Thanks for providing some context and examples. I am not familiar with Philipp Frank's book, but I did read Trout's Scientific explanation and the sense of understanding paper. In it he critiques "the role of a subjective sense of understanding in explanation." In particular, he draws on a number of studies that reliably demonstrate psychological biases that result in unjustified confidence given to explanations. He does not develop an alternative, though he notes that on his part, he would defend an objectivist conception of good explanation: "What makes an explanation good concerns a property that it has independent of the psychology of the explainers..." — SophistiCat
I think your concerns are more pedagogical than epistemological. In the present context, the former is concerned with accessing, internalizing and operationalizing established science (such as the Second Law of thermodynamics). The latter is concerned with establishing criteria for what constitutes a good scientific explanation. Trout above is concerned with epistemology and has little to say about pedagogy, other than that the two should not be mixed up. — SophistiCat
You mentioned something about giving neo-positivist names.OK, that's interesting and I'll give it a read, but I am not sure how this relates to the topic. — SophistiCat
I'll give a few quotes from that book Understanding Scientific Understanding by Henk W. de Regt.Who are these neo-positivist dogmatics? What are they actually saying? — SophistiCat
. . . to give us back the feeling that we can understand the general scientific principles other than and better than by their observable results.
. . . he regards the appeal to intelligibility as superfluous from a scientific point of view. Its only function is to relate science and common sense, and thereby to provide a kind of psychological comfort.
[N]o hypothesis that the approximately consensual current scientific picture
declares to be beyond our capacity to investigate should be taken seriously.
Second, any metaphysical hypothesis that is to be taken seriously should have
some identifiable bearing on the relationship between at least two relatively
specific hypotheses that are either regarded as confirmed by institutionally
bona fide current science or are regarded as motivated and in principle
confirmable by such science. (2007, p. 29)
If someone tried to explain what the second law of thermodynamics is and how that connects to the problem of the arrow of time I think I'd be at rather a loss if observables weren't referenced. However, I could see how pointing to certain phenomena could obscure what it is exactly we are getting at and the mathematics are too abstract to assist us here.Well, I don't know what kind of understanding you are after. Do you have a clear idea of what would satisfy you that you understand something? — SophistiCat
Note that none of these philosophers talking about understanding/explanation in the sciences denies that you can define understanding/explanation regarding scientific concepts without metaphor/analogy. In fact, its rather vague as to how this is meant to be intended as modern day anti-realists and neo-positivists understand lots of scientific concepts through operational definitions, theoretical definitions, or reference to instrumental practice.Metaphors and analogies may help - or mislead - but I don't think they are necessary for understanding. We are capable of understanding scientific concepts on their own terms. — SophistiCat
No one, I was making a caricature. Course, the founders of quantum mechanics were notorious for either abandoning any attempt at the intelligibility of the atomic or grew rather pessimistic at said notion.Who actually says that? — SophistiCat
Yeah, that is what the point and purpose of comparative thinking (metaphor/analogy) along with computational/concrete analogue models serve as their purpose. To bring understanding and serve as explanations.I think you overstate the limitations of our conceptual grasp. We are not locked into a fixed Kantian conceptual universe. Our minds have some flexibility and room for development, enabling us to comprehend formerly incomprehensible (or at least convince ourselves that we do so comprehend). — SophistiCat
I was just reading a book called Concepts of Force by Max Jammer which had a few passages talking about critical reflections on the notion of 'force'. A few by the renowned idealist Berkeley seem to be rather relevant here.Struggles with interpreting new and unintuitive science are not that new. Neither is the retreat to the "shut up and calculate" quietist approach. — SophistiCat
Force, gravity, attraction and similar terms are convenient for purposes of reasoning and for computations of motion and of moving bodies, but not for the understanding of the nature of motion itself.
Real efficient causes of the motion. . . of bodies do not in any way belong to the field of mechanics or of experimental science; nor can they throw any light on these.
. . . then all the famous theorems of mechanical philosophy which. . . make it possible to subject the world to human calculations, may be preserved; and at the same time,the study of the motion will be freed from a thousand pointless trivialities and subtleties, and from (meaningless) abstract ideas.
I'm not exactly sure because a cursory examination of said book and some of the reviews summing it up seem to paint her as someone who is more desiring for a callback to scientific advancement or achievements of the past. Wherein physicists astound us with how mixing two bland and boring chemicals gives an astounding show of colors. To use experimental results as guides to solve all our philosophical worries. If only it were testable!Ever happened upon Sabine Hossenfelder's book Lost in Math? There might be some commonality between what you're asking and that book. — Wayfarer
Its not a question of meaningfulness but of even playing the game of making meaningful assertions which themselves don't give some immediate pragmatic results. Why play the game when no end goal is in sight?So - is your question basically ‘what does it all mean’? — Wayfarer
You are not wrong. There are many rather illustrative thought experiments that Einstein and others had or continue to construct which do serve a role in bringing about some sort of understanding through visualized mental experiments.This doesn't strike me as true at all. Special and general relativity are full of what you call "ideas of understanding, visualization, or explanation," e.g. space curved by mass. — T Clark
Its actually completely irrelevant whether its comprehensible or not at those scales.I don't think science or even physics in general is seen as "incoherent to our sensibilities." People call QM weird, but as far as I understand it, it's just the way things are. Maybe dispensing with metaphysics, i.e. visualization and explanation, is the right way to approach it. Why should we have to expect that the behavior of the universe at that scale has to be comprehensible in the same terms as baseballs and toothbrushes. — T Clark
Descriptions serve this role of expressing how things take place because they do not go beyond observables or mathematical synonyms for said observables with logical connectives to link one to another. If you want to express or interpret it as 'how'/'why' instead of 'description'/'explanation' then go ahead.I have never heard this. I have heard science only deals with how things work, not why. That's not the same as your phrase and it makes sense to me in most situations. — T Clark
Usually, examples of analogue models which are presented fall along the lines of billiard balls or old Aether vortices which have been forced out of the modern era by the great Einstein paradigm shift. They are seen as a part of the previous generation which we have passed and are 'long dead' figuratively speaking along with their progenitors who are literally dead.Again, I don't understand the basis of this claim. — T Clark
That is sort of why I've been speaking about it in a rather indirect manner and, if I haven't then its implied in previous replies, that the word 'science' is taken as not more than a label of notoriety. Sort of how the title of philosopher has been stretched into such a high colloquial usage with such vastness that its meaningfulness has been rather diluted.Tell you what, I've repeatedly offered what I take valid empirical science to be. You, so far, have not offered any definition of what you take it to be - and examples of what "science says" do not come close to delineating what is and is not science. — javra
Teddy didn't leave immediately and apparently he continued doing a speech for 50min WITH it having not grazed him but gone into his chest. Then accepted medical attention only after.Yeah, I can’t believe he left after being shot. Crazy. — NOS4A2
Its a lazy and quick interpretation riddled with metaphysical assertions that aren't made explicit that they are, analogue model usage that is stated as literal, and usually in ignorance of a long past of re-interpretations which make GR seem more similar to a mathematical model that has a thousand potential interpretations. . . not specifically one.Not sure how to best interpret the sarcasm in the first sentence. That spacetime bends is not fact, but theory. — javra
Yes, a proper connection and interpretation made between qualitative ordinary language predictions with quantitative predictions from approximate/exact results of Einstein's field equations with a host of respectable experimentalist assumptions have gained it express support.It is fact that this theory of relativity currently best accounts for all observables in the field - this to the best of our knowledge. — javra
That isn't the point I'm making.But then it is also fact that this same theory of relativity has to date not been satisfactorily combined with our best theories regarding QM - thereby logically demonstrating that something is amiss in either one of the two theories just mentioned or else with both. To affirm that spacetime bends is fact is then to deny what's just been here stated. — javra
This is the same conclusion as those who have been long involved in the substantivalist/relationist debate where its sort of devolved into whether we formulate the math topologically speaking or emphasize spacetime points.As to the mathematics, pure mathematics is notoriously indifferent to the observable world, conformant only to mathematical axioms and the logical implications of these. If the maths don't serve to best explain the observable world (or, as is the case with probability, as a tool for best appraising the validity of observable results) they are then worthless to the empirical sciences. Take Einstein's ToR for example; he had to invent an new mathematics to properly address the theory he held in mind - namely, the Einstein field equations. Here, the maths are not sacrosanct but, rather, part of the theorizing regarding the data so far accumulated. — javra
Until you wait long enough and then those observable differences only negate one mathematical formalism of a certain interpretation but not another mathematical formalism.Sometimes, if not often, newly discerned observables will then make a difference as to which interpretations are to be culled from the list. At the very least narrowing down the valid possibilities as to what in fact is. — javra
No, you proved that Newton's mathematical model of gravitation was incomplete. . . not that Newtonian physics is wrong. As if Newtonian/Classical physics wasn't allowed to have alternative mathematical models to Newtonian gravitation or that a different mathematical model coming down from the newest paradigm shift couldn't also be considered Newtonian.To address commonly known examples, Newton's X, Y, and Z did not account for Mercury's movements as observation A. Einstein's X, Y, and Z does. Because of this, we acknowledge the Newton's physics (theory of the physical) is wrong, despite yet being relatively accurate for all intended purposes most of the time. — javra
But I'll reaffirm that science (empirical science proper) was never ever a means of obtaining infallible knowledge or truths regarding what is. One of its greatest strengths is in culling possible explanations regarding what physically is in definitive - yet still technically fallible - manners. Take for example theories of life: there is no scientific manner to reintroduce the theory of Young Earth Creationism into scientific models of how life emerges and behaves - this exactly because it directly contradicts data (fossils and such) - although this is yet still not infallibly known (e.g., one can always bring in something like a Last Thursday-ist explanation of the data, as extremely non-credible as this alternative will be to both anti-YECs and YECs alike - its very logical standing, or better lack of, here tentatively overlooked). That stated, not all variations of Lamarckian interpretations of biological evolution have been falsified - this although Lamarckianism proper has. The Neo-Darwininan model we currently endorse would go through a paradigm-shift were any one of these Lamarckian possibilities valid (via further enquiry into epigenetics and the like) such that the will on the part of parents can in any way whatsoever effect the phenotype of offspring. Yet nothing even remotely adequate has been proposed in terms of any such Lamarckian-like possibility to serve as any significant threat to the Neo-Darwininan model we currently hold and hold onto to as valid representation of what is. This, however, does not make Neo-Darwinianism an established fact, though. And any potential scientific proposal to contest the currently predominant view will need to be a) empirically falsifiable and b) not falsified via any test to stand any chance of evidencing the hypothesis proposed. But if falsified, then that one particular hypothesis will then be definitively evidenced wrong. — javra
Then become a logical positivist.So, going back to the OP, because science has by now evidenced the strictly mechanistic model of the world to be erroneous, we should not "go back" to a Newtonian-physics-like understanding of the world - this, for example, no more than we as a society should go back to a Young Earth Creationist understanding of the world in general and hence of biology in particular. — javra
I don't think you understood and I didn't make it clear enough as it was a snide remark. I want to make the point that the intellectual methods used by both are similar; metaphysicians & theoretical scientists.Those in philosophical arm chairs don't do empirical science by so sitting in arm chairs. One has to be observing out in the field, as least a significant portion of the time, to engage in empirical sciences proper. A very big difference, to me at least. — javra
Re-interpretation is popularized as a demonic tool of pseudo-scientists when it only concerns whose predictive counterfactual models are to be considered simpler or not in their usefulness. As regards their observable consequences but re-interpretation is alive and well among science away from the purview of any observables.As to the "re-interpretations" these again only occur when models/theories do not fit the data, hence requiring at least tweaking in the models/theories/interpretations yet endorsed so as to adequately account for the data. — javra
You bring up the variable speed of light hypothesis as if the conventionality of simultaneity/geometry doesn't already make that a moot point.Yet these black boxes at the very least teeter on the non-scientific (irrespective of what the mass-hype might be). Its why the empirical sciences proper only deal with falsifiable hypotheses. As one easy to appraise illustrative example of this, science cannot address the "black box" of whether there is a small unicorn under your tabletop that turns invisible as soon as you look under - this precisely because this hypothesis is unfalsifiable [by any conceivable type of observation]. What does this have to do with physics and, more broadly, the empirical sciences in general? Same applies to myriad "theoretical entities of modern physics": e.g., M-theory, Many Worlds Interpretation, and so forth. Contrast this with something like the variable speed of light theory, which could be falsifiable where our technology to be advanced enough (last I looked into the matter). — javra
"I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work."
I regard science, at least the hard sciences, as plagued by irresolvable immense scientific holism (dependence on parts) and conventionalism. So much so that I find it maddening at this point but not something I feel I could easily give up given my fruitless internet searching for as long as I can remember.I somehow feel we yet hold significantly different understandings of what empirical science consists of. But I'm not currently sure of what these underlying differences might be. — javra
On the one hand your claim that this collecting of empirical data is 'objective' might be riddled with holes if only you got rather more specific on the methods or social practice science uses to collect such data. Further, I don't think I disagree with this nor is this really that astounding a realization as if those in philosophical arm chairs aren't able to or in fact don't do the exact same. They can perform just as equally with as tenacious a spirit as these scientists the observational practices common to modern science just with other interpretative goals.For there to be modeling, or else interpretation, in the first place, there first needs (as in necessity) to be empirical data to be modeled, else interpreted. Yes, science engages in modeling via which interpretation of data occurs. But what I'm attempting to express first and foremost is that the empirical sciences proper, via its use of the scientific method, collects empirical data in as an objective manner as currently fathomable to us humans. — javra
I don't think scientists actually think this way as there have been past disagreements that were resolved by further observation but usually by acceptable 're-interpretation' of the data to regard inconsistences as mere appearance. Contradiction with observation implies a bad functional connection between observables and theoretical postulations. It doesn't have to imply anything about the veracity/falsity of theoretical entities nor some conspiracy against our methods of observation. Nothing is tested, neither observation nor theory, but the glue which binds them and there a myriad number of ways to glue together the theoretical with observables.Models and interpretations that do not account for all data thereby accumulated - or worse, that logically contradict this data in total or in part - will be deemed falsified — javra
I'm not sure I actually care about such models as their falsity is predicated on mutually contradictory observable postulations within the accessibility of falsification within everyday practical understandings of meaning, objectivity, truth, etc.As a crude example easy to gain accord upon, the theory that Earth is geometrically flat is one such model via which our communal empirical data can become interpreted. Or, more exotic, so too is the theory that planet Earth is hollow and inhabited by sapient beings in its core (which I have heard people address). These models are wrong, i.e. incorrect, only because they fail to account for all commonly shared or else commonly accessible empirical data and on occasion directly contradict it. — javra
Science can collect 'observations' and data. Knowledge on the other hand requires a definition to be provided and a theory of meaning to be defended.Science (by which I here mean the scientific-method-utilizing empirical sciences) does not, and cannot, fail as our optimal means of obtaining unbiased empirical knowledge regarding what perceptually is. — javra
Only disagreement or dissension based in how vague its all presented.Is there any major disagreement in what I've so far expressed as pertains to science? — javra
Why not!?I love The Seventh Seal, and several other Bergman films, but he's not your go-to director for sunny up-lift. — BC
How can we have faith in those who believe when we can't have faith in ourselves? What is going to happen to those of us who want to believe but aren't able to? And what is to become of those who neither want to nor are capable of believing?
Why can't I kill God within me? Why does He live on in this painful and humiliating way even though I curse Him and want to tear Him out of my heart? Why, in spite of everything, is He a baffling reality that I can't shake off? Do you hear me?
I want knowledge, not faith, not suppositions, but knowledge. I want God to stretch out His hand towards me, reveal Himself and speak to me.
I would say I've never been clinically depressed. . . melancholy for sure.I don't know whether you are clinically depressed or are just doom-looping. If it's the latter, well... stop doing that. Depression gets tossed around too much. IS someone really clinically depressed, or are they lonely and angry? Tired? Isolated? Frustrated? Burdened with too many problems to deal with? Antidepressants will not help those sorts of things. — BC
I'm 23 and have a rather nonexistent collection of social relationships. Workaholic coworkers who are rightfully preoccupied with there own lives. Friends who I've ostracized or they have moved on. Family members who are stretched across countries now and those I have immediate access to are troubled in ways I cannot solve nor can a pouring out of my own troubles satiate their own.Just for reference, how old are you now? What kind of connections do you have with other people, at work and outside of work? Family? Friends? Romantic partner? — BC
Perhaps the way I wrote it created a false sense of worry and I apologize for that. I can assure you such existential worries of such intensity left me in my beginning twenties. I'm a bit lonely on my days off but nothing so morbid entertains my thoughts anymore.You probably shouldn't be alone. It sounds as if you're in a state of mind that, if you can't think of a way to change it, you should get help with. At least support from someone you trust. — Vera Mont
Your input is appreciated.Excellent start to figuring things out. Looks as if you have a lot of re-evaluation and planning to do. You'll need your clearest head. I wish you all the luck! — Vera Mont
I already do those things. In the two year hiatus I've taken I got a job and worked up to being an assistant manager with a few assorted retirement/medical benefits. I've indulged in some high amount of spending as one does when they get a growing bank account but still can support myself and leave enough aside for a new car, medical emergencies, in case I get laid off for 2-3 months, food, car payments, insurance, etc.What you are expected to do, and most likely what you can, you must, you shall, and you will do (after you get it over with) is find a job; inhabit hopefully decent housing; pay your bills; gradually pay off loans; shop for groceries; do laundry; establish a short/medium/long term relationship; and more! It's called LIFE. Most people are reasonably happy doing this stuff a good share of the time. — BC
I took that too close to heart as I still don't know what I'm doing since taking a hiatus from my education. I'm finishing up the same degree later this year having transferred to a more prestigious university with most expenses covered by state or parents but I still don't understand what I'm to do aside from get it over with.I wonder how many distract themselves - whether with recreational drugs (including alcohol) or sports or social activities - because they should not have been there in the first place. Many young people embark on higher education simply because it is expected of them.
And, too, pressure to succeed, to compete, to excel may drive many others to the performance enhancing drugs that have a whole other set of side- and long-term effects.
Some of that dropping out may be due, not to the drug-use but to the initial reason for drug use. — Vera Mont
That depends on how you define Newtonian mechanics and what it means to say anything is 'Newtonian'. It can't merely be the mathematical structure as Newtonian mathematical models can be as statistical as quantum mechanical ones if not make use of the same mathematical machinery that such modern 'theories' make use of."they performed the same modeling techniques under different labels." - this sounds like you're saying "the model of relativity is just the model of Newtonian mechanics, under a different name." Is that not what you mean? — flannel jesus
Which part? That a paradigm shift resulted from a change in thinking coming from the younger generations or that a large majority of the same classical intellectual biases pervade how modern day physicists continue to model?That's not remotely true, that's a completely bonkers narrative that I would expect only from a flat earther. — flannel jesus
Depends on what you mean by Newtonian mechanics as well as whether you separate philosophical interpretation, mathematical modeling, and applied technological predictive modeling.Also, I’d say Newtonian Mechanics is wrong. It gives the right answer to a certain number of decimal places but if you go far enough (10th decimal, 100th decimal), it gives an answer that disagrees with Relativity and with reality. — Art48
So is it purely linguistic simplicity for a particular role/purpose?An interesting, well-made video. You've covered many of the bases that need to be covered. I do have one disagreement. Materialism is metaphysics, a philosophical perspective on reality, a way of thinking about things. As I, and R.G. Collingwood, think, metaphysical positions are not true or false, right or wrong. This is a drum I've pounded here on the forum many times. As you note, materialism can be very useful as a way of looking at the world. I've read that most physicists are materialist, which makes sense. But it's not the only useful metaphysical approach, e.g. I've read that most mathematicians are idealists. Ontology is not an all or nothing thing. We can use different approaches in different situations and at different times, depending on which is more useful in each set of conditions. — T Clark
It's easier when you don't see them as people but as mere politicians.It doesn’t follow, for me. — NOS4A2
They've always been that way.He has become a folk devil. As a result, they have become the petty despots they claimed to have feared. — NOS4A2
Exactly it's amazing how much the entire U.S. government and all it's affiliations don't tire of this paradoxical rhetoric.Every time they mention democracy, the rule of law, or some other bromide, we are only reminded of how quick they are to violate them. — NOS4A2
Was he admitted into a greater political position within the U.S.? Then he had to do something to get there the same as all the others.And Trump never committed any. They literally have to conjure them out of thin air in order to maintain a delusion. — NOS4A2
Physicists say lots of things that they come to later regret upon a cursory examination of their language. Perhaps they should keep their mouths shut rather than have us be forced to listen to their mad ramblings from documentary to documentary on the subject matter.That's so interesting. Thank you for sharing your insights about time. According to physicists, time is not on its own, it exists as spacetime. — Truth Seeker
Except, if blindness yielded vast catechisms of iron-clad, faithful, resolve and beautiful imagery in our minds over the dullness of what lay before us if we opened ours.I will simply suggest that illusion arises as a possibility from the existence of vision, but that does not make blindness preferable. — unenlightened
To search for what cannot be settled and always demand skeptical humility as if to always rationally castrate oneself for 'seeing'.Likewise one can deceive oneself if and only if one can also possibly be honest with oneself. To be open to both possibilities is to already be a philosopher. — unenlightened
If that is the case then I have instilled a new hatred for 'philosophers' of various sorts as they mislead each other by claiming their beyond aesthetics but do it regardless. Masking their claims in authoritative language and absolutist terms to give their ego greater credence.Philosophy raises the strictly pragmatic to that of aesthetic reflection... Even the philosophy of Pragmatism itself is an aesthetic view of things. It is to not walk in the world from one task to another, but to look at the whole, and see it upon reflection, whether that be metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics, and values. These are things that take a secondary-reflection and not meant necessarily as to obtain some practical end. In this way, philosophy acts as therapy from the mundanity of everydayness, the feeling of being instrumental, and of only survival, and filling up one's free time with proscribed activities of society. — schopenhauer1
That requires a certain breadth of care with the material of all others we've taken from which I may not possess for years. Its best that I stay silent until that time but I will have rather egregious slip ups out of personal weakness.It is when one can be critical of one's own dearly held philosophies, that one can be open to the synthesis of one's own efforts with others, participating in a sort of dialectic, that will form a novel understanding based on the other, previous ones, even if just small tweaks. — schopenhauer1
Something more inline with what Milic calls the corpuscular-kinetic view of nature which arises almost entirely in certain respects from our imaginative capacities for visualization. Something tinged by spatialized analogies.To be clearer, by “mechanistic” I so far understand a model, system, process, thing, etc. that incorporates a classical billiard-ball-like understanding of causation and, thereby, entails the classical Newtonian understandings of space and time required for such causation’s mechanical occurrence. Do you have something else in mind in your use of the term? — javra
Shut up and calculate!
I would feel then that in line with Milic the only direction to go would be to one of a highly metaphorical or esoteric sense of philosophizing which also acknowledges the fallibility of such an approach or its limitations. That way we, as Milic feared, neither fall into some esoteric animisim of old or be accused of seeing math in nature (panmatheism)It's not that quantification is either simply abstract or entertaining, but that it's exact. Insofar as you can quantify, you can predict and control. One of the prime factors in the success of science is the increasing scope and accuracy of measurement. In Plato there is recognition of the exact nature of arithmetical proofs, which are contrasted with value judgements about the sensory domain, hence dianoia, arithmetical reasoning, being judged higher that sense experience; when you know an arithmetic proof, you know it with perfect clarity and without reference to anything else. The Galileo quote you refer to was 'nature is written in mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles and other geometric figures, without which it is impossible to humanly understand a word; without these, one is wandering in a dark labyrinth.' Hence the fundamental significance of quantitative data in science, and the division I mentioned in the earlier post between primary (measurable) and secondary (subjective) attributes. — Wayfarer
More playing devils advocate here. Course, its not too far from the Stanford Encyclopedia article's on science to think that true scientific explanation is to be found in visual analogical modeling. Especially given most of scientific theorizing is merely mathematical modeling, visual analogical modeling, and metaphorical prose. Its just a question of intuitive primacy as to which of these aspects should be emphasized more and what we think an explanation amounts to philosophically speaking.Are you equating these models to what science in essence is? If you are, you then seem to disagree with my appraisals of what empirical science consists of. No biggie, but I am curious. — javra
So did GR. . . and Quantum mechanics. . . or any physics which has come before. Experiments do not decide interpretations in any determinate sense but rather can remain stubborn biases without proof or dis-proof or in lieu of apparent dis-proof. Take the idea of talk about fundamental particles or constituents of reality which is a stubborn assumption of a Classical mentality. No amount of scientific argument or experimentation could settle the rationality of such a doctrine as either the particle is split showcasing its not fundamental, its postulated it is fundamental if it meets certain requirements, or if those requirements aren't met then its assumed to be not fundamental. ITS NOT TESTABLE!When I stated that the data remains, I was addressing the verifiable results which are for example obtained from the delayed-choice quantum erasure experiment—which pose serious problems either for classical notions of causation, for classical notions of physical identity, or else for both. And I so far understand both these classical notions to be requisite for any mechanistic account, even more so for any "highly mechanistic" account of the world in scientific philosophy. — javra
Exactly, the epicycles of the day and the things they model remain unchanged as they are correct by coincidence but if shown wrong then the math is MODIFIED to account for this. You may claim its not done so in the sense of curve fitting but its fitting nonetheless and this may be curve fitting which takes into account more than the data itself. Its still just theory fitting.The replicable data obtained from this experiment, then, will yet need to be accurately accounted for regardless of the implemented models, mathematical or otherwise; regardless of the philosophical explanations which inevitably make use of metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of space, time, and causality; and so forth. As to the mathematics involved, it is directly related to the data—such that were the mathematical system implemented to be contradicted by empirical test, it would hold no scientific value. Here, for example, thinking of the classic tests which were accordant to Einstein's theory of general relativity; were these test to have not so been, the mathematical system/theory would not have held water. (Related to this, because string-theory is currently not falsifiable via tests, this mathematical system is argued by some to be non-scientific—even if other speculate that M-theory can be further developed into a unified theory of physics.) At any rate, while explanations and models for the acquired data can change, the data nevertheless remains. — javra
I admit it's a trope of philosophical and scientific thought to think so highly of only the most abstract things we can entertain ourselves with. Galileo thought the world was written in that fashion if I recall and it's a further trope today to declare something as pseudo-science more so because it lacks mathematical basis rather than experimental one. However, something feels lacking and I fail to see how any attempt at explicating visually/metaphorically a casual "omph" could be seen as inferior to the black board.I would recommend looking into the origins of mathematical philosophy in Pythagoras. The Greeks had the insight that only number could be completely knowable; the expression A=A (the law of identity) offered an intrinsic certitude that things in the material/sensory world could only aspire to. If you can get hold of a copy of Bertrand Russell’s History of Western Philosophy, have a look at the chapter on Pythagoras. You might also enjoy an essay - originally a lecture - by Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus. — Wayfarer
That is one way to approach it which is to showcase the necessity of such language.As I was developing my personal philosophical worldview, I didn't intentionally seek to cast hard science into softer poetic forms. But Quantum Physics --- "the most mathematically accurate theory in the history of science" --- is also the most counter-intuitive and irrational. So, the use of metaphors & analogies seems to be mandatory. But such mushy terminology --- wave-particle is an actor playing two roles --- goes against the grain of classical mechanical physics. The simple cause-effect relationship is complicated by inserting a conscious mind into the event : cause-observation-effect (two slit experiments). Even the math of Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle includes confounding infinities. Consequently, I was left with no choice, but to follow the lead of the Copenhagen compromise between objectivity and subjectivity. Hence, to combine physics with metaphysics. :cool: — Gnomon
I was actually talking about the void or space as such an entity wasn't so alien but in fact was in a close alliance with Classical physics.I assume the "entity" you refer to is something like an entangled wave-particle, which is neither here nor there, but everywhere. That's literally non-sense, but physicists eventually learned to "accept" such weirdness in exchange for uncanny technologies like quantum tunneling, that make your cell phone work wonders. I'm not familiar with Čapek, but Bergson and Whitehead were influential in the formation of my information-based worldview. :nerd: — Gnomon
On the contrary we already do this modern return to mechanism except it's not called mechanism.Nevertheless, the data so far acquired from modern physics will remain and need to be accounted for in whatever scientific developments regarding category (b) that might eventually result. Making the going "back to a highly mechanistic picture of the world in scientific education/philosophy" highly inappropriate. — javra
I'm not exactly sure. . . part of my journey here into these other works is motivated not by undoing the whole hardness of science nor is it entirely to soften it into poetic verbiage with merely aesthetic qualities. Perhaps, its more a research question as to whether there is some way to intuitively hold onto those poetic perennial forms of philosophy without succumbing to the same critiques from the 'shut up and calculate' crowd.Are you longing for a return to a softer kind of science, or maybe a more poetic brand of philosophy*2? — Gnomon
However, that did not stop the mechanistic theories of Classical physics of accepting such an entity, as that book by Milič Čapek supports, and that there are more concepts that such a view of the world accepted than is usually let on. Such a Classical view of the world interpreting them in a fairly consistent and specific fashion for their purposes. . . or biases.Your screename, "Substantivalism"*3, harks back to the ancient roots of modern science in debates about the substance of reality. Greek Atomism was a good start toward a mechanistic worldview, except that it postulated no empty space for change, because nothingness was taboo. Yet, mechanism requires both hard stuff (substance) and soft space (relation) to produce a dynamic material & physical world that won't stand still for us to examine it. — Gnomon
Well, you could say this obscurity also pervades modern physics in general and the public is thrashed around as a rag doll in a storm of such poetic expressions which are neither clarified explicitly nor literalized properly to remove any confusion. Perhaps its not just obscure philosophy that needs to do some better PR but also modern physics as well.If that's what this thread is all about, you will find some sympathetic ears, but be prepared for accusations of preaching mystical "obsessions" and metaphysical woo-woo. — Gnomon