Going by idealism, and keeping it consistent, there’s no difference among you and my experiences of you. — jorndoe
'The map is not the territory', which uses 'to be' in the 'identity' use. So according to Korzybski himself, his most famous utterance may be meaningless. — andrewk
The relevance of that to the thread is that, without that verb, I don't think one can even describe a difference between an Idealist and a materialist. The difference dissolves to just one of language use. — andrewk
The imaginary vs real distinction doesn't relate to the question of Idealism vs Materialism. Both Idealists and Materialists make the imaginary vs real distinction.If you asked this Indonesian tribe whether imaginary rocks are made up out of the same stuff as ordinary ones you stump your toe on, would they say yes? — Marchesk
The question is though, given Korzybski's concerns about the use of 'is' in the 'identity' sense (concerns that presumably arose later in his life, subsequent to his making the famous statement), how would he have rephrased that statement?Of course the map isn't the territory. — Marchesk
I suppose if I wanted to ask an Indonesian, in Indonesian, whether Harry Potter is real, I might ask something like 'Do you think anybody ever did all those things that the book says Harry Potter did?'. — andrewk
There are minds other than mine. It's idealism, but not solipsism. — Michael
Now just take away the physical bodies. There are minds other than mine. It's idealism, but not solipsism. — Michael
I never understood how idealism justified this stance. I get that metaphysically non-solipsistic idealists maintain there are other minds, but how they know this is problematic. — Marchesk
So me perceiving your body is how I know you have a mind? *Ahem*
Yes. Isn't that also what the materialist says? — Michael
How does the materialist know that there are other minds? — Michael
It's not some obscure tribe by the way. It's the official language of Indonesia, spoken by more than 200 million people. — andrewk
That doesn't work, because minds aren't ideas. — Marchesk
The idealist claim that all things are fundamentally mental or immaterial in nature is not to say that only my experiences exist. — Michael
And the idealist's claim that independent minds can interact with and perceive each other is no more problematic than the physicalist's claim that independent bodies can interact with and perceive each other. — Michael
But I don't see how. Walk me through how I go from ideas of your body in my mind to interacting and perceiving your mind, which isn't an idea/perception at all. — Marchesk
You're a mental thing and I'm a mental thing. When we "touch" this elicits in you certain experiences. — Michael
It's the same sort of thing that happens for the materialist. When my physical body "touches" your physical body, this elicits in you certain experiences. — Michael
Having a body is how we interact. — Marchesk
If we go for Hume's bundle theory, for example, our bodies are bundles of sense-data, and when these bundles of sense-data interact, you can directly perceive my immaterial body (as per a naive realist understanding of perception). — Michael
The problem here is that sense-data are sense-data for some perceiver, not an independent bundle that anyone can perceive. Unless you want to invoke God as the universal perceiver, there is no place for an independent bundle of bodily sense-data. — Marchesk
But this is what (some) idealists claim is the case. So you're saying that idealism can't avoid solipsism because non-solipsistic idealism is false? — Michael
Then why don't I experience your mind instead of your body when we touch?And the idealist says the same. Only that the human beings that we interact with are mental/immaterial things, not physical/material things. — Michael
And the idealist can say the same. — Michael
Materialism suffers from the same epistemological problem. — Michael
So then what is the difference between materialism and idealism? Why choose one over the other?And the idealist would agree. — Michael
What is it that separates other minds, if not time and space, for us to say that there are other minds besides my own? What is it that causes us to experience other bodies, and not other minds, when we "touch"?If all you want to do is argue that idealism is wrong, then fine. But it's still the case that there are forms of idealism that don't entail solipsism; that claim that the fundamental nature of the world is mental/immaterial, but that my mind is just one small part of a much bigger world (which contains other minds). — Michael
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