his policy achievements and accomplishments.)

What do you want and expect from philosophy? — Fooloso4

I take the term ‘philosophy’ to denote, not just the general definition as ‘love of wisdom’, but also the state ‘loving wisdom’ (akin to loving kindness). Surveying the state of humanity, generally, it is abundantly obvious that the love of wisdom, and the state of being it denotes, is rare and hardly valued. On the other hand, delusion and self-deception seem to be in abundant supply, both amongst ordinary individuals and amongst many heads of state and leaders of society. Perhaps one role of philosophy is in pointing that out.

What, in a ‘consumer society’, is valued more than material abundance, comfort and convenience, progress and novelty? What ultimate end do we entertain, beyond a long life, free of illness and disturbance? What vision of humanity’s place in the cosmos does our culture encourage, other than technocratic domination and the distant hope of escaping Earth itself? What does philosophy stand for in such a world, beyond the enculturation of the skills required for such pursuits?

Rather than this leading to nihilistic skepticism, in the absence of knowledge Socrates asks us to consider what it is that is best for us to believe as true. This not for the sake of the truth but for the sake of the soul. — Fooloso4

Might it not be the case that any kind of higher truth can only be grasped by those capable and prepared? That some form of philosophical ascent might be required? Isn’t that the meaning of ‘anagoge’? What was the aim of Plato’s Academy? It was the pursuit of knowledge, particularly in the realms of philosophy, mathematics, and science. Plato believed in the importance of rigorous intellectual inquiry to understand the underlying principles of reality and to achieve knowledge of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good.

The Academy emphasized the dialectics, seen as crucial for achieving philosophical understanding. Mathematics was a core component of the Academy’s curriculum. The entrance to the Academy is famously inscribed with “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here.” Dianoia, mathematical and geometrical knowledge, was higher than opinion, but lower than noesis, direct intuitive insight into the ideas.

The Academy aimed to educate individuals not only in intellectual matters but also in moral virtues, aiming to cultivate wise and virtuous leaders. The Academy functioned as a community of scholars engaged in collective study and dialogue. It was not just a place for passive learning but an active intellectual community where ideas were debated and developed.

Plato saw the Academy as a place to train future statesmen and leaders. He believed that those who understood philosophical truths were best equipped to govern society justly and effectively. The principles and aims of the Academy were heavily influenced by the teachings of Socrates, Plato’s mentor. The Socratic emphasis on questioning, ethics, and the examined life shaped the educational approach of the Academy.

So - what about that curriculum might amount to an ‘edifying myth’?

Quite a few people still believe that this is attainable. — Tarskian

Quite a few straw people, I suspect.

:up:

I wonder if I might elicit a comment from you about a previous OP of mine, which I believe might be closer to the point of your criticism of positivism:

'Scientific method relies on the ability to capture the measurable attributes of objects, in such a way as to be able to make quantitative predictions about them. This has been characteristic of science since Galileo, who distinguished those characteristics of bodies that can be made subject to rigourous quantification. These are designated the 'primary attributes' of objects, and distinguished, by both Galileo and Locke, from their 'secondary attributes', which are held to be 'in the mind of the observer'. They are also, and not coincidentally, the attributes which are specifically amenable to the treatment of mathematical physics, which lies under so many of the spectacular successes of science since Galileo.

This was part of the essential discovery of the 'scientific revolution': that insofar as you can represent an object mathematically, that you can use mathematical logic to predict its behaviour. The greater the amenability of an object to mathematical description, the more accurate the prediction can be: hence the high estimation of physics as the paradigm of an 'exact science'.

Bertrand Russell said that 'physics is mathematical not because we know so much about the physical world, but because we know so little; it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover.' And within the domain of applied mathematics, the applicability of mathematical logic to all kinds of objects yields nearly all of the power of scientific method. But Russell makes a philosophically important point, that the power of mathematics in the physical world depends on a fundamental abstraction, a boiling down to its precisely-quantifiable attributes.

In other words, what can be expressed in quantitative terms can also be subordinated to mathematical analysis and, so, to logical prediction and control. It becomes computable, countable, and predictable by mathematical logic. That is of the essence of the so-called 'universal science' envisaged on the basis of Cartesian algebraic geometry.'

That is much nearer to what I think you have in your sights, rather than pure mathematics as such.

Positivists are like that. — Tarskian

Sure. I’ve always rejected positivism, although for different reasons. I see positivism as being a kind of undercurrent in modern thought. But I don't know if Hilbert fits the bill. Hilbert's work in mathematics and his foundational program, known as Hilbert's program, aimed to provide a solid foundation for all of mathematics by formalizing it and proving its consistency using finitary methods. This goal aligns more with a foundationalist approach rather than with positivism per se.

Positivism, particularly as developed by the Vienna Circle in the early 20th century, emphasizes empirical science and the idea that meaningful statements are either empirically verifiable or logically necessary.

Hilbert was more concerned with the internal consistency and formalization of mathematics rather than the empirical verification of mathematical statements. His program sought to ground mathematics on a set of axioms and prove its consistency through purely syntactic means, without reference to empirical content.

I did a unit on A J Ayer's Language Truth and Logic, which is a canonical text of positivism, and found it immensely annoying. I was pleased to learn that it had became evident not long after its publication, that Ayer's style of positivism was self-contradictory, because the kind of verificationism that he insisted on, could neither be validated nor falsified by empirical methods. So it failed its own criteria! My tutor said it was like the mythical Uroboros, the snake that eats itself. 'The hardest part', he would say with a wink 'is the last bite.'

But while there are some overlaps in the emphasis on formalism and logic, Hilbert's aims were distinct from the broader philosophical tenets of positivism.

So I agree with your rejection of positivism, but not for your reasons.