You mentioned the mystical. I see Schopenhauer in a way, as being an analytic mystic. — schopenhauer1
I want from my philosopher reasoning and justifications for their assertions and claims. — schopenhauer1
6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say noting except what can be said, ie propositions of natural science ie, something that has nothing to do with philosophy - and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person - he would have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - this method would be the only strictly correct one.
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them - (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it) He must transcend these propositions and then he will see the world aright.
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
You mention the supposed colour incompatibility problem, but to my understanding, this issue only crops up if you take the work to operate in a manner similar to Russell. — 013zen
Therefore we cannot say "there are objects", which is not depicting anything, but we can say "there are red objects", which is depicting something.4.1272 The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number", etc. They all signify formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by variables
4.1274 "To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical"
2.0232 In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless
2.0251 Space, time and colour (beng coloured) are forms of objects
But was Tractatus really aimed to dispute the position of mereological nihilism?............................How does he actually do that, rather than simply asserting premises that he thinks is true? — schopenhauer1
Also, you didn't answer my question.. "What philosophy DOESN'T think their understanding of the world comprises independent facts"? I have yet to meet a person, who thinks "This is morally bad, or this is good" is the same as "The cat is on the mat." What problem then is he solving? — schopenhauer1
My point is this: which philosophies argue that the world, at least in terms of human communication, is not composed of facts or true propositions?
For example, the statement "the unicorn is on the mat" is a false proposition because it's an impossibility. — schopenhauer1
If I say, "the cat is on the mat," and we observe a cat on the mat, we might call this a true proposition.........................It's a truism. Almost no one disputes it. Well done for stating the obvious. — schopenhauer1
So, I'm puzzled as to why a philosophy would assert, "My knowledge is made up of independent facts," as if this were a profound statement. — schopenhauer1
1) Similarly, stating truisms in philosophy without delving into the mechanisms behind them adds little value.
2) My broader point is that non-empirical philosophies can also be considered true propositions
3) If Wittgenstein isn't explaining why a proposition cannot be true, why should we care if the broader claim, "The world consists of true propositions or independent facts," is correct? — schopenhauer1
It was not addressed by Witt, but it SHOULD HAVE if his goal was to show how propositional logic allows for mapping onto reality due to selecting out true states of affairs; the MECHANISM for doing so must be EXPLAINED. — schopenhauer1
Scientific modelling, the generation of a physical, conceptual, or mathematical representation of a real phenomenon that is difficult to observe directly. Scientific models are used to explain and predict the behaviour of real objects or systems and are used in a variety of scientific disciplines, ranging from physics and chemistry to ecology and the Earth sciences.
and as a model the Picture Theory does not need to be justified by a mechanism.2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"
6.3751 For example, the simultaneous of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.
4.1212 What can be shown cannot be said
But was that even addressed by Witt? — schopenhauer1
1) (Donald Davidson and his article What Metaphors Mean)...........I take it he means only in scientific applications, yes? Either way, I personally find this view unintelligible at face value. 2) A voltage is quite literally, not a pressure. 3) We seem to have a simile of sorts, based on the definition; but the definition merely reports usage. — 013zen
2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"
3 "A logical picture of facts is a thought."
4.12 "Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it – logical form"
4.001 - "The totality of propositions is language."
4 "A thought is a proposition with a sense."
2.021 "Objects make up the substance of the world".
7 "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence".
4.1272 The same applies to the words complex, fact, function, number, etc. They all signify formal concepts.
4.126 ..............I introduce this expression in order to exhibit the source of the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper.............
2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"
I do wonder what if anything Witt can tell us today - even if I am correct that he did have something relevant to say to his contemporaries. — 013zen
Once I am able to metaphorically picture a voltage as a pressure, the metaphor becomes redundant. in that I now understand voltage as pressure. Not that voltage is like a pressure but rather voltage is a pressure. For Wittgenstein, the ladder is the metaphor, and can be thrown away as redundant once it has enabled understanding.My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognize them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps - to climb up beyond them (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed p it)
Witt himself says: — 013zen
“... I think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively. I don’t believe I have ever invented a line of thinking, I have always taken one over from someone else.........................What I invent are new similes”.
There is only one Being, and it includes both sides of the Nature/Geist distinction — Count Timothy von Icarus
Likewise, an explanation of counting seems to require some mention of the fact that the world already has things that we can count in it. — Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't see how DNA would explain that, rather it might explain why we see things in the same kinds of ways. — Janus
How would that work? — Janus
Other than positing some hidden connection between all minds, there is no way to explain the commonality of human experience, a commonality that extends even to some animals. — Janus
Which theory of time is the most evidence-based? — Truth Seeker
You are confusing "simulate" with "is like". — Ludwig V
"We are living in a 'simulation' and such a virtual world is the same as the 'real world' in every respect, except that it is simulated and therefore 'not real." I have a few arguments against this notion: — jasonm
The intention isn't built into the AI models, it's the user that forms the intended use and guiding principle of creation. — Christoffer
Numerous research studies have found links between how the human mind generate new ideas to that of how AI models do it. — Christoffer
The idea of infinity can't be properly expressed using language, but then again, infinity is a word. — Scarecow
First, we do not only picture facts to ourselves. — Fooloso4
===============================================================================2.1 "we picture facts to ourselves"
The picture that comes to mind need not be the result of conscious choice. With regard to the model of the accident the color of the car has no bearing on what is being depicted. What a picture represents is a logical relation: — Fooloso4
'Object' is a pseudo-concept but not all objects are simple objects. Spatial objects such as a chairs tables, and books ( 3.1431) are not simple objects. — Fooloso4
The key word is "imagine". Wittgenstein is using an analogy. He is not saying that tables, chairs and books are Tractarian objects.3.1431 "The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
'x' is the variable name for the pseudo concept 'number'. (4.1272) Substituting "a number" for 'x' gives us: "Number is a number" which is nonsense. The variable name 'x' cannot be used for both the pseudo-concept 'number' and 'a number'. — Fooloso4
To say “x is an object” is to say nothing. It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three objects in the world”, or “there are an infinite number of objects in the world”.
4.127 "The propositional variable signifies the formal concept"
Introduction "This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept."
Even this on the face of it seems odd to call a "pseudo-concept"...And what about "concepts" like "processes"? — schopenhauer1
4.24 "I write elementary propositions as functions of names, so that they have the form "fx", ∅(x,y)", etc."
If so this itself would be an illustration of a "psychological theory" that goes beyond simply "acquaintance" (showing) the object, thus refuting that "acquaintance" or "showing" is where it must stop. — schopenhauer1
'Object' is a pseudo-concept. A particular object is not. — Fooloso4
'Object' is a pseudo-concept because it says nothing about what is the case, not because it makes up the substance of the world. — Fooloso4
Right, but the issue is whether something that falls under a pseudo-concept is a pseudo-concept. — Fooloso4
Introduction - "This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept. To say "x is an object" is to say nothing".
2.02 "Objects are simple"
2.021 "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite
2.0211 "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true
2.0212 "In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)
2.023 "Objects are just what constitute the unalterable form"
Formal concepts are pseudo-concepts. — Fooloso4
Introduction - "This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept. To say "x is an object" is to say nothing".
Examples of propositional variables could be: "the sky is blue", "the sky is purple", "grass is green", "grass is orange".4.127 "The propositional variable signifies the formal concept"
4.122 "In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural properties: and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations. (Instead of "structural property" I also say "internal property": instead of "structural relation", "internal relation")
4.1272 "Thus the variable name "x" is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object. Whenever the word "object" ("thing". etc) is correctly used, it is expressed in conceptual notion by a variable name"
That depends on the medium of representation, whether what is being pictured is intended to communicate something to someone else, and what it is that is being represented............2.1 "we picture facts to ourselves" — Fooloso4
2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"
Just as the car does not become the bicycle, it is necessary that whatever it is the represents the car in the picture does not become something else. — Fooloso4
Certainly, this could lead to a regress (definitions of definitions of definitions)....................Surely I can point to these processes that account for object formation in the mind, and how we attach meaning to objects. — schopenhauer1
'3' signifies the value of the concept number. A particular number falls under the concept number in a way analogous to 'table' falling under the concept 'object'. That does not mean that 'table' is a pseudo-concept. — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein seems to not care to discuss mind, but language limits. — schopenhauer1
===============================================================================Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.
If signs are not signifying a possible states of affairs, they are not picturing anything, and thus cannot be communicated with any sense. — schopenhauer1
1 +1 =2 is not derived from empirical evidence, but as a functioning of how numbers work — schopenhauer1
Surely I can point to these processes that account for object formation in the mind, and how we attach meaning to objects — schopenhauer1
The picture theory of meaning was inspired by Wittgenstein’s reading in the newspaper of a Paris courtroom practice of using models to represent the then relatively new phenomenon of auto-mobile accidents (Grayling 40). Toy cars and dolls were used to represent events that may or may not have transpired. In the use of such models it had to be stipulated which toys corresponded to which objects and which relations between toys were meant to represent which relations between those objects (Glock 300).
That was what I said, that numbers (or rather equations) are formal concepts because they are not abouts states of affairs of the world. Again, Kant is informative here, it is an analytic a priori statement. — schopenhauer1
4.21 "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
Why is "One is a number" a formal concept and "1 + 1 = 2" not a "formal concept"? — schopenhauer1
"It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three
objects in the world”.................the proposition is therefore seen to be meaningless.........We can say............“there are more than three objects which are red”"
What falls under a formal concept is not another formal concept..................If '3' was a formal concept then every number would be a formal concept. — Fooloso4
Mathematical equations are pseudo-proposiitons , but this does not mean the equation is a concept, either proper or formal. 1+1=2 is not concept, it is a calculation. — Fooloso4
'Number' is the constant form. 1, 100, and 1,000 are variables that have as a formal property this formal concept. — Fooloso4
4.1272 "The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number" etc. They all signify formal concepts"
4.1274 "To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical"
4.1272 "This the variable name x is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object.
4.126 "the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper"
4.21 "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
4.123 "A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it"
4.124 "The existence of an internal property of a possible situation is not expressed by means of a proposition: rather it expresses itself in the proposition representing the situation, by means of an internal property of that proposition".
"Objects can only be mentioned in connexion with some definite property."
"It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three
objects in the world”.................the proposition is therefore seen to be meaningless.........We can say............“there are more than three objects which are red”"
4.1272 "The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number" etc. They all signify formal concepts"
4.126 - "When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object. (A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc.)"
4.1272 "Whenever it is used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions are the result"
5.535 "This also disposes of all the problems that were connected with such pseudo-propositions"
6.22 "The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics.
4.0312 "My fundamental idea is that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts."
4.126 "A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc"
4.1271 "For every variable represents a constant form that all its values possess, and this can be regarded as a formal property of those values."
Yes, but Kant would simply classify it as analytic a priori. It is a truth that can be grasped through purely reasoning and not experience (equivalent to Wittgenstein's "state of affairs in the world"). But I am perplexed why with all this epistemological history he could have drawn from, he ignores it. — schopenhauer1
4.1272 - "The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number" etc. They all signify formal concepts"
4.1274 "To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical"
6.22 "The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics.
4.21 - "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
Thus, it seems to be the case for Witt’s theory, 1 + 1 = 2 is formal as it is not a state of affairs per se, but a description of a category of sets that may occur as a state of affairs. It’s a description of a class not of a particular state of affairs that could be true or false. — schopenhauer1
(4.12721) "A formal concept is given immediately any object falling under it is given. It is not possible, therefore, to introduce as primitive ideas objects belonging to a formal concept and the formal concept itself. So it is impossible, for example, to introduce as primitive ideas both the concept of a function and specific functions, as Russell does; or the concept of a number and particular numbers." — Fooloso4
In their monumental Principia Mathematica, Russell and his co-author Alfred North Whitehead attempted to create a logically sound basis for mathematics. In it their primitive proposition ∗9.1 implies that at least one individual thing exists. It follows that the universal class of things is not empty. This is stated explicitly in proposition ∗24.52. Whitehead and Russell then remark: “This would not hold if there were no instances of anything; hence it implies the existence of something.” (Principia Mathematica, Volume I, 1910, ∗24). Here then, logic seems committed to the existence of something.
If, however, I say: "There are three horses" then the number of horses is not expressed as the variable 'x', which could mean any number of horses, but as '3'. — Fooloso4
I think Wittgenstein is saying that an "object" like the number 1 has a sense if it is an object or a description. — schopenhauer1
It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three objects in the world”, or “there are an infinite number of objects in the world”. Objects can only be mentioned in connexion with some definite property. We can say “there are more than three objects which are human”, or “there are more than three objects which are red”
See 4.12721. The concept of a number is a formal concept. Particular numbers are not. They fall under the concept of a number. — Fooloso4