The example of Daniel Dennett shows that we don't need to be believers to be human. It's the same debate when atheists show that they are able to have humanity, sensitivity, empathy, without needing a religion or a metaphysical morality. I agree with them. When I say that, once we limit ourselves to objectivity, nobody is suffering when someone is tortured, I don't imply that attention to our inexpressible subjectivity is necessary to be human. This would mean posing subjectivity as the basis for a new dogmatic religion. Rather, I think that attention to subjectivity should be considered like art. If someone doesn't have the spirit of a musician, or can't see anything interesting in Van Gogh or Shakespeare, it doesn't mean that that person is a beast ready to kill and torture anybody. Attention to subjectivity is not something that we need, it's not the salvation of humanity. It is just something that some people talk about, refer to.
In this context I think we should acknowledge that there is no way to definitely, strongly, ban violence from human behaviour. This is the confusion contained in the New York declaration. They want to define a scientific ground to ban violence from humanity, but violence is subjective, you cannot avoid it by taking science as your weapon against violence. Dennett was a good hearted person, he didn't need to add anything to his objectivistic mind to be a generous heart, but that's all. The New York declaration is an attempt to go beyond this: they try to turn science into the necessary thing that religions and morality have been revealed unable to be.
This is, I think, where attention to subjectivity can not only do something, but especially show the correct methodology: the correct methodology is integrating in a dialog acceptance of unprovable arguments, of which subjectivity is the main one, and science.
The mixture, the messing up of references to subjectivity and objectivity in the New York declaration is not a completely bad thing: attention to subjectivity and objectivity need to go together, but in a clear dialog, aware of their different characteristics, rather than just in a confused mix, where science is surreptitiously tempted to fill the place that has been left empty by the deconstruction of religions.

Does anyone in the west think that animals are soulless automatons nowadays? From that whole discussion around Descartes that we had, it seemed that that wasn't close to a dominant view even centuries ago. — Lionino

It was actually the dominant default in natural science up into the early 70s. If you officially and/or in papers referred to animals and having motivations, consciousness, desires, etc. you were putting your career on the line. It wasn't exactly that the line was they don't have it, but the default was we don't know and people are confused if they think we do. You could say scientists were allowed to be behaviorists and talk perhaps about drives, but not to assume animals were experiencers.

You could say scientists were allowed to be behaviorists and talk perhaps about drives, but not to assume animals were experiencers. — Bylaw

Until evidence is provided, I will stay unconvinced.

Can you hear the bigotry in the phrase "the scientific attitude"? Do you not recognize scientists as individuals? — wonderer1

You can try, but very few buck the prevailing attitude of their times.
As individual people, scientists start out as little babies. They grow up in an environment of other people, in a culture, in a religious faith, in an economic stratum, in an education system. All those influences precede their identity as 'scientist', and all those influences don't just fall off when they're handed a little scroll on graduation.

In the sciences, as in architecture, music, law or theology, there are periods and prevailing trends. A few giants of the field set the tone for a new period: their radical, original theories are internalized by less creative thinkers; become doctrine in the colleges and taught to the next generation, where they become dogma... Until a new young giant grows up to challenge the status quo and the less creative thinkers of his generation take up a new theory as doctrine....

You could say scientists were allowed to be behaviorists and talk perhaps about drives, but not to assume animals were experiencers. — Bylaw


Until evidence is provided, I will stay unconvinced. — Lionino

What form would that evidence take?

Do you have any?

Of course; I have all the proof I require.

Well, you provided not evidence for your claim. But the evidence I found was through https://www.amazon.com/When-Elephants-Weep-Emotional-Animals/dp/0385314280 and his references/sources. I can't put that here, unfortunately. I've done a little googling to see what is online. This abstract gives a hint.
https://rsawa.research.ucla.edu/arc/subject-experience-animals/
If I ask various AI online they agree that it was taboo to assert that animals had subjective experience before the 60s and 70s and mention things like this

Donald Griffin: He was an influential figure in the study of animal cognition. In the 1970s, Griffin published "The Question of Animal Awareness," which argued for animal consciousness and challenged behaviorist views.

Note that in 71 it was consider a question.¨
And if I shift the wording around using terms like sentience, subjective experience, animals as experiences, the answers I get all start around the 70s.
And one might ask why as late as 2004 there would be an article with the title
Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans:
The evidence from neurobiology and behavior
https://ccrg.cs.memphis.edu/assets/papers/2005/Baars-Subjective%20animals-2005.pdf
The abstract here points out how behaviorism eliminated even interest in animal sentience for most of the 20th century.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168159106001110
And given Behaviorism's dominance

Although the foundation was now in place, the emergence of modern animal welfare science was delayed through the first 70 years of the 20th century by Behaviorism, which eschewed any consideration of subjective experiences. It took a controversial book by a layperson, Ruth Harrison, to stir both the scientific and philosophical community into developing theories of animal welfare and a book by an ethologist, Donald Griffin, to make it acceptable to study the feelings of animals.

https://www.fondation-droit-animal.org/proceedings-aw/animal-welfare-a-brief-history/
Me, I'm basing my opinion on my experience with the scientific community and given my age this includes experience before, during and after the transition. Unfortunately I can use my memories here. But it's part of why I will be extremely skeptical, not just unconvinced, about your claims in the post I responded to.

I'd like to add that while people in science, like Darwin, did talk about animal emotions, the idea that these include subjective experience were not accepted for much of the 20th century.
Obviously people outside of science have long understood that animals have subjective experience and likely many scientists in their private lives acted and believed they did. But until the 70s the default position coming out of the dominance of behaviorism (and then of course speciesism) in science was at best agnostic and given how tricky it is to prove another mind is experiencing, rather than another organism is behaving, the default position was problematic to go against.

Well, you provided not evidence for your claim. — Bylaw

What claim?

But the evidence I found was through https://www.amazon.com/When-Elephants-Weep-Emotional-Animals/dp/0385314280 and his references/sources — Bylaw

You could just quote it. I am not going to download and read the book. But the Amazon summary does say:

Not since Darwin's The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals has a book so thoroughly and effectively explored the full range of emotions that exist throughout the animal kingdom.

True.

The Dog, various expressive movements of—Cats—Horses—Ruminants—Monkeys, their expression of joy and affection—Of pain—Anger—Astonishment and terror. — The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals, Chapter 5

They also often give their puppies, after a short absence, a few cursory licks, apparently from affection. Thus the habit will have become associated with the emotion of love — The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals, Chapter 5

The feeling of affection of a dog towards his master is combined with a strong sense of submission, which is akin to fear. — The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals, Chapter 5

Darwin wasn't too long ago, and I did say in my original comment "even centuries ago".

This abstract gives a hint.
https://rsawa.research.ucla.edu/arc/subject-experience-animals/ — Bylaw

It does.
"The Romantic tradition of the 19th century attributed elaborate anthropomorphic thoughts, feelings and intentions to animals."
"Behaviorists of the early 20th century side stepped the issue: because psychological states were private, they could not be characterized objectively, even in humans."

If I ask various AI online they agree that it was taboo to assert that animals had subjective experience before the 60s and 70s and mention things like this — Bylaw

You see, they actually agree that it was not taboo :roll:

Besides all that, your claim that "It was actually the default [view] in natural science up into the early 70s." requires extraordinary evidence, specially because "natural science into the 70s" specifies almost an unbounded territory, whose map I don't think you have. I don't doubt that your professor may have told you that the literature avoided claiming animals have consciousness, the person who wrote the UCLA article seems to agree, but that is your professor reporting his experience with the literature he had access to. A far cry from "natural science into the 70s".

As a sidenote, in my basic education, which wasn't too long ago compared to some other folks here, there was a clear drawn distinction between rational animals, whose only example is humans, and irrational animals. Of course the distinction may be challenged, but it is useful nonetheless, no one would trust their pet rabbit to do taxes for them.

Rational/irrational is one of those weasel concepts, innit? What's the dubious definition of rationality to do with experience? Don't mentally ill people feel hunger, pain and fear and desire pretty much the same way that sages do?

What's the dubious definition of rationality to do with experience? — Vera Mont

Nothing, that's why it is a sidenote.

oh. As a sidenote, in elementary school I was given the impression that the earth rolled around in a big basketball net.

It doesn't surprise me.

I rather like the Buddhist term 'sentient beings' which encompasses all animals (but not plants), and the distinction of 'rational sentient beings', which describes human beings. (Buddhism also includes beings on other planes of existence although that is not the concern of this thread.) But from the Dhammapada: 'All beings tremble before death, therefore the wise do not kill or cause to kill'. A very succinct expression of empathy and awareness.

I basically agree with @Bylaw, that, in effect, the fact that non-rational animals are subjects of experience was barely considered until very recently. Not that animals were always treated as 'unthinking machines', as there have been humane societies and people very much aware of animal suffering for a long time, although laboratory science has often paid animal suffering very little attention.

What's the dubious definition of rationality to do with experience? — Vera Mont

Only that rationality and language allow you to reflect on experience, to make it the subject of conscious deliberation and analysis, as well as simply feeling it.

Only that rationality and language allow you to reflect on experience, to make it the subject of conscious deliberation and analysis, as well as simply feeling it. — Wayfarer

How sure are we about this baseline of 'rationality'? If evolution is a continuous, fluid process, it admits of no hard boundaries between existing and emergent species. Does it not follow that the traits of progenitors continue in a fluid way through the progeny and undergo gradual change, rather than stopping and starting at arbitrary borders?
So with intelligence, memory, pattern-recognition and cognition. Maybe Descartes was right in that dogs "do not philosophize", but they do dream; they remember persons, places, rules, and experiences. Is "reflection" very far from memory?

That much-vaunted human language ain't so unique either. Practically every vertebrate communicates in a way that is intelligible to other members of its species. Just because you don't know what a frog or starling or hyena is talking about, why assume they have no language? We may not understand what Javanese people say to one another, yet we assume that since they are human, they are speaking a language, because language is a uniquely human attribute... Like the use of clothing and tools. Ask a crow or octopus about that.

As for conscious deliberation, I have seen some pretty elaborate escape plans put into action - not by just one dog but two, working together. They abandoned the strategy we humans had discovered, and devised a new one. Several times. And when the serial escapee returned home hours later, she hung her head and walked in slow motion - you could practically see the little thought-bubble over her head "Oh, I'm in trouble... I'm gonna get it now..." And that's the semi-bright Pyrenees, not her henchman, the clever border collie X. (I also recommend video compilations on You Tube.) Animals have ideas, carry out plans, try to hide or deny their misdeeds. Where is the big black line of demarcation?

That much-vaunted human language ain't so unique either. Practically every vertebrate communicates in a way that is intelligible to other members of its species. — Vera Mont

I think 'intelligible' is too strong a word.

(There is) a radical dissimilarity between all animal communication systems and human language. The former are based entirely on “linear order,” whereas the latter is based on hierarchical syntax. In particular, human language involves the capacity to generate, by a recursive procedure, an unlimited number of hierarchically structured sentences. A trivial example of such a sentence is this: “How many cars did you tell your friends that they should tell their friends . . . that they should tell the mechanics to fix?” (The ellipses indicate that the number of levels in the hierarchy can be extended without limit.) Notice that the word “fix” goes with “cars,” rather than with “friends” or “mechanics,” even though “cars” is farther apart from “fix” in linear distance. The mind recognizes the connection, because “cars” and “fix” are at the same level in the sentence’s hierarchy. A more interesting example given in the book is the sentence “Birds that fly instinctively swim.” The adverb “instinctively” can modify either “fly” or “swim.” But there is no ambiguity in the sentence “Instinctively birds that fly swim.” Here “instinctively” must modify “swim,” despite its greater linear distance.

Animal communication can be quite intricate. For example, some species of “vocal-learning” songbirds, notably Bengalese finches and European starlings, compose songs that are long and complex. But in every case, animal communication has been found to be based on rules of linear order. Attempts to teach Bengalese finches songs with hierarchical syntax have failed. The same is true of attempts to teach sign language to apes. Though the famous chimp Nim Chimpsky was able to learn 125 signs of American Sign Language, careful study of the data has shown that his “language” was purely associative and never got beyond memorized two-word combinations with no hierarchical structure.

From a review of Why Only Us? Noam Chomsky and Robert Berwick.

As I've said, I don't dispute that animals are sentient beings. i've owned dogs, one of ours had quite a large 'vocabulary' - like, he'd sometimes begin to bark when he thought he overheard one of us say 'hello' or 'hi' because it meant someone was at the door. Animals are capable of an enormous range of behaviours, and they do communicate, but as the above points out, their languages don't have an heirarchical syntax. It takes the ability to abstract and represent for that.

(Incidentally, the full story of poor Nim Chimsky was very sad. He was 'adopted' by an ambitious animal behaviourist, specifically to demonstrate that a chimpanzee could be taught language, via symbolic communication (not having a vocal tract). But alas, Nim failed, and he was abandoned to a desolate facility for unwanted lab animals, where he died in obscurity. link.)

So, the distinction is of structure and complexity. Did the first two humans communicate in a language with hierarchical syntax - or were they freak chimps talking linear and their children, and great-great-great-great grandchildren evolve less hair and more complexity of speech?

one of ours had quite a large 'vocabulary' — Wayfarer

In a second language. (I've known a dog who learned German and later English) Most of ours also spoke fluent feline. Dogs are - of course! - expected to and do learn our words, but we don't all make any effort to learn theirs.
And you know, a Great Dane is hardly ever required to figure how many cars your friend's mechanic is supposed to fix. Just as well you are hardly ever required to read all the messages on a fire hydrant, because most humans couldn't pick out the smell of their own urine from a lineup, never mind a pileup.
All I mean is, every species develops the language in which it needs to communicate, to whom and what it needs to communicate. I do not dispute the extreme complexity of human life and therefore the need for complexity in human communication. But we're still talking flavours and degrees of the same medium, not isolated tanks of different media.

Did the first two humans communicate in a language with hierarchical syntax - or were they freak chimps talking linear and their children, and great-great-great-great grandchildren evolve less hair and more complexity of speech? — Vera Mont

That is the subject of the book I mentioned. Noam Chomsky is of course famous for his theories of language, and that book canvasses how it came to be that only humans developed the capacity - hence the title, 'Why only us?' I haven't read the whole book, but I might get around to it.

Agree that humans and other species are on a biological continuum, but I also believe that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on, and that it is a highly signficant difference, that though we're related to other animals, we're more than 'just animals'. And I think this is something mostly lost sight of in many naturalist accounts of humanity. Interestingly Alfred Russel Wallace expressed similar ideas in his essay 'Darwinism Applied to Man' albeit in florid Victorian prose.

Agree that humans and other species are on a biological continuum, but I also believe that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on, and that it is a highly signficant difference, that though we're related to other animals, we're more than 'just animals'. — Wayfarer

That's your favored way of thinking about it because your Buddhist presuppositions require humans to be "more" than other animals. We can equally say that humans are, in respect of language and tool use, merely unique among, rather than "more than", the animals, which I think is a more balanced and modest assessment, and which eschews the dangers of hubris inherent in notions of human exceptionalism.

To me it seems an obvious ontological gap, which due to your naturalist presuppositions you're inclined to ignore. ;-)

Here's a collection of human artifacts, the likes of which could have been constructed by no other animal:

Please explain what you mean by "ontological gap", and why you think our existence is of a different kind to the other animals, as opposed to merely our perceptions and experience being different.

I acknowledge that due to the acquisition of symbolic language that humans are capable of a kind of linguistically mediated memory and self-reflection that animals would presumably not be. But how would that amount to an ontological difference rather than just a different mode of consciousness?

As to your charge that I am biased by naturalist presuppositions, that is not true. I have come to naturalist conclusions because I see no good reason to posit anything other than nature and culture at work in humans. Do you have good reasons that you can clearly lay out for thinking that something beyond nature is needed to explain human life and experience?

Please explain what you mean by "ontological gap", and why you think our existence is of a different kind to the other animals, as opposed to merely our perceptions and experience being different.

I acknowledge that due to the acquisition of symbolic language that humans are capable of a kind of linguistically mediated memory and self-reflection that animals would presumably not be. But how would that amount to an ontological difference rather than just a different mode of consciousness? — Janus

Well, recall what an ontological distinction is. In information technology, the ontology of a system comprises a catalog of the different major components and also some info about the relationship between them. In more traditional terms, ontology is usually associated with metaphysics and questions about the meaning and constituent kinds of being(s).

In this case, I think the differences between humans and other animals are manifold. Apart from language and rational ability, there's also abstract skills like mathematical reasoning, art and science. We're also existential animals - we have a grasp of our own mortality that is generally absent in other creatures (although mention might be made of elephants who seem to have quite a vivid awareness of death.)

There's a book by E F Schumacher, of Small is Beautiful fame, called Guide to the Perplexed (his last book, I believe). In it there's a brief outline of an ontological scheme which I think bears resemblance to the Aristotelian.

Schumacher agrees with the view that there are four kingdoms: Mineral, Plant, Animal, Human. He argues that there are important differences of kind between each level of being. Between mineral and plant is the phenomenon of life. Schumacher says that although scientists say we should not use the phrase 'life energy', the difference between inorganic and organic matter still exists and has not been explained by science to the extent of rendering said phrase fully invalid. Schumacher points out that though we can recognize life and destroy it, we can't create it. Schumacher notes that the 'life sciences' are 'extraordinary' because they hardly ever deal with life as such, and instead content themselves with analyzing the "physico-chemical body which is life's carrier." Schumacher goes on to say there is nothing in physics or chemistry to explain the phenomenon of life.

For Schumacher, a similar jump in level of being takes place between plant and animal, which is differentiated by the phenomenon of consciousness. We can recognize consciousness, not least because we can knock an animal unconscious, but also because animals exhibit at minimum primitive thought and intelligence.

The next level, according to Schumacher, is between Animal and Human, which are differentiated by the phenomenon of self-consciousness or self-awareness. Self-consciousness is the reflective awareness of one's consciousness and thoughts.

Schumacher realizes that the terms—life, consciousness and self-consciousness—are subject to misinterpretation so he suggests that the differences can best be expressed as an equation which can be written thus:

"Mineral" = m
"Plant" = m + x
"Animal" = m + x + y
"Human" = m + x + y + z

In his theory, these three factors (x, y and z) represent ontological discontinuities — Wikipedia

There are things I would argue with but it makes sense to me. I think there's plainly an ontological discontinuity between the mineral and organic domains, and so on for the other domains.

Plainly humans are biological phenomena, but I argue, and I think Schumacher would argue, we're under-determined by biology in a sense that other animals cannot be. Of course, I also think that is the original intuition behind philosophical dualism, such as that of the Phaedo, and whilst I don't agree that such dualisms are literal descriptions, nevertheless they convey something symbolically real about human nature.

In more traditional terms, ontology is usually associated with metaphysics and questions about the meaning of being. — Wayfarer

As I understand it ontology is concerned with the nature of being and with the different kinds of entities.

In this case, I think the differences between humans and other animals are manifold. Apart from language and rational ability, there's also abstract skills like mathematical reasoning, art and science. — Wayfarer

I don't understand why you would say that abstract skills, mathematical reasoning, art and science are not abilities attendant upon symbolic language, or why rational ability is not just a part of what is enabled by symbolic language.

We're also existential animals - we have a grasp of our own mortality that is generally absent in other creatures (although mention might be made of elephants who seem to have quite a vivid awareness of death.) — Wayfarer

I don't know what you mean by "existential animals". If it means that we exist, well so do all the other animals. We are aware of our own mortality, perhaps due to langauge, or perhaps it would be possible anyway due to viusal memory and the automatic assumption that what happens to others will also happen to me. If the latter is the case, other animals may also be aware of their mortality. Since they can't tell us, how would we know?

Plainly humans are biological phenomena, but I argue, and I think Schumacher would argue, we're under-determined by biology in a sense that other animals cannot be. Of course, I also think that is the original intuition behind philosophical dualism, such as that of the Phaedo, and whilst I don't agree that such dualisms are literal descriptions, nevertheless they convey something symbolically real about human nature. — Wayfarer

You are yet to present an argument as to why you think we are underdetermined by biology in a sense that other animals are not or cannot be, and absent such an argument Schumacher's agreement is either irrelevant or an appeal to authority.

Why do you think that philosophical dualism conveys anything more about human nature than its being due to our linguistically enabled capacity for binary thinking?

As I understand it ontology is concerned with the nature of being and with the different kinds of entities. — Janus

Not quite. All kinds of sciences deal with 'different kinds of entities'. Ontology strictly speaking is about kinds of beings. It might be considered obsolete by some. I'm not appealing to Schumacher as an authority, simply as an example of what I consider a valid ontological schema.

There are things I would argue with but it makes sense to me. I think there's plainly an ontological discontinuity between the mineral and organic domains, and so on for the other domains. — Wayfarer

This aligns with Nicolai Hartmann's "ontological strata" approach also, for another perspective.

Agree that humans and other species are on a biological continuum, but I also believe that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on, and that it is a highly signficant difference, that though we're related to other animals, we're more than 'just animals'. — Wayfarer

Can you show me the threshold? Tool use is not unique; language is not unique; the 'so on' is built-up levels of complexity. The problem of "more than" is that it is far too easily read by the beneficiaries as "superior to" (rather than "more accountable") and the odious phrase "just animals" is far too easily read as "things". ...

And I think this is something mostly lost sight of in many naturalist accounts of humanity. — Wayfarer

If it were, the priests are still there to set us straight: "just animals" have no souls.

Here's a collection of human artifacts, the likes of which could have been constructed by no other animal: — Wayfarer

A bigger, busier, less organized and far less peaceful termite mound.

Bigger, richer, more more voracious, more complex doesn't equate to better. It just means a unique capability for destruction. That should have meant we are also aware and refrain from doing more damage, and some of us have always been that way inclined. But the double-thinking human mind with its complexity and linguistic agility guarantees that this species is unique in its internal conflict and the variety of ways it can go mad.

Agree that humans and other species are on a biological continuum, but I also believe that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on, and that it is a highly signficant difference, that though we're related to other animals, we're more than 'just animals'. — Wayfarer

I've seen you state this before, and I find it interesting and would like to see it better supported. What type of "threshold" are you talking about here? would this be an objective, or a subjective threshold, and in what form does it exist?

By "subjective threshold", and "objective threshold" let me give you an example of what I mean. Suppose that within a given species there is a significant degree of variation, but not enough variation to warrant sub-classes, as sub-species within a species, the sub-classes are only variations. Now suppose one particular variation refuses to interbreed with the other variations, and only breeds amongst others of that particular variation. Then, suppose that this variation branches off and becomes a distinct species. When it was a variation within a species, the "threshold" was subjective, because it was by choice that they bred only amongst themselves avoiding the other variants. But when it became a distinct species, it can no longer breed with the other variety, by physical impossibility, so the threshold is an objective threshold, supported by that physical impossibility.

So what I am asking about your claim "that humans crossed a threshold with the advent of language, tool use, and so on", is to say whether this is objective or subjective. Is it the case that we, as human beings, have subjectively decided to say that we are different (perhaps referring to human intellect), and that our minds have produced some sort of mental, or psychological threshold, or barrier, or is it the case that there is real physical principles (opposing thumb?) which supports your claim of a threshold?

But the double-thinking human mind with its complexity and linguistic agility guarantees that this species is unique in its internal conflict and the variety of ways it can go mad. — Vera Mont

:100: :up:

Is it the case that we, as human beings, have subjectively decided to say that we are different (perhaps referring to human intellect), and that our minds have produced some sort of mental, or psychological threshold, or barrier, — Metaphysician Undercover

That's a very interesting anthropological question. It wasn't easy to divide early hominids into classes, and even for a very long period into the species definitely identified as human, we have very few clues as to their thinking. We see rock art and cave art, but can't really know what it meant to the people who made them, or how they regarded themselves or their place in the animal kingdom. Remnants of early mythology (that is, well within the last 50,000 years or so) suggest a respectful attitude toward other species as well as overlap between the human, the animal and the divine spheres.

The hard demarcation line doesn't show up until the after the Neolithic Revolution, with the advent of sophisticated urban societies. If a deliberate psychological threshold was set, I would date it to about 6,000 BC. One of the remarkable features of the ensuing several thousand years is the appearance of human/animal totems as objects of worship and the celebration of hunting as an elite sport. It suggests to me an attempt not merely to dominate, but to subsume the species humans prized, admired or feared.

or is it the case that there is real physical principles (opposing thumb?) which supports your claim of a threshold?

That wouldn't wash; there are a dozen or more similar hands, and not merely among primates: it includes rats, raccoons and lizards.