Eternity is infinite. But if you can't make sense of the beginning of time, pushing it back forever doesn't give you a more logical explanantion. There are illogical things in this world, but the logical is prior. How a physical timeless universe goes from being still and then into the flow of time without outside causality is a question scientists are breaking their heads over. They have no forrm of natural faith so they can't see creation out of nothing. I reject the idea of God for certain reasons but if there was a God I can perfectly well see him creating our of nothing. I do have natural faith but I reject supernatural faith as the dreams of trolls — Gregory

I agree science cannot deal with creatio ex nihilo but nor can philosophy/metaphysics as such a concept is to me rather illogical. The problem for you here is assuming there was some time when stuff just didn't change (like before the big bang) then it started to change at t = 0 which isn't what a substantivalist interpretation of general relativity is implying. There are no times before t = 0 and no time when the universe went from timeless to changing which would mean some meta-time existed before the singularity, that's adding on more physics than is present within the theory. By all means go on to do so but you're now dipping into theoretical/experimental physics which requires an inductive verification or falsification.

I’d like to suggest a review of exactly what “infinity” is. Since time and space are inextricably linked, another way of saying this is, you can’t have one without the other. As finite “material” beings we exist in a finite material universe. Since when is it correct to assume the universe - made up of matter which has finite properties - is in and of itself infinite? — Dan Cage

There is nothing to say that it's necessarily infinite or finite. These are epistemological questions concerning the nature of our universe.

If we’re calling into question “The Big Bang”, indeed “where” did the singularity from which the creation of all matter sprang come “from”? If “where” didn’t exist before The Bang occurred, then neither did “when”. This implies time has a beginning and is therefore finite. Perhaps the term “forever” applies, but that is a time reference. Eternity is not equal to infinity. — Dan Cage

The singularity didn't ever come into existence because if take on a bastardized substantivalist perspective spacetime then there was never a time when matter didn't exist. Also it's not a big bang its a big everything got really close to everywhere else but didn't pop out of existence at any time because for all the time that existed it also existed. Eternity implies that "for all time" it existed which could mean while time existed or given an infinite past. You are making quick use of a substantivalist perspective of time here though, use change instead to justify these perspectives.

I think set paradoxes which are only resolvable by an unmechanized mind proved an infinite past would require a divine mind, but I still think it's impossible — Gregory

There is no mechanized or unmechanized minds in your sense. Only what part of reality is from you and that which isn't.

The Page-Wooters mechaism is a fascinating phenomonen. It suggests time is a local phenomenon associated with quantum entanglement. An elapse of time is experienced by observers within a quantum system, but external observers to not observe the elapse of time within the system: — Relativist

Time as an abstraction you mean. Change is rather fundamental to reality as we know it, especially in quantum mechanics, and time (as in its ordering, simultaneity, asymmetry, the future/present/past existence) could be emergent from such an analysis.

I'm aware of no metaphysical analysis that would have predicted this, nor that even attempts to account for it. Hence, I suggest metaphysics is futile for understanding it. — Relativist

As carrol once said, I believe, "our metaphysics must follow our physics." Recall that we, however, should not postulate mechanisms or theories that may outright contradict our experience. Also, metaphysics may not have discovered it but it damn will analyze the hell out of it. Interpretations of scientifc theories don't come out of experiments but our formed afterwards and preemptively.

An infinite series of, say, dominoes going into the past does indeed need a prime mover or movers (Aristotle) or a Trinity (Aquinas) to keep it well ordered. — Gregory

Why?

Try if you can to imagine humanity with all the births and deaths going back forever with no first human or evolution. It verges on the illogical. — Gregory

As does creatio ex nihilo or a beginning for a universe on my end. Both circular repetitive cycles of creation, infinite casual chains, or creatio ex nihilo are equally illogical.

In the beginning there was the inflaton field, and it was without form, and void.

Then it spontaneously transitioned into a different phase exciting all of the other quantum fields.

yadda yadda yadda later the hot plasma filling the universe was without form, and void, and then the free electrons paired with the H and He ions in another phase shift from plasma to gas and there was light.

And it was good. — Pfhorrest

Ha

Yea, as I said, I'll go with the Biblical account for now, just not sure about the deity or force that made the difference.

Even if this field has existed and will always exist, why does it exist,and what changed and why, in order for us to exist?

I don't know enough about this stuff, and from the little I understand, it seems to me that we are not even close to understanding it. Under some interpretations, as Wayfarer indicated, the physicists are proving the theologians were right all along. Physicists try to escape to the multiverse, but this is just a ruse in my opinion. — Cavacava

It's not escaping to the multiverse it's a conclusion from known physics. Heck, you cannot get something from nothing therefore there was always something because something exists now end of story. Asking these why questions presumes there is an answer to be given that is understandable in human concepts or terms. Not only that it, seems to presume a form of the principle of sufficient reason from Leibniz and while in many situations it's conceivable to discovery a reason for some state of affairs obtaining why think this extends universally to situations so varied or far from our local circumstances to even existence itself. Ex nihilo is contradictory and creatio ex materia or some form of creatio ex profundis is the only answer. If you throw a "but why" my way please feel free to justify that this even applies or that such a reason exists. There are many questions in mathematics that may be inherently unanswerable by us precisely but there are proofs that such proofs do at the very least exist.

What would an alternative be to causality? Surely quantum particles causually rely on their quantum fields? — DoppyTheElv

Depends on how you define causality. Are you the person who given a Humean reductive analysis of the concept or are you the person that philosophical needs a casual omph at the base of reality?

The basic argument itself just says that the universe had a cause. But then after that he sometimes argues that such a cause would have to supervene space and time itself and therefore God. I dont know how a mind can work without time. And I know jack shit about philosophy of time (apparently he has written a good amount on time though) So theres that. — DoppyTheElv

If causation as defined by you or others requires the inclusion of change/time then yes it would be nonsense to suppose that without time/change there could be causation. Note that he's assuming an interpretation of general relativity that presumes that all the matter that was compressed close to each other close to the big bang singularity just appeared out of nothing ex nihilo. To assert time began citing general relativity as evidence you would need to defend a spacetime substantivalist perspective of the theory as well as mess around with this interpretation in a vacuum away from most all none work on quantum gravity. In my perspective I take change to be fundamental to reality with time merely being an abstraction from such a central concept. Spacetime to me is either coexistent or emergent from materiality and the least parsimonious answer in my eyes is to argue that stuff got really close to each other then. . . just. . . popped out of existence the farther back in time we go?

Again I dont know much. I'm simply playing devils advocate to learn more. I dont have a positive or negative opinion of WLC. But I do wonder why people dislike him so much. Where is he dishonest? — DoppyTheElv

Some claim and perhaps have good reason to regard him as dishonest but my problem with him has more to do with his messy philosophical defenses for a god. They assume too much and there's always too many asterisks to have on its own without recourse to objections put the argument in question. Many opponents to him also cite video evidence of him on numerous occasions saying (possibly in contrast to other apologist/counter-apologists) that no amount of evidence could convince him other wise that his religious convictions are wrong because the holy spirit supports such convictions. He would still believe even if all his arguments fell through, his words paraphrased not mine. Play devils advocate all you want, it's good to entertain contrary positions to keep bias in check.

I see quite a lot of people not having issue with infinite regress as objection to the argument. I know very little but WLC seems to argue that ockhams razor would shave off unnecessary causes?

Why take infinite regress when the ground state could be necessary and thus uncaused? — DoppyTheElv

William Lane Craig has problems with the existence of actual infinities but not necessarily potential infinities. I would preface this with the fact that general relativity, the theory he thinks supports his argument, has an actual infinity at t=0 or when the density and temperature become actually infinite. He either avoids this by modifying the theory which puts him on scientific grounds to be objected to, what if his modification of GR makes the singularity avoidable, or he tries to obscure the result saying it isn't an actual infinity because. . . reasons.

Though, remember that Occam's razor only applies to situations in which you have two theories which both accurately explain the same observations experimentally but there is a way of quantifying excess structure meaning the one with more is less parsimonious so less likely to be correct. Think Galilean spacetime vs. Newtonian spacetime in which absolute space is clearly excess structure that could be cut away. Can you apply this same principle to finite vs. infinitely old spacetimes? How is one simpler than the other? Is being a-causal/uncaused more parsimonious than infinite casual chains?

Ok guys Thank you all for showing me that I know very little :)
I really have to read a lot more on this to fully understand the argument.

Would be great if you guys give me some recommendations on what to read.

Thanks! — PhilosophyNewbie

There is a lot to unpack in that argument and it's not un-like many others to look upon its simple form thinking there wasn't much under the surface. Neither is this the case with respect to any other arguments for god which equally as much assume more metaphysics than is said in the premises. You can start on William Lane Craig's website (don't buy anything from him as I personally think he's rather dishonest). I would also recommend looking back to my own previous replies which had many helpful links sprawled about many of which came from stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. A good site to start on with these sorts of issues as well as numerous others including cosmological arguments for god.

with infinite i mean infinite in time. if he is infinite in time, he has no cause. — PhilosophyNewbie

Further, while such a thing may not have a cause there would still need to be a sufficient reason or metaphysical grounding for said entity (if you subscribe to such metaphysics). Even for an eternally existing entity or thing you could conceptually without logical contradiction ask why have this be the case that such an entity or state affairs obtain?

he would have to have some kind of free will and some sort of creative power right? — PhilosophyNewbie

You have to now define what you mean by free will and creative power. As well as justify that this thing possesses said qualities (such as consciousness and thusly free will) while being atemporal or out of time and or being changeless. Further does anything ever even come out of nothing or ex nihilo or is it only ever a reformulation of previously existing stuff, properties, and relations. Thusly can this god create universe from nothing, if such a concept is even coherent, or can it only be something arranged differently.

with infinite i mean infinite in time. if he is infinite in time, he has no cause. — PhilosophyNewbie

There is a difference between being atemporal or out of time and being eternal.

in other words: when someone believs god is infinite in order to exclude him from premiss one, why dont we just believe that the universe is infinite, since god proves that its possible — PhilosophyNewbie

Infinite in. . . what? Is he omni-present and infinitely large or are their infinitely many capable actions he could undertake (omnipotence) or perhaps in some sense of the word he has a form of consciousness that is able to take in infinitely many conceptually possible scenarios (omniscience)?

Correct me if I'm wrong but if we grant that there is a cause for the universe, this cause has to have at least some godlike qualities right? — PhilosophyNewbie

What are those qualities and are they coherent? It may perhaps even be the case that actual infinities cannot exist in reality only merely potential infinities such as constantly adding one to another number versus the whole natural number line.

Yeah, I know there is probably a lot more to consider here but I will try best.

1. so with cause i mean something that is responsible for something happening. (i dont know how to explain it any further)

2. With existing I mean everything material whether that is all the fundamental particles or atoms, depends (where all fundamental particles are included) depending on your view of existing things. But in either case it's all material.

3. I don't really understand what you mean with conception of time. Do you maybe mean that beginning of something needs further explanation because I refer to something where time wasn't even existing?

forgive me if thats just non-sense — PhilosophyNewbie

For some philosophers causation is as elaborated upon as you intuitively put it. Note that some causation models merely specify conditions and then conditionally (similar to an "if. . . then. . ." statement) are led to their effects. Some think this lacks a physical or casual omph and so there have even been physics models of causation based on energy transfer as well as other rather esoteric philosophies on it across the board. I'll specify that in philosophy there is a difference between (though you could perhaps blur the line) metaphysical grounding, sufficient reasons, or causation.

I could quibble with you on materiality as for me i'd rather use physicality, definitely recommend this book and here is another helpful link. Physicalism/materialism has greatly evolved over the years from some thesis that certain atomic elements only exist to more a statement about what we discover through scientific methodology and thusly add to our ontology.

Finally, you can start reading about interpretations of spacetime here. The key idea is that you need a fairly particular philosophical interpretation of general relativity without recourse to quantum mechanics to willingly assert there was a beginning to time let alone any creation of matter ex nihilo as is usually brought up by apologists. It depends on the relationship between matter and spacetime as well as whether spacetime itself exists as an entity in its own right. Some of which i've recently began to discuss in this thread. Much of the discussion is usually done assuming that you have a substantival spacetime (like a bucket that could have stuff in but be empty without issue) but this is to me a great misfortune. A good analogy for what i'm getting at is sydney shoemakers argument from time without change. Does it even make sense to say that time passes without change? Reflections on these issues creates not so much a rebuttal but a greater issue for apologists who propagate particular interpretations of general relativity.

I don't know isn't cause pretty self-explanatory?
With cause i mean something that is responsible for something happening.
For example a rock can't move by its own it needs something that caused him to move, like strong wind or a human kicking the stone.

The argument is saying that everything that beginns to exist needs to have something that caused it to do that — PhilosophyNewbie

Causation has a long and popular philosophical tradition of being either overly complicated in terms of accompanying ontology or extremely reductive to the point that causation becomes a fancy word for repetitive pattern. Start here.

Second, what do you mean by everything? This could mean the observable universe or it could mean the greater cosmos roughly defined as all that has, does, or will exist.

First, as others have noted you need to define what you mean by cause. You also need to specify exactly what your own definition of begins to exist even encompasses or means. Especially because your concept of beginning to exist probably depends on a particular conception of time (A-theory vs. B-theory) and what does actually begin to exist. We think that electrons or atoms exist always materially throughout long spans of time but a chair doesn't exist UNTIL a particular configuration of matter is arranged chair-like.

We need to coherently distinguish between creatio ex materia and creatio ex nihilo. This all becomes much more complicated if we even abandon a substantivalist interpretation of time or of general relativity focusing more on the reality of change than of time so then does the beginning of space-time even make sense under that perspective.

Heck, what happens to the beginning of time or meaning of beginning to exist if we abandon the A versus B theory discussion?

You choose to believe that laws that were there for no reason at all somehow gave rise to this world. You choose to believe that laws are responsible for what you do, that choice is an illusion. You choose to believe that love and suffering and thoughts and beauty and good and evil somehow appeared out of lifeless stuff that is none of that. That’s what sounds crazy and outlandish to me. — leo

Define life first. As i'm pretty sure you will not include much info into what a living organism is made out of (as the iron in my blood is NOT ALIVE) but that a living being is a collection of patterns and processes. You're made up of non-living atoms so what distinguishes you from the environment. . . could be the patterns and processes that this NON-LIVING matter under goes that defines it as living.

Second, the laws could be there for no reason, some reason, metaphysically necessity (given there is no metaphysically possible way it could have been other wise), or even a self-sufficient reason within it. So many possibilities you CHOOSE to ignore and not investigate for the betterment of human knowledge or philosophy.

Third, how do you define beauty, good, or evil. Is it a substance things are made out of or more likely a relationship between processes and patterns of behavior such as social connections as well as our psychology? What sounds crazy to me is a persons adamant use of vague terminology and rampant straw-man of internet atheists.

You can break the laws that society imposes on you, does that mean they aren’t laws?

You say the true laws of nature can’t be broken. How would you prove that such laws exist in the first place, considering that we “routinely transcend” apparent laws? If they exist, why would all things follow these laws and not some other laws? — leo

If you could break what physicists or sociologists thought were laws of their respective domains of investigation then they wouldn't be universally applicable in the form given. If you were able to break the laws of society or the laws of physics (as espoused by PHYSICISTS) and if a law in both contexts is something which most apply in all circumstances in the form defined then yes they wouldn't be laws. Note that the only reason we are interested in discovering or cataloging laws of nature are because we have found some aspect of nature that is universally applicable in all circumstances due to metaphysical necessity/a constant pattern of nature, if they were not universally applicable but merely arbitrary patterns why call them laws of nature?

To discover said laws or even suspect they exist we need to allow for the possibility that the world is coherent and isn't inherently random in all respects. This implies there are patterns or non-random aspects to nature that exist which are applicable to most situations. . . why don't you find them and inductively test them until they either do or do not break. Even finding false laws of nature is inherently helpful because you have found an important regularity in nature which always applies in certain situations and could clue you into more fundamental notions. Remember the difference between the map and what we interpret is among the terrain from said map.

Finally, why would they follow these laws? You mean metaphysically they could've been other wise (NOT JUST CONCEPTUAL POSSIBILITY)? Is it metaphysically possible that reality could ACTUALLY be anything else than it already is.

In relativity, space and time are on equal footing, so in relativistic QM, position is demoted from an operator to a parameter. One could read that as meaning that spacetime is less physical in relativity than Newtonian mechanics perhaps. — Kenosha Kid

Less physical in QM but not exactly the case in special relativity simpliciter. If anything special relativity alone is just as substantivalist as newtonian spacetime was interpreted to be long ago barring any other dynamically focused interpretations of the theories in question.

Materialism suffers from the same epistemological problem.
— Michael

A materialist can say that it's inconceivable for a human being to act like they have a mind but not have one, since mind is necessary for human behavior. — Marchesk

A materialist can say that it's inconceivable for a human being to act like they have a mind but not have one, since mind is necessary for human behavior.
— Marchesk

And the idealist can say the same. — Michael

Can an objective idealist say or claim all the same things that a metaphysical physicalist realist could? It seems to be the case that what's of issue is that what we experience must be separate from our minds or other minds to be meaningful (not contradictory) but both of the those positions, the realist or objective idealist, do it just well with the idealist merely taking an epistemological doctrine to an ontological extreme.

Indeed, relationism (of state rather than intervals) is gaining traction among quantum theorists following the recent Wigner's friend experiments, yet, even as a quantum theorist myself, I don't have much of an ontological position on it. Relativity is much more compelling in that regard but it isn't really an argument for substantivism, more a framework for working with models of a substantive-seeming spacetime.

Even within that framework, there's no obvious reason why the spacetime picture need be fundamental. This is not a counter-argument in itself, but I'm reminded of the holographic principle in which the informational content of a volume, including the entire universe, can be encoded on its surface. (There are theoretical phenomena for which this cannot be true, and it still relies on the existence of a lower-dimensional spacetime.) When one opens the door to the idea that spatial dimensions can arise from more fundamental structures, one struggles to argue that the apparent spacetime we observe is substantive. — Kenosha Kid

Special relativity alone is not an argument for a substantival spacetime but taken with other philosophical considerations such as assuming the non-existence of spacetime would entail there being few absolute or invariant dynamical asymmetries/invariants to physics. This is because these features could then be argued to be grounded in something other than matter itself.

Of course there doesn't seem to be any conceptual necessity that spacetime be fundamental in any sense of the word nor possess certain exact features. It's not logically necessary and is a rather contingent affair in general.

Though, it may be difficult to say in what manner spacetime is not substantive because if spacetime truly is emergent or reductive to other fundamental properties then it's perhaps truly non-existent in an eliminativist sense. If we cannot reduce spacetime to physical properties but the two always seem to have to coexist the discussion then becomes much vaguer.

We find a general definition of a space in mathematics: a space is a set of "points" with some added "structure". The points can be whatever but obviously they are not nothing. The structure (also called topology) is a certain collection of subsets of the underlying set of points, and this collection of subsets must satisfy certain conditions (namely, a union and an intersection of any of the subsets must belong to the collection too).

The particular kind of space in general relativity (or "spacetime", which is a 4-dimensional space with time as a special 4th dimension) is a space with a curved metric topology where the points seem to be objects with quantitative properties we call energy and momentum, and these quantitative properties of every point are related to the quantitative properties of other points via regularities across space that we call laws of physics (in general relativity, Einstein field equations).

If we regard objects possessing the properties of energy and momentum as "material" then the space in general relativity is made up of material objects. But apparently there can also be spaces with the same topology but with non-material objects as their points. — litewave

In your interpretation the spacetime points are coexistent, co-present, and coincide ontologically with the objects in question. I would preface that this is an intriguing interpretation as it seems to basically be a form of super-substantivalism in which an entity is exactly identical to that in which it's located at, if i'm getting at your interpretation correctly. It's an intriguing possibility and there is opposition to such a possibility along with other positions in the mereology of location where other interpretations consider it more that there are material objects located at real existent spacetime points but they are not identical to those points. It's the difference between saying objects with energy/momentum permeate spacetime versus having parts of spacetime itself behave in certain ways that mimic the energy/momentum/behavior of fundamental particles.

Sorry, I don't think I can answer this question. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? I mean both Berkeley and Kant held rather intriguing perspectives on the non-reality of spacetime which both were strongly influenced by their subjective and transcendental forms of idealism. Perhaps I was jumping at a collection of positions too quickly and yours is merely a form of naive realism mixed with modern day psychology.

Do you apprehend, as I do, that making the "top casual speed" (whatever you mean by "casual") as c, is to posit an absolute? — Metaphysician Undercover

You mean an invariant? Special relativity has many invariants in the theory such as the spacetime interval and even the idea that while accelerations maybe feel or appear different depending on the frame of reference there is no question about who is accelerating, no relativity of accelerations. You either are or are not accelerating just like in real life you either are feeling a fictitious force and thusly accelerating or you are not but either way the symmetry of the situations is broken by dynamical considerations. In a sense this could be raised into an argument against a relationist persepctive of special relativity given it keeps that idea that accelerations, rotations, and the spacetime interval as rather asymmetric or invariant so you may be propelled to postulate a real existent spacetime that grounds these dynamical/kinematic invariants of our reality.

I'll just note that a highly relativistic theory and an absolute theory of spacetime structure (like newtonian spacetime) does not decide or guarantee an answer in the relationist/substantivalist discussion though they do overlap. The first is a discussion of what is to be included in the structure of our spacetime (simultaneity, preferred rest frame, preferred direction, invariant casual speed, etc.) while the later regards the ontological status or grounding of such an entity.

It's weird that I voted relationism pretty much on instinct. GR is obviously a theory that compels a substantive picture of spacetime... the stuff bends, for goodness' sake! And yet, deep down, I've often wondered if the wavefunction of the entire universe gives a crap that we have a positional basis set to describe it with. — Kenosha Kid

You're definitely not faulted for thinking GR prefers a substantivalist interpretation as Einstein, I believe, once thought his theories of relativity (special and general) vindicated relationism but were still full of situations in which solutions had absences of matter with still existent spacetime geometry so he later somewhat abandoned it I think. Relativity of the spacetime structure in more ways than galilean spacetime sadly did not mean the absence or emergence of spacetime itself. When you bring in quantum mechanics perhaps such a situation is much more amenable to the relationist position. . . depending on whether you adopt a background dependent or independent theory and the interpretation that follows from both camps.

None perceived. I agree with your comment that there is a general aversion to solipsism among philosophers, and I was just pointing out that the aversion itself is a poor reason to reject any view. I personally find the view self contradictory, and reject it for that reason. — noAxioms

Self-contradictory? I get that this philosophical viewpoint is not emprically well-founded and never could be (it would be consistent with any personal experience) but it always felt relatively possible.

Yes, but again, I identify that as a personal bias, and therefore not good grounds for rejection. Who knows, maybe the universe is made for us. That possibility must be considered, but positing such doesn't seem to explain anything better than more plausible views. — noAxioms

I also agree with you on this and also hold this sort of personal bias especially on views of god in which I strongly disagree with anthropomorphic versions of such a concept as has been done in christian traditions.

Space and time, as well as space-time are the concepts human beings have developed to understand their surroundings. We understand our environment as things which are changing relations to each other, and are also changing in themselves. Since these concepts are derived from the fundamental principles which describe our surroundings as things, it doesn't make any sense to talk about space and time as being independent from things.

There was a time when things were thought to move in space. Empty space was required in order that a thing could move, otherwise it would have to push on another thing which would push another an another, and nothing could move. But Einsteinian relativity conceives of things as moving relative to light. This allows that things might move through light without necessarily moving through space, and space and time as concepts, refer to the relations between things and light.. — Metaphysician Undercover

So your perspective is more psychological and related to our conscious experiences. Is this a Berkeley or Kantian strategy you are gleaning from in treating spacetime as a fundamental psychological process but nothing more?

Technically physical objects in special relativity move relative to other frames of reference and are always going to happen to observe that the top casual speed is c. The way out of a cartesian plenum is merely to assert that the properties inherent in certain physical objects may happen to include being co-present or ghost-like as photons are allegedly supposed to be able to pass right through each other. Though, maybe space is like a constantly changing Heraclitean fire, that in a similar manner to what Descarte had proposed, where in changes in position or form will influence the rest of the system cascading throughout.

Just because it's distasteful doesn't mean it's wrong. But I think there are serious logical problems with the solopsistic view, coupled with a personal bias against any sort of geocentrism, anthropocentrism, or any other view asserting us having a privileged status. — noAxioms

I mean no disrespect or assume that because its "distasteful" it's therefore wrong but only that most philosophical viewpoints that would hold onto this as the center piece of their metaphysical viewpoint is both arbitrary or up to high scrutiny. We see eye to eye on the geocentrism and anthropocentrism of view points as I also find metaphysics which make us highly centered in the grander scheme of things likewise also highly suspect.

If I want to be formal, I had to find a definition of 'me' that didn't violate the law of identity, and it pretty much makes a hash of the way 'me' is used in everyday language. Language is littered with unstated premises, all of which I question (hence my user name), and most of which I cannot justify. — noAxioms

It's like a sorites problem of sorts to attempt to specify where you end and the greater worldly environment begins.

Here's a blog post on Smolin's relationism that looks pretty reasonable/serious at first blush (haven't read it yet myself, am in the process now but figured I'd post it)-

Lee Smolin's Relationist (Meta)Physics — Enai De A Lukal

I sure will read up on this, thank you for your input.

Yeah, solipsism really makes a philosopher run for the hills doesn't it.

It was just the words being used by you such as 'me' that made me think you were taking a sort of idealist direction for your metaphysics but I was wrong there.

Right now i'm looking at a cosmology and quantum gravity lecture by the guy you mentioned.

Thank you for the comment noAxioms.

I agree mostly with what you have said and partially with the idea that the immediate reality we're familiar with is created through sensory inputs as well as processing within my brain/mental substances but I still have to admit that their are things that exist or are 'real' whether I or anyone else is directly experiencing them.

I'll look into RQM, thank you for noting it.