The worst part of consumerism is that the ‘goods’ they sell you are designed to break down and be thrown away rather than to be durable goods. That’s a big part of the plastic catastrophe.

The Puffer-fish boudoir looks like a creative work of art. — Gnomon

Well, they all look the same so there’s limited creativity from the individual puffer-fish. It is thought that females evaluate the size and regularity of the sculpture to assess the size and fitness of the males.

What amazes me is the mathematical precision of the sand sculpture, the several concentric circles, radial furrows and all.

How do we stop being greedy? — unenlightened

We can develop an anti-consumerist, anti-materialist philosophy, and try to teach it to our kids.

I find ‘qualia’ a useful neologism. True that some people have no use for it, or misuse it.

But pain exists. — Banno

Not really. Consciousness is an illusion, remember? So your conscious feeling of pain is an illusion, as per Dennett... Stop complaining.

Whatever. Glad I entertained you. Will make sure never ever to teach you a new word in the future. That’s a promise!

And the bloody arthritis is playing up again, making me even grumpier. — Banno

Don’t worry about it, pain qualia don’t exist.

I love you too, Banno.

he says nothing precise
— Olivier5

Coming from someone who advocates for the use of "qualia"...

...that's a tad bit ironic if it's meant to be a critique. — creativesoul

That is so unfair! I've been very precise about what I mean by qualia.

We can apprehend the world through quality and quantity, hence both of these must exist, at least in our mind. They must be supported by perception systems. I noted that the taste of sugar combines a quality (sugar taste) and a quantity (too little, too much sugar in my coffee). So the idea is like this:

Functionally, a successful animal needs to be able to estimate certain things, including the energy available in its food, and incentivise certain behaviors, while minimising certain risks (including food poisoning). Its olfactive and gustatory senses help distinguish between "good" and "bad" food by:

1. Using chemical reactions in the nose and mouth to estimate a series of indicators - eg concentration in disposable sugars, various salts, some "known" ( by evolution) poisonous stuff, etc.
2. Tag each of these indicators with a qualitatively distinct mark or feel, a qualitative signal if you wish, that allows the animal to recognise the indicator. The taste of sugar is different from the taste of salt.
3. Use the intensity of the signal above to code for the quantitative aspect of perception. (too much or too little sugar)
4. Attach pleasure or displeasure to each of these qualitatively identified signals, as a way to shape behavior.
5. Make the system evolutive and adaptative throughout the animal's life, with some capacity to record or reproduce past food consumption events, to inform future ones. — Olivier5

Tastes work. Quantitatively, objectively, they measure important stuff, like the content of sugar and salts in our food. Such a system cannot logically work without some ID system for tastes, some qualitative perceptual signal, recognisable somehow from the perceptual signals of other chemicals. Memorizable somehow. And then this individual perceptual signal for say, sugar, is perceptive enough to code for solution dosage by way of modulating the intensity of the signal.

Now we can ask ourselves how our senses work, a scientific question, or wonder what is the ontology of tastes, a philosophical question. But let's be clear that everyone can taste the difference between sugar and hot pepper. Especially at high dosage.

Therefore qualitative differences in perception exist.

Enter the little qualia, dancing in circles... I mean the modest, phenomenological qualia: mere qualitative coding for generally quantitative signals that make up our robust, biological, life-afirming senses.

Our senses honed by evolution, the source of all our experiences, they need some way of tagging, identifying qualitatively the signal of certain significant chemicals, or wavelengths, or sound signatures. It's literally "color coding". — Olivier5

It has been defined in such a way as to mean almost exactly that. So ideas associated with 'religion' are placed on one side, and those with 'science' on the other. Often this demarcation is assumed or tacit. — Wayfarer

This demarcation is useful, though.

facile deus ex machina cop-outs.
— Olivier5

Care to mention an example? I didn't see anything of that kind in it, myself. — Wayfarer

In what? Nagel's essay? No, of course not. I am just saying that I personally go by some rules while philosophizing, rules which exclude the facile recourse to mythology and theology. It's not an ontic statement about the existence or absence of the gods, just a methodological statement.

Saw this yesterday and wondered how such a behavior could emerge from evolution... It's about a species of puffer fish. The male puffer fish creates a nesting ground for the female in the shape of a sand sculpture. The female gets attracted (supposedly) by the 2 m large work, goes in the center, and when bitten by the male, lays her eggs. The eggs are fertilized by the male and dropped off at the center of the circle. The male then protects the eggs while the female goes away, and while his sculpture progressively erodes around him... The full work is visible at 2:00 mn. (in french)

Nagel's essay — Wayfarer

I've started reading, found it a good piece. But rest assured that I am not afraid of anything here, except facile deus ex machina cop-outs. One can answer "God did it" to any philosophical question; it's just a bit too easy, which is why I stay away from theology.

the Greek term 'metaphysical' is an exact translation of the Latin 'supernatural'. — Wayfarer

My understanding of the prefix "meta" is that it simply means "about", often in some reflexive way (metadata = data about the data, metacognition = cognition about cognition). Metaphysics is a discourse about physics, itself understood as a discourse about nature.

While "super" in supernatural means today something very different: "at odds with nature".

Supernatural’ is a boo word. You really ought to look at the Nagel essay I linked to, it’s in no way religious apologetics. — Wayfarer

Of course it’s a boo word, so what? I am entitled to have likes and dislikes, just like everyone else. And I don’t like mythological explanations that much. So to me, minds emerge naturally from our biology.

But it does seem to imply a mind or foregoing intelligence. Religion is not all gods and fairies, you know — Wayfarer

We agreed already with Janus that minds exist and are effective (i.e. causal). What is religion without a belief in the supernatural?

Since you don't back this up with any form of erudition, I don't really much care. — Banno

Likewise, why should I care about your Dennett article, if you can’t even be bothered to summarize what it says?

Fakers everywhere...

Another good thing about the article cited is that it provides a more nuanced account than the rather mundane "qualia or eliminative materialism" spectrum apparently assumed by folk here - Luke, @Olivier5? — Banno

You want to summarize the conclusion for us, Banno? Personally I hold Dennett as a fake thinker, as a snake oil salesman à la Trump. In typical fashion for a faker, he says nothing precise in Quining Qualia. I suppose the same is true of this other article.

Transcendental is natural, by the way, as it does not require the intervention of any god.
— Olivier5

That is an interesting topic for debate in its own right. In practice, naturalism is suspicious of transcendentals, because by definition they're not defineable in purely naturalistic terms — Wayfarer

I suppose it would depend on what one defines as ‘natural’ and ‘naturalism’. Historically the latter is synonymous with ‘ physicalism’. But for me it just means ‘without god’s intervention’. Remember that ‘physical’ has no meaning In this context, since it usually means ‘mind-independent’. So natural does not mean physical, it just means ‘without need for a god or fairy’. And transcendence needs no fairy.

Just saying that the word ‘physical’ means nothing in this context. ‘Natural’ does mean something though, so I would rather use this concept here. Transcendental is natural, by the way, as it does not require the intervention of any god.

There is no logical proof that minds are physical or not. — Janus

Okay so the question is not important. The important thing is that minds decide what is physical and what is not.

An even more important thing is that minds are natural. Forget ‘physical’.

So if one applies your criteria, the question ought not to be if minds are physical, since minds decide what is physical... — Olivier5

In other words, if one applies your criteria, minds are evidently physical, since minds decide what is physical.

I conclude that ‘physical’, if not defined in opposition to minds, is a vague and empty concept. And if defined in opposition to minds (is physical what is mind-independent) then of course minds are not physical.

I prefer the term ‘natural’, in the sense of excluding the intervention of a supernatural being. No magic, not local anyway. Only universal laws apply, which of course can be created by some gods but the gods obey and observe their own laws so to speak, so there’s no local exception to the rules. ‘Natural’ also evokes biology rather than physics, and I am a strong believer in the powers of biology to explain (ultimately) symbolic human thought.

so what? — Janus

The point is that the human mind is having a huge ‘physical’ impact. Through science and technology for instance.

I haven't anywhere claimed that minds are not central to all our investigations. We investigate with our minds (and bodies of course). Physicalism, even eliminative physicalism, does not necessarily claim that minds are not central, or that they are illusory, all it necessarily claims is that there is nothing substantively non-physical about minds and their thoughts. — Janus

The point is that your criteria for ‘physicality’ is based on the existence of minds able to have phenomenological experiences. So if one applies your criteria, the question ought not to be if minds are physical, since minds decide what is physical... The question should be: beside minds, what else is physical.

I think it's truer to say we are screwing up the climate due to our prior ignorance of the effects of our technology. It is only science itself that tells us how we are screwing up the climate. Wilful ignorance of science is now the problem. — Janus

Our scientific knowledge of climate change as a theoretical possibility dates from the mid 19th century. In other words, it’s as old as the industrial revolution. Climatology validated the predictions in the 1960’s and 70’s.

A causal hypothesis must be testable to count as such. Hypotheses about God, the Devil or the Tao are metaphysical hypotheses and are not testable.

Okay so by ‘physical’ you mean ‘testable’? Minds are testable all right. But more importantly, minds are what is testing anything. In order to test anything, you first need a mind to do the testing... So your very criteria for physicality presupposes the existence, centrality and effectiveness of minds.

Something is physical if it, or its effects are detectable. — Janus

Well, that’s an easy decision then: the effects of the human mind cannot be denied. We’re even screwing up the climate now, thanks to our sciences and technology... we don’t need much philosophy to establish that.

We count something as physical if we can form a causal hypothesis as to its detectable effects.

That’s much too easy. Anyone can form a causal hypothesis as to the detectable effects of God and the Devil, or the great Tao or something. This criteria simply doesn’t work. It doesn’t exclude anything.

But what do you mean by physical?

I understand ‘natural’. It excludes some central decision making center directing the whole thing. Causality stems from things themselves, from their qualities, in a decentralized and local manner. But ‘physical’ to me refers to what is not mental... and yet mental events are evidently natural.

What's being eliminated is the notion that the mind is non-physical, not the notion that it is important. — Janus

By physical, you mean natural, like, not involving a supernatural being or substance? Because one usual, common meaning of ‘physical’ is in opposition to ‘mental’...

But the eliminative materialist can consistently deny that the mind is anything apart being a function of the physical brain. — Janus

A VALID AND USEFUL function, yes, which therefore fails to eliminate anything in it.

Just why and account of just what is materialism "self-denying and life-demeaning"? And then what's the alternative exactly? Those are the two questions that critics of materialism never seem to be able to answer. — Janus

Eliminative materialism, by definition, attempts to eliminate human consciousness and reason. Eg by saying it’s an epiphenomenon or an illusion. That is self-denying because them materialists are themselves conscious and endowed with reason.

The alternative I am contemplating is a form of non-naive materialism where our minds are not denied (because such denial is futile and absurd), but recognized as useful, effective and causal. That is the only intellectually honest form of materialism: one in which minds matter.

The question is why is it not possible for a materialist to hold spiritual, ethical and aesthetical values? — Janus

It IS possible, as long as he does not deny the existence and importance of his own mind.

Stuck in our conscious containers with our dreadful colors displaying on the mind's wall. Unable to appreciate the pure material forms. — Marchesk

Ah ah... you really want to perceive Beethoven’s 5th as ‘a variation of air pressure’?

The materialist god forbids that people recognize anger by its phenomenal qualities. Aka the satanic qualia.

Also, the expectations have something to do with public models, which are what we think other people would do in our situation. — Marchesk

I don’t know about no ‘public model’. Is that a meme? An official theory? A frequent practice? A common sense position? Sounds like a slippery concept to me.

Do you fell up to summarising? — Banno

The images that we see are constructed unconsciously in our head based on sensory data, understood as a constant updating of our expectations. Something like that.

It’s fear. For that, see Thomas Nagel’s essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. (Sorry if I’m overburdening you with reading materials. :yikes: ) — Wayfarer

I never cared enough about gods to think or want this or that of them. They are metaphors, the way I see them, sometimes useful and poetic metaphors but nothing more. What I came to value over the years is spirituality, that is to say, to leave the transcendental door open.

Michel Bitbol. He has some very interesting and relevant insights into this issue - see his paper It is never known but it is the knower. — Wayfarer

Read it, thanks. That's really witty and useful, and very topical to pretty much all these discussions we've been having here on the "hard? problem?". (question marks to imply that the problem may not be that hard, or that it may indeed not be a problem at all)

Bitbol is making pretty much all the same arguments that we have been making here against the Great Denial. He calls it a blind spot, but I think he is being too charitable, at least in some cases. The amount of resistance that some eliminative materialists put up to the rather obvious idea that they themselves exist as 'minds', and their their incapacity to understand the contradiction in their stance indicate that something more sinister than a mere blind spot is at play: eliminative materialism is a self-denying and life-demeaning ideology. What started as a blind spot has evolved into denial.

I take Bitbol's point that we may never "objectify subjectivity", because that would be a contradiction in terms. So we will never be able to understand a subjective experience 'from the outside'. But explaining how our biology give rise to minds and how minds affect our biology in principle is a more modest project than to objectify fully a subjective experience. It is rather about explaining how something like experience could possibly emerge from biology.

You underestimate Siri. — TheMadFool

That, or you overestimate it.

But it's problem of reflexivity. 'The eye can see another, but not itself. The hand can grasp another, but not itself.' That actually is from the Upaniṣads, and it's an observation which I don't think has a parallel in Western philosophy, but it's an extremely important principle. — Wayfarer

But a hand can hold another hand, and an eye can see another eye...

I don't know if you're aware of a French scholar by the name of Michel Bitbol. He has some very interesting and relevant insights into this issue - see his paper It is never known but it is the knower.

Never heard of him, will check out.

There are logically coherent forms of materialism, that consider the mind as physically mediated, created by the brain,
— Olivier5

I think 'created by' is an issue. It's a question of ontological dependency. We instinctively see the mind as 'created by' or 'a product of' the material, but I'm not so sure. If I was a good enough story-teller, I could tell you something that effected your physiology - your 'blood would run cold' or maybe you would become angry and your adrenaline would kick in. That is 'mind over matter' on a very small scale, but the principle applies in all kinds of ways.

Underwritten by the brain, if you prefer. Information is always ‘written’ on something, it has to be the form of something material, in order to exist materially. A poem is not paper and ink, but it has to be written in paper and ink (or another material support) in order to exist.

If matter can affect minds (and it can), then minds can affect matter, by the principle of action-reaction.

In the type of biology-centred ‘emergent materialism’ I practice, ‘mind over matter’ is the only possible raison d’être of minds. By that I mean that if nature created something as bizarre as minds, it must be for a reason. Minds must be able to do something special, have some sort of value-added that living creatures without it are necessarily lacking. My hypothesis is that the mind is simply the pilot in the creature. It follows that the greater the freedom of movement of the creature, the greater the need for a mind. A plant moves less than an animal, and has far less need for a mind than an animal. A vegetative animal (e.g. a corral remaining in the same place, or any bivalve mollusk attached to its rock) has less need for a mind than an octopus. De facto, cephalopodes (octopuses, cuttlefish etc) have far larger brains than any other mollusk species, because they can move a lot of arms (8). Now, if brains underwrite minds, cephalopodes have bigger minds than all other invertebrates.

Not as l large as birds, who can fly. I envy them a bit for that... :-)

As for passing comments, a standard issue desktop can be installed with a program that can do that. — TheMadFool

Sure, a human being or several could encode in the computer a capacity to emulate human speech, like Siri. But Siri can’t pass for a human being. It cannot pass the Turing test.

you can't explain consciousness, because consciousness is the source of any and all explanation. — Wayfarer

This is the core of the issue, and probably why we think it’s hard, but I am not yet convinced that the human mind is unable to understand itself.

Yes I don’t understand how he can still be materialist but he apparently is. — Wayfarer

There are logically coherent forms of materialism, that consider the mind as physically mediated, created by the brain, but not an illusion. Instead, the mind is seen as an effective organ, useful to the survival of the individual. Aka compatibilism. So one can be a non-naïve, coherent materialist if one includes the human mind in ‘matter’, as something that literally ‘matters’.

The image of the world in our eyes is identical to the image of the world in a camera's. If that were false, a camera wouldn't be a camera. A camera records events and that's another way of saying the image in the camera should be a faithful reproduction of actual events/places. — TheMadFool

The camera has been designed on purpose to capture an image close to what your eyes would capture. The colors, the focale, etc. are designed to render faithfully human vision. But the cellphone doesn’t actually perceive anything by itself. Otherwise it would comment on what it sees, like you can do.