But atheism would therefore seem to be, or reliant on, a theory about what is publicly accessible and about what qualifies as a sound argument. In other words the particulars would therefore consist of "explanations of how states of affairs change or formal abstractions work"?

What does the critique consist of, and does it hold any assumptions?

If by "theories" you mean explanations of how states of affairs change or formal abstractions work, then I don't think "religions qualify as theories". — 180 Proof

Accepting this definition of a theory, would you say that (your best interpretation of) atheism qualifies as a theory?

But what about the claims of religions, are those incompatible, or are you unsure? — Hallucinogen

Usually. No. — 180 Proof

Would you say that religions qualify as theories? Would you say theories among scientific theories or theories among historical theories are incompatible with each other?
If your answers to these two questions aren't both "yes", what is the substantive difference between religion and theories (historical/scientific)?

They have the same function (re: pacifying false fears with false hopes) — 180 Proof

Would you say that they are all devoid to true content (in their claims)?

their contents may be "incompatible" like e.g. 'styles of art' or 'varieties of medicines' or 'tribal/territorial identities' throughout history and across cultures. — 180 Proof

But what about the claims of religions, are those incompatible, or are you unsure?

Would this be religious pluralism? — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's negative pluralism (about religons) specifically. Positive pluralism would be that they're all disjunct but they all contribute toward greater understanding / they each contain truth value. Negative pluralism would be there's lots of them and they're all veridically empty.

Indifferentism is used to describe the non-committal belief that no one religion is better than any other — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's relativism.

I am not sure if there is a specific sub-type of religious pluralism that specifies that all religions are epistemologically disjunc — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think it's irreducible plurality (about religions).

Interesting. Are you saying mythology itself holds this view or that the universe of each myth entails incompatability with all others?

Could you point to what the following definition, from the Oxford definition is lacking?

"Action or conduct indicating belief in, obedience to, and reverence for a god, gods, or similar superhuman power; the performance of religious rites or observances." — Oxford Dictionary

Or the definition by Emile Durkheim? "A unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them."

Thanks. What do you think the problem is with standard definitions of "religion"?

It's a view I've seen espoused in places. It also seems implicit in the "which God?" response. A watered-down version is espoused by Thunderf00t here. It also sounds very close to what Sam Harris says. But it's hard to find someone making the exact claim that there is no common framework for religions, it just seems to me to be what they're shooting at with these types of comments.

If when you said "the greatest possible vampire" you ultimately didn't mean something uniquely vampiric, but just meant a non-contingent entity upon which everything else is contingent and we're calling it "Dracula", then your analogy is just the same argument and it is valid.

It's still missing the premise that asserts that there exists something which is TTWNGCBC — Michael

It doesn't need one; the argument is still valid.

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. God is defined as TTWNGCBC — Michael

Line 1 connects anything that fits the definition of TTWNGCBC (since you're allowing it to mean the same thing as "if some X is...") with it necessarily existing. So once a concept is identified as fitting that definition, it is shown to in fact exist.

Your objection seems to me to undermine the very capacity of logical and mathematical generalizations to prove anything about the world. All I need is for God to fit the definition of something which is a valid generalization of the logical and mathematical relationships between things that I already know to exist.

1. If there exists something which is the greatest conceivable vampire then this thing necessarily exists
2. Dracula is defined as the greatest conceivable vampire
3. Therefore, Dracula exists

The conclusion doesn't follow. I'd need as a premise that the greatest conceivable vampire exists. — Michael

It's a false analogy. Vampires aren't non-contingent entities.

How does 2 differ from 3? — Michael

3 is not an axiom, just a definitional fact. 2. isn't necessary, I just left it there because you put it there. See:

If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists
God is an X.
Therefore, God (necessarily) exists. — Hallucinogen

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. There exists something which is TTWNGCBC
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

But 3) is an empirical claim that needs to be shown. It's not something that's true a priori. — Michael

Oh right. But I was assuming that by "If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC", you meant the same thing as "If some X is TTWNGCBC," in the arguments you gave when you were previously attacking it. I wouldn't try to defend this argument beginning with "If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC", because of the flaw you've pointed out, so I would have to insist on going back to the way you originally simplified it, to "If some X is TTWNGCBC (...)"

Showing that "there exists something which is TTWNGCBC" is the intent of the argument, so I suppose you would have to express it in a way that does not require the satisfaction of an empirical claim, as I have done above.

Then the argument is:

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists — Michael

Actually it would be

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. TTWNGCBC is God (or vice versa).
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

Although it isn't optimal, it appears to be valid and sound.

Which again is invalid. — Michael

How so?

You're misunderstanding the logic. Look at existential quantification. — Michael

Could you elaborate on what I'm misunderstanding? I see that quantifier being used in the article cited to argue for the existence of certain numbers. I don't see the difference to how it's being used in this argument.

TTWNGCBC is a concept, just like numbers are, so using a quantifier that means "there exists" to express the condition that something fits the definition of that concept should not beg the question, even if the conclusion is that that something exists.

1. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing necessarily exists
2. If there exists something which is TTWNGCBC then this thing is God
3. If there exists something which is God then this thing necessarily exists
4. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists — Michael

3. in the above isn't in the original argument by the OP. They don't give the condition "if there exists God..." in the argument. It isn't necessary to include and I don't see a fallacy in the argument without it. All that is necessary is stating that God fits the definition of TTWNGCBC in some way, which the OP did in point 4.

No it doesn't, it asserts God fits the definition of X.

If some X is TTWNGCBC then X necessarily exists
If some X is TTWNGCBC then X is God
If some X is God then X necessarily exists

Therefore, God (necessarily) exists

This is what the argument amounts to. The conclusion is a non sequitur. — Michael

I don't think that's a non sequitur, it's just not a fully formed argument. It's just 3 axioms followed by a conclusion. You could have switched "God" and "X" on the 3rd line though, that would've made it a valid and sound argument.

It could go:

If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists
God is an X.
Therefore, God (necessarily) exists.

Not a non sequitur.

It might be referred to as negative pluralism and irreducible plurality among religions.

Thanks. Although this could provide the link to finding what I meant, I actually meant the idea that view that is critical of all religion, specifically on the basis that they're irreconciliable and that schisms aren't based on any kind of underlining logical framework.

I think you are simplifying 1) too much.

a) If some X is TTWNGCBC then X necessarily exists — Michael

If TTWNGCBC existed contingently, then it would not exist necessarily, but something else would be TTWNGCBC.

Removing those parts is allowing you to make the argument look as if it's a non-argument.

Given 4), replace "TTWNGCBC" with "God:
b) If some X is God then X necessarily exists — Michael

No, the argument is "If some X is TTWNGCBC, then X necessarily exists".

1. If TTWNGCBC existed contingently, then there would be something greater than it (viz. a version of TTWNGCBC that existed necessarily).
2. Nothing is greater than TTWNGCBC.
3. Therefore, TTWNGCBC exists necessarily.
4. TTWNGCBC is God.
5. Therefore, God is necessarily existent. — Epicero

Your argument appears to be:

1. If God exists then God necessarily exists
2. Therefore, God (necessarily) exists — Michael

Could you lay out how you arrived at this representation please?

It does not begin with "if God exists", it begins with something equivalent to saying "that which there is nothing greater cannot be contingent". What falls into this category is God, and so the set-up connecting existence with non-contingency produces the conclusion. Denying that the category exists seems a contradiction in terms, as well as raises difficult questions about what the denier thinks. It is like saying "there's no greatest number".

Why would this topic of "being given existence but only for a limited time" "only a problem for ... atheists"? — 180 Proof

Because atheists believe that it is only for a limited time.

It seems only a problem for the believer who expects there to be more to life and nature than this life — 180 Proof

Why is it a problem for believers? It should not make a believer feel powerless since physical life itself is the very opportunity to carry out God's plan and receive the reward. It's close to the opposite of powerlessness.

As a philosopher how do you reconcile these two seemingly contradictory notions of being given existence but only for a limited time? Does it not sometimes make one feel powerless or at worst nihilistic in the face of it? — invicta

Seems like another one of those questions which is only a problem for agnostics and atheists.

Strawman fallacy.

Because you allowed it. You should have repeated your original argument, not entertain a strawman. — L'éléphant

Yeah I think it is the strawman fallacy. It only seemed like it wasn't because normally strawmanning is so in-your-face and head-on, whereas this has a "sneaked-in" quality to it. The argument was months ago, but I did eventually (a couple comments later) notice what he did and when I mentioned what he'd done, that ended his attacks.

Some radical circularity here. The "law" is discovered by the repeated failure to produce perpetual motion machines, etc. The law doesn't prove anything about the world but contrarywise, the world proves the law. And there is a built in contradiction; if energy cannot be created how come there is energy? Laws have a scope; and energy is conserved in the universe; how energy got to be in the universe is necessarily beyond the scope of the conservation law. — unenlightened

Completely correct. Normally if this is pointed out, the empiricist/atheist will appeal to "we just don't know"-type slogans. So to avoid that, I pointed out that if he denies the conservaiton law has an origin, he's being inconsistent, since he who infers laws from observations in state to explain changes in those states is obliged to explain where the inferred law itself comes from. Otherwise, it is special pleading.

Is atheism then a concern of theists only, and atheists concerned only with refuting the theist conception of God? — Ciceronianus

It's a distinction which is highly predictive of a bifurcation in ethical views. Each branch defines its subsequent ethical and political views largely circularly on the reasons for that original theism/atheism distinction.

I don't feel the need for math (fields) to explain/discuss religion — Agent Smith

Presumptuous/false distinction

unless [ math ] clarifies the matter (...) That's all there is to omnipresence. — Agent Smith

Given that the former is true, the latter isn't true.

In a universe consisting of 2 points, a god that's omnipresent is in both points. — Agent Smith

You seem to be ignoring how we define "points" and which field studies them to start with.

and you insist that He's in hell too — Agent Smith

No I didn't.

I'd actually say the problem is we haven't agreed on what omnipresence is. We have already agreed that God needs to be omnipresent, and while I don't know if I agree to your exact wording (for hurting / punished + punisher) of what Hell is, I'll agree to it for the sake of argument.

The importance of what I am pointing out about omnipresence is that the "God is in x, for all x" formulation thereof is problematic, both for reasons pertaining to the "x" part (e.g. the conception of Hell which you raise), and because of the "in" part: because that automatically means that something is outside God by virtue of what "in" means. So expressing omnipresence in the above way entails that God isn't omnipresent.

The way forward is to conceive of omnipresence as equivalent to a mathematical fields closure over its elements.

a field is a set F that is a commutative group with respect to two compatible operations, addition and multiplication, with "compatible" being formalized by distributivity (...) Closure of F under addition and multiplication F or all a, b in F, both a + b and a × b are in F (or more formally, + and × are binary operations on F).

The field F itself is analogous to God, the elements a and b are analogous to any objects or locations therein, and the operations + and × are analogous to the means of interaction and relation between elements. Calling God omnipresent therefore is asserting that God is the field under which all elements that exist are closed and interrelated.

The fact that God in this conception isn't an element that can be pointed out and identified to be restricted to existing "in" anything, as well as the fact that physics is closed under mathematical operations, only provide further reasons to adopt this definition of omnipresence.

It also helps me support my earlier claims about possibility being the output of a syntax: syntaxes are composed of operations and possibilities are rearrangements of elements (products) thereof. So entertaining God to be "possible" in one world confuses the roles that fields, operations and elements play, since using the word "possibilities" to describe rearrangements of elements across all worlds immediately implies that operations exist that are responsible for all such possibilities, which in turn implies a single field under which those operations and elements are closed.

The inconsistency is that God can't be in hell and you're saying He is — Agent Smith

No I am not saying that. Did you not read the comment directly above? I just said Hell is in God. I’m not using a definition of God that makes it inconsistent with being in Hell, you are. I told you to explain why my God is inconsistent with Hell, not yours. You even said

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui? — Agent Smith

You were meant to explain why my God is inconsistent. Now you switch misleadingly by replying as if you are arguing against your definition of God.
I responded to your assertion that God cannot be in Hell already, by pointing out that we aren’t committed into adopting your definition of Hell/omnipresence.

Then you changed tack - you now claim hell is in god — Agent Smith

No I did not. That is what you just did. I never replied to you as if I believed God can’t be in Hell.
The only point in this discussion I phrased the relationship as such was when I asked you “Why can’t God be in Hell?” and the only reason I referred to God being in Heaven was to save redefining omnipresence when it wasn’t necessary to do so.
The first time I told you what I thought the actual omnipresent relationship between Hell and God is in my comment before the previous one.

you now claim hell is in god (unsupported conclusion) — Agent Smith

It is no less supported than your own assertion that God can’t be in Hell. Besides, you haven’t given any reason why my definition of Hell/omniprescence is unsupported, especially since you seem to be avoiding arguing against it and prefer to switch to your own definition to argue against, even when you’re told to do the opposite.
It sheds light on why you thought that we could go back and forth with no end though: you’re subconsciously anticipating that you’ll miss the point of any premise that breaks the circularity of your reasoning.
So, back to getting you to explain why omnipresence is inconsistent. You are responding to the proposition that God is omnipresent, where omniprescence is defined such that Hell is inside God. Continue.

Power comes from valid cognition.
Degrees of valid cognition correlate with nobility, not corruption.
See: eugenics.

Humans have a qualio-perceptual syntax https://ctmucommunity.org/wiki/Human_Cognitive_Syntax

Individual colors are to be understood as states, corresponding to physical frequencies. Comparison between states is what gives the impression of relativity.

But the syntax, what you refer to as "code", provides an objective or absolute nature to qualio-perceptions, as it distributes the relations over the states. It's what makes the states different to one another, or provides them with "categories" a la Kant. The syntax is what distinguishes individual states in terms of the other states that they are not.

If it were true it would make your god is everywhere inconsistent, oui? — Agent Smith

No. Where's the inconsistency?

God being everywhere is inconsistent with hell, as I already explained. — Agent Smith

As I already explained: God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in.

Why is my formulation of hell false? — Agent Smith

Hell is in God, as above.

In my universe, possible means consistent although not necessarily true à la scientific hypotheses. — Agent Smith

Hence if God exists in one universe He exists in all of them -- this is in other words, not "possible" but necessarily true.

Omnipresence is consistent with god being in all worlds, but not in hell. There are only 2 kinds of beings in hell - those who hurt and those who hurt and god can't be either of them for He is sinless. — Agent Smith

Then your formulation of God, Hell and worlds is false. God is omnipresent, so everything is in God. God is not "in" anywhere, He is what everything else is in.

What did you want me to be clearer about?

However, omnipresence has a specific definition as far as I know and from that definition, your argument is a non sequitur. — Agent Smith

Elaborate?

Coming to your belief being a possibility, one among many others, to my reckoning, no contradiction is entailed. — Agent Smith

Of course it's a possibility that my belief about something is true. This wasn't what I originally objected to being "just" a possibility though. You said that the claim I put forward was a possibility; I responded by saying it isn't just a possiblity: it is certain.

As for it being necessarily true, I have my doubts (vide supra). — Agent Smith

Elaborate.

You mean to say god's everywhere doesn't entail a contradiction in any world? But it does in our world (the problem of evil). What about the omnipotence paradox? — Agent Smith

OK, so you meant that my comment entails a contradiction?
It's a different subject to that of possibility, which is what I originally commented to offer my opinion on, but I don't acknowledge that the problem of evil is based on valid reasoning. I think that belief in the problem of evil is entirely a result of those people having very particular moral intuitions about responsibility that not everyone shares.

I also don't think there's any paradox between omnipresence and omnipotence. It would seem to me that being omnipresent would be a requirement for being omnipotent, in fact. Ultimately, something has to be responsible for changing everything at every level that change occurs, by which virtue it would count as omnipotent, and no principle would stop that same thing from being present everywhere in reality.

I thought "Our God in heaven" for a good reason. — Agent Smith

God is in Heaven, but it doesn't mean He isn't anywhere else, especially if He is omnipresent.

What contradiction? — Agent Smith

You referred to the idea of contradiction here.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. — Agent Smith

So I added that I didn't say you were in contradiction about anything.

but of course it's too obvious to mention why omnipresence is much less defensible that God existing in some possible world. — Agent Smith

Why do you think so?

Clearly, God, a fortiori, can't be in hell, a legit possible world. — Agent Smith

Why can't God be present in Hell? If he built the place it doesn't seem as if there'd be a repulsive force barring any future interaction with it.

As for possibility, I used the standard definition - isn't or doesn't entail a contradiction. As far as I could tell, your statements didn't imply one and hence my reply "possible". — Agent Smith

I was also using the standard definition. I didn't say that you were in contradiction, though. Only that if God exists anywhere, He already exists everywhere, in all "worlds", and this encompasses the very law by which "possibility" is generated.

Are you saying there's no alternative other than to accept your statements i.e. to reject your position entails a contradiction? Please clarify. — Agent Smith

Yes.

You made a claim and it seems possible. How did I miss the point and I couldn't possibly be begging the/any question because ... — Agent Smith

I said:

"Possible" presumes a relation or syntax in which that which is possible is distinctly identified and related to the rest of reality. God by definition would subsume the whole of that reality by dint of omnipresence, so if your conception entails God existing in any part, God by definition subsumes the whole. — Hallucinogen

You replied that it is merely "possible" that possibility is subsumed by God's omnipresence. This misses the point that actually, it is certain that it does, not just "possible". Your response is on a par with claiming it is "possible" that bachelors are unmarried, or "possible" that 1 minus 1 equals 0.

Your reply also begs the question on what determines what "is possible". My reply provided an answer to this question - it is a syntax that relates parts of reality. You then stated this "is possible", when in fact if it were not the case then this provides no explanatory framework of what possibility is and what determines it (which makes it odder that you're asserting possibility as a response).

↪Hallucinogen
Yep, that's something that seems possible. — Agent Smith

Misses the point + begs the question

"Possible" presumes a relation or syntax in which that which is possible is distinctly identified and related to the rest of reality. God by definition would subsume the whole of that reality by dint of omnipresence, so if your conception entails God existing in any part, God by definition subsumes the whole.

In a true democracy the government should serve (all) the people, so we have a system where the people are the master and the government the servant (not derogatory). — TheMadMan

Not possible because if some people want something, it has to come from someone else. Someone is always the loser in a democracy, and democratic elections are often decided by around 30% of the population.