What is 'seeing' as a process for you? — Isaac

Along the lines of what is written in Searle's article:
“You said that you directly perceive the tree, but suppose it is a hallucination. And suppose the hallucination is type identical with the veridical experience. What do you see then? It is obvious that you do not see the tree but only the visual experience itself, what the traditional philosophers called an idea, an impression, or a sense datum.”

The Cambridge Dictionary describes "to see" as:
to be conscious of what is around you by using your eyes
to watch a film, television programme, etc.
to be the time or place when something happens
to understand, know, or realize
to meet or visit someone, or to visit a place
to consider or think about
to imagine someone doing a particular activity
to take someone somewhere by going there with them
to try to discover
to make certain that something happens

I see what you mean, but both the good and bad thing about language is that each word may have several different meanings, and knowing what is meant often depends on context, which is often ambiguous.

so are you seeing two things? One, the tree(indirectly) and two, the model (directly). — Isaac

I think that I am seeing only one thing, a model of a tree in my mind.

Searle wrote:
"The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain."

Using Searle's words, it is not that the visual experiences has a tree as an object because the visual experience is identical with the tree.

What would it mean to exist 'as a tree'? As opposed to what? — Isaac

"Trees" exist in my mind as concepts. What exists in the world are elementary particles, elementary forces and space-time.

I don't see how you would know what 'treating it like a tree' would entail if no-one has any veridical experience of trees. — Isaac

"Trees" as private concepts didn't exist before being named in a public performative act, which could have been either by social acceptance over a period of time or by an institutional body. Before being publicly named, no one would have had any veridical experience of "trees". For example, in France, trees were named "arbres" and in Germany were named "alberi". This public performative act is available to everyone who uses that language. Therefore an individual's private concept of "tree" has been determined by knowledge of the public performative act of naming a certain set of shapes and colours as a "tree".

For example, no one at this moment has any veridical experience of a squund. However, if I pointed out to you a certain shape that was square at the top and round at its base and said "I name this a "squund"", we would then both have the private knowledge that this particular shape had the name "squund". I could then ask you to pass me the squund, and you could do so, even though your private knowledge of a squund is inaccessible to me, and my private knowledge of a squund is inaccessible to you. The veridical knowledge of squunds is then henceforth stored in the public domain, either in dictionaries or in conversations

Similarly for trees, my concept of tree is different to yours, I can never know your private concept of tree, yet we can both sensibly discuss trees because what a tree is is stored in the public domain.

If to 'know' something is to have sufficient warrant for believing it', and if 'sufficient warrant' is 'having something respond as expected when treating it as if it were what you believe it to be' - then is simply follows, by substitution, that you 'know' you see a tree all the while you treat it as if it were a tree and it responds accordingly. — Isaac

A warrant is a justification. They say knowledge is justified true belief. I may believe that there is a tree in the field and can justify my belief, but a justified belief is not knowledge.

To be knowledge, the justified belief has to be true. There arrives the problem.

A Direct Realist argues that they have direct knowledge of the world, and therefore knows that there is a tree there. An Indirect Realist argues that they only have indirect knowledge of the world, and therefore can only believe that there is a tree there.

You've made a pretty puzzle for yourself. — Banno

A puzzle I have my own solution to, but remains to be accepted by the Direct Realist.

I wrote "Direct Realism's solution to this seeming paradox is by equating the effect with the cause, in that, if the effect is sensing of the colour green, Direct Realism says that the cause is also the colour green. Given a single effect, Direct Realism gives a single cause that is identical with the effect. However, this is an illusion."

As Searle wrote, the experience of pain is identical with the pain
"The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing"

The Indirect Realist accepts that perceiving a single cause for a single effect is an illusion, but this is not something that the Direct Realist accepts.

Other factors that the the Direct Realist need to take into account are: i) the asymmetry of causal relations, which coincides with temporal asymmetry, whereby effects do not precede their causes, and ii) the over determination problem, where an effect such as perceiving the colour green can have two or more distinct sufficient causes.

Seems you can't tell that this post from me is a post from me - just by seeing this post, "one cannot know, of the several possible causes, which was the actual cause". — Banno

Very true. Who are you. You may be a sixteen year old working as a waiter and living in Lima, you might be Kamala Harris passing her evenings in Washington, you could be a forty year old tax inspector living in Beijing wanting to improve their English, or you may even be a ChatGPT. I don't know. I am responding to the post, not the author of the post who is unknown to me.

Roland Barthes wrote The Death of the Author in 1967, which emphasizes the primacy of each individual reader's interpretation of the work over any "definitive" meaning intended by the author.

Searle sets out with great clarity the difference. When one sees a tree, there is a tree to be seen. When one hallucinates a tree, there is no tree to be seen...........He does take this distinction as granted. — Banno

Searle writes about the mistakes of philosophers of great genius
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes."

As regarding the debate between Indirect and Direct Realism, he writes
"The second mistake almost as bad is the view that we do not directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world."

I agree that he writes with great clarity about what he perceives as the mistakes of the past, but he is a bit short on giving any reasons or justifications why they were mistaken. As you say, he takes a lot for granted.

You've mixed your intentionality with your causation. Knowing involves intentionality, rather than cause. That is, claiming to know something is adopting a certain intentional attitude towards that state of affairs: that this is true — Banno

There is a direction of information flow in a causal process

Searle writes about perception and direction of fit and causation
"Perception has the mind-to-world direction of fit and the world-to-mind direction of causation. That is just the fancy way of saying that the perception is satisfied or unsatisfied depending on how the world is in fact independently of the perception (mind-to-world direction of fit), but the world being that way has to cause the perception to be that way (world-to-mind direction of causation)."

Searle writes about the intentionality and causation of a visual experience
"A fourth feature of the situation is that the visual experience has intrinsic intentionality. The experience sets conditions of satisfaction, and these conditions are those under which the experience is veridical as opposed to those conditions under which it is not veridical. Confining ourselves to seeing the tree in front of me we can say that the conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience are that there has to be a tree there and the fact that the tree is there is causing in a certain way the current visual experience. So on this account the visual experience in its conditions of satisfaction is causally self-reflexive in that the causal condition refers to the perceptual experience itself. If the perceptual experience could talk it would say, “If I am to be satisfied (veridical) I must be caused by the very object of which I seem to be the seeing."

In order to know that I am seeing a tree, my visual experience must have an intrinsic intentionality about the tree, such that my mind is directed at the tree. But in order to see the tree, there must have been a temporally prior world-to-mind causation, from the tree being the way it is in the world to the tree in my mind.

Therefore, as Searle writes, knowing requires both intentionality and causation, in that the cause of a perception is temporally prior to the perception itself. Between the cause of the perception and the perception itself there may have been several intermediary stages in a long causal chain.

There is only one direction of flow of information in a causal chain, in that, just by seeing a broken window on a walk into town, one cannot know, of the several possible causes, which was the actual cause. If backwards flow of information was possible through a long causal chain, a detective at the scene of a crime would straight away know the identity of the criminal.

The puzzle is, how can the mind, when perceiving an object, know the single cause of its perception, when the cause happened prior to the perception and at the far end of a long causal chain.

The Direct Realist's position is that the perceiver of an object knows a single cause of that perception, yet this would require a backwards flow of information through a causal chain, which is impossible.

If Direct Realism was how reality worked, every detective would be taught Direct Realism in order to give them a 100% success rate in crime solving.

If I come along and find somebody who does not hallucinate, does this mean they don't have "sense data"? — Richard B

Searle, hallucination and the veridical

Searle discusses the ambiguity of the word "see".
"What shall we say about the bad argument in both of its versions? I think in spite of its enormous influence it rests on a simple fallacy of ambiguity over ‘see’ and other perceptual verbs" and "In the ordinary sense of ‘see’ in which I now see the tree, in the hallucinatory case I do not see anything".

Searle repeats a scientific version of the "argument from illusion":
“You told us earlier that visual experience takes place when photons strike the photoreceptor cells and set up a series of causal events that eventually results in a visual experience in the cortex. But it is of that visual experience that we are visually aware. The science of vision has proven that the only thing you can actually see, literally, scientifically is the visual experience going on in your head. We might as well have a name for these visual experiences. Call them ‘sense data’. All you ever perceive are sense data, and by way of vision all you can ever perceive are visual sense data.”

Searle says someone could see a tree even if there wasn't one
"but when I see the tree I cannot separate the visual experience from an awareness of the presence of the tree. This is true even if it is a hallucination and even if I know that it is a hallucination. In such a case, I have the experience of the perceptual presentation of an object even though there is no object there."

Generally, one knows something one perceives is not there because its being there would be improbable or anomalous, for example, an airplane divebombing the house, or a spectre of death standing on the edge of the forest. But for a common object as a tree, something that is not out of place, and there is nothing improbable or anomalous about it, and is something that one definitely expects to perceive, how can one know that there is no tree there.

Searle is saying that in the hallucinatory case the observer perceives a tree within sense data but doesn't see the tree, and in the ordinary case the observer doesn't perceive a tree in the sense data but does see the tree. If the observer perceives a tree, and there is nothing anomalous about the tree, there can be no way for the observer to know whether the tree exists or is an hallucination. If the tree exists, then the observer sees the tree. If the tree doesn't exist, then the observer perceives the sense data.

If there is no way for the observer to know whether everyday objects such as trees exist or are hallucinations, how does the observer know whether they are seeing the tree or perceiving the sense data ?

Searle doesn't explain how an observer can know they are hallucinating about an object that is neither improbable or anomalous.

You questioned whether we know what we see is the tree. — Isaac

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that I directly see a model or a representation of a tree in my mind. I don't directly see a tree in the world, but only indirectly.

When I perceive a tree, I don't question that I am perceiving a tree, but I do question that what I am perceiving as a tree exists in the world as a tree.

As a believer in Realism, I believe the world exists, and believe that there is something out there in the world that I perceive as a tree. Even if it not a tree, I can act towards it as if it were. As you rightly said "all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree"

As a Realist, I believe that there is a world out there and I am part of it. In believing that I can transact with a world that is inseparable from my agency within it, my approach is that of a Pragmatist. As originally conceived by Charles Sanders Peirce, the core of pragmatism was the Pragmatic Maxim, a rule for clarifying the meaning of hypotheses by tracing their ‘practical consequences’, their implications for experience in specific situations. I can treat the something I perceive as a tree as a tree in the world, act towards it as tree, and follow the consequences of my actions. If the results are not as I expected, I can adjust my future interactions with the world.

So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree — Isaac

I agree when you say that "all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree", but don't agree that your conclusion would logically follow "So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree"

It doesn't necessarily follow that because we treat something as a tree then it is a tree.

Physical properties interacting with each other without perceivers, becomes oddly anthropomorphic in its conception. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. A case of psychological projection, rather than onto other people onto the world around us. As the Wikipedia article on Psychological Projection writes, "Psychological projection is a defence mechanism of alterity concerning "inside" content mistaken to be coming from the "outside".

You have sufficient warrant to believe the tree you see is, in fact, a tree, all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree. — Isaac

I agree with that. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, a pragmatic approach to the world.

Can we really talk about non-perceived events and interactions — schopenhauer1

There is a useful paragraph in the SEP article Nonexistant Objects.

"One of the reasons why there are doubts about the concept of a nonexistent object is this: to be able to say truly of an object that it doesn’t exist, it seems that one has to presuppose that it exists, for doesn’t a thing have to exist if we are to make a true claim about it? In the face of this puzzling situation, one has to be very careful when accepting or formulating the idea that there are nonexistent objects. It turns out that Kant’s view that “exists” is not a “real” predicate and Frege’s view, that “exists” is not a predicate of individuals (i.e., a predicate that yields a well-formed sentence if one puts a singular term in front of it), has to be abandoned if one is to accept the claim that there are nonexistent objects"

In order to talk about a non-perceived event, one first has to presuppose that we are able to perceive it.

If you need that explaining you may want to seek professional help. — Isaac

I wrote that Searle doesn't explain how one knows whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience.

Searle wrote:
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes"
"The second mistake almost as bad is the view that we do not directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world. For this view famous arguments were advanced, and I am going to argue in this article that the arguments are all variations on a single bad argument, which I will honor with the capital title “The Bad Argument”
"I think the great philosophers of the past rejected Direct Realism because of an argument which was, until recently, quite commonly accepted among members of the profession. Some of them thought Direct Realism was so obviously false as not to be worth arguing against. There are different versions of it but the most common is called ‘the argument from illusion’ and here is how it goes"

According to Searle, even the great geniuses of philosophy were concerned with The Argument from Illusion, in how to know whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience, so I am in good company.

But there's nothing causal here. Not knowing whether A caused B has no bearing on the plausibility of an hypothesis that A causes B. — Isaac

I agree, but I thought the whole point of Direct Realism is that one directly sees the green tree, not hypothesise about it.

Can you elaborate on this, defining instantiation here, and property and why one instantiation of property is not property? — schopenhauer1

By definition, a property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects, so there must be at least two things before there can be a property. My starting position is that properties don't exist in the world but only exist in the mind as concepts, along the lines of Conceptualism and Nominalism. It follows that if a "tree is green", the properties green and tree only exist in the mind and not the world. So what exists in the world. There is nothing left but space-time, elementary forces and elementary particles, along the lines of Neutral Monism and Panprotopsychism. Everything else exists in the mind, such as tables, mountains, apples, governments, morality, ethics and green trees.

"What is an event that is unperceived.................what does that even mean for space and time to be a placeholder for an event sans perceiver?" — schopenhauer1

In conceptual terms, what is most widely accepted today is the giant-impact theory. It proposes that the Moon formed during a collision between the Earth and another small planet, about the size of Mars. The debris from this impact collected in an orbit around Earth to form the Moon.

In reductionist terms, there were changes to the elementary forces and elementary particles within space-time.

Wasn't this an event in space-time without a perceiver ?

One of the strengths that folk ascribe to this idea that we "directly perceive sense data" is the certainty that they can not be in error. This is the great appeal. However, I don't believe that the veracity of this idea can be proven, and the idea itself incoheren — Richard B

John Searle: The Philosophy of Perception and the Bad Argument

Searle's refutation of The Argument from Illusion is weak

One reason philosophers in the past have rejected Direct Realism is because of The Argument from Illusion, which is obviously a strong argument. It is argued that the hallucination and veridical experience can be type identical, such that if an hallucination can only be explained by seeing sense data, then a veridical visual experience must also be explained by seeing sense data.

John Austin was critical of sense data, and in his 1962 book Sense and Sensibilia took aim at the doctrine that we never directly perceive material objects but only sense data. However, Searle's refutation of the Argument from illusion is more recent, writing about the topic in the article above.

Searle calls his refutation of The Argument from Illusion The Bad Argument. However, his refutation is quite weak, and not persuasive.

He says that when one sees an hallucination and when one sees an object in a veridical visual experience, the word "see" is being used in two different ways.

However, he doesn't explain how one knows whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience, and if two visual experiences appear the same, such that we don't know which is an hallucination and which is veridical, then how do we know in which each sense "see" is being used.

Searle makes the statements " In the sense in which I see the tree, I do not see a sense datum." and " in the ordinary sense of ‘see’ in the hallucinatory case, I do not see anything", neither of which he backs up with any justification.

He writes " it is obvious that the argument is fallacious", to which the retort may well be ""it is obvious that the argument is sound", which doesn't get anyone anywhere.

Direct Realism would require backwards causation, causation from mind to world

My key argument against Direct Realism uses part of Searle's own article, where he discusses the hierarchy of perception, the direction of fit and the direction of causation.

He writes "Perception has the mind-to-world direction of fit and the world-to-mind direction of causation. That is just the fancy way of saying that the perception is satisfied or unsatisfied depending on how the world is in fact independently of the perception (mind-to-world direction of fit), but the world being that way has to cause the perception to be that way (world-to-mind direction of causation)"

It is true that an object in the world could cause a perception in the mind, such that an object in the world could cause the perception of a green tree in the mind, in that causation has a world to mind direction.

Searle writes that the direction of causation is from world to mind, not mind to world, in that there is no backwards causation.

One problem with Direct Realism is that it requires backwards causation, from perceiving a green tree to knowing that the cause of this perception was also a green tree.

For Searle, there is only a mind to world direction of fit, not a mind to world direction of causation. As regards mind to world direction of fit, a perception is satisfied or unsatisfied depending on how the world is in fact independently of the perception. The key is whether the perception is satisfied or unsatisfied. If satisfied the perception fits the world, if not satisfied the perception does not fit the world. There is nothing in this statement that the perception has to fit the world.

For the same reason that when seeing a broken window on one's walk to work, it is impossible to know just from the broken window what caused it to break, just by having the perception of a green tree in one's mind it is impossible to know what caused that perception.

As Searle himself writes, for perception, causation is from world to mind, not mind to world.

How do physical properties obtain without a perceiver? — schopenhauer1

I can discover in the world several shapes that are square at the top and round at the base.
I can invent the physical property "squund", which is a shape that is square at the top and round at its base. As a property is a concept, it cannot exist in the world. Although there may be particular instantiations of the property squund in the world, an instantiation of a property is not a property.

Therefore, physical properties cannot obtain without a perceiver.

What is an event without an perceiver? — schopenhauer1

Unperceived.

Is it space-time that becomes the placeholder for the event to obtain? — schopenhauer1

There's nothing else apart from space-time that could be a placeholder.

There are three scenarios, each arguing against Direct Realism.

Scenario one
I just perceive the colour green. As anything could have caused it, this is an argument against Direct Realism which is the position that its cause would be known.

Scenario two
Over the recent past I had seen a tree and perceived the colour green. Today, I just perceive the colour green. I infer that the cause of my perception of green is a tree, but as inferences may be wrong, my knowledge that the cause is a tree can only be indirect. Another argument against Direct Realism which is the position that its cause would be known.

Scenario three
I see light from the sun hitting the leaves of a tree, green light is reflected and enters my eye which I perceive as green. I know the causal chain that started at the sun and ends up with my perception of green. But each stage in the causal chain has the same problem: I perceive white, how do I know that it was caused by the sun, I perceive green, how do I know it was caused by the leaves. If the question is, when I perceive a green tree how do I know it was caused by a green tree, the fact that there are many stages in a causal chain doesn't ensure a solution if each stage suffers from the same problem, how do I know what caused my perception.

The problem of knowing the cause of my perception of the colour green is the same problem as how I know the cause of the broken window seen on my walk into work. Causation is directional from the sun to my perception of green. Backwards causation is impossible. Even though one knows the final stage of a causal chain, it would be impossible to discover how the chain was initiated, in that for each effect there will be several possible causes.

And yet one "knows" that the green tree I perceive in my mind was caused by a green tree in the world. The mind must equate effect with cause. If I perceive green the cause was green, if I perceive a tree the cause was a tree, if I perceive a green tree the cause was a green tree.

For the mind, it seems to me, it is not that we directly attend to objects in the world that are independent of us, as in Direct Realism, rather we directly attend to our sense data which we equate with what exists in the world, as in Indirect Realism.

Direct realism I would say is about knowledge of the world, not mechanism of the knowledge. The mechanism is agnostic — schopenhauer1

I agree that in one sense the Direct Realist is looking at a tree in the world , not at the sense data in the mind. They are "looking through" the sense data to the tree on the other side of it, as one looks through a window to the world outside.

However, if someone somehow removed the sense data from the brain of the Direct Realist, they wouldn't be able to see the tree.

In another sense, the Direct Realist is directly looking at something that is at the same time both sense data and a tree. This could be part of the argument against Direct Realism, in that the Direct Realist is perceiving something which is in fact sense data although they think it is a tree, ie, a psychological illusion.

For direct realism, the perceiver directly perceives the world, and thus we are able to distinguish between the perceiver and the things upon which he is directing this activity. For the indirect realist, the perceiver directly perceives sense data, ideas, impressions, representations, models, sensations—internal flora and fauna indistinguishable from the perceiver himself—leaving us no distinction between perceiver and perceived. So it’s like saying we perceive perceptions, we see seeings, or we feel feelings. In order to answer the question of what we are directly perceiving, one must posit something that is not the perceiver to find it. Since indirect realism is unable to do so, indirect realism is redundant. — NOS4A2

The argument is that as the Indirect Realist directly perceives sense data, this leaves no distinction between perceiver and perceived, meaning that the Indirect Realist would be unable to perceive any external world. However the same argument would apply also to the Direct Realist, who also directly perceives sense data, but claiming that sense data is veridical and coincides with reality.

Sense data exists in the mind and is perceived by the mind. If Direct Realism is able to transcend its perception of sense data to the objects in the world that are its cause, then similarly so could Indirect Realism.

For the Direct Realist:
1) We directly perceive sense data
2) There is an external world
3) Sense data is caused by the external world
4) We directly engage with objects in the world using the perceptual intermediary of sense data.

For the Indirect Realist:
1) We directly perceive sense data.
2) There is an an external world
3) Sense data is caused by the external world
4) We indirectly engage with objects in the world using the perceptual intermediary of sense data.
5) From these sense data we construct an internal representation of objects in the world
6) There is a direct causal link from objects in the world, to our sense data and to our perception of these sense data.
7) The fact there is a direct causal link from object in the world to our perception of it in the mind does not mean that we can necessarily have direct knowledge of what is in the world. For example, from the fact that there is a storm, the wind blows, a tree sways, a branch hits a window and the glass breaks it does not follow that when we see broken glass we know the cause was a storm. There is a direction of causation from storm to broken glass. Knowledge of backward causation from broken glass to storm is not possible.

Since it was so important, we developed machines, more sensitive and accurate than humans, that could detect the green color of objects. So light would come in and the machine would report and answer “green”. Is the machine having a sensation or constructed perception of “green” to detect the color of “green” in order to report “green”? — Richard B

The leaf is green because it does not absorb the green wavelength. If it is not, what color is it? If you say there is no color, well OK feel free to define “what it really is” any way you like, maybe it will have some interesting utility for us. — Richard B

A wavelength does not have an inherent colour, though any set of wavelengths can be given the name of a colour. The wavelength between 570 and 500 nm has been named "green", though it equally well have been named "vert".

A machine may be programmed such that if its input is 570 to 500nm its output is "green", though it could equally well have been programmed such that if its input was 530 to 420 nm its output was "xyz".

Rather than say " The leaf is green because it does not absorb the green wavelength", one could also correctly say "the machine gives the output green because its input was between 570 and 500nm due to that being the wavelength the leaf did not absorb".

As regards language, I would say that the machine is able to sense a wavelength but is not able to perceive it.

I’m not sure a direct realist position entails the argument that just by knowing an effect we are directly able to know its cause. Would you explain? — NOS4A2

Direct Realism requires backwards causation, which is impossible

There is a direction to causation, in that it is not the case that first there is an effect and later there is a cause. For example, first sunlight hits the leaves of a tree, then light travels from the leaf to our eyes which we can then sense as green. It is obviously not the case that we sense green, then light travels backwards from our eye to the leaf. There is a direction of causation as there is an arrow of time.

Causation also requires that there is a direction in which information flows. For example, I know that if I throw a stone at a window there will most likely be one possible effect, the glass will shatter. But if I see a shattered window, I cannot know which of several possible causes was the actual cause, a thrown stone, a broken branch or a flying bird. For the same reason, in just sensing the colour green, I cannot directly know its cause because of the fundamental direction of causation, and the direction of information flow within causation.

But on the other hand, when I sense the colour green I psychologically know beyond doubt that I am looking at a single event, a green tree. So how to explain this seeming paradox, that information has appeared to flow backwards through time, in that, given a single effect, my sensing green, I believe I know a single cause, a green tree, something that is impossible given the arrow of causation.

Direct Realism's solution to this seeming paradox is by equating the effect with the cause, in that, if the effect is sensing of the colour green, Direct Realism says that the cause is also the colour green. Given a single effect, Direct Realism gives a single cause that is identical with the effect. However, this is an illusion.

One of the arguments against Direct Realism is the problem of illusion, in that a stick half in water appears bent. However, this is a different kind of illusion to that of Direct Realism, the psychological illusion that the cause of an effect is identical with the effect, that when we sense the colour green its cause was also the colour green. Direct Realism is a psychological illusion, where the mind a priori believes that an effect, a sensation in the mind, such as sensing the colour green, is also the cause of that sensation, ie, seeing a green tree.

This is also a different argument to the argument that there can often be a long and complex causal sequence between an object and event and the perceiver. Many Direct Realists accept this fact, and still maintain that external physical objects or events can be immediate or direct objects of perception, which is a reasonable position. My argument is that Direct Realism is an illusion because it does not take into account the fundamental restrictions in the direction of information flow. There is an asymmetry in the direction of causation, in that causal indirectness inevitably results in cognitive indirectness.

The "arrow of time" linking causal interconnections is one aspect of Leibniz's Principle of Sufficient Reason, one of the four laws of thought, which states that everything must have a reason or a cause. Our normal understanding of causation is that we can only causally affect the future but not the past. In all cases of causation, the cause and the effect are placed in time such that the cause precedes its effect temporally, to such a degree that we intuitively have great difficulty imagining things otherwise. Whereas David Hume argued that causes are inferred from non-causal observations, Immanuel Kant claimed that people have innate assumptions about causes, and about the temporal ordering of events and "directionality" of time

In our example of sensing the colour green and seeing a green tree, Direct Realism is the position that the green tree is a necessary cause of sensing green, whereas Indirect Realism is the position that the green tree is only one sufficient cause of sensing green.

Direct Realism is an illusion because it equates the cause of an effect with the effect, in that it equates sensing the colour green with its cause, a green tree, which is impossible, as it would require backwards causation.

Direct Realism is not valid, as it requires, just from knowledge of an effect, direct knowledge of its cause, which is impossible.

Direct realism argues we perceive the world directly.

A possible sequence is: sunlight travels from the sun to a tree and hits its leaves. Wavelengths between 415 and 740 nm are absorbed by the Chlorophyll in the leaves, and wavelengths between 520 and 625 nm are reflected off the leaves towards our eyes. Say a wavelength of 550 nm enters my eye. In my sense data is a patch of green, I perceive that I am looking at a green tree, and my cognition tells me to go towards it as there may be edible fruit on it.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that we directly sense the colour green. However, it is impossible to directly know just from an effect the cause of that effect, although it may be possible to discover its cause indirectly. Therefore, it is impossible to directly know just from sensing the colour green its cause, although it may be possible to discover 550 nm as its cause indirectly.

For example, if a stationary 1kg object starts to move at 10 ms after being hit by another object, we know from the conservation of momentum that the mass * velocity of the hitting object was 10 kg m/s. However, there are an infinite number of possible combinations of m and v of the hitting object. This means that, even if we did know the mass and velocity of the object that was hit, we cannot directly know just from the behaviour of the hit object the m and v of the hitting object, although it may be possible to discover this information indirectly.

Therefore:
1) Just by knowing an effect, it is impossible to directly know its cause. Just from sensing the colour green, it is impossible to directly know that it was caused by a wavelength of 550 nm, although it may be possible to discover this information indirectly.
2) Similarly, it is impossible to directly know that the 550 nm was caused by a green tree.
3) Therefore, Direct Realism, which argues that from just knowing an effect we are directly able to know its cause, which is impossible, is not a valid position to take.

There really is no logic that can reasonably jump to solipsism. Just because we can’t be “sure” (and to be frank we can’t be sure of anything so that’s not a metric to use) doesn’t mean it’s all in your head or you’re the only conscious thing. That’s not what explains our observations so it doesn’t logically follow. — Darkneos

Epistemological solipsism is the philosophical idea that one can only be sure about the existence of one's own mind. The existence of an external world is not necessarily rejected but one can not be sure of its existence.

You write that "and to be frank we can't be sure of anything", but that is exactly the metric to make the jump to epistemological solipsism.

Your position that "we can't be sure of anything" is the point of epistemological solipsism.

When looking at a green tree, does the Direct Realist directly perceive the colour green or directly perceive the wavelength 500nm ? — RussellA

I suspect that he directly perceives all of the above, and everything else within his periphery. — NOS4A2

Sunlight hits the leaves of a tree, wavelengths from the blue and red spectrum are absorbed by the Chlorophyll in the leaves and green, yellow and orange are reflected off the leaves towards our eyes. A wavelength of, say, 500nm then travels from the tree to our eyes, which we can then perceive as the colour green.
.
How is it possible to not only perceive the colour green but also to perceive the cause of our perception of the colour green, ie the wavelength of 500nm ?

Like I said before all arguments for it boil to nonsense since you have to deny solipsism to prove it and rely on things outside of it. — Darkneos

This is the problem of negative singular existence statements, where in order to deny the existence of a given individual, one must assume the existence of that very individual.

Faulty premises — Darkneos

Where is the faulty premise ?

My premise was "Everything I perceive in the world outside my mind happened in the past, whether the position of the moon or a leaf falling from a tree."

It takes time for light to travel from an object to my eyes, whether the 2.54 million years from the Andromeda Galaxy, the 8min 20sec from the Sun, the 1.3 sec from the Moon, as well as the leaf falling from the tree.

The time taken for light to travel from a falling leaf to my eyes may well be small, but it is finite. Pragmatically, it may make no difference to my daily life, but philosophically it does.

Philosophically, it means that it is impossible for me to have any knowledge of what exists in the present outside my mind. I may strongly infer what exists, but it is still an inference, and as only an inference, I can never be sure beyond doubt. I can only ever be sure of what exists in my mind in the present .

As I can only exist in the present, the past no longer exists. Therefore, the only other thing that can exist is the present outside my mind. But as I can only know the present outside my mind by inference, and as an inference is something that I may be wrong about, then is something that I cannot be sure about.

Therefore, the only thing that I can be sure about is the existence of my own mind, which is an argument for Epistemological Solipsism.

For the direct realist, the man directly perceives a tree — NOS4A2

When looking at a green tree, does the Direct Realist directly perceive the colour green or directly perceive the wavelength 500nm ?

But as I quoted above, those who try to prove it just end up making a whole bunch of assumptions they can't prove, like events only happen if you're looking at it which is nonsense, otherwise car crashes wouldnt happen. — Darkneos

Hopefully, the following argument uses no assumptions anyone would disagree with.

An argument for Solipsism

Everything I perceive in the world outside my mind happened in the past, whether the position of the moon or a leaf falling from a tree.

On the one hand, as I am always perceiving something that happened in the past, I am perceiving something that no longer exists, and to perceive something that no longer exists could be said to be perceiving an illusion.

On the other hand, I can imagine that what I am perceiving in the past continues to exist into the present. But what I am imagining is not the actual thing but a fictional account of it, and to imagine something that may or may not exist could be said to be perceiving a fiction.

Either way, everything I perceive existing in the world is either an illusion from the past or a fiction about the future.

Solipsism holds that only one's own mind is sure to exist. If my only knowledge about what exists in the world is either an illusion or a fiction, how can I be sure about any existence outside my mind, and isn't this what solipsism is saying.

I'm not certain and hence I'm a Pyrrhonist. — Agent Smith

Are you certain that you're a Pyrrhomist ?

I'm a Pyrrhonist — Agent Smith

That's a very un-Pyrrhonist thing to say, you sound very certain about it.

I thought I proved ... something. — Agent Smith

I take up your challenge. :smile:

The argument is:
1) Only things that we're 100% certain exists exist.
2) The only thing I'm 100% certain exists is me (re cogito).
3) Ergo, I alone exist.

There are two parts to statement 1). The first part is "Only things that we're 100% certain exists". Name this first part X. The second part is "X exist".

The problem is what exactly is "exist" referring to.

As regards the first part of statement 1), as the only things that I'm 100% certain exist are my thoughts, such as my thought about apples, therefore, exists must be referring to what exists in my mind.

As regards the second part of statement 1), X exist, what is exist referring to, what is in my mind or what is outside my mind, apples existing as thoughts in my mind or apples existing in the world independently of my mind.

If exist is referring to what is in my mind, then 1) is tautological, in that thoughts about apples that exist in my mind exist in my mind as thoughts about apples. If exist is referring to what is outside my mind, then 1) is saying that the things that I am thinking about, such as apples, exist outside my mind. But this is an unjustified statement.

Therefore, statement 1) is the problem, in that it is either tautological or unjustified.

You are performing a reducio ad absurdum, taking solipsism to it's extreme conclusion to refute it. Indirect realism can be reduced to the absurd by taking it to solipsism. However, solipsism is like indirect reality, it is not completely of the mind, but it is a function of the body. Pure solipsism is not a challenging philosophical exercise. — introbert

The title of the thread is "Can you prove solipsism true?"
Yes, an argument that refutes an absolutist metaphysical solipsism also leads to a refutation of sceptical epistemological solipsism. Indirect Realism is not a form of solipsism.

If solipsism is true, then everything I know, such as apples, mountains, other people, are parts that make up the whole me. If from these parts I become conscious of something that I didn't know before, such as hearing about a scientific law, seeing a Derain painting, being told about the opening times of a new restaurant, reading a McCarthy novel, but these parts are in fact part of myself as a whole, then I must have already known about them.

So how does something that I know about but am not conscious of become something that I am conscious of.

If solipsism is true, only I could have decided to be conscious of something that I was previously not conscious of. But if I was not previously conscious of something, how could I know to become conscious of it. The solipsist needs to explain how I can become conscious of something that I was not previously conscious of.

As solipsism can be proved false, it follows that solipsism can be proved to be not true.

Taking solipsism as knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is impossible

I want to prove the proposition P that solipsism is false.

Start by assuming that Solipsism is true.

Assertion one: I have knowledge of the novel Don Quixote, but as knowledge of anything outside my mind is impossible, only my own mind could have created Don Quixote, and therefore I am a great writer.

Assertion two: this post fails to convince me that this is the best argument to prove that solipsism is false, therefore I am not a great writer.

As assertions one and two are contradictory, by the law of noncontradiction, proposition P is in fact true, ie, solipsism is false.

I hope we'll dialogue again. — ucarr

:grin:

five big questions — ucarr

Invaluable to me in sorting out my own ideas.

Your answer says elementary particles and forces -- and their emergent property, consciousness -- have their ground within a neutral monism that is neither mental or physical. — ucarr

I'm wavering between panprotopsychism and neutral monism.

Donovan Wishon in his article Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, and Neutral Monism
describes panpsychism, panprotopsychism and neutral monism as: "The first is panpsychism, which is the doctrine that mind is a fundamental and pervasive feature of the universe. The second is panprotopsychism, which is the doctrine that fundamental physical entities, while not themselves minded, have special features that give rise to conscious minds when they are arranged into a sufficiently complex physical system. The third is neutral monism, which is the doctrine that both minds and physical entities are constructed from more basic elements of reality that are in themselves neither mental nor physical."

But I also believe in the Mysterianism of Colin McGinn, in that the hard problem of consciousness cannot be resolved by humans.

Your answer says humans relate to consciousness as an act of faith in the existence of something unknowable. — ucarr

For me it is more than faith, where faith is a strong belief, in that I am absolutely certain that I am conscious. I know without doubt that I am conscious. From then on it gets more complicated.

There are different levels of knowledge, in that I can know I'm conscious without knowing why. I can know the form of an object without knowing its content, as Pandora knew the form of the large storage jar without knowing the curses it held within it

I am sure that at the heart of the hard problem of consciousness is the Binding Problem, or in Kant's terms, the unity of perception. Consciousness is unknowable because there is nothing else in our experience that enables us to understand how a disparate set of parts can be perceived as a unified whole. We have no key to explaining the gestalt property of consciousness, whereby a perceived object or event is dynamically bound together from its properties into a unified mental representation. For example, our representation of a tree can be expressed in neural activity that is widely distributed through the cortex. Objects such as trees can only be represented in the brain by many neurons spatially separate, yet we are conscious of the tree as a unified whole at one instant of time. The mystery reduces to that of how can one be conscious of a unified whole at one instant in time that is made up of parts that are spatially separate.

I don't know what the answer is, but I feel the answer must avoid the pseudoscience of Quantum Mysticism, those metaphysical beliefs that seek to relate quantum mechanics to all and sundry problems, whether consciousness, intelligence, the spiritual or the mystical.

Your answer hedges ambiguity somewhere between determinism and chaos. Your quote from The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy suggests the quest for this answer will mire itself inside an infinite regress. — ucarr

I believe in the principle of Laplace's Demon, such that if a demon knows the precise location and momentum of every atom in the universe, their past and future values can be calculated from the laws of classical mechanics.

However in principle, such a calculation would be to all intents and purposes impossible because of what we know from chaos theory, whereby even small changes to a complex system can give rise to extreme consequences. Given the start position of a complex system, if we wanted to predict a distant future, the calculation would probably have to account for differences in position of the order of the planck length.

As regards free will, there are some things about which I have no choice, such as eating, though I do have the choice as to what I eat, pasta or pizza. On the one hand, intellectually I believe that the world is determined, yet on the other hand, viscerally, I believe I have free will.

How to resolve such a contradiction. Sean Carroll proposes Poetic Naturalism. As we understand through metaphor, Big Bang Theory, Hubble's Law of Cosmic Expansion, Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion, Universal Law of Gravitation, etc, Carroll's approach is effectively the use of different metaphors for different domains of knowledge. When talking about the physical world we use the metaphor determinism, when talking about the world of the mind we use the metaphor free will. In this sense, talk about a deterministic world in which we have free will is not contradictory, as such terms are metaphors. In fact, it could be argued that all our understanding is metaphorical, in that all language is fundamentally metaphorical.

your answer says emergence of life from fundamental physical entities is mysterious. — ucarr

Yes, Colin McGinn's Mysterianism. As a cat, dog or donkey could never understand the working of the European Commission, humans can never understand the nature of consciousness (in fact, probably an easier problem that understanding the workings of the European Commission). As Sean Carroll suggests, perhaps understanding requires a change in our frame of reference. The fundamental problem is that in order for humans to understand consciousness, consciousness need to understand itself. Not a new idea, as "know thyself" is one of the three Delphic maxims inscribed in the forecourt of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi.

Is this type of thinking non-binary WRT the physical/mental binary? — ucarr

In the world are elementary particles, such as electrons, and elementary forces, such as the gravitational force. My consciousness doesn't exist independently of these elementary particles and forces that make up my body, but has emerged from them, in that if my body moves from the kitchen to the living room, my consciousness doesn't stay in the kitchen.

So, my consciousness is inextricably linked with the elementary particles and forces that make up my body. Either consciousness is external to these elementary particles and forces and is somehow attached to them, as a label is attached to a bunch of fruit, or consciousness is part inherent within these elementary particles and forces, as an apple is part of the tree from which it grows.

If consciousness is an inherent part of these elementary particles and forces, then this suggests neutral monism, in that that both minds and physical entities are constructed from more basic elements of reality that are in themselves neither mental nor physical. If consciousness is external to these elementary particles and forces, either consciousness has existed at least as long as these elementary particles and forces or consciousness came into existence at a later date.

If consciousness has existed at least as long as these elementary particles and forces, yet is external but still attached, this again suggests neutral monism.

If consciousness came into existence at a later date, we have the problem of explaining how something can come from nothing. As I personally don't believe in spontaneous self-causation, I don't accept this as a possibility.

That leaves, for me, neutral monism as the best explanation.

Is this a way of saying an analysis of the world, as it becomes viable, merges into the world. If so, is one of the implications that analysis of world is finally just self-referential world? From this does it follow that the self-referential part of world is exampled by humans? — ucarr

Even though the world may be deterministic, the Butterfly effect shows that the world is too complex to be able to predict in the long term, even by Laplace's Demon, in that a minute localized change in a complex system can have large effects elsewhere.

Perhaps because of the chaotic complexity of the world, only a computer the size of the world could undertake any such calculation. As Douglas Adams wrote in The Hitch-hiker's Guide to the Galaxy: "In their travels, Arthur comes to learn that the Earth was actually a giant supercomputer, created by another supercomputer, Deep Thought. Deep Thought had been built by its creators to give the answer to the "Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, and Everything", which, after aeons of calculations, was given simply as "42". Deep Thought was then instructed to design the Earth supercomputer to determine what the Question actually is".

I don't know what you mean by self-referential.

Is it correct to say these neutral basic elements are in reality to some degree alive and that, therefore, it's meaningful to talk about degrees of aliveness? — ucarr

That seems to be the position of panpsychism, whereby the mind is a fundamental and pervasive feature of the universe.

However, panprotopsychism seems more sensible, whereby fundamental physical entities, while not themselves minded, have special features that give rise to conscious minds when they are arranged into a sufficiently complex physical system. The mind emerges from these fundamental physical entities under certain, and mysterious, circumstances. It would be strange to think that the food we eat, that eventually makes up the physical structure of our our bodies had to be alive in order for us to be alive.

Consciousness therefore has some degree of grounding in chromosomes and genes? — ucarr

Yes, in that as consciousness is grounded in chromosomes and genes , these are in turn grounded in elementary particles and forces.

The mind_world interface is something like the intricate tessellations of an M C Escher drawing? A tile -- in this case reality -- covers a surface -- earth -- with no overlaps or gaps? — ucarr

Perhaps the mind is like a wave on an ocean, where the ocean is the world.

I see your take on the problem of consciousness is that for humans the correct position is necessarily agnostic in the strict sense of knowledge-not. — ucarr

More a "theist" as regards a belief in consciousness, in that I know that consciousness exists, but I don't know what it is.

Talking about the secular approach to life, I found Sean Carroll's The Big Picture: From the Big Bang to the Meaning of Life informative.

On the one hand, as astrobiologist Michael Russell says, the purpose of life is to hydrogenate carbon dioxide in order to increase the entropy in the universe. But on the other hand, Sean Carroll introduces the concept of Poetic Naturalism, whereby we can accept both the microscopic world of elementary particles, forces and space-time and the macroscopic world of apples, causation, purpose and the arrow of time as long as we change our frame of reference. By changing our frame of reference we can accept both a deterministic world and a world of purpose, reason and what is ethically right or wrong.

Are you telling me mind is a discrete unit within a system we call world? — ucarr

Not really, more that the mind is an intimate part of the world, along the lines of the article Panpsychism, Panprotopsychism, and Neutral Monism by Donovan Wishon. I'm somewhere between panprotopsychism and neutral monism.

if appearance of randomness can be conquered, will the debate be resolved in favor of pre-determination? — ucarr

Yes, in principle, the future could be calculated, though the computer needed to analyse the world would probably need to be as big as the world, taking chaotic systems into account.

Some will say a concomitant of your above quote is an embrace of the notion life can arise from non-life. — ucarr

Yes. This goes back to neutral monism, which is the doctrine that both minds and physical entities are constructed from more basic elements of reality that are in themselves neither mental nor physical.

In the above statements I perceive you to be telling me innate knowledge is a kind of genetic predisposition for knowing certain things. — ucarr

Yes, exactly.

Once the person has the empirical experience of seeing the colour red and she remembers it, and, on top of this remembrance, develops additional impressions and, on top of these, develops additional evaluative and judgmental thoughts, her mind is now operating independent of external world? — ucarr

A car when driving on a road is external to the road but is still dependent upon the road.

The Hard Problem (of neuro-science). — ucarr

As regards the hard problem of consciousness, as an animal such as a cat, dog or donkey could never understand the European Commission, no matter how much it was explained to them, I don't think humans could ever understand what consciousness is. Even if a super-intelligent and super-knowledgeable alien visited Earth, and tried to explain the nature of consciousness to us, we would still be incapable of understanding. We may be able to learn more about the role of neurons in the brain, but what consciousness is would still elude us.

It seems to me:

Do human mind and physical world create together a Venn Diagram of an overlap, which is to say, a portion of each identity blended into a shared identity? — ucarr

More or less. Something that has taken 3.7 billion years since life first evolved on Earth, in that life must be the product of its environment. If the environment had been different, life would most likely have turned out differently. As regards the Venn Diagram, the mind doesn't overlap with the world, the mind is part of the world.

Is it your belief that rainfall in the rainforest that grows the plants results from random forces such as air currents, barometric pressure, temperature and the seasons? — ucarr

More or less, in that these forces are mindless, although not random. I don't believe in spontaneous self-causation, I believe that every effect has a cause and the world is deterministic. Randomness is a human concept for events that are too complex for us to analyse what is happening, a system may be chaotic but it is still deterministic, whereby effects are preceded by causes.

Is it your belief the world caused you? — ucarr

Yes. The age of the Earth is about 4.5 billion years and it is believed that 4.3 billion years ago the Earth may have developed conditions suitable to support life. The oldest known fossils are about 3.7 billion years old, and homo sapiens, the first modern humans, evolved between 200,000 and 300,000 years ago.

The process whereby humans have evolved has been underway for at least 3.7 billion years, a process physically determined by the world in which such evolution has taken place.

Your rational mind, however, operates independently of mindless external world, creating knowledge of sense impressions a priori. — ucarr

Not really. Innatism is the doctrine that the mind is born with ideas, knowledge and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, Empiricism, is that the mind is a blank slate at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses.

There are costs and benefits from both innate and learned knowledge. In a changing environment, an animal must constantly be gaining new information in order to survive. However, in a stable environment this same individual need only to gather the information it needs once and rely on it for the duration of its life.

Descartes makes the analogy that innate knowledge may be compared to an innate disease, in that an innate disease signifies that a person may be at risk from contracting such a disease later in life. Similarly, innate knowledge does not mean that the person has been born with such knowledge, just that such knowledge wasn't expressed. Innate knowledge requires experiences to be triggered or it may never be expressed. For example, a person is not born with the knowledge of the colour red, but are born with the innate ability to perceive the colour red when experiencing it for the first time

A human's innate knowledge, in other words a priori knowledge, is the end product of over 3.7 billion years of evolution, ie, Enactivism

The rational mind has grown out of the world, and is therefore not something separate to it.

If your answer to the above is "yes," do you also believe the link goes in one direction only (mind independent world to RussellA's mind) — ucarr

No. As a mind-independent world causes changes to my mind, my mind causes changes to a mind-independent world, a case of Enactivism.

In Enactivism, cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. The environment of an organism is brought about, or enacted, by the active exercise of the organism itself. Living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or co-determination.

do you believe that mind independent world conveys to your mind its contents without any intentions whatsoever? — ucarr

Yes. If a raindrop hits a leaf and moves the leaf, there is no intention on the raindrop's part to move the leaf.

Is your belief Justified True Belief (JTB)? — ucarr

No. If I have the sensation of the colour red, there is no doubt in my mind that I have sensed the colour red. I don't need to justify to myself that I have experienced the colour red, as I know it beyond doubt. It is knowledge, not because it is a justified true belief, but because I know that it is a true belief.

Other things I know beyond doubt is that for every effect there is a cause, in that self-causation is not possible, and that there is a world outside my mind, in that I am not a Solipsist.

I can intellectually question what I know to be a true belief, and wonder whether they are in fact true beliefs. But regardless of any intellectual questioning, there is still no doubt in my mind that they are true beliefs. For example, I may experience the colour red in my mind, and intellectually question whether in fact I really am experiencing the colour red, but no amount of intellectual musing will alter my visceral knowledge that I know beyond doubt that I am experiencing the colour red. I may in fact be wrong in my belief that I am experiencing the colour red, but being wrong doesn't change the fact of my knowing beyond doubt.

In Kant's terms, my knowing certain things beyond doubt is innate and a priori within the structure of my brain, a product of millions of years of evolution, where the brain has evolved in synergy with the world external to it.

Therefore, I know beyond doubt my sensations, I know beyond doubt these sensations as effects have had a cause, and I know beyond doubt some of these causes are external to my mind.

But as these causes are external to my mind, I may have beliefs as to what they are, but I can never know beyond doubt what they are. I can justify my beliefs as regards anything external to my mind, but I can never know whether these beliefs are true or not.

Pragmatically, it may not matter whether these beliefs about a world external to my mind are true or not, as long as my beliefs are sufficient to enable me to continue to more or less keep on living as an individual, and as part of a species that is able to survive as a cohesive group through time. A species does not need to know what is true in an external world in order to survive within it.

In answer to your question, by belief is not JTB. In my mind I have true beliefs that don't need justifying, and external to my mind I may justify my beliefs, but can never know whether they are true or not.

You have concluded our world is mind-independent? — ucarr

My world consists of what I know, and everything I know exists in my mind. What I know are feelings such as pleasure and pain, concepts such as governments and chairs, sensations such as the colour red and a grating noise and beliefs such as the principle of cause and effect and that my sensations have been caused by something external to me.

I know that there is a world that exists in my mind, and I believe that there is a world that exists independently of my mind.

I also believe that within this world that exists independently of my mind, there are other minds, such as John's and Mary's.

My belief is that this something external to our minds is not another mind but is mind-independent.

My conclusion is that our world, the world of me, John and Mary, consists of minds and between these minds is something that is mind-independent.

Infinity is solved by solving knowledge. How do you know what infinity is? Is infinity an actual thing, or is it a conceptual framework of an algorithm? — Philosophim

We cannot know the whole if we only know a part. We may know a rock, but as there is no information within the rock that it is part of a mountain, we cannot know the mountain by knowing the rock.

If infinity was an actual thing, such as infinite time, we may know a finite time, but as there is no information within a finite time that it is part of an infinite time, we cannot know an infinite time by knowing a finite time.

The only other way to know an infinite time is by experiencing an infinite time, which would take far too long.

Similarly with space, numbers, etc.

Therefore, infinity may be an actual thing, but we can never know. All we can ever know is the concept of infinity.

As with most scientific concepts about which we have knowledge, including the Big Bang Theory, Hubble's Law of Cosmic Expansion, Kepler's Laws of Planetary Motion, Universal Law of Gravitation, Newton's Laws of Motion, Laws of Thermodynamics, Archimedes' Buoyancy Principle, Evolution and Natural Selection, Theory of General Relativity and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, such knowledge of infinity can only be metaphorical.

It would seem the best that could be hoped for would be determining the neural correlates of various states of consciousness as reported by subjects , but that doesn't answer the so-called hard problem. — Janus

:up:

That's a more accurate statement than mine! — Agent Smith

Perhaps, but as Raymond Chandler said “A writer who is afraid to overreach himself is as useless as a general who is afraid to be wrong.”

Kurt Gödel, genius made him, genius killed him. — Agent Smith

Gödel died from a fear of poisoning, and malnutrition killed him. Most geniuses are killed by old age.