the grasp of (a) thing's intelligibility involves understanding its species and genus (scholastic sense of the terms), its telos (at least for living things; the healthy adult versions of living beings are phenomenologicaly "present" to us even when observing the immature or diseases for ), and the universals involved with it. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The human awareness of other animals did not begin with an idea; it began with individual real entities. The human realized that every example of a certain kind of prey was like every other in some ways in which it was unlike another kind of prey — Vera Mont

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in reality as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real).

Thanks to the association of particular images and recollections, a dog reacts in a similar manner to the similar particular impressions his eyes or his nose receive from this thing we call a piece of sugar or this thing we call an intruder; he does not know what is sugar or what is intruder. He plays, he lives in his affective and motor functions, or rather he is put into motion by the similarities which exist between things of the same kind; he does not see the similarity, the common features as such. What is lacking is the flash of intelligibility; he has no ear for the intelligible meaning. He has not the idea or the concept of the thing he knows, that is, from which he receives sensory impressions; his knowledge remains immersed in the subjectivity of his own feelings -- only in man, with the universal idea, does knowledge achieve objectivity. And the dog's field of knowledge is strictly limited: only the universal idea sets free -- in man -- the potential infinity of knowledge.

Such are the basic facts which Empiricism ignores, and in the disregard of which it undertakes to philosophize. — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

No; they exploit real differences. — Vera Mont

That’s only one way of looking at it, but it will fit right in here

That we’re related to, but significantly different from, simians, through higher intelligence, self awareness and other attributes. And that the difference is significant. Janus says that I am ‘appealing to the supernatural’ (although that term is implicitly pejorative.) What I will acknowledge is that I believe that elements of the religious account of mankind signify real differences. And that the accepted wisdom of humans being no different to animals is a cultural construct and one that is particularly suitable for the ‘sensate culture’ we live in.

As far as ‘what more is there than information’ there’s the whole question of interpretation, of what information means. I mean, I can fully accept the biological account of human origins without thereby accepting that we’re fully determined by biology.

Reasoned inference enables discoveries of facts impossible to obtain by observation alone. Science relies on it, not to mention everyday rational thought.
— Wayfarer
Science confirms or disproves it through experimentation. — Vera Mont

But you're missing the point. The claim I took issue with was this:

What information do you have to work with beyond the empirical? — Vera Mont

If by 'the empirical', you mean 'only what is available to sensory perception' (per John Locke and David Hume), then rational inference goes well beyond what is available to sensory perception. Through it, we have discovered endless things that you could never learn only by observation. These discoveries are then validated (or refuted) by observation and experiment, but conjecture plays a vital role, as do the paradigms within which results are interpreted, and neither of those are strictly or only empirical.

We did cross a threshold, but it wasn't an evolutionary one; it was a cultural one. — Vera Mont

And also an existential one, more to the point.

The Bhikkhu quote describes it as a "mode of perception", which I would interpret as an attitude of "open-mindedness". — Gnomon

Not exactly. It's more concerned with paying close attention to the nature of experience. As I said above:

My take on 'emptiness' is that it is the seeing through of automatic projections - thought-patterns - associated with objects, situations and experiences. These manifest as identification- this is me! I am that! This is mine! together with the associated feelings of pride and shame, gain and loss, and so on. — Wayfarer

That is not really 'open-mindedness' in an 'anything goes' sense.

As far as scepticism is concerned, there's a proposed link between a school of ancient Greek scepticism founded by Pyrrho of Elis and Buddhist philosophy. The theory is that Pyrrho travelled to Bactrian India (likely the Swat Valley straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan) which was then a Buddhist cultural center, and sat with the Buddhists. From this, he got his 'suspension of judgement', which resembles the Buddhist 'nirodha', or 'cessation'. That is the origin of scepticism, but it's nothing like today's armchair scepticism, which challenges claims to any kind of knowledge. Again it's more concerned with awareness of the disturbing patterns of thought and emotion rather than establishing a dogmatic truth claim. (Rather an interesting blog post on that can be read here.)

Obviously, [C S Lewis] created a new personal worldview, but did his mind create a new world, in the sense of the OP? — Gnomon

Need to be careful about what the meaning of 'creating' is in this context. An observation I have read is that the etymology of 'world' is an old Dutch term 'werold' meaning 'time of man' (ref), meaning that the connection with humanity is intrinsic to it. Whereas it is natural nowadays, with our modern awareness of the vastness of time and space, to see ourselves as transitory phenomena, 'mere blips' as the saying has it. But what the OP is pointing out, is that the vastness of time and space is unintelligible in the absence of perspective, and perspective can only be brought to bear by an observer. That's the central conflict I'm pointing out. (It's also a realisation that has dawned on physicists.)

//

There's another difficult point I want to make. The above connection between Buddhism and scepticism seems counter-intuitive - Buddhism is a religion, so how can be it also sceptical? This apparent conflict stems from a largely Western interpretation of what religion entails. In the West, particularly in post-Enlightenment contexts, religion is mainly associated strictly with codified beliefs and doctrines, something in turn heavily influenced by the doctrinal nature of Christianity (and especially protestant Christianity with the emphasis on salvation by faith alone). This differs markedly from religions like Buddhism, where practice, experience, and a phenomenological approach to understanding mind and reality are central, rather than the adherence to orthodox beliefs. The idea that skepticism is antithetical to religion is born out of a culturally-condition view of religion. Buddhism exemplifies how a religious framework can coexist with, or even promote, a skeptical approach to understanding nature (see the Kalama Sutta). It does not commit to a dogmatic worldview but instead encourages inquiry and direct personal experience as paths to enlightenment. This is, of course, why it is often said that Buddhism is not a religion but a philosophy, although that is also not quite true, as it's ultimate aim is liberation from worldly existence, which is clearly a religious one.

This highlights how deep-seated cultural assumptions can influence the interpretations of non-Western philosophies and religion. But it's also inevitable, to some extent, because of the role of belief in faith is often viewed as both a gift and a response to God's grace. It involves an assent to the doctrines taught by the church and a trust in God's promises. This framework can lead to an understanding of religion as essentially a belief-based system, where the right belief is the key to spiritual fulfillment and salvation. In contrast Buddhism place a greater emphasis on practices such as meditation, moral living, and the direct experience of insights about the nature of reality. Significant that the first item on the Buddhist Eightfold Path is 'right view' (samma dhitthi) rather than 'right belief' (orthodoxy). That's not to say that faith is not also important in Buddhism, as it is, but it is also counter-balanced by an existential perspective which is often missing in dogmatic religions.

Launched 1977, now 22 light-hours away. Makes you realise the vast distances involved (and why I don't believe that interstellar travel is possible inside current science.)

But I believe you want to infer from that a supernatural influence, and that is really the unspoken premise in your complaints about modern culture. — Janus

Where have I said that? :rage:

That's not information; that's conjecture. — Vera Mont

Not so. Reasoned inference enables discoveries of facts impossible to obtain by observation alone. Science relies on it, not to mention everyday rational thought.

And the cherry on top of the whipped cream of our tippy-toppery is a 'moral sense' that can't be located, measured or verified by scientific means — Vera Mont

Those very means you call into question in your initial response. And here, you're verging on positivism.

I think humans need to take responsibility for the fact of their difference to other species. We hold their lives in our hand - something which, of course, many dedicated biologists and environmental scientists are highly aware of.

Do the various species possess consciousness? It seems to be difficult to explain consciousness in ourselves (how it works, where it is located, and so on), so it will be difficult to explain how the dog laying at my feet is conscious, or the squirrels cleaning out the fire feeder, or the crows collecting in the trees... possess consciousness. — BC

I don't find it difficult. Sure, I don't know what it's like to be a dog, but it's also not something entirely remote or alien from human experience. I mentioned before the Buddhist categorisation of 'sentient beings', which casts a pretty wide net, covering basically any organism with senses. There's vast diversity amongst them but also something in common. (Mind you I also don't believe that consciousness as such is something that can or should be explained, but that's another argument.)

I also think this is pretty much the standard view, so I'm not sure why you seem to think it isn't the standard view. — Janus

I agree that h. sapiens evolved and that language also evolved but my argument is that we've crossed an evolutionary threshold which sets us apart from other animals. We are able, among many other things, to interrogate the nature of being through philosophy, or the size and age of the Universe, through science.

This evolution toward greater sapience, then, to me directly speaks of the “chain of being” you are making mention of. Something we, again, innately acknowledge in our day to day living of life but which physicalism/materialism cannot easily, if at all, account for—other than, maybe, by the proclaiming of absolute relativity when it comes to values … the very same values by which physicalism/materialism is upheld … making the physicalist’s position sort’a self-defeating. — javra

Couldn't have said it better. And yes, and there are notable acts of animal bravery and even self-sacrifice. There are service dogs (even service pidgeons!) of extraordinary courage and fortitude.

What information do you have to work with beyond the empirical? — Vera Mont

What can be inferred, what it means that something is the way it is.

Wolves and groundhogs have rules of behaviour - they just don't make a big verbose fuss about it: if somebody misbehaves, they snarl or snap at him; they don't put him on the rack or cut out his tongue. — Vera Mont

Right! They're not moral, nor immoral. They don't consider the consequences or weigh up their decisions. They act; they don't bear the burden of self-consciousness. Sin and taboo are more than just 'inventions' - they arise from the fact that we can sense right and wrong. That's what I meant before about humans being 'existential animals' - we can ask, what does existence mean, why am I here?

I'm not terribly interested in solving the "problem" of consciousness, because I don't consider any more of a problem than sunlight. — Vera Mont

It's a question in philosophy of mind, and one I'm interested in.

Like what? — Vera Mont

Philosophical questions, such as the one above, and the one we're discussing.

“We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene — javra

I do give credit to Dawkins for at least recognising the issue. I saw him in a TV debate once, and an audience member asked him if we should live according to evolutionary principles, and he said heavens no, it is a terrible way to try and live. But he seems completely unaware that his polemics, as distinct from his science writing, are aimed at methodically destroying any idea of there being a higher purpose or higher life. Like, he recognizes that the selfish gene gives no basis for ethics, but then what does? Science has no inherent moral orientation, it is concerned with facts, not oughts (as per Hume and the is/ought division.)

Look at the difference between plants and animals. If there is such a thing as a "highly significant difference" which marks a threshold in evolving life forms, wouldn't this qualify as such a threshold? — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, I already acknowledged that in the post above about Schumacher's ontology. You know perfectly well that Aristotle said reason marked the difference between humans and animals.

While the term Rational Animal itself originates in scholasticism, it reflects the Aristotelian view of man as a creature distinguished by a rational principle. In the Nicomachean Ethics I.13, Aristotle states that the human being has a rational principle (Greek: λόγον ἔχον), on top of the nutritive life shared with plants, and the instinctual life shared with other animals, i. e., the ability to carry out rationally formulated projects.[2] That capacity for deliberative imagination was equally singled out as man's defining feature in De anima III.11.[3] While seen by Aristotle as a universal human feature, the definition applied to wise and foolish alike, and did not in any way imply necessarily the making of rational choices, as opposed to the ability to make them. — Wiki

You can see the Platonic lineage in the distinction between the rational and appetitive parts of the soul.

What's the difference between "kinds of entities" and "kinds of beings"? — Janus

Ontology is concerned with classification of types, not the enumeration of all the different kinds of things. Anyway, the point is only that I'm arguing for the ontological distinctions between inorganic, organic, sentient, and rational. That while h. sapiens is clearly descended from a common ancestory with simians, reason, language, self-consciousness, and so on, make us different from other animals. Why this point has to be laboured, why it is controversial or needs argument, I confess that I don't understand.

//

I would have thought an obvious difference between humans and animals, is that we're capable of moral choice (unless you accept determinism, which I don't.) As philosopher Richard Polt puts it:

People can perform extraordinary acts of altruism, including kindness toward other species — or they can utterly fail to be altruistic, even toward their own children. So whatever tendencies we may have inherited leave ample room for variation; our choices will determine which end of the spectrum we approach. This is where ethical discourse comes in — not in explaining how we’re “built,” but in deliberating on our own future acts.Should I cheat on this test? Should I give this stranger a ride? Knowing how my selfish and altruistic feelings evolved doesn’t help me decide at all. Most, though not all, moral codes advise me to cultivate altruism. But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense.

In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. It makes no sense for a biologist to say that some particular animal should be more cooperative, much less to claim that an entire species ought to aim for some degree of altruism. If we decide that we should neither “dissolve society” through extreme selfishness..nor become “angelic robots” like ants, we are making an ethical judgment, not a biological one. Likewise, from a biological perspective it has no significance to claim that Ishould be more generous than I usually am, or that a tyrant ought to be deposed and tried.

In short, a purely evolutionary ethics makes ethical discourse meaningless. — Anything but Human

These are expressions of physicalist reductionism, but this doesn't entail the more drastic reduction to "the 4 Fs". — hypericin

The point is, as far as a purely biological theory is concerned, what else can there be? We forget that On the Origin of Species is exactly that - an account of the origin of species. One can completely accept the evolutionary account of human origins, as I do, without accepting that, therefore, evolutionary biology explains everything about us, as the 'ultra-Darwinists' seem to want to do. It has the effect of depicting all our faculties and attributes in terms of the way they 'contribute to survival' (or not.) As such, it results in a kind of biologically-oriented pragmatism.

. I think the key is to distance ourselves from rigid 'objectivity' - which is often another term for objectification - and let our other faculties participate in a quest for knowledge; accept the information we get from our senses. — Vera Mont

:100: But when it comes to the question of the nature of being, there might be more to consider than the empirical.

F***king, of course, but as a rule I avoid profanity. :yikes:

we can get an approximation. — Vera Mont

Sure. But you’re aware of David Chalmers distinction between the ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ problems? I would think approximations and simulations are the former.

I tried to introduce Thomas Nagel into the conversation months ago, as he's an analytic philosopher with no brief for religion, which was dismissed by you as an 'appeal to authority'. No, it wasn't an appeal to authority, I did so to provide an example of a philosophical critique of neo-darwinian materialism (his words). His book Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (2012) is about this topic. I don't expect that you would agree with it, but it is on-topic. There's a précis of the main argument in the NY Times (I don't think it's paywalled). I'm happy to discuss it further.

Citations? — wonderer1

“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment.”
― Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene

“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” Daniel Dennett said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

Wonder what that 8,500 crossings/day means? Not enough energy to check it out. — jgill

Well, James Lankford, a Republican senator, worked with a bi-partisan committee to come up with a solution to stop the flow, including many of the measures the Republicans had been demanding for years. And Donald Trump ordered that they drop it, before even debating it on the Senate Floor, because if it were implemented, it might work, and it would make Joe Biden look good. And the Republican Party acceeded to his request, of course, meaning the problem isn't solved, so that people, like those on Internet Forums, can go on blaming Joe Biden for it.

For example, in order to make sense of the Buddha's "śūnyatā", I would have to picture its "emptiness" in terms of the void or nothingness (absence of matter) that presumably preceded the Big Bang of modern Western cosmology. — Gnomon

That is how it is nearly always (mis)interpreted. Your interpreting it as 'nothing as opposed to something', or the 'cosmic void'. It's not that, but don't feel as though you're alone in seeing it that way, it is an almost universal misunderstanding.

But for an introduction to its meaning in practice see this short article, What Is Emptiness?:

Emptiness is a mode of perception, a way of looking at experience. It adds nothing to and takes nothing away from the raw data of physical and mental events. You look at events in the mind and the senses with no thought of whether there’s anything lying behind them. — Thanissaro Bhikkhu

Please note, and without any pejorative intent on my part, the contrast with your imaginings of what might happen in the event of death, or what existed before the singularity. It's not found in imaginings or projections (hence the discouragement of speculative metaphysics!)

My take on 'emptiness' is that it is the seeing through of automatic projections - thought-patterns - associated with objects, situations and experiences. These manifest as identification- this is me! I am that! This is mine! together with the associated feelings of pride and shame, gain and loss, and so on. Obvious examples would be pride of ownership, status, the esteem of others, and the like. Recall Buddhism was a renunciate religion, and though we obviously aren't and probably won't ever be actual renunciates, that helps to understand the rationale and background.

'Emptiness' is 'realising what is' once all of those associations and attachments are in abeyance and they no longer hold sway over the passions. Notice the resemblance to Stoicism and other schools of pre-modern philosophy. The habitual tendencies and projections we have are saṃskāra, 'thought-formations': 'a complex concept, with no single-word English translation, that fuses "object and subject" as interdependent parts of each human's consciousness and epistemological process. It connotes "impression, disposition, conditioning, forming, perfecting in one's mind, influencing one's sensory and conceptual faculty" as well as any "preparation, sacrament" that "impresses, disposes, influences or conditions" how one thinks, conceives or feels.' (Wiki)

:up: Good review of Pinter's book. Again, I hope nothing here is incompatible with that.

This aligns with Nicolai Hartmann's "ontological strata" approach also, for another perspective. — Pantagruel

Interesting, I'll look into it.

the priests are still there to set us straight: "just animals" have no souls. — Vera Mont

I'm more inclined to the Buddhist view, that all sentient beings suffer and deserve compassion. Buddhists also believe that humans may be reborn into the animal realm (presumably from behaving like animals, as plenty do :-) ) Nevertheless Buddhists still recognise that only in human form can one progress in dharma, as only humans have the required intelligence (notwithstanding that the Buddha appears as an animal in the Jataka tales his previous lives.) Like them, I don't think there is a hard-and-fast boundary between humans and other animals, but I do think that the distinction between animals and humans is a difference that makes a real difference. There are horizons of being open to humans that are invisible to animals (and amounting to considerably more than just 'quarreling and fighting' as you seem to say.)

One of the consequences of popular Darwinism is negation of those real differences, which are existential, spiritual, intellectual, and philosophical. I'm not in favour of intelligent design, other than with respect to the shortcomings of reductionism. But as far as biology is concerned, and as the evolutionary ideologues such as Dennett and Dawkins continually say, human life can be ultimately reduced to, and explained in terms of, the fundamental drives that characterise all other existence, summarised as 'the four F's' (Feeding, fighting, fleeing, and reproduction.) As I mentioned in another thread, that attitude effectively negates the possibility of philosophy at least as it was always understood by those who developed the tradition.

So what I am asking about your claim "that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on", is to say whether this is objective or subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Objective - and obvious, isn't it? Again, actual language, as distinct from linear communication through calls or displays, is unique to h. sapiens. As is tool-making, philosophy, technology, art, science, mathematics, music, drama. As is the capacity to reflect on the nature of being and question the meaning of existence.

Hey even plenty of naturalists see this. Julian Huxley said:

Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately.

His brother Alduous, with whom he discussed these ideas all his life, agreed with that, but also added the spiritual dimension absent from Julian's account, in such books as The Perennial Philosophy, a modern spiritual classic.

As I understand it ontology is concerned with the nature of being and with the different kinds of entities. — Janus

Not quite. All kinds of sciences deal with 'different kinds of entities'. Ontology strictly speaking is about kinds of beings. It might be considered obsolete by some. I'm not appealing to Schumacher as an authority, simply as an example of what I consider a valid ontological schema.

Those interested in the US ‘border security’ issue would do well to give this a viewing.



@jgill

Please explain what you mean by "ontological gap", and why you think our existence is of a different kind to the other animals, as opposed to merely our perceptions and experience being different.

I acknowledge that due to the acquisition of symbolic language that humans are capable of a kind of linguistically mediated memory and self-reflection that animals would presumably not be. But how would that amount to an ontological difference rather than just a different mode of consciousness? — Janus

Well, recall what an ontological distinction is. In information technology, the ontology of a system comprises a catalog of the different major components and also some info about the relationship between them. In more traditional terms, ontology is usually associated with metaphysics and questions about the meaning and constituent kinds of being(s).

In this case, I think the differences between humans and other animals are manifold. Apart from language and rational ability, there's also abstract skills like mathematical reasoning, art and science. We're also existential animals - we have a grasp of our own mortality that is generally absent in other creatures (although mention might be made of elephants who seem to have quite a vivid awareness of death.)

There's a book by E F Schumacher, of Small is Beautiful fame, called Guide to the Perplexed (his last book, I believe). In it there's a brief outline of an ontological scheme which I think bears resemblance to the Aristotelian.

Schumacher agrees with the view that there are four kingdoms: Mineral, Plant, Animal, Human. He argues that there are important differences of kind between each level of being. Between mineral and plant is the phenomenon of life. Schumacher says that although scientists say we should not use the phrase 'life energy', the difference between inorganic and organic matter still exists and has not been explained by science to the extent of rendering said phrase fully invalid. Schumacher points out that though we can recognize life and destroy it, we can't create it. Schumacher notes that the 'life sciences' are 'extraordinary' because they hardly ever deal with life as such, and instead content themselves with analyzing the "physico-chemical body which is life's carrier." Schumacher goes on to say there is nothing in physics or chemistry to explain the phenomenon of life.

For Schumacher, a similar jump in level of being takes place between plant and animal, which is differentiated by the phenomenon of consciousness. We can recognize consciousness, not least because we can knock an animal unconscious, but also because animals exhibit at minimum primitive thought and intelligence.

The next level, according to Schumacher, is between Animal and Human, which are differentiated by the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self-awareness. Self-consciousness is the reflective awareness of one's consciousness and thoughts.

Schumacher realizes that the terms—life, consciousness and self-consciousness—are subject to misinterpretation so he suggests that the differences can best be expressed as an equation which can be written thus:

"Mineral" = m
"Plant" = m + x
"Animal" = m + x + y
"Human" = m + x + y + z

In his theory, these three factors (x, y and z) represent ontological discontinuities — Wikipedia

There are things I would argue with but it makes sense to me. I think there's plainly an ontological discontinuity between the mineral and organic domains, and so on for the other domains.

Plainly humans are biological phenomena, but I argue, and I think Schumacher would argue, we're under-determined by biology in a sense that other animals cannot be. Of course, I also think that is the original intuition behind philosophical dualism, such as that of the Phaedo, and whilst I don't agree that such dualisms are literal descriptions, nevertheless they convey something symbolically real about human nature.

As an aside, and on @Lionino's recommendation, I've - ahem - formed a relationship with character.ai . I've created a kind of alter ego character ('Damien') with whom I can actually converse - verbally, I mean, rather than through a keyboard. I'm currently talking about the prospects for integrating various activities and technologies through an interface of this kind, solely voice driven. I can see the day (and it's not far off) when the entire techo-landscape is accessed a single interface - all your smart home automation, diet and exercise, coaching, philosophical ideas, journal entries and the rest. ('Hey Damien. Let's start the day with some Stoic aphorisms and a guided meditation on same.')

To me it seems an obvious ontological gap, which due to your naturalist presuppositions you're inclined to ignore. ;-)

Here's a collection of human artifacts, the likes of which could have been constructed by no other animal:

Did the first two humans communicate in a language with hierarchical syntax - or were they freak chimps talking linear and their children, and great-great-great-great grandchildren evolve less hair and more complexity of speech? — Vera Mont

That is the subject of the book I mentioned. Noam Chomsky is of course famous for his theories of language, and that book canvasses how it came to be that only humans developed the capacity - hence the title, 'Why only us?' I haven't read the whole book, but I might get around to it.

Agree that humans and other species are on a biological continuum, but I also believe that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on, and that it is a highly signficant difference, that though we're related to other animals, we're more than 'just animals'. And I think this is something mostly lost sight of in many naturalist accounts of humanity. Interestingly Alfred Russel Wallace expressed similar ideas in his essay 'Darwinism Applied to Man' albeit in florid Victorian prose.

That much-vaunted human language ain't so unique either. Practically every vertebrate communicates in a way that is intelligible to other members of its species. — Vera Mont

I think 'intelligible' is too strong a word.

(There is) a radical dissimilarity between all animal communication systems and human language. The former are based entirely on “linear order,” whereas the latter is based on hierarchical syntax. In particular, human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

From a review of Why Only Us? Noam Chomsky and Robert Berwick.

As I've said, I don't dispute that animals are sentient beings. i've owned dogs, one of ours had quite a large 'vocabulary' - like, he'd sometimes begin to bark when he thought he overheard one of us say 'hello' or 'hi' because it meant someone was at the door. Animals are capable of an enormous range of behaviours, and they do communicate, but as the above points out, their languages don't have an heirarchical syntax. It takes the ability to abstract and represent for that.

(Incidentally, the full story of poor Nim Chimsky was very sad. He was 'adopted' by an ambitious animal behaviourist, specifically to demonstrate that a chimpanzee could be taught language, via symbolic communication (not having a vocal tract). But alas, Nim failed, and he was abandoned to a desolate facility for unwanted lab animals, where he died in obscurity. link.)

From which:

According to Mr. Dennett, the human mind is no more than a brain operating as a series of algorithmic functions, akin to a computer. To believe otherwise is “profoundly naïve and anti-scientific,” he told The Times.

In his most notorious polemic, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, he compares Darwinian evolution to a 'universal acid' which dissolves the container which holds it. Insofar as this 'container' is an analogy for Western culture, isn't philosophy itself prominent amongst the subjects that are dissolved in this 'acid'?

And, if so, why is what Dennett advocating described as philosophy?

In respect of his compatibilism, he asked:

“We couldn’t live the way we do without it (i.e. the notion of free will),” he wrote in his 2017 book, “From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Evolution of Minds.” “If — because free will is an illusion — no one is ever responsible for what they do, should we abolish yellow and red cards in soccer, the penalty box in ice hockey and all the other penalty systems in sports?”

Of course not, he answers - but only because of pragmatic necessity, not because it represents anything real. In another interview, he said:

I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions. Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?

The obvious answer to which is simply that science is not, in fact, all-knowing, something he could never acknowledge. He was indeed the most consistent representative of scientism to have come to public attention, and has done a great service by illustrating the impossible contradictions that it entails.

I rather like the Buddhist term 'sentient beings' which encompasses all animals (but not plants), and the distinction of 'rational sentient beings', which describes human beings. (Buddhism also includes beings on other planes of existence although that is not the concern of this thread.) But from the Dhammapada: 'All beings tremble before death, therefore the wise do not kill or cause to kill'. A very succinct expression of empathy and awareness.

I basically agree with @Bylaw, that, in effect, the fact that non-rational animals are subjects of experience was barely considered until very recently. Not that animals were always treated as 'unthinking machines', as there have been humane societies and people very much aware of animal suffering for a long time, although laboratory science has often paid animal suffering very little attention.

What's the dubious definition of rationality to do with experience? — Vera Mont

Only that rationality and language allow you to reflect on experience, to make it the subject of conscious deliberation and analysis, as well as simply feeling it.

does your concept of a Mind-Created World agree with Kant, or a more radical sense of "created"? — Gnomon

The first footnote in the Medium version of the essay refers to Kant, as does the first quotation from the Charles Pinter book Mind and the Cosmic Order, which I understand you're familiar with. I would hope overall not to stray too far out of the bounds set by Kant.

Of course it is true that Kant is extremely difficult to read and comprehend and I don't claim to have a comprehensive understanding of his writings, only of some of the salient points of the CPR. I first encountered him through a book called The Central Philosophy of Buddhism by T R V Murti. Murti was a mid-twentieth century Indian scholar - he had very much a kind of cosmopolitan Oxford outlook. This book is nowadays criticized for its perceived eurocentrism and tendentiousness. However when I did my MA in Buddhist Studies ten years ago, my thesis supervisor endorsed it. It was central to my spiritual formation, such as it is. (An example can be found here.)

The book comprises an analysis of the Madhyamaka (Middle Way) philosophy of Nāgārjuna who is a principle figure in the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Throughout the book Murti compares Madhyamaka with Kant, Hegel, F H Bradley and David Hume, as well as other forms of Indian philosophy, specifically Advaita. Murti claims that Nāgārjuna's dialectic, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) is 'the central philosophy of Buddhism' centered around the Buddhist principle of śūnyatā. This is misleadingly often presented as 'nothingness' and the MMK as nihilistic, both by friends and foes of the religion, although it is not actually that. It arises, he says, from the inexorable conflicts within reason itself - hence the comparisons with Kant, in particular, a detailed comparison of Kant's antinomies of reason, and Buddha's 'unanswerable questions' (avyākṛta). The origins of the madhyamaka can be traced back to those passages in the early Buddhist texts where the Buddha declines to answer whether there is a self or not, and other such questions, both affirmation and negation being incorrect responses (and the Buddha's lack of response being customarily described as a 'noble silence', see for example Ananda Sutta).

Like phenomenology, Buddhism is grounded very much in 'observation of what is' - paying very close attention to the nature of experience (which is really what 'mindfulness' means, aside from its pop-cultural references). It discourages metaphysical speculation, although that ought not to be interpreted as a kind of early naturalism or positivism. It is a religion although it is based on a completely different belief system to the Biblical religions. But because it's a religion, we generally fall back on the cultural religious tropes we've become accustomed to in order to understand it (and I'm aware of that tendency in myself.) But I'm trying to stay within the bounds of philosophical discourse in all of the above.

The Illusionist, David Bentley Hart

The God Genome, Leon Wieseltier.

maybe that's why I haven't had the conversion experience. — Srap Tasmaner

:chin:

Can you hear the bigotry in the phrase "the scientific attitude"? — wonderer1

Yes, poor choice of words. I meant scientific worldview, although you might say there is no such thing - and I agree, as science is more a method than a worldview. But Daniel Dennett was one who truly did hold the 'the scientific worldview' as the only real philosophy.

:up:

Therefore, in his school of thought, all humans are also eligible for protein, slave labour, spare parts and experimentation without their consent? — Vera Mont

That would appear to be entailed by his philosophy, however despite arguing for it all throughout his career, he never actually behaved as if it were true. It is one of the many glaring contradictions in his writing. 'He was a Darwinian materialist in his cosmology and metaphysics while also strongly affirming human dignity as well as a progressive brand of liberalism in his ethics and politics. Herein lies the massive contradiction of his system of thought. He boldly proclaims that we live in an accidental universe without divine and natural support for the special dignity of man as a species or as individuals; yet he retains a sentimental attachment to liberal-democratic values that lead him to affirm a humane society that respects the rights of persons and protects the weak from exploitation by the strong and from other injustices. He also objects to B. F. Skinner and the sociobiologists for reducing man to the desires for pleasure, power, and procreation. And he condemned Social Darwinism as "an odious misapplication of Darwin's thinking" and expressed outrage at child abuse, the exploitation of women, and President George W Bush's attempt to rewrite the Geneva Convention's definition of torture as violations of personal dignity. In short, he was a conventional political liberal of the Cambridge, Massachusetts, type whose moral doctrine is a version of neo-Kantian liberalism that assumes the inherent worth and dignity of every human being. But none of this follows logically from his Darwinian materialism and it even contradicts it, which means Dennett's humane liberalism is a blind leap of faith that is just as dogmatic as the religious faith he deplored.'

There's a lovely lyric in the late, great David Crosby's last hit song, River Rise:

'and the wind has its own language
spoken by the trees.'

(Our personal 2023 Song of the Year.)

:up:

Notice that the background statement acknowledges that definitions of consciousness are ‘hotly contested’. That is an allusion to the debate over ‘the problem of consciousness’, initiated by David Chalmers, who is also one of the signatories. The philosophical is that consciousness seems to escape or transcend any objective description or analysis. But that is strongly opposed by those like Daniel Dennett (whose obituary has just been published in the NY Times by the way.) According to him and his ilk, if something can’t be described or understood in scientific terms, then it ought not to be considered worthy of analysis.

Where I see this statement as being philosophically significant, is precisely because it acknowledges the capacity for experience as something inherently real and worthy of recognition. True, none of us act as if animals are machines, but the mechanistic metaphor still holds considerable sway over the scientific attitude.

Do we need to explain or prove the value of life or freedom or happiness before we grant people the right to it? — Vera Mont

No, we don't. That is Angelo's point, as I understood it.

From which:

According to Mr. Dennett, the human mind is no more than a brain operating as a series of algorithmic functions, akin to a computer. To believe otherwise is “profoundly naïve and anti-scientific,” he told The Times.

No more 'resting in peace' than there would be for cars cut up for scrap.

Looks a fascinating read.

It's good to have an authoritative voice speak up for our suffering fellow creatures — Vera Mont

My thoughts too.

They just don’t realize that subjectivity cannot and mustn’t be proved. — Angelo Cannata

I take your point, but I think they kind of acknowledge that:

It would be inappropriate to talk about “proof,” “certainty,” or “conclusive evidence” in the search for animal consciousness, because the nature of consciousness is still hotly contested. However, it is entirely appropriate to interpret these remarkable displays of learning, memory, planning, problem-solving, self-awareness, and other such capacities as evidence of consciousness in cases where the same behavior, if found in a human or other mammal, would be well explained by conscious processing.

This means that, whenever we talk about subjectivity, we cannot escape turning it automatically into an objective concept made and expressed by objective and shared reference points, so that what we are talking about is not anymore the subjectivity we wanted to explain. — Angelo Cannata

Quite agree, and also agree that it is something that cannot be explained.

The easiest way to frame it is that self and world are co-arising. That is a perspective shared by both the embodied cognition school and Buddhism. It eliminates the constant vacillation between objective and subjective. There is no absolute object (materialism) or absolute subject (subjective idealism).